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EVERT VAN DER ZWEERDE

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Preface

Academic studies are not the mechanical result of library visits or archive research. They are also, one way or another, related to personal experience. When I first visited Moscow, capital of the USSR, in 1984, I could not foresee the many ways in which the encounter with Soviet philosophy would determine my life and academic career. The confrontation with the Soviet way of doing history of philosophy has proved to be a very fruitful experience. The desire to understand the difference with my own academic background without declaring the latter 'normal', but at the same time evading the relativist temptation, has forced me to analyze Soviet philosophy in general, and Soviet historiography in particular, as a form of philosophical culture, one concrete answer to the question 'What is philosophy?'

It has never been obvious, in Western academic philosophical culture, to study Soviet philosophy, and this research could never have been done without the lasting support and critical interest of teachers, colleagues and friends. I want to mention here the following persons: Ludwig Heyde, who made me struggle with Hegel; Edward Swiderski, whose confidence often kept me going; and Machiel Karskens, whose support in every respect has been indispensable. Also, I want to thank Tim Baerwaldt and Wilfried Simons for their professional help in the final preparation of the manuscript.

A word of gratitude is due to the Soviet historians of philosophy, the *aspiranty*, the students, and others in Soviet Russia, esp. at the department of history of 'foreign philosophy' at Moscow State University and at the sector of history of Western philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, who helped me conduct my research and patiently answered questions that must often have appeared very strange to them. When I first was their guest in 1984, at the height of 'stagnation', I was pleasantly surprised by the hospitality and helpfullness of the people working in my field of interest. The encounter with the complexity of Soviet philosophical culture as it actually existed has remained a source of inspiration, to which later changes, during perestrojka and thereafter, have added their impetus, rather than replacing the initial intuition that this was a topic of considerable interest.

This book has served, in a longer version, as my Ph.D. thesis. The present version has been shortened, revised, and improved in many points, but I have seen no ground to make substantial changes to my analyses and conclusions. On the contrary: reactions, reviews, and recent publications have, in the main, confirmed them. In this respect, this book concludes my life as a student in philosophy, and therefore this is the place to express my gratitude to my dear parents, my mother and my late father, whose support made it possible to study philosophy to begin with. Finally, this book would have been unthinkable without the endurance and patience of three beloved ladies: my wife Vera, and my daughters, Judith and Tanja. A happy home is the basis of this work.

Introduction

> Jede Philosophie ist Philosophie ihrer Zeit,...; sie kann also nur Befriedigung für die Interessen gewähren, die ihrer Zeit angemessen sind.
>
> G.W.F. Hegel, 1817[1]

The subject of this study is Soviet historiography of philosophy, *istoriko-filosofskaja nauka* -*IFN*, as I shall abbreviate it-, which literally means 'historico-philosophical science' or 'scientific history of philosophy,' i.e. the account and interpretation of philosophy's past as produced by Soviet historians of philosophy, as well as the theories about the history of philosophy developed by Soviet specialists. *IFN* was both quantitatively and qualitatively an important part of Soviet philosophical culture, one of its many specialist branches, and not the least interesting one: it often served as a place where philosophical culture was preserved in an hostile environment, and it was, in building up considerable competence in the history of philosophy, one of the factors in the improvement of the level of Soviet philosophical culture as a whole.

However, like the other disciplines within Soviet philosophical culture, *IFN* had its specific nature and background. It is not only a Soviet philosophical discipline, but also an example of an historiography of philosophy, comparable in this respect to its Western counterpart, and it was, through its Marxist background, strongly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel. Therefore, the first chapter of this book briefly discusses, in the first place, history of philosophy as a specialist discipline, secondly, Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, important for the discipline in general and for *IFN* in particular, and, in the third place, the theoretical impulses contained in the legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, important for *IFN* as for any branch of Soviet philosophy.

After this preparation of the ground, the second chapter is dedicated to a concise historical survey and philosophical analysis of Soviet philosophical culture as it existed and developed from 1920 to the late 1980s, and in doing so tries to assess its nature. To my knowledge, it is the first attempt to do so after the disappearance of the Soviet system and its philosophical culture.

The next four chapters make up the central body of this monograph. The third chapter sketches the historical development of *IFN*, from its foundation in the 1930s to its mature stage in the 1980s, showing both the limitations and the possibilities of this discipline. The fourth chapter discusses the place, function, form, and content of *IFN* as a part of Soviet philosophical culture in the so-called period of 'stagnation', which was, for *IFN*, a period of unprecedented bloom. The next, fifth chapter, consists of a necessarily selective, but representative survey of the work done by Soviet historians of philosophy in six different fields, from Greek Antiquity to the 'history of the philosophy of the peoples of the USSR,' showing sometimes

striking qualitative differences. The sixth chapter analyzes Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, paying particular attention to the gradual return of essentially Hegelian elements.

The seventh, concluding chapter consists of a discussion of developments in late Soviet *IFN*, during the period of *perestrojka*, developments which are used, with the advantage of hindsight, to shed light on Soviet *IFN* as it existed until 1986.

This study as a whole aims to fill the only remaining gap in Western scholarship with respect to Soviet philosophy: all other branches of Soviet philosophical culture have been the subject of studies within the tradition of 'philosophical sovietology'.[2] At the same time, it embarks upon an endeavor that differs from the 'sovietological' perspective on one significant point, namely the *historical* investigation of Soviet philosophy: it is only after the end of Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy as an "influential school of thought in the contemporary philosophic scene,"* that Soviet philosophical culture can appear as an historical phenomenon. In that respect, the history of Soviet philosophy is yet to be written, and with this book I hope to make a first step in that direction.

Soviet philosophy most definitely is a thing of the past. Hardly anybody in the world today will lament the disappearance of this 20th century phenomenon, apart perhaps from the people who owed their status to it, the 'generals' of Soviet philosophy. It has been the object of vehement criticism in the years of *perestrojka*, and it has become the topic of reminiscences and empirical investigations since. It is only of past things that histories can be written. Consequently, it is only now that one can develop a truly historical perspective on Soviet philosophy. But why would one adopt that perspective, why take any interest in Soviet philosophy at all?

There are, in my opinion, three reasons for such an interest. The first is that Soviet philosophy is a chapter, and a lengthy one, in the history of Russian philosophy. Its precise place within that history, the extent to which it was a continuation of what existed before, its lasting influence on post-Soviet Russian philosophy, and its actual contributions to Russian philosophical culture, are still to be determined. To regard it as a *quantité négligeable*, a mere gap of seventy years is as naive as it is unhistorical, and to leave the rewriting of its history to post-Soviet Russian scholars alone is as unprofessional as it would be unwise to disregard their efforts: the history of Soviet philosophical culture is only conceivable as a 'joint venture'.

A second reason to reinvestigate Soviet philosophy is that the actual contribution of Soviet philosophers to philosophical thought in general is yet to be assessed. If it is true, as is one of my assumptions, that the Western perception of Soviet philosophy was systematically distorted by the predominance of an official philosophy, the 'system' of *diamat* and *istmat*, and by the presence, on the

*Cf. the backside of several volumes of the Sovietica-series in which this book is appearing, too.

international philosophical scene, of party-philosophers like M.B. Mitin, F.V. Konstantinov, and, more recently, I.T. Frolov, then this assessment requires minute study of published and unpublished materials.

The third reason, finally, to study Soviet philosophy is that it presents an example of a philosophical culture as part of a 'totalitarian' system which itself claimed to be based on a philosophical theory. Soviet philosophy is one of the forms philosophical culture has taken, and one that does not have a parallel in world history: comparisons with scholasticism or with gnosticism are illuminating, but reveal only part of its nature, if only because Medieval Europe was not 'totalitarian', and because gnostics did hold political power in the Roman Empire.[3] An investigation of Soviet philosophical culture will thus contribute to a typology of philosophical cultures, and the latter can bring us one step closer to a genuinely global and world-historical perspective on philosophy, which leaves behind both the eurocentrism predominant in the historiography of philosophy as it exists to date, and the exoticism and esotericism that accompanies much of Western attention for non-Western philosophical traditions, including that of Russia.

Two notions that play a central role in this study require some preliminary explanation: the idea of a 'philosophical culture', and the concept of 'ideology'. 'Philosophical culture' is an expression frequently employed, though rather loosely, in connection with Soviet and post-Soviet philosophy.[4] I believe that, in a more precise definition, the concept of "philosophical culture" is of considerable value both in history of philosophy in general, and in the study of Russian and Soviet philosophy in particular: a foreign philosophical text can only be properly understood if one takes into account the situation in which it was produced, and perceives this situation not as something circumstantial, but as one of the determinants of philosophical work. In the case of our own philosophical tradition –or of what we think that tradition to be– we usually take this for granted. The conception of philosophical culture here employed is endebted to, on the one hand, Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, especially his notion of concreteness, and, on the other, the ideas of a number of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian philosophers.[5]

The core of this conception is the notion of concreteness. Philosophy exists as the actual thought of individual philosophers, located in space and time, i.e. in a concrete, historical, social and political situation, which determines not only the level of freedom of discussion and publication, but also the tradition or traditions that philosophers can continue or oppose, the expectations of a broader public with respect to philosophy, as well as what one Russian philosopher recently called 'the social demand'.[6] Philosophical culture is the totality of factors and activities that, in the end, results in philosophical thought, theories, and texts. It includes the individual philosophers with their training, capacities, and relations to one or more philosophical traditions, schools, or trends; it includes the range of philosophical positions and theories that are actually accessible to these individual philosophers, as well as the relations of implication and exclusion that logically exist between them,

the sets of problems they are known to imply or suggest, standard 'fallacies' and so on; it further includes a material basis, consisting of libraries and texts, as well as all other material conditions for the creation and continuation of a tradition (in the literal sense of 'passing on'), for text production and teaching; finally, it includes the social, political, and cultural situation in which philosophy is done, a situation with determines the fate of philosophical thought once it is made public, but also the way(s) philosophers see themselves, the expectations they raise, the extent to which what they do is an academic affair, et cetera.

If these factors were mere objective conditions, one might disregard them as being circumstantial and contingent. Hovewer, philosophers deal with them actively: when a professor reads Aristotle to his students, he thereby confirms a tradition, when he puts the book back on the library shelf, he reestablishes the material basis of philosophical industry, and when his colleague participates in public debate and speaks out on some issue, he thereby confirms freedom of speech. The individuals that act within a philosophical culture thus permanently create and reproduce the very conditions of their activity. In this respect, culture obtains the literal meaning of Latin *colo*, 'to take care of' or 'to cultivate'. Philosophers are responsible for the culture they participate in, and philosophical culture can flourish or decay, it can be preserved, stimulated, oppressed, destroyed, or revived. Philosophical culture is not subject to anybody's will, but at the same time it only exists as the result of the efforts of all participants. As is the case with any form of culture, it is a means for, in this case, philosophy, and like any culture it becomes an object of cult when it is treated as an end in itself.

As for ideology, this is a concept and a phenomenon too complicated to be dealt with at any adequate length here.[7] Moreover, it is a far from neutral concept: strongly conflicting conceptions mark its history. At the same time, it is essential to include it in an analysis of Soviet philosophy, both because the latter explicitly related itself to it, and because it was generally approached -and criticized- in terms of its relation to ideology.[8] The relation to ideology indeed is the decisive element in Soviet philosophy, but is easily misunderstood due to the explicit nature of that relation: Soviet philosophical culture 'told us' how it was related to ideology, and rather than making students of Soviet philosophy suspicious, it has often led them to believe it. Therefore, I shall briefly introduce the conception of ideology I have applied in my analysis of Soviet philosophy, including *IFN*, in the present study.[9] Its value must then appear from its actual use in what follows; as for its theoretical background, I have employed ideas developed by, among others, George Kline, John Thompson, Leszek Kołakowski, and Louis Althusser.[10]

Ideology is not a type of theory, opposed to, for example, scientific theory, nor is it a type of consciousness, be it 'false' or 'lying' consciousness as in classical Marxist theory, or 'militant' consciousness as in Leninism. As Leszek Kołakowski put it: "Der Unterschied zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft ist nicht der Unterschied zwischen Lüge und Wahrheit. Sie unterscheiden sich durch ihre soziale Funktion und nicht durch den Grad ihrer Wahrhaftigkeit."[11] Ideology is a *possible*

function of any more or less explicit and elaborated, relatively coherent, and more or less consistent set of particular or universal theoretical claims and practical valuations, i.e. of a *theory*. Apart from the familiar distinction between form and content, a third dimension of theories, including philosophical theories, should be distinguished: their *function*. Even if their primary, intrinsic goal is to formulate (intentionally) true knowledge about reality, and their primary function therefore is epistemic, they can perform other functions, too, including an ideological one. The important thing is that, while on the one hand theories do not coincide with any of their functions, and the actual function(s) they perform are determined by extra-theoretical factors, viz by the situation they exist in, they are, on the other hand, more or less fit or liable to perform certain functions, and they can, both in form and in content, be ajusted to a better performance.

For example, historical materialism was -and is- a theory about human society and history, which aims at a true understanding, and has the form of an overall frame-work, a global periodization, a number of case-studies such as 19th century capitalism or the 18th Brumaire, and a set of principles, guidelines, and laws of development. That it performed a major part in the ideological self-legitimatization of the Soviet system, as well as of non-Soviet Communist parties, was neither the fault of Marx, nor of historical materialism itself, as is demonstrated by the simple fact that it performed a different function elsewhere – and in fact even within the Soviet system, where it was a source of potentially critical social theory. At the same time, both its content and its form made it fit to perform such an ideological function: the idea of the historical inevitability of socialism, the idea of the vanguard role of the industrial proletariat, the idea of an 'end' of human history, its universalist claims, its 'Promethean' stress on science and technology. The fact, finally, that it was canonized in the simplified form of *istmat* by Stalin and his philosophical assistants for the sake of optimum performance of its ideological function, did not leave the theory itself untouched: it never excluded, but seriously hampered its epistemic function both within and outside of the USSR.[12]

The ideological function of a theory consists in justification by appeal to theoretical truth. This justification can take two basic forms: one is to *motivate* the commitment and *action* of social groups, the other is to *legitimatize* a specific *status quo* or the past action of social groups; in both cases, the groups or individuals that justify actions or a status quo do not have to be the same as the groups whose action is being justified. The ideological move itself contains three elements: a *claim* as to the truth of the theory concerned, an *exclusion* of alternative possibilities, and a *transition* from theory to practice. At least one of these elements *has to be concealed*: ideology can never be transparent, or, as Louis Althusser put it: "...l'idéologie ne dit jamais 'je suis idéologique'."[13] Finally, each of these elements can be backed by *physical* force, or can compensate for or complement it.[14]

Any theory can perform an ideological function, irrespective of whether its theoretical claims *are* true, false, or indeterminate in truth value, and not necessarily depending on whether the subjects (originators) *or* the objects (addressees) of ideology sincerely adhere to its content: it can even become a ritual affair, the main

function of which is to exclude competitors by occupying the legitimate place of, e.g., social theory. And it can to a greater or lesser extent be *official*, i.e. developed and guarded by an ideological authority,. for example, a political party or a state apparatus.

From the perspective of the conception just outlined, Soviet Marxism-Leninism, generally seen as a major example of ideology, appears as an *extreme* case, one that was, in the first place, directly linked to established political power; that was, secondly, carefully guarded and 'creatively developed', i.e. adapted to new circumstances; that occupied, thirdly, a monopoly position; that, in the fourth place, gradually became an exclusively legitimatizing, not a motivating ideology; and that, in the fifth place, became a ritual affair with little conviction behind it (which is why such profound conviction had to be permanently *asserted*). Soviet ideology was an extreme case, finally, because it concealed its ideological nature by *claiming* to be an ideology, namely a true and scientific one. A major effect of this was the a priori legitimate exclusion of any other ideology: alternative positions had to seek a legitimate place *within* official ideology, which led to the at first sight peculiar presence of liberals, social democrats, and 'national bolsheviks' within the CPSU.

If ideology is an inevitable phenomenon of every social order, motivating the action and commitment of social groups, and legitimatizing a given status quo, then obviously there must be something like an ideology of philosophical culture, too. Such a meta-philosophical theory *about* philosophy and philosophical culture justifies its existence within a given society, as well as the expenditure of public money on it. It motivates the members of that philosophical culture to cultivate, protect, and if necessarily defend it. It legitimatizes its status and nature by reiterating traditions, establishing paradigms of 'good', e.g. scientific philosophy, singling out great philosophers as well as important 'pseudo-philosophers' (cf. the role of Heidegger or Derrida in hard-boiled analytical philosophy), and pointing to cases of 'bad philosophy' (such as, for Western philosophy, Soviet philosophy). It argues for the social relevance or scientific status of philosophical thought, or, alternatively, for its elevated nature.

Soviet philosophical culture made no exception at this point: it contained an ideology of Soviet philosophy that was not, as in the case of Western philosophical culture, spontaneously produced and reproduced by its participants, but ordered from above, by the Party. At the same time, it was a compromise between official dogma and the actual state of Soviet philosophical culture. This is demonstrated, in the present study, by means of the increasingly sophisticated Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, which was both a meta-philosophical conception of philosophy, the theoretical foundation of a professional historiography of philosophy, and part of the ideological self-legitimatization of Soviet philosophical culture. Rather than treating the 'ideology of Soviet philosophy' as mere propaganda or as 'false consciousness', it must be seen as one of the determinants of Soviet philosophical culture, making it possible by limiting it, and in both respects part of its reality.

The method applied in this study is a combination of extensive library search, close-reading of key texts, and empirical research, including interviews with many representatives of *IFN* over a period of 12 years. A lot more work might have been done: the number of texts on the history of philosophy by Soviet scholars is so large that several specialists could spend a lifetime studying them, and such research would greatly profit from a more profound competence in the periods and philosophers discussed than I dispose of. In that sense, this study is selective. My hope is that the materials and topics selected are as representative as I believe them to be. Whatever little material there is by Western authors has been made ample use of.

The vast majority of sources exist in Russian only. Specialists in the history of Russian and Soviet philosophy frequently complain about the fact that knowledge of the Russian language –and consequently of Russian philosophical thought– is nearly absent among Western philosophers. Sad as this is, it is a fact, and in order to make at least part of the source material accessible to people who don't read Russian, many citations and paraphrases have been included. Wherever translations were available, I have usually consulted, and sometimes used them. Unless otherwise indicated, however, all translations from the Russian are mine. Translating Russian philosophical texts into English is not always an easy job. Russian philosophical terminology was partly a translation of the language of German idealism. Given the 'Hegelian roots' of Soviet philosophy, this means that the texts that form the source material of this study are often difficult to render in English. To tackle this problem, I have added, when this seemed useful, the original Russian word between square brackets, and sometimes the corresponding German word, too.

The most notorious case in this respect is the typically Hegelian –and Marxist!– concept of *Aufhebung*.[15] Having a twofold meaning in colloquial German, in philosophical terminology 'aufheben' acquires, as Kojève pointed out, a triple meaning: to cancel [*supprimer, annuler*], to preserve [*conserver, sauvegarder*], and to bring to a higher level [*sublimer, élever*].[16] Russian 'snjatie' preserves this threefold meaning, and like the German is related to a verb: snimat' - snjat'. While Hegel was pleased to find in the German language a word that fitted his speculative thinking, and Russian philosophers freely use 'snjatie', translators have a hard time finding an appropriate equivalent. The English equivalents 'to sublate' and 'sublation', seem to be widely accepted.[17] But they are also criticized for being artificial and, in fact, not even adequate.[18] Therefore, I have employed 'sublation' in order to obtain a continuous text, but I have inserted the Russian or German equivalent between brackets.

Russian words and names have been transliterated in accordance with the ISO-transscription system, which has the great advantages of a one-to-one correspondence with the Russian and of being equally difficult for speakers of all main European languages. The only concession to the standard English transliteration is the use of 'kh' for Russian 'X'. This procedure has also been applied to widely used personal names like Gorbačëv or Dostoevskij –rather than Gorbachev and Dostoyevski– because any line drawn between familiar and unfamiliar would be arbitrary. When a name is introduced for the first time, I give the full name, including Christian name and patronymic, indicating stress, as well as dates of birth and death.

REFERENCES

1. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.65.

2. In the Sovietica-series, there is no volume on Soviet history of philosophy, and in his invaluable survey of Soviet philosophy, Scanlan discusses all branches with the exception of *IFN* (Scanlan 1985); apart from an unpublished Ph.D. thesis by M. Rybarczyk, and articles by K. Ballestrem and G. Kline (see Bibliogpraphy), *IFN* has received little to no attention from the side of Western specialists in Russian and Soviet philosophy.

3. For the parallel with scholasticism, cf. Blakeley 1961; on 'Soviet gnosticism' cf. Besançon 1977.

4. Cf., among others, Iovčuk 1970, p.13ff, Davydov 1988, Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.260, Bakhurst 1991, passim, Scanlan 1994, passim; in 1909, Berdjaev spoke of the "level of philosophical culture" in Russia (Berdjaev 1991, p.25).

5. Including Aleksej Bogomolov, Teodor Ojzerman, Zakhar Kamenskij, Nelli Motrošilova, Vladimir Bibler, Merab Mamardašvili; see chapters 6-7.

6. Sekatskij 1994, p.9.

7. A comprehensive, but instructive account of its history can be found in Thompson 1990, pp.28-52; a more exhaustive one is Romberg *et al.* 1976. A comprehensive *status quaestionis* can be found in Thompson 1991.

8. Kline 1964, Besançon 1977 and 1986b, Jeu 1969, De George 1966, De George 1967, Kołakowski 1967, Goerdt 1967.

9. I have developed this conception departing from Kline 1964a, and in discussion, most of all, with Althusser 1976, Thompson 1990, and Kołakowski 1960.

10. Cf. Kołakowski 1960, Kline 1964, Althusser 1976, and Thompson 1990.

11. Kołakowski 1960, p.24f.

12. Cf. on this 'tailoring' of historical materialism Sekackij 1994.

13. Althusser 1976, p.114.

14. This point was elaborated esp. by Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci; cf. Althusser 1976, Kołakowski 1981, III, and the chapter on Gramsci in De Clercq 1988, pp.256-266.

15. Hegel explained the double meaning of German '*aufheben*' in a note to his fundamental idea of the '*Aufhebung*' of Being [*Sein*] and Nothingness [Nichts] in Becoming [*Werden*] in his *Wissenschaft der Logik*: "*Aufheben* und das *Aufgehobene* (das Ideelle) ist einer der wichtichsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt,... Was sich aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht zu Nichts. Nichts ist das *Unmittelbare*; ein Aufgehobenes dagegen ist ein *Vermitteltes* , es ist das Nichtseiende, aber als *Resultat* , das von einem Sein ausgegangen ist; es hat daher die *Bestimmtheit, aus der er herkommt, noch an sich*. *Aufheben* hat in der Sprache den gedoppelten Sinn, daß es soviel als aufbewahren, *erhalten* bedeutet und zugleich soviel als aufhören lassen, *ein Ende machen* (Hegel *Werke* V, p.113f)."

16. Cf. A. Kojève, *Introduction à al lecture de Hégel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), p.457, and Edie *et al.* 1976^2, I, p.xii.

17. Cf., for example, B. Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought; An Introduction* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1979), p.95, who refers to the translation by A.V. Miller of *Hegel's Science of Logic* (London & New York: 1969).

18. Cf. Edie *et al.* 1976^2, p.xii, and Scanlan 1985, p.134, n.109.

Chapter One

Three Perspectives on *IFN*

> Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the *dialectical* elaboration of the history of human thought, science, and technology.
>
> Vladimir I. Lenin, 1914[1]

Like all other Soviet philosophical disciplines, *IFN* had its specific nature and background: rather than being a mere 'application' or 'extension' of the 'system of dialectical and historical materialism', it had a status of its own as a professional discipline. *IFN* was an historiography and a theory of the history of philosophy, and should be seen not only as part of Soviet philosophical culture, but also from the general perspective of historiography of philosophy. Therefore, the first part of this chapter assesses the status and central issues of history of philosophy as a discipline [1.i].

A key position in all discussions about the relevance and status of the history of philosophy is occupied by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, whose conception of the history of philosophy is seen as original and relevant by adherents and opponents alike. Soviet philosophy has been regarded, by some Western scholars, as a form of Hegelianism anyway, and it certainly inherited its basic notions and problems with respect to the history of philosophy from Hegel.[2] In *IFN,* Hegel was given pride of place as the main theoretician in the field, and a solution for central theoretical problems in *IFN* has been sought by returning to his conception. *IFN* thus is part of the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of the philosophy of Hegel, too, and therefore an account of his conception of the history of philosophy, as well as an indication of the problems pertaining to it, forms the indispensable second part of this chapter [1.ii].

IFN relied on the heritage of three thinkers who were paraded as the *klassiki marksizma-leninizma* [classics of marxism-leninism], Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimic Il'ič Uljanov [Lenin]. This heritage, as far as history of philosophy is concerned, is a mixture of reactions to the Hegelian position, and it formed, for *IFN,* a set of impulses that defined a field of possible theoretical development. For Soviet philosophers, the officially sanctioned version of the works of the *klassiki* were a source of authoritative argument, and the absence of a clear-cut 'orthodox' position on the history of philosophy made the mixed legacy of the *klassiki* a factor of considerable importance for *IFN.* Therefore, this heritage is the subject of the third and concluding part [1.iii].

1.i History of Philosophy as a Discipline.

One of the many specialisms within Western philosophical culture is that of the history and theory (philosophy) of the history of philosophy, a field of philosophical investigation which owes its existence to the increasing awareness of Western philosophy of its historical nature: according to Ad Peperzak, over two thirds of contemporary philosophical production is dedicated to historical subjects.[3] This specialism began with an intensive *Methodenstreit* in German philosophy around 1800, and a second one around 1900.[4] After World War II it included protracted discussions in France and Italy, and, in later years, advancements both in continental and Anglo-American philosophical culture.[5] The emergence of the history of philosophy as a topic of philosophical interest can be associated with the name of Immanuel Kant, the first major philosopher to include an historical perspective in his philosophical system, thus implying that philosophy itself is in some way historical. The 18th century had witnessed a rapid growth of the knowledge of past philosophy, taking shape in monumental histories of philosophy like *Historia critica philosophiae* (Leipzig 1742-1744, 5 vols) by Jakob Brucker, *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie* (Marburg 1791-1797, 6 vols) by Dietrich Tiedemann, and *Geschichte der Philosophie* (Leipzig 1798–1819, 11 vols) by Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann.

Today, there is a vast amount of literature available on the two sub-disciplines of 'philosophy of the history of philosophy' and 'history of the history of philosophy' but it is very disjointed: Vittorio Hösle's complaint about the absence of a discipline 'philosophy of the history of philosophy' is fully justified. He himself synthesizes the German, and to some extent the French discussion, but does not pay attention to the Anglo-American tradition, while the Anglo-American camp hardly refers to the discussion Hösle is writing about.[6] Despite their availability in translations, the considerable results achieved in the same field by Soviet historians of philosophy have barely been studied or even noticed by their Western colleagues.[7] In fact, however, this Soviet discussion came much closer to an independent discipline, taking into account non-Soviet work, covering both the history and the philosophy of the history of philosophy, and consistently linking practice and theory.

The possibility of both a philosophical and an historical perspective on the history of philosophy, both as a process and as a philosophical and historical discipline, easily generates a confusing terminology, aggravated by the existence of the philosophy of history: the latter is something entirely different, but the differences between 'history of the philosophy of history', 'history of the history of philosophy', and 'philosophy of the history of philosophy' are not automatically clear to everybody. In an attempt to avoid confusion, I shall employ the following terminology, making use of distinctions made by Hösle, Zakhar Abramovič Kamenskij (b.1915), and Jorge J.E. Gracia:[8]

1. 'philosophy's history' ('history of philosophy as a process'): the totality of historical facts and events that can be called 'philosophical';
2. 'historiography of philosophy': the totality of accounts of philosophy's history;
3. 'history of philosophy as a discipline,' comprising:
   a. theoretical conceptions of philosophy's history (philosophy of the history of philosophy);
   b. theory of history of philosophy as a discipline
   c. methodology & didactics;
   d. a history of the history of philosophy (as a discipline).

As is clear from these distinctions, history of philosophy occasions a wide range of questions, from speculative and 'meta-philosophical' reflections upon the historical nature of philosophy as such to most practical issues (in methodology and didactics) and empirical investigation. An interesting feature of Soviet *IFN* is that it covered this whole range of questions, departing from a recognition of the philosophical significance of the history of philosophy, and in this respect it can be compared with Western conceptions like those of Martial Guéroult, Lucien Braun, Hösle, Ulrich Johannes Schneider, or Gracia.[9]

The central question of these discussions is: 'Why does philosophy have a history?' The idea that philosophy *does* have a history that is relevant to present philosophy, and that therefore history of philosophy is an important philosophical discipline, became widespread at the turn of the 18th and 19th century.[10] While it is obvious that there has been philosophy in the past, too, it is much less evident to see it as 'the history of philosophy', as present philosophy's past. Related to this question about the historical nature of philosophy is the question about the status of 'history of philosophy' as a discipline: is it a philosophical discipline, an historical one, or both? And, if the latter is the case, how are the two related? In spite of the significance of history of philosophy in contemporary philosophical culture, these questions remain unresolved. However, hardly anybody today would contest that there is such a thing as history of philosophy, and that the attention it receives in philosophical instruction is justified.

Until about 1800 people held a different view on philosophy's past. In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle included a presentation of the positions held by previous philosophers. He thought they could strengthen his own theory, by adding something to it, by correcting it, or by not having anything substantial to add, thus confirming it.[11] Aristotle regarded his predecessors as colleagues, much like present-day philosophers do with respect to their predecessors within their own tradition. In fact, this is the 'spontaneous' attitude of every philosopher to philosophy's past: it is a collection of possible positions that may function as an addition to or a correction of contemporary philosophical discourse, or as a token illustration of past error in contrast with present truth.

This attitude is essentially *a-historical*, and its natural complement is doxographical history of philosophy, i.e., the rendering of "the lives and opinions of eminent philosophers" (Diogenes Laërtius).[12] With the increasing availability of the material basis of past philosophy (texts), doxography has shifted towards survey and summary, but essentially remains the same: a well-arranged collection of past

attempts at philosophical truth at the service of present attempts. This has been a predominant form of historiography of philosophy from Greek Antiquity until the end of the 18th century, and still is a major element of philosophical culture.

Christendom introduced another notion, absent in Antiquity: the idea that the theories of the philosophers were vain attempts which at best might partially coincide with the Truth of Revelation.[13] Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabilis ad nostram aetatem perducta*, the standard history of philosophy in philosophical education until 1812 in Germany and until 1820 in Britain, still contained the notion of a "*philosophia antediluviana*", a paradisiacal truth –the first philosopher is Adam, the second Kaïn– that has been lost, and which must be retrieved in an age-long process, at the end of which true philosophy –Leibniz' philosophy for Brucker– reunites all partial truths of previous philosophy.[14]

What was lacking until around 1800 was the idea that past philosophy is philosophy's past, its historical precondition. This idea appeared for the first time in Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781), where he announced a 'History of Pure Reason [*Geschichte der reinen Vernunft*]' as part of his philosophical system, and in his *Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik* (1791), especially in the so-called *Lose Blätter*. Kant argued that there are three methods in metaphysics: a dogmatic, a skeptical, and a critical one, which must be conceived as its necessary stages:

> Es sind also drei Stadien, welche die Philosophie zum Behuf der Metaphysik *durchzugehen hatte* [italics mine, EvdZ]. Das erste war das Stadium des Dogmatism; das zweite das des Skeptizism; das dritte das des Kritizism der reinen Vernunft.[15]

The first two stages, dogmatism and skepticism, are necessary conditions to reach the stage of the critique of human reason; with the appearance of this last stage, philosophy is released from its age-long 'oscillation [*Schwanken*]', and reaches a final and stable stage.[16] The idea of the history of philosophy as a necessary process that leads to a true philosophical system, rather than as a mere *historia stultitiae*, was thus implied by Kant. It also was Kant's discovery that a system of philosophical knowledge *must* contain a conception of the history of philosophy. A few years later, Tennemann was the first historian of philosophy to write a long theoretical and methodological introduction to his *Geschichte der Philosophie* (1798).[17]

Hegel took up the notion of a necessary and progressive development of philosophy through history, and of history of philosophy as an indispensable part of the system of philosophy, but his claim was much stronger: philosophy itself, as a phenomenon in history, is part of the reality that philosophy aims to understand. Hegel was the first to develop a conception of the history of philosophy as part of his philosophical system, directly linked to his conception of philosophy.[18] This enabled him to take the rich philosophical heritage both philosophically and historically seriously, as opposed to the doxographic and 'critical' (Kantian) approaches practiced before him. Hegel thus brought together two lines: the establishment of historiography of philosophy as an *historical* discipline, and the *philosophical* reflection on philosophy's past as something which preceded one's proper position. Hegel frequently treated the history of philosophy in his lectures on

the subject (1805-1831), being the first major philosopher to do so at all, and elaborated his conception in the 'Einleitung' to those lectures.[19]

Hegel's philosophy was a major source of Marxism, and strongly influenced the views of Marx and Engels on the history of philosophy. Moreover, his conception of the history of philosophy was especially influential within Soviet *IFN*. Further, it plays an important role in the conceptual apparatus employed in this study. Within Western discussions about the historical nature of philosophy, finally, Hegel's conception occupies a central place, too, serving as a point of departure, main opponent, or simply as the philosopher who has clearest of all formulated the problem.[20] Therefore, Hegel's view of the matter will be discussed at greater length in the next part of this chapter. For the sake of the present section, his conception can be summarized as follows.

According to Hegel, the history of philosophy is the gradual coming about, in and through time, of philosophical truth, realized, in each subsequent epoch, by the last, fullest, and most concrete philosophical system of the epoch. This system absorbs –'sublates'– all previous philosophical systems as one-sided answers to major philosophical problems, and includes the fundamental principles of those philosophies as moments in the system of philosophy. Regarding the history of mankind as the self-realization of World Spirit, and philosophy as the "thinking development of the Idea," Hegel links philosophy to history in a more than accidental manner, and defines history of philosophy as a separate and, moreover, philosophical discipline: each 'philosophy of the present' is the necessary *result* of all of past philosophy, which not only makes it relevant to present philosophy, but indeed inevitably leads to the inclusion of history of philosophy in the system of philosophy proper.

The easiest way to discusss subsequent developments in the philosophy of the history of philosophy is by relating them to the Hegelian position, which, while justifying a philosophical interest in past philosophy, seems to prove too much rather than too little: the Historical Development of One Philosophical Truth. First of all, it is possible to deny the very necessity of the connection, highlighted by Kant and Hegel, between philosophy and its history, i.e. to adopt a pre-Kantian and pre-Hegelian position. At this point, two possibilities present themselves.[21] The first is to deny that the historical aspect has any philosophical relevance, and to regard philosophy's past as a wonderful playground for contemporary philosophy. Past philosophies then become token positions of profound insights or of classical fallacies, past philosophers become colleagues, fools, allies, or enemies, and historically adequate representation gives way to polemics and, sometimes, caricature. This approach to some extent is a natural reaction against the historical burden contemporary philosophy is carrying, and it is fully legitimate in the sense that present philosophical thought must be free to take its departure and inspiration from wherever it likes, including from a distorted perception of the past.[22]

The opposite possibility is to disregard the philosophical aspect, and argue that an historian of philosophy does not have to be interested in the importance, impact, truth or falsity of his object of study and description any more that an historian of science has to care about whether the *phlogiston*-hypothesis makes sense. This

approach results in more or less neutral, descriptive historiography, and in historical analysis in terms of influences and developments which, again, is fully legitimate, and indeed an indispensable part of current philosophical culture.[23]

So, there is nothing at all to be held against these two approaches, as long as the first does not claim that it is historical, or the second that it is philosophical. Indeed, much of the massive production under the heading of 'history of philosophy' falls under these two categories. Yet neither approach satisfies the expectations generated by the realization of a tension between the claim to *truth* of all philosophy, and the fact of its permanent *change* in time, and, one way or another, in connection with history in general. If one considers the conflict between truth and historicity as manifest and substantial, then one takes the Hegelian conception seriously, and if one refuses to adopt Hegel's solution then one looks for alternative, post-Hegelian positions. At this point, different strategies can be discerned.

If the history of philosophy is about the Historical Development of One Philosophical Truth, a problem is what this development actually leads to. At first sight, Hegel's conclusion is that this development results in the formulation of a true philosophical system, and, whether or not one regards *Hegel's* system as this true system, this strongly suggests an 'end of philosophical history.' An obvious solution to this problem is to drop the idea of unity. Rather than with the development of one philosophical truth, the history of philosophy presents us with a plurality of *attempts*, by finite individuals, at truth, which may all contain their 'grain of truth,' but even so cannot be 'united' in an ultimate synthesis, since such a synthesis would be just as individual and particular as any other.[24]

Another solution is to give up the notion of truth as of what philosophy is about. Instead, philosophy is about different world-views, about aesthetic visions of the world, or about different, incompatible approaches to reality (for example a rational vs. a poetic or a romantic approach): even if there was a time when philosophy and science were identified, later historical development has made truth the domain of a plurality of specialized sciences, while what remains for philosophy is, at best, a clarification of the concepts we employ in science and in everyday life. The prime example of an aestheticizing approach is Guéroult.[25] Gracia comes close to the idea of incompatible traditions when he distinguishes a mainstream (which Kant had labelled 'dogmatic'), a critical tradition (including skepticism), and a poetic tradition, but he 'saves' philosophical truth by stressing the *search* for it rather than focusing on the *claim* to have achieved it.[26] Similarly, the notion of truth, as well as that of progress, can be preserved by focusing on philosophical *problems* instead of *solutions*, as does the tradition initiated by Wilhelm Windelband.[27]

A third solution is to abandon the notion of historical development: there is not really a development, be it linear or dialectical, and there is no progress, but an endless repetition of moves. Philosophers evidently react to their predecessors, but in doing so they do not improve philosophy in any significant manner, they merely explore logical possibilities which often were already elaborated by their predecessors' predecessors. Philosophy does not have a history in any irreversible sense, or, which amounts to the same, its past is a purely contingent series of changes and events. Whether philosophically skeptical or historically relativist, this solution

denies any form of historical development or progress, however subtly or sophisticatedlyconceived.[28]

A fourth solution, finally, to the problems implied by the Hegelian position, is to drop the idea that the history of philosophy really is the history of *philosophy*, or, which is the same, to abandon the idea that philosophy has a history *of its own*. This solution leads to a variety of reductions of philosophy's history to the history of something else: socio-economic formations (sociologism, economism), political positions and ideologies (class struggle, open vs. closed society), historical periods in their irreducible singularity (historicism), different nations and cultures (nationalism, cultural relativism), types of individuality (psychologism), gender, race, et cetera.[29]

1.ii *Hegel's Conception of the History of Philosophy*

The lasting value of Hegels's conception of philosophy's history consists in his attempt to understand philosophy itself as part of history. By giving philosophy its place in the general process of human, and indeed of world history, he could do justice to history of philosophy as a discipline, blooming in his days, give it a place within the system of philosophical sciences as he saw it, and assess the manifold nature of philosophy: apparently, Hegel was both the originator of the very concept of 'historicity' and the first to use the word 'philosophy' in the plural.[30] In fact, Hegel's *Vorlesungen...* attempt to cast the vast historical material brought together by historians of philosophy like Brucker, Tiedemann, and Tennemann, into an historical argument for his understanding of philosophy as the concretely developing (self–)knowledge of the substance of reality, i.e. the Absolute Idea, thus filling the place in the system of philosophy explicitly left open by Kant.[31] It is not my aim to enter into a full discussion of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, or of its relation to his actual historiography.[32] Hegel's conception is not the object of my research, but one of the instruments of my analysis of *IFN*.[33]

Hegel's initial question is how there can be a history of philosophy at all, since the very concepts of philosophy and history seem to exclude each other: philosophy is "the science of necessary thought, ...the knowledge of what is true and therefore eternal and everlasting," whereas history is dealing "with what has been, and hence is contingent, transient, and past."[34] On the one hand, the existence of a multitude of philosophies is an undeniable fact; on the other hand, the aim of philosophy is truth, which is essentially *one*, and so there can either be only one philosophy, viz the true understanding of reality, or no philosophy at all.[35]

The obvious solution would be that one philosophy is true, whereas the others at best approach philosophical truth to some extent.[36] This solution is rejected by Hegel, because such "abstract opposition of truth and error" reduces the history of philosophy to a collection of opinions [*Meinungen*], all equally claiming to be that single true philosophy.[37] Hegel, by contrast, attempts to develop a conception of philosophy that includes a history of philosophy as essential to philosophy itself:

Wir müssen dies begreiflich machen, daß diese Mannigfaltigkeit der vielen Philosophien nicht nur der Philosophie selbst –der Möglichkeit der Philosophie– keinen Eintrag tut, sondern daß sie zur Existenz der Wissenschaft der Philosophie schlechterdings notwendig ist und gewesen ist...[38]

To understand philosophy's history is to demonstrate that philosophy *must* have a history, since only what is necessary is rational.[39] The history of philosophy is not accidental to philosophy: it belongs to the very nature of philosophy to be historical.[40]

The key notions employed by Hegel are *development* and *concreteness*.[41] The historical sequence of philosophies is the gradual development of a single philosophy, each subsequent system of philosophy expressing and elaborating a particular principle, each further system 'sublating' [*aufheben*] the earlier system, not simply cancelling it, but elevating it by preserving its principle as a moment in the proper system:

Das allgemeine Resultat der Geschichte der Philosophie ist: 1. daß zu aller Zeit nur *eine* Philosophie gewesen ist, deren gleichzeitige Differenzen die notwendigen Seiten des *einen* Prinzips ausmachen; 2. daß die Folge der philosophischen Systeme keine zufällige, sondern die notwendige Stufenfolge der Entwicklung dieser Wissenschaft darstellt; 3. daß die letzte Philosophie einer Zeit das Resultat dieser Entwicklung und die Wahrheit in der höchsten Gestalt ist, die sich das Selbstbewußtsein des Geistes über sich gibt. Die letzte Philosophie enthält daher die vorhergehenden, faßt alle Stufen in sich, ist Produkt und Resultat aller vorhergehenden.[42]

Philosophical truth is the result of the work of generations of philosophers, and it is only after this work is done that it becomes fully clear what philosophy is: not a theory *about* reality, but the adequate self-realization (in the double meaning of 'becoming real' and 'becoming aware') *of* the rational substance of reality:

Das *Resultat* ist der Gedanke, der bei sich ist und darin zugleich das Universum umfaßt, es in intelligente [NB: not 'intelligible', EvdZ] Welt verwandelt.[43]

Philosophy is the 'highest' form of development of the Idea, because it is the 'place' where rational substance fully becomes substance-subject:

Die Idee ist so, konkret an sich und sich entwickelnd, ein organisches System, eine Totalität, welche einen *Reichtum von Stufen und Momenten in sich enthält.* Die Philosophie ist nun *für sich* [italics mine, EvdZ] das Erkennen dieser Entwicklung und ist als begreifendes Denken selbst diese denkende Entwicklung.[44]

Philosophy is a form of knowledge, and *fully* adequate knowledge of (about) reality as a whole is fully adequate realization of philosophy, i.e. fully adequate knowledge of (belonging to) reality itself [*an und für sich*]. Philosophy is "*die sich denkende* Idee, die wissende Wahrheit."[45] But this only becomes manifest when philosophy achieves a proper understanding of itself:

Diese Bewegung, welche die Philosophie ist, findet sich schon vollbracht, indem sie am Schluß ihren eigenen Begriff erfaßt, d.i. nur auf ihr Wissen zurücksieht.[46]

The development of philosophy is part of the concrete development of reality. Philosophy exists in the concrete unity of the universal and the particular: it exists as this or that philosophy, in space and time, and as the thought of individuals. It further means that philosophy exists both as the logical development of concepts within the system of philosophy, and as the emergence, existence, and fate of philosophies in history:

Die andere Weise aber, daß die unterschiedenen Stufen und Entwicklungsmomente in der Zeit, in der Weise des Geschehens, an diesen besonderen Orten, unter diesem oder jenem Volke, unter diesen politischen Umständen und unter diesen Verwicklungen mit denselben hervortreten –kurz, unter dieser empirischen Form–, dies ist das Schauspiel, welches uns die Geschichte der Philosophie zeigt.[47]

The development of philosophy is an *historical* process, the emergence of philosophy an historical event, not only because they take place at some moment in time, but also because they are conditioned by history: philosophy came into existence in Ancient Greece, since it was there that thought became free, free thought and political freedom emerging as part of the same process.[48]

The 'inner logic' at work in philosophy's historical development is *identical* with the inner logic of the conceptual development of the philosophical system:

Nach dieser Idee behaupte ich nun, daß die Aufeinanderfolge der Systeme der Philosophie in der *Geschichte dieselbe ist* als die *Aufeinanderfolge in der logischen Ableitung* der Begriffsbestimmungen der Idee (...) aber man muß freilich diese reinen Begriffe *in dem zu erkennen* wissen, was die geschichtliche Gestalt enthält.[49]

1. The claim that a single logic, viz the logic of the Idea, is at work both in the system of philosophy and in the historical sequence of philosophies, is a first characteristic element in Hegel's conception. A strong correspondence of logic and history has often served as a major ground for rejecting his conception as a 'projection' of his own system onto past philosophy, but Hegel's conception does not really depend upon it.[50] In fact, Hegel allows for some divergence of historical order and logical order, and in his historiographical practice the identity of logic and history is less strictly applied.[51]

2. A second important feature of Hegel's conception is its apparent immodesty when he situates his own philosophical system at the end of the historical development of philosophy as its *result*, totalizing all previous development:

Die der Zeit nach letzte Philosophie ist das Resultat aller vorhergehenden Philosophien und muß daher die Prinzipien aller enthalten; sie ist darum... die entfalteste, reichste und konkreteste.[52]

Consequently, the last chapter of Hegel's *Vorlesungen...*, in which he discusses the present stage of philosophy, i.e. his own system, is headed 'Resultat':

> Bis hierher ist nun der Weltgeist gekommen. Die letzte Philosophie ist das Resultat *aller* [italics mine, EvdZ] früheren; nichts ist verloren, alle Prinzipien sind erhalten. Diese konkrete Idee ist das Resultat der *Bemühungen des Geistes* durch fast 2500 Jahre (...), seiner *ernsthaftesten Arbeit*, sich selbst objektiv zu werden, sich zu erkennen...[53]

Hegel thus seems to put an end to the very history of philosophy: if his system is the single true system of philosophy there would be little left in terms of future development. This is not his position: not only does he rightly hold that as an historian he cannot look into the future, he also makes explicit the *historical* nature of this 'result':

> Dies ist nun der Standpunkt der *jetzigen* Zeit, und die Reihe der geistigen Gestaltungen ist *für jetzt* damit geschlossen [italics mine, EvdZ].[54]

Hegel's system of absolute idealism, upon its own conception, was, as Jan Hollak has shown, "the *present* self-comprehension of spirit [italics mine, EvdZ]," which implies that other times must yield their own self-comprehension.[55] But even if Hegel cannot be blamed for the "idiotic notion" that the history of philosophy had ended, the question remains what is left for philosophy after him.[56] It would seem that his philosophy is itself a 'child of its time', and cannot satisfy present interests, but at the same time something essential was achieved in it that must and therefore will reappear in present philosophy.[57]

Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy is a consequence of his conception of philosophy, and the latter is an elaboration of the idea of philosophy dominant in the Western tradition since Parmenides and Plato. The pretensiousness of Hegel's philosophy is not the pretensiousness of Hegel, but of that tradition. The two central notions of philosophy as 'knowledge of the true [*Wissen des Wahren*]' and of the absolute totality of substance –'the true is the whole [*das Wahre ist das Ganze*]'– logically imply a notion of true philosophy as self-comprehension of the Absolute [*Wissen des Ganzen*]. If, therefore, the outcome of his conception of the history of philosophy is unacceptable, we are referred back to the notion of philosophical truth. In this way, the moment in which the historical nature of philosophy is formulated as a philosophical problem coincides with the moment in which the project of Western philosophy becomes fully explicit and problematic: Hegel makes clear what it means to claim that philosophy is true knowledge of reality.

3. A third important feature of Hegel's conception is the *necessary* character of the historical process of philosophy: even if his own system was not its final result, it was a stage through which philosophy had to pass. The "pilgrimage of truth through time" follows a single, though complex line, with a starting point, necessary stages, and an end or goal.[58] But does not this narrowing-down of the history of philosophy to a single 'mainstream' of Greek - Christian - Germanic philosophy, of which

Hegel believes himself to represent the current totalization, mean that Hegel forced all past history into the straitjacket of his *Logik*?

The question, again, is not about Hegel's arrogance. From a formal perspective he is simply right: *if* his philosophy embodies philosophical truth (and for Hegel to claim otherwise would mean not to take himself seriously as a philosopher), then it *must* contain every valuable step towards truth made by previous philosophers, it *must* be the result of the history of philosophy, and the logic of development *must* lead to his philosophy. This alone, however, neither implies the fact of an historical *development* of philosophy (it might be that Hegel discovered a lost truth), nor its *unity*. At this point, it becomes clear that Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy rests not only on his idea of philosophy, but also on his philosophy of history.[59] Philosophy, as it develops through history, not only exists in history, but also emerges from it.

4. This leads to a fourth point: the *correspondence* of philosophy's history with history in general. Hegel, 'absolutizing' philosophy and 'historicizing' the Absolute, by the same token historicizes philosophy. History is the self-realization of Absolute Spirit through a sequence of 'epochs', stages [*Gestalte*] of World Spirit [*Weltgeist*], with at each stage philosophy as its highest and 'concluding' form, in which World Spirit comes to a full realization of itself as Absolute Spirit.[60] Philosophy and world history are not just simultaneous, but *strictly identical*.[61]

The duration of the development of philosophy thus is not simply determined by the intellectual abilities of philosophers to develop philosophy, but by the fact that the fundamental principle of each stage of world history must be developed in all concreteness before a philosophical understanding of it can be achieved.[62] At the same time, philosophy paves the way for the transition to a new stage, because the full development of a principle means that it has lost its *raison d'être*, since it is understood as *a* realization of World Spirit, a particular and limited *Gestalt* which *eo ipso* is superseded.[63]

It is important to note that Hegel employed a threefold meaning of the word philosophy: first of all, there is the self-knowledge of Spirit, the one true Philosophy, secondly, there is 'epochal philosophy', and, thirdly, there is the individuation of philosophy into 'philosophies' (Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle). He further employed two concepts of time: natural time (time and space as forms of *Äußerlichkeit*), and historical time (the realm of *Geist*).

The three meanings of philosophy and the two meanings of time interlink. The one true philosophy is not in time, but 'above' it, since it belongs to the realm of the absolute Idea, logically preceding time as part of its externalization as Nature; epochal philosophy corresponds to the stages of *Weltgeist* in historical time; and the individuation of epochal philosophy into philosophies corresponds to natural time: even if Hegel's philosophy, as the concluding stage of Modern philosophy, represented absolute Spirit returning back to itself out of time, it still had a concrete form in 1817-1839 in Heidelberg and Berlin as *Hegel*'s system.

As to philosophical epochs, Hegel distinguished only two: Greek philosophy and Germanic (Christian) philosophy, with Medieval philosophy as a period of fermentation and preparation.[64] When Hegel qualifies philosophy as "ihre [of

philosophy, EvdZ] Zeit, in Gedanken erfaßt," we must bear in mind that he means historical, not natural time, and epochal philosophy, not individual philosophies: it is modern philosophy as a whole, totalized by Hegel, that is the full understanding of Modernity.[65]

The idea of epochal philosophy is based on Hegel's "Belief in World Spirit," and the "grand presumption that, in this respect, too, the way of the world has been rational – which is what gives the history of philosophy its importance in the first place..."[66] Epochal philosophy is the concrete *unity* of the universal (the one true philosophy) and the particular (the many philosophies), and it is where the necessary "inner history" and the contingent "outer history" of philosophy come together: without the second the first would be pure logic, without the first the second would be mere externality [*Äußerlichkeit*].[67] This concrete unity is fully realized only when, at epochal turning-points like Hegel's own philosophy, the universal (absolute, inner, necessary, rational) recognizes itself in and as the concrete universal, i.e. as concreticized in particularity (including the relative, external, contingent, irrational).

For our purpose it is important to focus on this relationship of inner and outer history.

i. First of all, for Hegel, the exteriorization of philosophy into epochal philosophies is necessary as part of the gradual realization of World Spirit. This process takes a lot of (natural) time and human effort, but the process itself is rational:

> Es ist allerdings eine lange Zeit..., welche der Geist dazu braucht, sich die Philosophie zu erarbeiten. (...) Was die Langsamkeit des Geistes betrifft, so ist zu bedenken, daß er nicht pressiert ist, nicht zu eilen und Zeit genug hat... (...) Er... treibt sein Werk im Großen, er hat Nationen und Individuen genug zu depensieren. ...der Weg des Geistes ist die Vermittlung, der Umweg. (...)
> Die *erste* Folge... ist diese, daß <u>das Ganze</u> der Geschichte der Philosophie ein in sich notwendiger, konsequenter Fortgang ist; er ist in sich vernünftig, durch seine Idee bestimmt [underlining mine, EvdZ].[68]

ii. Secondly, the individuation of moments of the idea into distinct philosophies within a given epoch is also necessary:

> Die Unterschiede, die in der Idee liegen, werden als Gedanken gesetzt; das ist das erste. Das zweite ist, daß diese Unterschiede zum Bestehen kommen müssen, der eine hier, der andere da. (...) Solche vollständige Gestaltung des Gedankens ist eine Philosophie.[69]

The distinctions of the idea have to become objective and to exist as philosophy A or B of philosopher X or Y, in order for philosophy –in the epochal sense– to recognize and resume them as its own determinations and distinctions:

> Die *zweite* Bestimmung, die aus dem Bisherigen folgt, ist die, daß <u>jede</u> Philosophie notwendig gewesen ist und noch ist, keine also untergegangen, sondern alle als Moment *eines* Ganzen in <u>der</u> Philosophie erhalten sind. (...) Was widerlegt worden, ist nicht das Prinzip dieser Philosophie, sondern nur dies, daß dies Prinzip... die absolute Bestimmung sei [underlining mine, EvdZ].[70]

iii. Thirdly, it is necessary that each principle be elaborated into a philosophical system:

> Jedes Prinzip hat eine Zeitlang die Herrschaft gehabt; daß in dieser Form dann das Ganze der Weltanschauung ausgeführt worden, das nennt man ein philosophisches System.[71]

These three levels each entail a proportion of necessity and contingency. The length of an epoch is contingent, as is the number of generations 'spent'. It also is a matter of contingency where, when, and by whom philosophies are developed, as is the exact shape of philosophical systems, their elaboration into world-views, and their details. The reason for contingency, i.e. for the externality that marks the historical development of philosophy, is that it is necessary for the appearance of necessity as such, and it is only to this extent that it can be understood.[72]

Philosophy, Hegel declares, does not deal with what is contingent.[73] What counts is "to recognize, in the empirical form and appearance in which philosophy historically comes to the fore, its progress as the development of the Idea," and to this end "one must have the knowledge of the Idea to begin with."[74] It is here, at the 'border' of necessity and contingency, that Hegel situates his distinction between a *philosophical* and an *empirical* history of philosophy, the latter not deserving the name of a science.[75]

This, however, results in an abstract division of philosophical and empirical history of philosophy, ultimately corresponding to the abstract opposition of inner and outer history (it is tempting to see the very *spatial* metaphor of 'inner' and 'outer' as an indication of what Hegel himself disqualified as '*Verstandsmetaphysik*'). Because the contingent is not rational, it is understandable and hence a possible object of science only as *contingency*, not as this or that contingent phenomenon. This leaves out much of the subject matter of history of philosophy, both as a philosophical and as an historical discipline, and Hegel was not accidentally accused of neglecting some philosophers while treating others at disproportionate length.[76] In fact, the global correspondence at the epochal level, in combination with the necessary objectivization of all 'principles' into philosophies, saves Hegel the task of investigating the concrete development of philosophical positions in relation to each other.

Hegel states an *a priori* necessity –what must emerge shall emerge–, which makes the actual differentiation of positions, and the actual influence of one philosophy on another, historically irrelevant and irrational: because the process as a whole is necessary, there is no necessity in it, since the effect comes about anyway. The differentiation of positions within a philosophical 'epoch' resembles a field in which a hidden mycelium yields the separate mushrooms which are the different philosophies, whereas in fact each position arises as a rational (at least in its intention) reaction to (an) earlier one(s). The Hegelian scheme thus proves too much, depriving concrete history of much of its rational content. And the same applies to the concrete relation of individuated philosophy to surrounding history: here again, the thesis of global correspondence warrants the rationality and *Zeitgemäßheit* of Philosophy, but removes the (ir)rationality and the *(Un)zeitgemäßheit*

of how philosophers related to their actuality. Still, against the background of his time, Hegel's historiography of philosophy is an attempt to do justice, more than any of his contemporaries, to the philosophers and the philosophies of the past, and to take them seriously in their attempt to solve problems that are the problems of philosophy itself.[77] But the presupposition of an a priori scheme, viz the development of the Idea, fails to do justice to them as individuals who, in a concrete socio-historical situation, aim at a true understanding of reality.

5. A fifth major element is Hegel's thesis that the historical development of philosophy is *globally progressive*, and that "the present is superior."[78] Hegel gives a philosophical and an historical reason for the impossibility to adhere to a past philosophy. The first consists in the irreversible progress of philosophy itself: earlier positions are criticized, negated, and 'sublated' [*aufgehoben*] by subsequent philosophical thought, and once they are, to adhere to them would mean to be irrational. The historical reason is that "every philosophy is philosophy of its time," and only fit "to satisfy those interests, that are appropriate to its time [*ihrer Zeit angemessen*]."[79] Past philosophies are irrevocably outdated:

> Aus diesem Grunde aber befriedigt den Geist, in dem nun ein tiefer bestimmter Begriff lebt, eine frühere Philosophie nicht. (...) Deswegen leben wohl die platonische, aristotelische usf. Philosophie, alle Philosophien zwar immer und gegenwärtig noch in ihren Prinzipien; aber in dieser Gestalt und Stufe, auf der die platonische und aristotelische Philosophie war, ist die Philosophie nicht mehr. Wir können nicht bei ihnen stehenbleiben, sie können nicht wieder erweckt werden. Es kann deswegen heutigentags keine Platoniker, Aristoteliker, Stoiker, Epikureer mehr geben.[80]

Hegel is mistaken at this point, I believe: it is very well possible to be a Platonist, Epicurean, or Hegelian, and the presence of past positions even is a major factor in the plurality of contemporary philosophy, one of its production factors. What *is* impossible is to be a more or less orthodox Epicurean or Hegelian *and* to be regarded by the majority of philosophers or by a significant proportion of the public as offering a proper understanding of our time: orthodox Platonists and Hegelians isolate themselves from contemporary philosophical culture. But the existence of a multitude of more or less orthodox 'incarnations' of *unzeitgemäße* philosophical positions is invaluable as a 'living laboratory' of possible positions: these very lines could not have been written the way they were, if the Hegelian position was not 'incarnated' in present-day philosophy by Hösle.[81] A further consequence of Hegel's idea of later philosophy rendering earlier positions obsolete is that a polemical relation to them becomes impossible: we have no reason to take them seriously as possibly true. But past thought can only be provoking, inspiring, and stimulating for present thought to the extent to which present philosophers do regard it as possibly true.

The Hegelian conception thus points to important features of philosophy as it exists historically, and it confronts us with irreducible choices. In the first place, it confronts us with the question of the logic at work in philosophy's history. Secondly, it shows how the idea of philosophy as true knowledge leads to a

totalizing conception of philosophy's past. Further, it has become clear how the idea of manifest truth implies the singularity of the historical process of philosophy: to drop that idea does evade this consequence, but it does not exclude the existence of order in the history of philosophy. Rather it suggests the notion of a possible plurality of lines of development.

In the third place, although one must reject Hegel's abstract distinction between the necessary and the contingent, it is indeed "conspicuous that all synthetic thinkers are at the end not only of philosophical epochs, but also of historical epochs."[82] If World Spirit cannot be accepted as an explanation for this phenomenon, then an alternative one must be put forward. And if, finally, we reject Hegel's totalization of philosophy's history, it is still his merit to have opened our eyes to the fact that all past philosophy is historically limited, and, at the same time, of possible value for present philosophy. Hence, history of philosophy is not part of a system of philosophy, nor a purely historiographic discipline, but an independent philosophical and historical discipline.

1.iii *The Klassiki Marksizma-Leninizma on the History of Philosophy*

All three *klassiki marksizma-leninizma* wrote on the history of philosophy: Marx in his doctoral dissertation, *Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie* (1841), Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (1888), Lenin in *Materializm i èmpiriokriticizm* (1909), and in his 'Konspekt knigi Gegelja *Lekcii po istorii filosofii*' [Summary of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*] (1915).[83] Apart from this, all three *klassiki* extensively discussed aspects of the history of philosophy, related to their own theoretical activity: a collection by Irrlitz and Lübke of texts by Marx and Engels that address the history of philosophy counts nearly 700 pages.

Also, all three greatly admired Hegel's work in this area.[84] Marx commented that Hegel's history of philosophy marked the very beginning of historiography of philosophy as such, and that Hegel had "summed up the entire history of philosophy for the first time."[85] Engels called the *Lectures...* "one of [his] most ingenious works."[86] And Lenin's 'Konspekt...' abundantly testifies to his passionate reading of Hegel: he wonders at his "slanders on materialism," criticizes his "idealistic rubbish," mocks Hegel's attempt to portray Aristotle as an idealist instead of a realist –"hah! he's afraid!!" –, but at the same time admires his analysis, and basically agrees with Hegel's critique of all non-dialectical materialism: "With this Hegel defeats every materialism *except* dialectical."[87]

However, none of the *klassiki* elaborated a Marxist conception of the history of philosophy. Irrlitz and Lübke claim that there was no area in which Marx and Engels had a more continuous and balanced opinion, but they also state that, in spite of their interest in the history of philosophy, they never found the time to write the historical studies they planned.[88] Lenin, finally, was too busy with political affairs to elaborate a conception of the history of philosophy: *Materializm i èmpiriokriticizm* is, in spite of its many references to Kant, Hume, and others, a polemical rather than an historical work, and what remains of his studies of Hegel's

Wissenschaft der Logik and his *Lectures...* (both on the history of philosophy and on the philosophy of history), pursued while in exile in Switzerland in 1914/5, is a combination of excerpt and commentary, which, though often interesting, does not offer a theory of the history of philosophy.

Between Reduction and Retrospect: Six Marx-Engelsian Impulses

A main problem in the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy was that it could not really give an answer to the question as to how philosophy is concretely related to history. The inner logic of philosophy's development and the outer history of philosophy were left to stand next to each other as two 'sides', and a solution to this problem should be sought by emphasizing the concrete nature of philosophy as active thought by finite individuals in a socio-historical situation, aiming at a true understanding of reality. Historical materialism arose from a critique of Hegel's philosophy, denying his conception of '*Idee*' and '*Geist*' as the substance of (historical) reality, and turning to the material (re)production of mankind instead. It therefore seems reasonable to expect an answer to the problem just mentioned from historical materialism, and Irrlitz and Lübke indeed claim that Marx and Engels solved Hegel's problem.[89]

In fact, they make an even more sweeping claim: specifying their gratuitous remark that "Marx' and Engels' materialist conception of history started a new epoch in the historiography of philosophy," they argue that the "productive principles of the main preceding stages" are united in Marxism:

> Damit wurden die produktiven Ansätze sowohl der aufklärerischen wie der Hegelschen Kulturgeschichtsschreibung, also das Prinzip des Kampfes zwischen progressiven und konservativen Ideen als Hauptinhalt der Philosophiegeschichte, und der Totalitätsgesichtspunkt, im Rahmen materialistischer Kausalauffassung entfaltet.[90]

If this were true, Soviet philosophy would have inherited a ready-made Marxist(–Leninist) conception of the history of philosophy, only to be further elaborated and applied by Soviet historians of philosophy. This, however, is not the case: the three elements mentioned by Irrlitz and Lübke (the principle of the struggle of progressive and conservative ideas, the '*Totalitätsgesichtspunkt*', and material determination) are recognizable as *distinct* impulses in the works of Marx and Engels, and Soviet philosophy thus inherited, through Plekhanov and Lenin, a number of partially elaborated conceptions of the history of philosophy.

1. In the first place, there is Marx' doctoral dissertation (1841), "written in the flush of his Young-Hegelian period."[91] Employing Hegel as a champion of rationality and freedom, and as an ally in anti-religious struggle, Marx stressed the importance of atheism and materialism for social progress, placing Epicurus in the 'Promethean' tradition.[92] He thus significantly amended Hegel, but for Marx this was rather a supplementation:

> *Hegel* hat zwar das Allgemeine der genannten Systeme [of Democritus and Epicurus, EvdZ] im ganzen richtig bestimmt; allein bei dem bewunderungswürdig großen und

kühnen Plan seiner Geschichte der Philosophie, von der überhaupt erst die Geschichte der Philosophie datiert werden kann, war es teils unmöglich, in das einzelne einzugehen, teils hinderte den riesenhaften Denker seine Ansicht von dem, was er par excellence spekulativ nannte, in diesen Systemen die hohe Bedeutung zu erkennen, die sie für die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und den griechischen Geist überhaupt haben.[93]

Marx also followed the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy when he explained the development from Democritus to Epicurus in terms of contradictions in the former's system:

The theme of his doctoral dissertation... was the inadequacy of the Democritean view of science, which treated the atom purely 'empirically', in isolated abstraction, and therefore failed to develop and resolve the logical contradictions contained within it. These contradictions, Marx argued, led necessarily, as a matter of logical development, to the Epicurean doctrine of the 'swerve'.[94]

Philosophy develops historically, due to the inner logic of philosophical theory, and the progressive character of 'Promethean' philosophy is a result of its rationality:

Epikur ist... der größte griechische Aufklärer... Bei *Epikur* ist daher die *Atomistik* mit allen ihren Widersprüchen *als die Naturwissenschaft des Selbstbewußtseins*, das sich unter der Form der abstrakten Einzelheit absolutes Prinzip ist, bis zur höchsten Konsequenz... durchgeführt und vollendet.[95]

2. A second impulse is present in *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845/6) and *Das Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* (1848). Its most concise formulation can be found in the theses against Feuerbach (1845), especially the 3rd, the 8th and the 11th.[96] The central idea is the rejection of philosophy altogether as delusive speculation, and its replacement by science and revolutionary practice:

Da, wo die Spekulation aufhört, beim wirklichen Leben, beginnt also die wirkliche, positive Wissenschaft, die Darstellung der praktischen Betätigung, des praktischen Entwicklungsprozesses der Menschen. (...) Die selbständige Philosophie verliert mit der Darstellung der Wirklichkeit ihr Existenzmedium.[97]

Philosophy is a form of false consciousness, replacing reality with ideality. In Hegel's philosophy this ideological character becomes manifest, and in Marx and Engels philosophy 'sublates itself'.

3. A third element is the interpretation of philosophy as part of 'social consciousness', determined by the socio-economic basis. The classical formulation of this basic idea of historical materialism can be found in the 'Preface' to Marx' *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* of 1858/9:

Die Gesamtheit dieser Produktionsverhältnisse bildet die ökonomische Struktur der Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf sich ein juristischer und politischer Überbau

erhebt und welcher bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bewußtseinsformen entsprechen. Die Produktionsweise des materiellen Lebens bedingt den sozialen, politischen und geistigen Lebensprozeß überhaupt. Es ist nicht das Bewußtsein der Menschen, daß ihr Sein, sondern umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, daß ihr Bewußtsein bestimmt.[98]

Lenin applauded this passage as "an integral formulation of the fundamental theses of materialism, extended to human society and its history," and it became a classic quotation in authoritative Soviet sources.[99] Its economism deprives philosophy of its autonomy and proper history: like any form of social consciousness, philosophy reflects the historical development of society through class struggle, and is "an illustration of the history of something else."[100] To quote Marx and Engels:

Die Moral, Religion, Metaphysik und sonstige Ideologie und die ihnen entsprechenden Bewußtseinsformen behalten hiermit nicht länger den Schein der Selbständigkeit. Sie haben keine Geschichte, sie haben keine Entwicklung, sondern die ihre materielle Produktion und ihren materiellen Verkehr entwickelnden Menschen ändern mit dieser ihrer Wirklichkeit auch ihr Denken und die Produkte ihres Denkens.[101]

This conception leaves no room for rational argument for philosophical problems as a specific type of problems, nor for the fact that philosophers react mainly to the work of their predecessors. As Kamenka argued:

The point may be brought out by taking a period of philosophical development at first sight extremely favorable to the Marxist position: the development of German Idealism in the hands of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. All three men passed from revolutionary ardor to conservative reaction; all three saw their philosophies as having clear implications for politics in general and German policies in particular; all three had close relations with the Government and were treated by it as valuable political ideologists. As formulators of conclusions, as inspirers of policies, as expressions of a *Zeitgeist*, they may be of interest to the political historian... But to the historian of philosophy they are philosophers insofar as they were attempting to solve certain characteristically philosophical problems and to develop certain characteristically philosophical arguments.[102]

Although it is a mistake to draw a dividing line between philosophers as philosophers and philosophers as members of a given society, declaring the first to be the sole object of history of philosophy, Kamenka is right that to neglect the philosophical nature of what philosophers are doing is to deny an important part of what happens in history. Economic reductionism not only does not yield a workable basis for concrete historical research, it also fails to do justice to the intellectual 'pre-history' of the Marx-Engelsian theory itself.

4. A fourth position repairs this situation. Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (1888) is an attempt to award Marxism its rightful place in the history of *philosophy*, and to rehabilitate Hegel as a philosopher.[103] "The genius," Kamenka commented, "of Hegel, for Engels as for Marx, lay in Hegel's closeness to, and discovery of, important truths that were not

relative to his time, or to anyone's time."[104] In this text, Engels presents the thesis of the existence in philosophy of "two camps," linked with contrary answers to the "basic question of philosophy" with its two sides, the ontological and the epistemological:

> Die große Grundfrage aller, speziell neueren Philosophie ist die nach dem Verhältnis von Denken und Sein. (...) Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis... des Geistes zur Natur... (...) Je nachdem diese Frage so oder so beantwortet wurde, spalteten sich die Philosophen in zwei große Lager. Diejenigen, die die Ursprünglichkeit des Geistes gegenüber der Natur behaupteten, also in letzter Instanz eine Weltschöpfung irgendeiner Art annahmen... bildeten das Lager des Idealismus. Die andern, die die Natur als das Ursprüngliche ansahen, gehören zu den verschiednen Schulen des Materialismus.[105]

The two 'camps' are not mere expressions of class struggle, even if they play a role in it.[106] The very fact that Engels takes the 'basic question' seriously, signifies a toning down of economic reductionism:

> Noch höhere, d.h. noch mehr von der materiellen, ökonomischen Grundlage sich entfernende Ideologien nehmen die Form der Philosophie und der Religion an. Hier wird der Zusammenhang der Vorstellungen mit ihren materiellen Daseinsbedingungen immer verwickelter, immer mehr durch Zwischenglieder verdunkelt. Aber er existiert.[107]

We witness a return of philosophical *truth* here: Engels repeats the thesis about the end of philosophy and its replacement by science, but he clearly presupposes the truth of the materialist answer to the 'basic question'.[108] The history of philosophy is the battleground of two camps which side with class struggle: materialism with progress, idealism with reaction. Engels further distinguishes between two philosophical methods, and links these with political positions, too: metaphysics with status quo, dialectics with change and revolution.[109] In this way, Engels' text entails a *vertical dichotomization* of the history of philosophy.

5. A fifth position is implied by Engels' conception of dialectical materialism as the right combination of a materialist answer to the ontological side, a realist answer to the epistemological side of the 'basic question' of philosophy, and a dialectical answer to the question of method. Until Marx, materialism always was, according to Engels, 'mechanical' materialism, regarding nature as a realm of necessity in which no real change can take place. Dialectics was developed in the 'idealist camp', finding its supreme formulation in Hegel. Dialectical materialism put an end to this dichotomic history of philosophy.

A consequence of this is that philosophy regains its proper history, not only as a battle-ground of 'camps', but also as the pre-history of the combination of linking the right answer to the basic question by means of the right philosophical method.[110] All philosophical trends and schools relate themselves to the history of philosophy: Engels, formulating the 'historical self-awarenes' of the philosophy of Marx, presented it as the result of philosophy's history. This means a reconstitution of the history of philosophy, but it also implies a *horizontal dichotomization* of

philosophy's history, making "philosophy before Marx and philosophy after Marx [...] really incomparable."[111]

6. Finally, a sixth motive can be discerned that rehabilitates philosophy as a profession and gives the history of philosophy a place in current theory:

> For Marx, as for Hegel, inadequacy and abstraction reveal themselves by generating contradictions and a resultant instability of view... In this spirit, the history of philosophy might be seen as an object lesson in falsity, as an argument worked out in time, leading through its contradictions to the exposure of false views.[112]

This position is present in a statement in Engels' *Dialektik der Natur*, widely employed in Soviet philosophy as a justification for investigations of the history of philosophy:

> Das theoretische Denken ist aber nur der Anlage nach eine angeborne Eigenschaft. Diese Anlage muß entwickelt, ausgebildet werden, und für diese Ausbildung gibt es bis jetzt kein andres Mittel als das Studium der bisherigen Philosophie.[113]

A Mixed (Anti–) Hegelian Legacy

The impulses just distinguished are not present in the works of Marx and Engels as explicit and subsequent positions. The point is not that they are all mutually exclusive, but that it is difficult to unite them into a 'Marxist conception of the history of philosophy'. In point of fact, they demonstrate a development from Young Hegelianism to historical materialism (impulses 1 – 3), and from historical materialism to dialectical materialism (impulses 4 and 5).[114] There is a tension between an (allegedly) *scientific* theory of society and history (including philosophy as part of the ideological superstructure), and an (allegedly) universal theory of reality, i.e. a *philosophical* theory. In other words, it is not necessary for Marxists to give, as Hegelians would say, a determination [*Bestimmung*] of the Absolute, but to the extent to which they actually do so, they are forced in the direction of a philosophical theory and, consequently, in the direction of the fifth position.

All six impulses are related to elements of the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy. The 1st denies Hegel's identification of genuine philosophy with idealism, and rehabilitates materialism. The 2nd denies the status of philosophy as speculative truth, hence its further development can only be the transition to revolutionary practice. The 3rd inverts the relation of philosophy to history: both Hegel and Marx regarded social-historical reality as a developing totality, but what in Hegel is the true understanding of an epoch becomes an expression of contradictory social reality in Marx. The 4th impulse turns Hegel 'upside down', materialism instead of idealism being elevated to the status of true philosophy. The 5th impulse transfers Hegel's claim to represent the conclusion of the history of philosophy (a claim taken for granted in impulses 1 to 3) to Marxism. The 6th, finally, reduces the history of philosophy to a collection of already refuted instructive positions.

The 1st impulse adopts the Hegelian idea of an inner logic of the historical development of philosophy, the 2nd accepts Hegel's claim to conclude that

development but denies its truth, the 3rd absolutizes the notion of 'outer history', the 4th absolutizes the struggle of opposites, the 5th, by contrast, reintroduces the notion of final result, the 6th finally absolutizes the notion of one-sidedness of all philosophical positions of the past.

Of these six impulses, the first two clearly do not belong to classical Marxism, and the sixth is not distinctively Marxist.[115] We are left, then, with *three main impulses*, not forcibly excluding each other, but not easily united into one conception either. These impulses will be referred to as the *economistic*, the *dichotomic*, and the *totalizing* view of the history of philosophy.

The economistic impulse is closest to historical materialism, and the most 'Marxian' position. The totalizing view is closer to dialectical materialism, and becomes important to the extent to which the latter is promoted to the status of a philosophical system. It is the necessary consequence of the claim to be the final stage in philosophy. The dichotomic impulse, finally, is closest to the role of philosophy in ideological struggle. The economistic and the dichotomic impulse can be linked in an arguable way, and so can the dichotomic and the totalizing impulse, but *the economistic and the totalizing impulse cannot.*

If the economistic and the dichotomic impulse are combined, philosophical ideas reflect objective social contradictions. History is the history of class struggle: there is always a ruling class which produces idealistic ideas that relate the conciliation of social differences to an ideal, supernatural world, and metaphysical ideas that deny any real progress. The oppositional, revolutionary class produces materialist and dialectical ideas, the first keeping problems on the level where they belong, the second treating development as the very essence of reality, the two together pointing the way to social progress. The totalizing view is thereby excluded, because the victory of one social class would ultimately favor one side in philosophical class struggle.

A combination of the totalizing and the dichotomic impulse yields a totally different conception, namely one that presents true philosophy, dialectical materialism, as the synthesis of a struggle of theories. Given the two oppositions of dialectical versus metaphysical and idealist versus materialist, the revolution in the history of philosophy is the emergence of the 'right combination'. Materialism is the only right answer to the basic question of the relation of thought to being, dialectics the only right philosophical method, and the history of philosophy was necessary to reach this conclusion. This conception regards philosophy not as an expression of something else, but as true theory, which excludes economic reductionism.

A combination of the economistic and the totalizing view, therefore, is impossible inasmuch as the reduction of philosophy to a result of class struggle is incompatible with the elevation of dialectical materialism to the status of an historically inevitable, true result of philosophy's development. From a reductionist perspective, truth can never be more than an accidental effect of history. The only way to unite them is to regard class struggle as the vehicle of philosophical truth: one class would be in a privileged position to discover it. This, however, excludes the dichotomic view, because it renders all dichotomy temporary, to be elevated in a

final synthesis. Moreover, it 'absorbs' the economistic position because philosophy no is longer relative to the economic basis: social progress and philosophical development coincide, because the incarnation of historical progress, the proletariate, is at the same time the bearer of true theory. In the end, the three impulses can only be kept together if, indeed, the economistic impulse is absorbed and the dichotomic impulse temporized, and both 'sublated' [*aufgehoben*] into a totalizing position.

The Third Klassik Marksizma-Leninizma: Lenin on the History of Philosophy

This is not the place for an elaborate discussion of the reception and development of Marxism in czarist Russia. I shall keep to the generally accepted opinion that Russian Marxism was founded by Plekhanov, practically, as the initiator of the first explicitly Marxist political organization, and intellectually, inspiring many protagonists of early Soviet philosophical history, including Lenin.[116] Plekhanov, who regarded himself as an orthodox Marxist, saw dialectical materialism as a philosophical *system*, thus following the 'Engelsian' rather than the 'Marxian' line.[117] He rejected any sort of dualism, recognizing the two monistic answers, materialism and idealism, as the only genuine answers to the 'basic question':

Dualism was never able to reply satisfactorily to the inevitable question: how could these two separate and independent substances ['spirit' and 'matter', EvdZ], which have nothing in common between them, influence each other? Therefore the most consistent and most profound thinkers were always inclined to *monism*...[118]

Like Engels, he invoked Hegelian dialectics in order to solve the basic question.[119] He clearly opposed a 'determinist' or 'economist' interpretation of history, stressing instead "social man" as the sole "factor" in history, capable of achieving the freedom (understood as 'recognized necessity') to act in history by means of a *true understanding* of (historical) reality:

Thus dialectical materialism not only does not try, as its opponents attribute to it, to convince man that it is absurd to revolt against economic necessity, but it is the first to point out *how to overcome* the latter. Thus is eliminated the *inevitably fatalist* character inherent in *metaphysical materialism*. (...) ...it depends on us to overthrow its yoke, it depends on us to make *necessity* the obedient slave of *reason*.[120]

With respect to the history of philosophy, Plekhanov combined the dichotomic and the totalizing view.[121] Both the basic question and the answer, dialectical materialism, were taken seriously by him as *philosophy*, not as mere reflections of social oppositions. In his own words:

People made and had to make their history *unconsciously* as long as the motive forces of historical development worked behind their backs, independently of their consciousness. Once those forces have been discovered..., people will be able to take them in their own hands and submit them to their own reason. (...) For Marx and the Marxists the proletariat is a majestic force, the bearer of the future. Only the proletariat is capable of mastering the teaching of Marx..., and we see how it is in fact becoming more and more permeated with its content.[122]

Lenin accepted Plekhanov's vision of orthodox Marxism as a systematic dialectical materialist philosophy, and he clearly tended towards the dichotomic and the totalizing impulse. In *Materializm i ėmpiriokriticizm* he stressed, in matchless militancy, the opposition between materialism and idealism:

> In the course of the entire foregoing exposition... we have been tracing the struggle between *materialism* and *idealism*. Behind the heap of new terminological contrivances, behind the dust of *Gelehrten*-scholastics, we always, without exception, have found *two* basic lines, two fundamental tendencies in the solution of philosophical problems. Should one take as primary nature, matter, the physical, the external world – and regard as secondary consciousness, spirit, sensation (– experience, according to the terminology *prevalent* in our day), the psychic and so on, that is the radical question, which *in fact* continues to divide the philosophers into two large camps.[123]

But in his *Filosofskie tetrady* Lenin showed himself impressed by Hegel's account of the history of philosophy, and, commenting on his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, almost identified idealism and materialism:

> It is remarkable, that the whole chapter about 'the absolute idea' hardly says a word about god..., and moreover... hardly contains anything specifically *idealistic*, but has as its main subject the dialectical method. Result and résumé, the final word and the essence of the logic of Hegel is the dialectical method – this is most remarkable. And also this: in this most idealistic work by Hegel is the least idealism, the most materialism. 'Contradictory', but a matter of fact.[124]

In *Materializm i ėmpiriokriticizm* Lenin stressed the dichotomy of idealism and materialism, reducing philosophy to a radical choice, and depriving philosophy of its history, but in *Filosofskie tetrady* he attached equal importance to philosophical method, i.e. to the opposition of dialectics and metaphysics, thereby subsuming the dichotomic under the totalizing impulse: philosophy has a history at least in the sense of the emergence of the right combination of materialism and dialectics.[125] Finally, the totalizing impulse is manifest in Lenin's presentation of Marxism as the synthesis of "the best that mankind has created in the 19th century," viz German idealist philosophy, French utopian socialism and British political economy, which, again, means to take seriously philosophical theory in a way that seems hard to insert in an economistic interpretation of 'social consciousness'.[126] We thus see, in Plekhanov and Lenin, a tendency towards the combination of the dichotomizing and totalizing impulses, at the expense of the economistic impulse.

Chapter Two

Soviet Philosophical Culture

> After all, philosophic works officially published in the USSR should be, by definition, Marxist-Leninist.
>
> Lion Chernyak 1987[1]

> ...si on a pris la décision de philosopher, il faut aller jusq'au bout.
>
> Bernard Jeu, 1969[2]

The aim of this chapter is to provide the background for the discussion of Soviet history of philosophy, *IFN*, through an analysis and survey of Soviet philosophical culture. First of all, the historical development of *IFN*, the topic of the next chapter, was tightly linked to the history of Soviet philosophy as a whole, and can be divided into the same periods. Secondly, *IFN* was one among many philosophical disciplines, and in order to understand its relation to ideology, its place and function within Soviet philosophical culture, as well as its relation to other philosophical disciplines, it is first necessary to establish the general nature of Soviet philosophy. Thirdly, *IFN* also was the 'historical self-awareness' of Soviet philosophy, and it cannot be properly understood without a clear insight into the latter.

The first part of this chapter presents an analysis of the relation of philosophy to ideology in the Soviet system, distinguishing between the subordination of philosophy to its ideological function and the 'ideology of Soviet philosophy' that legitimatized Soviet philosophical culture as it actually existed [2.i]. The second part describes the period after the October revolution, a period of gradual exclusion of non-Marxist philosophy and of lively discussions among Soviet Marxists, all ended through Party interventions and leading to the establishment of Marxist(–Leninist) orthodoxy (1917-1930) [2.ii]. The third part discusses the creation of Soviet philosophy as an integral part of the Soviet system, and of the basics of the ideology of Soviet Philosophy (1931-1946) [2.iii]. The next part covers the effects on Soviet philosophical culture of the revival of ideological struggle that took place after World War II (1947-1954) [2.iv]. The fifth part highlights the partly temporary, partly lasting effects of 'thaw' in the field of philosophy (1955-1966) [2.v], while the sixth part discusses the period in which the limits of development of Soviet philosophy began to show (1967-1975) [2.vi]. This led to the period of 'stagnation', which for philosophy was a period of increasing differentiation and professionalization (1976-1985) [2.vii]. The concluding part points out the effects of 'perestrojka' on philosophical culture in the USSR, effects which led to the end of Soviet philosophical culture (1986-1989) [2.viii].

2.i *Philosophical Culture and the Ideology of Soviet Philosophy*

Soviet philosophy has received the attention of Western and emigrated Russian scholars of very different backgrounds, ranging from religious idealism (Nikolaj Berdjaev, Nikolaj Losskij, Sergej Levickij), via approaches sympathetic to Hegel or Marx (Herbert Marcuse, Leszek Kołakowski), or to materialism (John Somerville, Loren Graham), to Neo-Thomism, phenomenology, and analytical philosophy (Gustav Wetter, Josef Bocheński, and the tradition of 'philosophical sovietology').[3] From these perspectives, Soviet philosophy has appeared as a manifestation of the Antichrist, atheist materialism, petrified dialectics, a perversion of Marxism, a promising non-reductionist materialism, a non-scientific philosophical world-view, or simply 'bad philosophy'. What these approaches had in common was a perception of Soviet philosophy as, first and foremost, a particular philosophical theory or a school of thought: '(Soviet) dialectical and historical materialism'. This, I believe, is a mistake: 'Soviet philosophy' does not denote a philosophical school or theory, but an historically limited type of philosophical culture, a complex of opportunities, restrictions, institutions, organisations, and traditions, within which philosophy was done. Soviet philosophy is the place where a Russian, Estonian, or Uzbek student of philosophy would receive his training as a professional philosopher, get acquainted with texts, topics and problems, familiarize himself with the ways in which philosophical texts were to be produced, with the ideological conditions of philosophical discussion, and with the possibilities and impossibilities of making one's ideas public.

The key to understanding Soviet philosophical culture is its dual determination by 'ideology'. On the one hand, philosophy was subjected to political power, and subordinated to an official, Marxist-Leninist ideology: these aspects come together in effective control by the CPSU over philosophical culture. On the other hand, the Soviet system itself claimed to have philosophy as part of the theoretical basis of its Marxist-Leninist ideology, the latter providing the legitimatization of the system as it existed and developed.

If the Soviet system was not always and not in every respect what it claimed to be, and produced an ideological image of itself, we may assume that Soviet philosophical culture, in its outward presentation, did not necessarily represent its 'reality' either. At the same time, these self-produced ideological representations are not 'mere illusions', but part of the reality they represent. Just as the continuous window-dressing of the Soviet economy could not, in the end, convince people that they were approaching a Communist paradise, but successfully precluded measures to reform it, and just as the permanent boosting of 'socialist democracy' could not make people enthusiastic about pre-arranged elections, but was effective in checking the development of political consciousness, so the ideology of Soviet philosophy obviously did not represent its reality, but blocked other representations. The place of a representation of reality, which is what people base their actions upon, can be occupied only once.

If to understand Soviet philosophy as a particular school of philosophy is to misunderstand the historical phenomenon of Soviet philosophical culture, one must ask why this mistake became so widespread. The answer is: because Soviet

philosophical culture produced it. Our perception of Soviet philosophical culture tends to be blurred by the ubiquitous story that it told about itself. Every philosophical culture presupposes a meta-philosophical theory about what philosophy is, and about what it is not, and this theory performs an ideological function in justifying that philosophical culture, both inwardly, by motivating philosophers to contribute to it and by giving them a sense of purpose and discipline, and outwardly, by legitimatizing its place in the academic world and in society as well as the budgets spent on it. Every philosophical culture holds a place for such a meta-philosophical theory, and, like any place, it can be occupied only once (or be divided between a dominant culture and one or more sub- or countercultures). Hence, the presence of an official ideology of philosophy excluded alternative conceptions of philosophy, as well as any serious meta-philosophical discussion. This was one of the reasons why Soviet philosophical culture made such a monolithic and outdated impression, resembling a cumulative positive science rather than a breeding ground of mutually exclusive positions.

The most outstanding feature of Soviet philosophy was its identification with Marxist-Leninist philosophy, though not with Marxist(–Leninist) *ideology*: "Dialectical materialism is the philosophy *of* Marxism-Leninism... [italics mine, EvdZ]."[4] It was treated as fundamental to it: "Dialectical and historical materialism are the philosophical foundation of Marxism-Leninism."[5] The key to understanding Soviet philosophical culture is to see this 'philosophy of Marxism-Leninism' as the central concept of an ideologically functioning meta-theory that had very little to do with philosophical theory or philosophical thought, but everything with the conditions under which the latter could or could not take place. This difficulty is further aggravated by the fact that this meta-theory about Soviet philosophy was, itself, in form and content, though not in function, philosophical. And it is complicated, finally, by the fact that many Soviet philosophers *were* convinced Marxists or Leninists.

The ideological situation just outlined was the *decisive factor* in shaping Soviet philosophical culture. Philosophy never is an evident part of society and culture, and therefore always has to be ideologically legitimatized. This, in combination with the position of Marxism-Leninism as a universal medium of legitimacy, implies that anything philosophical that actually existed in the USSR had to be accounted for, in order to be legitimate, in terms of dominant ideology. Hence, the production and sophistication of a theory about (Soviet) philosophy that could serve as its ideological legitimatization was an indispensable element of Soviet philosophical culture.

The "philosophy of Marxism-Leninism" was an artefact, created in the 1930s and protected and adapted later on, up to and including the *perestrojka* years. Both the system of *diamat* and *istmat* and the ideology of Soviet philosophy were *facts* of Soviet society. The former was taught, adjusted, and refined, the latter repeated, adapted, and sophisticated. Therefore, the question is how 'genuine philosophy' was possible given these realities. Two authors who have succesfully tackled this problem are Bernard Jeu and James Scanlan, the first by emphasizing the unpredictable outcome of the *development* of whatever content of philosophical thought, the second by emphasizing the fact that "in practice people will invest

whatever words they have with the meanings they find necessary in order to make sense of their experience."[6] Together, the objective, logical potential of philosophical theory, and the subjective urge of individually thinking human beings to make sense of their situation and experience, employing the concepts and theories given to them by existing philosophical culture, account for the possibility of a dynamics of philosophical thought on the basis of *any*, including the most dogmatic, philosophical theory. At the same time this dynamics has to develop within a given, concrete situation, which is not necessarily favorable to it. In the case of Soviet philosophical culture, it was not favored to the extent to which any development threatened, at least potentially, the very basis from which it took off, but it was favored by the important fact that philosophical dogma itself had to be adapted to new political, economic, and scientific realities, and that the only way to do so was to let philosophical thought develop, albeit in a limited space. All Soviet philosophical production was Marxist-Leninist "by definition," and while this definition could cover a variety of positions, it was a standard to which Soviet philosophers had agreed in advance, and hence could be measured by.[7]

Soviet philosophy was an *official* philosophy, an integral part of a 'totalitarian system.' Without exception, all Soviet leaders have expressed their concern about the state of philosophy in the USSR, often on the pages of the main philosophical journal, *Voprosy filosofii*.[8] Soviet philosophy was *orthodox*, in the sense that its current version was not to be questioned: such questioning began during *perestrojka* and was already part of the decline of Soviet philosophy, just as the exclusion of serious challenge had accompanied its establishment. Soviet philosophy was *dogmatic*, in the sense that its main tenets were repeated so frequently and uniformly that they looked like ritual formulas. Soviet philosophy was adapted to changing circumstance, and to this end its main tenets were so *flexible* as to become almost void of meaning. The official philosophy that was part of the Soviet system can therefore be aptly described as *flexible dogma*.

The 'ideology of philosophy' warranted the subordination of philosophy to its ideological function, but it also made possible the *legitimate existence* of philosophy in the USSR. To 'de-diabolicize' our perception of Soviet philosophical culture means to understand it in terms of 'normal' particular interests and ideological mechanisms. As N. Vasil'ev remarked with respect to one branche of Soviet philosophy:

> The *real state* of... critique of contemporary philosophy and sociology is the result of the combination of the demands of power and the interests of the very people who work in that branch. By the way, everything in Soviet society is the result of... the interaction of these two levels...[9]

It is tempting to think that philosophical thought in the USSR could only exist outside, or in opposition to Soviet philosophy, in *samizdat*, *tamizdat*, "apocryphal philosophy," or the catacombs.[10] This, again, is misleading: the border between legitimate and illegitimate was crossed by individual philosophers, and some were on both sides of the border at the same time. Moreover, what is illegitimate is determined by what is legitimate, is *its* illegitimate 'other,' and this regards both

content, form, and function of philosophy: Mamardašvili, as he said himself, would have developed his philosophical activity differently in a different situation, and he would certainly not have become the kind of cult-figure he became.[11] Hence, to investigate Soviet philosophy must mean to investigate it in its entirety, including its official, dogmatic 'core,' its multitude of specialized disciplines, and its catacomb counter-culture.

The inner dynamics in Soviet philosophy, amply demonstrated by Western investigations into specialist branches like aesthetics, logic, ethics, theory of knowledge, and even dialectical materialism, stems from the fact that, though dominated by the official 'philosophy of Marxism-Leninism', the *content* of Soviet philosophical culture -concepts, ideas, theories, discussions- still was the result of individual philosophical thought. Even the most obvious adaptation of official dogma, such as the temporary abolition of the third law of materialist dialectics, that of the negation of negation, requires individual thinking both to abolish and to reintroduce it.[12] The claim of the Soviet system to be guided by a scientific ideology, with a philosophical system as its theoretical foundation, necessitated specialist work by professional philosophers in at least four ways: in sophisticating that philosophical system, in mediating between ideologically motivated requirements and actual developments in science, in meeting the standards of an international scene on which Soviet philosophy claimed to play its part, and in rounding off the philosophical system with an account and interpretation of philosophy's history.

The function of 'ideology of Soviet philosophy' was performed by a theory about philosophy in general, and Soviet philosophy in particular. This theory was part of official philosophy, and thus an application of historical materialism to philosophy as one of the forms of 'social consciousness': political ideology, legal consciousness, morality, religion, science, art, and philosophy.[13] All forms of social consciousness were claimed to be determinded, "in the final analysis [*v konečnom sčёte*]," by the development of productive forces and by class struggle, but "within the limits of its general dependence on social being, the various forms of social consciousness possess a certain relative independence [*otnositel'naja samostojatel'nost'*]," manifest in "continuity [*preemstvennost'*] of development," and in active influence on social development.[14]

It is important to note that *science*, upon this official account, is ideologically neutral inasmuch as its aim is objective knowledge of reality, which is why it "changes, in the course of history, into a *productive force* of society."[15] This means that philosophy, to the extent to which it is scientific, becomes ideologically neutral, too. Marxist-Leninist world-view or ideology was claimed to be scientific *and* philosophical. *Scientific* because the interests of the international working class coincide with the objective development of history, and hence objective scientific truth about reality is on the side of the working class, which is also why "with the victory of socialism, Marxism-Leninism becomes the ideology of society as a whole."[16] *Philosophical*, because "its philosophical basis is dialectical and historical materialism."[17] The central place of philosophy in the system of scientific knowledge is further determined by the fact that it generalizes the results of all other sciences, and arms them with the appropriate approaches to the phenomena that they

have to study.[18] According to official sources, Soviet philosophy performed several *functions*:

...Marxist philosophy is a consistently scientific-philosophical *world-view*, and a general *methodology* for the knowledge of objective reality and revolutionary action. Carrying out these functions, it elaborates the means of *world-view orientation* [*mirovozzrenčeskaja orientacija*] of man, of the *theoretical foundation* of the practical struggle of progressive social forces, and the general *methodological principles of investigation* in the field of all particular sciences [italics mine, EvdZ].[19]

The 'ideology of Soviet philosophy' results from the interplay of three basic notions: *partijnost'* [partisanship], *naučnost'* [scientific nature], and *sistemnost'* [systematic nature], gathered under the aegis of the *Marxist-Leninist* nature of Soviet philosophy. Official Marxist-Leninist philosophy thus preserved essential features of the Hegelian conception of philosophy that immediately preceded Marxism: the idea of philosophy as a *system*, as a *science*, and as *partisan* (in Hegel *Parteilichkeit*).[20] *Partijnost* is usually translated as 'partisanship', but means not only 'party spirit' but also simply 'belonging to the party'.[21] Four meanings of *partijnost'* can be distinguished:

- **1** the objective class-bound *nature* of all forms of social consciousness;
- **2** the *attitude* required of all Marxists, including Soviet philosophers;
- **3** the *right* and obligation of the Party to decide and interfere in questions of ideology;
- **4** the actual *control* by the Party over philosophical culture.

The notion of *partijnost'* is based upon Marx' and Engels' doctrine that all forms of social consciousness are class-bound: it was part of the historical materialist theory about 'social consciousness' [*theoretical partijnost'* (**1**)]. Lenin turned this into the practical maxim to be partisan in all ideological matters [*militant partijnost'* (**2**)]. This application was realized in the subordination of other values (moral, aesthetic, scientific) and interests (economic, private, intellectual) to those of the Party. The establishment of Bolshevik Party-rule changed this militant and motivating notion of *partijnost'* into 'Stalinist' *partijnost'*: the Party's right to interfere in any realm of superstructure [*legitimate partijnost'* (**3**)]. This signified the ideological legitimatization of the 'leading role of the Party' in political and ideological matters, including its control over philosophy [*material partijnost'* (**4**)]:

...since the Party is the 'vanguard' of the working class, expressing its basic interests, it follows that partisanship in philosophy is possible only when the position of the Party is taken; and, of course, only the Party can decide when this is the case.[22]

For a proper understanding of Leninism, *militant partijnost'* [**2**] (the application of *theoretical partijnost'* [**1**] to the party itself) is essential, but *actual partijnost'* [**3**

+ 4] was the heart of the Soviet system, warranted by the notorious 6th article of the *Konstitucija*, in force from 1936 to 1990.[23]

The *scientific* nature of Soviet philosophy received equal stress as its *partijnost'*, philosophy being defined as the "science about the universal laws of development of nature, society, and thought [*nauka o naibolee obščikh zakonakh razvitija prirody, obščestva i myšlenija*]."[24] Thus the long process of turning philosophy into genuine science was completed:

> The basis of the unity of the *partijnost'* and the scientific nature [*naučnost'*] of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the coincidence of the class-interests of the proletariat with the real logic of history, and *eo ipso* with the interests of progressive mankind as a whole.[25]

The third basic element of the ideological account of Soviet philosophy was its alleged *systematic* nature. There are two sides to this notion. One is that it was presented as a philosophical *system* in the sense of unity of parts, and in the sense of *development*:

> The philosophy of Marxism, rejecting the idea of a once and forever concluded philosophical system, at the same time is a *dialectical-materialist system*. This means, that the philosophy of Marxism is characterized by a fundamental unity of its component theses, and, further, that it... develops...[26]

Marxist-Leninist philosophy was claimed to be in *permanentdevelopment*, because material reality –nature, society, and thought– is permanently developing, and science, in its 'reflection' of that reality, is developing, too:

> Marxist-Leninist philosophy does not rest on what is achieved: in union with natural science and the social sciences, in close connection with historical experience, and with the practice of constructing communism, it pushes forward to new problems and new solutions.[27]

This points to another sense of '*system*': philosophy as a *system of disciplines*. The emergence of to some extent autonomous disciplines was a potential threat to the unity of Soviet philosophy, and had therefore to be legitimatized and 'contained' within an overall 'system':

> The philosophy of Marxism-Leninism is dialectical materialism, and, appearing in unity with it, historical materialism. *Also* part of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism are: philosophical questions of natural science [*filosofskie voprosy estestvoznanija*], psychology, ethics, aesthetics, scientific atheism [*naučnyj ateizm*], and history of philosophy [*istoriko-filosofskaja nauka*]; they are the result of the application of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of moral consciousness, to the laws of development of art, to the development of natural science, to the history of the development of philosophical thought. Philosophy is *not only* the theory of objective dialectics and the logic of scientific knowledge, *but also* a general sociological, ethical, and aesthetic doctrine [italics mine, EvdZ].[28]

2.ii *The Wedding of Politics and Philosophy (1917-1930)*

Lenin did not pretend to be philosopher, but he read "a good deal of philosophical literature" and attached great significance to philosophical issues.[29] Karev rightly stated, in 1924, that "Lenin would have been most surprised if one had told him that he had opened a new era in Marxism," and Deborin, equally rightly, wrote in 1929 that "Plekhanov was most of all a theoretician, Lenin most of all a practical worker, a politician, a leader."[30] Lenin's main contribution to philosophy consists in a radical politicization of the notion of *partisanship*: every philosophical position is either materialist and politically progressive, or idealist and reactionary – 'militant *partijnost'* (**2**) is a mere consequence of this politicization.[31]

Lenin claimed Marxist theory to be 'objectively true':

> The only conclusion from the opinion, shared by Marxists, that Marx' theory is the objective truth, is the following: following *the road* of Marxian theory, we will come ever closer to objective truth (without ever exhausting it); *along any other road* we cannot arrive at anything but confusion and falsehood.[32]

The truth of Marxist theory warranted its practical success, and, by the same token, the success of the revolution demonstrated the truth of Marxist theory: "the Marxist doctrine is omnipotent, *because it is true* [italics mine, EvdZ]."[33]

It is a gross misunderstanding to claim that in the USSR "philosophy came to power" or "Marxism was realized."[34] Marxism was the theory that functioned as motivating ideology for the Bolshevik faction that seized political power in November 1917. The success of the Revolution changed the ideological function of Marxism from *motivating* and guiding a revolutionary movement to organizing and *legitimatizing* Bolshevik power and policy.[35]

The October revolution of 1917 led to a period of "civil war" in philosophy, but also of considerable intellectual freedom.[36] Nikolaj Aleksandrovič Berdjaev (1874-1948) was appointed professor of philosophy at Moscow university in 1920, non-Marxist philosophers continued to teach, and non-Marxist books and journals could appear.[37] This period of prosperity was ended by the closing down, in 1921-1922, of the Faculty of History and Philology (where philosophy was housed) of the university of Moscow, the dismissal of all university professors in philosophy, and the banishment, on Lenin's orders, of "the most representative part of Russian idealist philosophers."[38] Very few non-Marxist philosophers (Pavel Aleksandrovič Florenskij (1882-1937), Aleksej Fëdorovič Losev (1893-1988), Gustav Gustavovič Špet (1879-1937)), remained in the USSR.[39]

The years following this annihilation of non-Marxist philosophy are characterized by the building up of philosophical cadres by the Party.[40] By 1922 Marxism was the "official philosophy" of an established regime, reducing other trends to illegitimate "philosophical sectarianism," and allowing for "internal pluralism" *within* Marxism only, with theoreticians like Aleksandr Aleksandrovič Bogdanov [Malinovskij] (1873-1928), Anatolij Vasil'evič Lunačarskij (1875-1933), and Nikolaj Ivanovič Bukharin (1888-1938).[41] 'Inner pluralism' was stimulated by the

fact that the new government was forced to abandon central Marxist principles such as the 'withering away' of state structures, market economy and money.[42]

The 1920s were marked by three passionate discussions –especially on the pages of *Pod znamenem marksizma* [Under the Banner of Marxism], a journal founded in 1922 as a "mouthpiece of militant materialism"– about the role and status of philosophy in general, and of dialectical materialism in particular.[43] The first discussion was provoked by the radical article '*Filosofija za bort* [Philosophy overboard]!' by Sergej Konstantinovič Minin (1882-1962), who denied the very right of existence of a Marxist *philosophy* as separate from either positive science or Marxist political ideology.[44] The discussion between 'liquidationists' like Ėmmanuel Semënovic Enčmen (1891-19??), Vladimir Viktorovič Adoratskij (1878-1945) and Minin, and Marxist philosophers like Ljubov' Isaakovna Aksel'rod [Ortodoks] (1868-1946), Abram Moiseevič Deborin [Ioffe] (1881-1963) and Bukharin, was ended in 1923 by a condemnation by the Central Committee of Enčmen's theses.[45]

The second discussion was that between the 'mechanicists' led by Bukharin, and the 'dialecticians', later 'deborinists', headed by Deborin.[46] While the former repeated the classical Marxist notion of the replacement of philosophy by the sciences of nature and history, the 'deborinists' found support in the publication of Engels' *Dialektik der Natur* (1925).[47] The publication of Lenin's *Filosofskie tetrady* [Philosophical Notebooks] (1929) yielded further support, esp. through Lenin's admiration of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Like Plekhanov, Deborin's teacher and the originator of the term "dialectical materialism," the 'deborinists' saw dialectical materialism as a philosophical system, having as its basic category the material substance of the world, which, in a series of dialectical jumps, ultimately produces the highest form of matter, the human mind, capable of formulating dialectical materialism, i.e. the self-consciousness of material substance.[48] At the 'Second All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Institutes', organized by the 'deborinists' in 1930, 'mechanicism' was condemned as a "manifest deviation" from the point of view of *consistent Marxism-Leninism* [italics mine, EvdZ]."[49]

The third discussion began when the "bolshevizators," of which Mark Borisovič Mitin (1901-1987) and Pavel Fëdorovič Judin (1899-1968) belonged to the Party organization within the *Institut Krasnoj Professury* [Institute of Red Professors, f.1921], and who were explicitly backed by the Central Committee, attacked the 'deborinist' position.[50] The 'deborinists', "warning against the dissolution of philosophy in the political slogans of the day," were fighting a lost battle when Stalin denounced deborinism as "menshevizing idealism."[51] The discussion was ended on 25 January 1931 by a resolution of the Central Committee, in which both 'mechanicism' and 'menshevizing idealism (deborinism)' were condemned in favor of an "orthodox" position.[52]

All three discussions of the 1920s thus were ended by interventions from above: "Philosophical controversy had come to an end by political decree."[53] This signified the end of "internal pluralism," and the establishment of Marxism-*Leninism* as an orthodox philosophical doctrine.[54] Deborin's victory was the political victory of *orthodoxy*:

Carrying out the assignments and instructions by Lenin, Abram Moiseevič has succeeded in founding... the school of *orthodox Marxism-Leninism* [italics mine, EvdZ].[55]

According to Goerdt, the expression 'Marxism-Leninism' was coined by the 'deborinists' to indicate their position as (the only) true heirs of Lenin.[56] In 1924, Deborin qualified Leninism a "the revolutionary Marxism of the era of the disintegration of capitalism and the birth of socialism," a formulation that barely differs from the one employed by Iosif Vissarionovič Stalin [Džugašvili] (1878-1953) in the same year.[57] The establishment of Marxism-Leninism smoothened any difference between Marxism and Leninism, turning the latter into the former's "Leninist stage [*leninskij ėtap*]."[58] The 'deborninists' represented an offensive position, attempting to subordinate science and technology to the authority of philosophy, while the 'mechanicists' stood for the defense of freedom of scientific research; the victory of the 'bolshevizators' over the 'deborinists' sealed the subordination of scientific research to political goals and extended it to philosophy.[59]

Non-Marxist philosophy was silenced in the early 1930s: Losev was arrested in 1930, shortly before the publication of his *Dialektika mifa* [The Dialectic of Myth], "the last book legally printed in the USSR that expressed opposition to Marxist-Leninist principles," which contains the famous qualification of dialectical materialism as a "crying absurdity [*vopijuščaja nelepost'*]."[60] The book was banned, its author subjected to an official campaign, and condemned to ten years in a labor camp.[61] Losev served at the *Belomorkanal* from 1930 until 1933, when he was allowed to return to Moscow and resume his scientific work.[62] Florenskij and Špet were "repressed" in 1933 and 1935, respectively, and executed in 1937.[63]

Soviet philosophy thus gradually took shape in the 1920s. Its most remarkable feature was not its dialectical or historical materialist nature, but the subordination of (philosophical) theory to (political) practice, effectuated and controlled by a body that held political power and intellectual monopoly, or by, as Graham put it, "the wedding of centralized political control to a system of philosophy with claims to universality."[64] This 'wedding' explains the search for an orthodox line in philosophy: Marxist(-Leninist) philosophy was Marxist philosophy, understood as the only true, orthodox continuation of Marxism, excluding any deviant interpretation of Marxism, and 'Stalinist philosophy' was the warranting of this Marxist-Leninist philosophy by its immediate link to political power. As early as 1929, Stalin was put forward as "true continuator of the cause of Marx and Lenin..., staunch fighter for the *purity* of Marxism-Leninism [italics mine, EvdZ]."[65]

Why was it so important for the Party to make philosophy a constituent part of Marxist-Leninist ideology? Why did the line that claimed to represent a Marxist-(–Leninist) philosophy gain the upper hand over the tendency to do away with philosophy altogether and replace it by science? Why did Deborin succeed, and why did Mitin and Judin adopt *his* position with regard to philosophy? Neither because Mitin and Judin had such a high opinion of philosophy, nor because Stalin had such a high opinion of Mitin and Judin, and certainly not because they thought that

philosophy would actually provide Soviet ideology and policy with a scientific foundation, but because to include philosophy in Marxist(–Leninist) ideology meant to *exclude* philosophy, esp. Marxism, as a *legitimate independent* activity. This is highlighted in Leszek Kołakowski's distinction between *intellectual* and *institutional* Marxism, the first indicating the conviction that Marxist theory contains methodological principles which are a) specifically Marxist, and b) of value in the analysis of social phenomena, the second being a *formal* concept:

> Das Wort 'Marxismus' sollte keinesfalls eine auf ihren Inhalt hin bestimmte Doktrin bedeuten, sondern eine Doktrin, die ausschließlich formal, und zwar durch das jeweilige Dekret einer *unfehlbaren Institution*, bestimmt wurde, die in einer gewissen Epoche von der Welt 'größtem Sprachforscher', 'größtem Historiker', 'größtem Philosophen', 'größtem Wirtschaftsexperten' verkörpert worden ist.(...) Das Wort 'Marxist' bezeichnet nicht einen Menschen, der die eine oder andere inhaltlich umrissene Auffassung von der Welt besitzt, sondern einen Menschen mit einer bestimmten Geisteshaltung, die durch die Bereitschaft gekennzeichnet ist, Auffassungen zu akzeptieren, die behördlich bestätigt worden sind.[66]

One effect of the events of 1930 was the appearance of a "new breed" of "party-philosophers," whose job was to hand on orders from on high to the philosophers working in the field of research and education.[67] Mitin, the "typical example of the Soviet party-philosopher," became Stalin's official philosopher.[68] According to Bocheński, he was "the main philosophical representative of contemporary dialectical materialism" in the 1930s and 1940s, because he "participated in all condemnations of his over-independently thinking colleagues."[69] Another effect was the much-loathed '*citatničestvo* [quotatology]': in a key text by Deborin 46 out of 53 quotations are from Lenin, and all of them function as authoritative arguments.[70] As a matter of fact, *all* participants in the discussions of the 1920s referred to Marx, Engels, and esp. Lenin, to establish their own point of view as true to Lenin.[71]

2.iii. *The Construction of Soviet Philosophy (1931-1946)*

The official philosophy that arose after the condemnation of 'menshevizing idealism' differed from it only in one significant point, which shows that the point of the 'discussion' was the elimination of independent work in philosophy.[72] This objective was not disguised at that time, nor was it later:

> After the resolution of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) about the journal *Under the Banner of Marxism* (1931), the participation of philosophers in the solution of the tasks of constructing socialism was activated. Marxist-Leninist philosophy gained a dominant position not only in the social, but also in the natural sciences.[73]

Soviet philosophy was to be determined by the highest *Party* authorities, not by the director of the *Institut filosofii* of the Communist Academy, the leader of the OVMD, or the editor-in-chief of *PZM* – three posts held by Deborin.[74] This was part of a broader process that led to the establishment of "only one authority in

ideology, philosophy, politics."[75] The *theoretical* authority, Stalin as incarnation of the Party, was entitled to exert full *practical* control over any field of intellectual activity, a shift towards 'actual *partijnost'* [**3** and **4**]':

...Stalin, justifying the title of coryphaeus of all sciences, established a new order in biology, but also in linguistics and political economy.[76]

Even if Marxism continued to be a motivating force, too, this was dangerous rather than helpful from the perspective of the Soviet regime, hence the need for Stalin and his allies to *neutralize* Marxism, to destroy its critical potential, and to replace all convinced Marxists by *apparatčiki*. When in 1936 Mitin's position as court philosopher was in danger "...Stalin himself stood in defence of Mitin. He was hardly mistaken with respect to the scientific level of the works of the future *akademik*. (...) Such a servant of truth was exactly what the 'leader of the peoples' needed..."[77]

Official Soviet Marxism-Leninism was "the principle of legitimacy of the Soviet regime" for 60 years (1929-1989).[78] It legitimatized the Bolshevik revolution and the very existence of the Soviet system, it justified whatever actual policy of the Soviet Party & State, and it accounted for the legitimate control of the CPSU over all parts of Soviet society, including its "ideological superstructure," and including science and philosophy.[79] In order to suit its purpose, Marxism(–Leninism) was 'tailored' at several points. These adaptations were introduced under Stalin, and not abandoned until the late 1980s.

- Marxism was *sanctified*: the epithets of sanctity, attributed to the USSR, the CPSU, and Lenin, were extended to the Soviet doctrine. The title of *klàssik marksizma-leninizma* was granted to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and, for some time, Stalin.[80] A consequence of this was the *authoritative* nature of the texts of the *klassiki*: anyone who violated their theses could *rightly* be accused of not being a true Marxist-Leninist, but by the same token the collected works of the *klassiki* were sites of authoritative arguments.[81] (An example in this respect is Losev's success in persuading the responsible bureaucrats of publishing a Russian translation of Plato's works by quoting Lenin's famous statement that "clever idealism is closer to clever materialism than stupid materialism."[82])
- Soviet Marxism-Leninism possessed a peculiar combination of *inflexible dogma* and *dogmatic flexibility*: 'orthodoxy' means its adaptability to changing circumstances and party-directives.[83] The need to develop Marxist-Leninist philosophy has been permanently stressed by the Party:

A Marxist-Leninist party cannot carry out its role if it does not pay sufficient attention to... *the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory.* Marxist-Leninist philosophy, too, is called upon to make a vital contribution to the comprehension of life's new phenomena.[84]

- Linked to this 'flexible dogma' is the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism as a "...developing *system* [*razvivajuščajasja sistema*] of philosophical, economical and social-political views," or an "organic synthesis" of "dialectical materialist philosophy, proletarian political economy, and scientific communism."[85]

- Soviet 'institutional Marxism' was *unified*. There was no difference between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism: philosophical dictionaries have only an entry 'Marksizm-Leninizm.'[86] Leninism was "not one of several possible 'interpretations' of Marxism, but the only true, consistent further development of revolutionary Marxism as applied to the era of imperialism and socialist revolutions, the era of the transition of capitalism to socialism."[87]
- In line with this unification the entire ideological field was *dichotomized*: if ideology is class-bound, and if in the 'era of imperialism and socialist revolutions' there are only two classes, there can be only two ideologies. Since one is the scientific ideology of the proletariat, the other must be *bourgeois* ideology, and 'bourgeois pluralism' must be mere disguise:

> ...the question is *only this*: bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle here...[88]

- Further, the field of ideology was *polemized*. If history is determined by class struggle, and ideology bears a class character, then one form of class struggle is 'ideological battle':

> Marxist-Leninist ideology is opposed to bourgeois ideology and wages an uncompromising battle against it.[89]

- At the same time, Marxism-Leninism was *eternalized* by stressing its permanent development along with the immutability of its 'principles' (*partijnost'* and *istorizm*), and by stretching the epoch of which Marxism-Leninism was the ideology:

> Leninism... [is] the further development and concretization of Marxism under the conditions of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of the building of socialism and communism.[90]

- Further, it was *made absolute*: Lenin's statement about the three sources of Marxism (French socialism, German philosophy, and British political economy) was the basis for a presentation of Marxism-Leninism as the supreme outcome of the entire intellectual history of mankind:

> Marxism critically re-shaped and generalized the previous achievements of philosophy, science, and social practice, and, for the first time in the history of knowledge, made philosophy a consistently scientific tool of social progress.[91]

- Finally, it was literally *made true*: the combination of theoretical superiority and practical success, following Lenin's claim that "Marxist doctrine is omnipotent, because it is true," found its match in the idea of 'verification by practice':

> The decisive advantage of Marxism-Leninism as compared to any other doctrine resides in the fact, that it has obtained an all-round confirmation [*vsestoronnee podtverždenie*] in social practice...[92]

The claim of Soviet Marxism-Leninism to be a true and scientific ideology, with a philosophical system as its theoretical basis, was itself an ideological move: *Soviet ideology was ideology, but it was not the ideology it said it was*.[93] Here, three ideological moves reinforce each other: the first is to present Marxism-Leninism as a *world-view* [*mirovozzrenie*], i.e. as a conviction and a form of consciousness, not as an institutional, official doctrine; the second is to present it as a *motivating* instead of a *legitimatizing* ideology, which implied that everyone who did not want to appear as being 'guided' by another ideology had to profess his or her being guided by Marxist-Leninist principles in advance; the third is to present Marxism-Leninism as a 'transparent ideology', which rules out the possibility of 'normal', i.e. concealed ideology within the same society.[94] These three moves together *immunized* Marxism-Leninism against the charge of being an ideology in the 'normal' sense, *neutralized* the critical potential of Marxism, and *monopolized* the ideological field.

To regard the orthodox position adopted in 1931 as a *philosophical* position is to miss a point, unless it means to point to *radical* politicization and 'instrumentalization' of Marxism as a possible consequence of Marxism itself.[95] The effect of this radical subordination of philosophy to ideology was the elevation to the position of official philosophy of "a generalization of the dialectical materialist theses of Fr. Engels' and the historical materialist theses of the later Marx."[96] Instead of orthodox Marxism-Leninism in the sense of 'thought as true as possible to that of the *klassiki*,' a "general line" emerged, expounded in a *single* textbook [*učebnik*].[97] Works like Lenin's *Filosofskie tetrady* (1929) and Marx' *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte* (1932) were excluded from the Soviet edition of their *Complete Works*:

> Until quite recently, the works of the 'early Marx' were off-limits in the Soviet Union, and even *Capital* was discussed only in terms of carefully selected passages, passages which, of course, had been 'treated' by Lenin.[98]

To qualify this period as 'Stalinist philosophy' is adequate if we realize that this is not a *philosophical* qualification.[99] To say that "...for roughly the next two decades after the condemnation of 1931, the only significant voice to be heard in the realm of Soviet thought was that of Joseph Stalin," is adequate if we regard this 'orthodoxy' not as Stalin's philosophical view, but as a carefully supervised instrument in the hands of the Party.[100] It is misleading to think that anyone (including Stalin himself) ever saw Stalin as a philosopher: the "ever greater adulation of Stalin as *the* philosopher," was the *formal* elevation of the actual Party-leader to the rank of a *klassik marksizma-leninizma*, and not a result of Stalin's *personal* megalomania, nor an expression of increasing admiration of "the *theoretician of victorious socialism*."[101] The term "personality cult [*kul't ličnosti*]" rather than *Stalin*-cult, is appropriate in the sense that Stalin c.s. created a *Lenin*-cult which inevitably became a cult of the present leader.[102]

Philosophers who were willing to admit their 'heresy' were not liquidated: Deborin taught philosophy at MGU as late as 1945, and published until shortly

before his death in 1961, Mitin pursued his career after admitting his faults.[103] The individual philosopher had become a 'philosophical worker', an *apparatčik*, whose "primary task... became the education of the masses and the training of the teachers in the new monolithic world view of the Party."[104]

The period until 1936 still was a period of lively, but increasingly insulated discussion.[105] In 1932, the historico-philosophical faculty of MGU was turned into the independent *Moskovskij Istoriko-Filosofskij Institut*, and in 1934 the inclusion of a faculty of literature yielded the *Moskovskij Istoriko-Filosofskij i Literaturnyj Institut* [MIFLI].[106] This "oasis in a world of growing terror," as Frances Nethercott called it, was the only place where philosophy was taught, and the breeding ground of Soviet philosophers like Ėval'd Vasil'evič Il'enkov (1924-1979), Zakhar Abramovič Kamenskij (b.1915), Teodor Il'ič Ojzerman (b.1914), and Georgij Solomonovič Pomeranc (b.1918).[107]

The elimination of all "disagreement on the philosophical front [*raznoglasie na filosofskom fronte*]," partly coinciding with Stalinist terror (1935-1938), led to a "dead period" in Soviet philosophy (1938-1946).[108] It began with the canonization of Marxism-Leninism in the *Kratkij kurs* [*Istorija VKP(b) (kratkij kurs)*, History of the All-union Communist Party (bolshevik) (short course)], and the reduction of Marxist-Leninist philosophy to its philosophical chapter *O dialektičeskom i istoričeskom materializme* [On Dialectical and Historical Materialism], ascribed to Stalin.[109] Until the publication of Stalin's *Marksizm i voprosy jazykoznanija* [Marxism and Questions of Linguistics] in 1950, this was *the* authoritative text in Soviet philosophy.[110] Its assertions are of a sufficiently general nature to account for almost any concrete phenomenon or policy, and, by the same token, to serve as evidence of the permanent confirmation of *diamat* and *istmat* by practice.[111] With the important exception of history of philosophy, philosophizing was reduced to the "repeated exposition of and commenting upon the works and ideas of Stalin."[112]

The result of this process was *Soviet philosophy*, which can be defined as *philosophy, fundamentally subordinated to the ideological authority of the Communist Party*. Losev's "crying absurdity" became an official doctrine, and kept this special status until the late 1980s.[113] Dialectical materialism is a possible, though problematic philosophical position: claiming its foundation in itself, i.e. in thought, it contains the "centrifugal tendencies of a philosophy seeking to be both materialist and dialectical."[114] A problematic philosophical position will, if conditions allow, be exposed to criticism, and divergent positions will be developed. *According to this inner logic*, Marxist philosophy in the USSR could not but split into two opposed directions in the 1920s. What happened in 1929/30 therefore was the *neutralization* of the *inner logic* of development of philosophy.

Transformed into an instrument of the Party, philosophy lost its inner truth criteria.[115] In this way philosophy was deprived of its *own* history, its further development along lines of its inner logic.[116] Graham rightly argued that "if dialectical materialism were allowed to develop freely in the USSR, it would no doubt evolve in a direction consistent with the common assumptions of a broad nonmechanistic, nonreductionist materialism."[117] But *diamat* was not allowed to develop freely in the USSR, and the controversy which in the 1920s took the form

of the discussion between 'mechanicists' and 'dialecticians', re-emerged several times only to be quickly 'resolved'.[118]

2.iv *Cold War in Philosophy (1947-1954)*

After World War II, the USSR was in need of highly qualified cadres, including teachers of philosophy.[119] Ideological control had to be tightened after relative relaxation during a war fought with bourgeois allies, and the "dead period" was ended by a Party intervention on 24 June 1947, the "birthday of Soviet philosophy," as Thomas Blakeley called it: "Contemporary Soviet philosophy was born in the discussion of G.F. Aleksandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy*."[120] The Central Committee of the CPSU, through the People's Commissar of Culture Andrej Aleksandrovič Ždanov (1896-1948), organized a discussion at the IF, intended to arouse Soviet philosophy from its lethargic state, since "our Party is in utter need of an increase in philosophical work."[121]

The essence of the intervention was contained in Ždanov's speech "about the situation at our philosophical front," in which Soviet philosophers were summoned to be more productive, to turn their attention to present-day issues, to trade scholastic discussions and "quotatology [*citatničestvo*]" for philosophical discussion, and to wage an uncompromising ideological battle against "bourgeois idealism" and all deviations from Marxism-Leninism.[122] The following period was marked by a struggle of professional philosophers, convinced Marxists but genuine philosophical scholars like Valentin Ferdinandovič Asmus (1894-1975), Bonifatij Mikhajlovič Kedrov (1903-1985), and Kamenskij, against "ignorant careerists and ideological zealots."[123] As Bocheński put it, there was an "unbridgeable gap between the supporters of barbarian reactionary nonsense and the philosophers."[124] New 'party-philosophers' came to the fore who dominated Soviet philosophy until its breakdown in the 1980s: Fëdor Vasil'evič Konstantinov (1901-1991), who reportedly could not "avoid mistakes in spelling even when silent," Pëtr Nikolaevič Fedoseev (1908-1990), who "controlled the social sciences in the USSR for fifteen years and faithfully supported mutually exclusive ideas for every regime since the 1940s," and Michail Trifonovič Iovčuk (1908-1990).[125]

The materials of the 1947 discussion made up the first issue of *VF*, a new, until 1958 the only, and ever since the central philosophical journal.[126] In 1948, 82 students were preparing at the IF for an academic career in philosophy, and 40 books were planned for publication.[127] Data given by Bocheński and others document a considerable growth of philosophical industry:[128]

- in 1947 there were 3 philosophical faculties (one was abolished in 1951), but "since then the number of philosophical faculties... has been greatly increased" to 10 in the 1980s;
- the number of students at these faculties grew from perhaps 450 in 1947 through 1,150 in 1951 to some 2,000 in 1954; the number of professional philosophers grew from (at the most) 400 in 1947 to some 1,500 in 1955;

- the number of institutions where a graduate study [*aspirantura*] in philosophy was done rose from 6 in 1947 to 30 in 1953/4 (1948-1951: 10, 1951/2: 28), and the number of graduate students doubled from 1,000 to 2,000 between 1951 and 1954;
- the number of candidate's dissertations exploded from 10 in 1945 through 66 in 1947, 75 in 1948, to 240 in 1948-51 (annual average: 80), 203 in 1951/2 (101 per year), and 469 in 1953/4 (annual average: 234);
- the number of philosophical books published annually quadrupled in the decade 1948-1958, rising from 9 in 1947 to 41 in 1955;
- finally, *VF* steadily grew in size: from 2 issues a year in 1947 through 3 over 1948-1950 to 6 in 1951-1957 and 12 since 1958, from 879 pages a year in 1947 to 1,423 in 1955 (pages roughly 2.5 times the size common in Western philosophical journals) and over 2,000 since 1958, and from 20,000 copies in 1947 to 50,000 in 1956.

A certain decentralization took place to the Russian 'province' and to the other Soviet republics.[129] In 1947, all 66 candidate's dissertations were defended at Moscow-located institutions, but by 1954 the proportion had dropped to 36%.[130] Book publication was "increasingly decentralized," and some local philosophical centers emerged: in 1947, there were only two philosophical institutions of any significance in the 'periphery' (in the Ukraine and in Azerbajdžan), but a philosophical faculty was opened at Kazakh State University in Alma-Ata in 1949, and the Academies of Sciences of a number of Soviet republics opened departments, sections, or institutes of philosophy; in Tbilisi, an active philosophical center emerged under the leadership of Konstantin Spiridonovič Bakradze (1898-1970).[131]

At the same time, the period from 1947 to 1955 was "the darkest period of state intervention in artistic and scientific realms."[132] The philosophical authority of the party remained unchallenged, the Party actually was an active arbiter, and the greater output desired by Ždanov came about very slowly.[133] Revival of discussion was hampered by the reinforced subordination of philosophy to a primarily ideological function: Soviet philosophers received an order to do philosophy, but they were not given the proper conditions.[134] According to a late Soviet source:

> The discussion about the book by G.F. Aleksandrov had highly lamentable consequences not only for work on the history of philosophy, but for all philosophical research. (...) ...every thesis... had to be corroborated by a corresponding quotation, preferably... from the works of I.V. Stalin. Everything that was not confirmed by quotations, i.e. really was an idea of the author of the work himself, was nearly always criticized as *otsebjatina* [something of one's own making, EvdZ].[135]

After Ždanov's death (1948) Kedrov, accused of 'cosmopolitanism' and of underestimating Russian scientists and philosophers, was forced to resign as editor-in-chief of *VF* and to confess his "violation of the Leninist principle of *partijnost'*."[136] Still, the quick reaction of philosophers like Kedrov or Kamenskij in favor of relatively autonomous philosophy "showed... the powers and capacities that were dormant and fallow in Soviet scientists and philosophers, as well as the fact that one push was enough to bring them to the fore and reactivate them."[137]

The last phase of 'Stalinist philosophy' was dominated by two 'authoritative texts' by the leader himself. The first was *Marksizm i voprosy jazykoznanija*

[Marxism and the Problems of Linguistics], an attack on the theory of Nikolaj Jakovlevič Marr (1864-1934) on language as a class-biased phenomenon: Stalin argued that if a capitalist employer gives orders to an exploited worker, language *must* be a class-neutral medium of communication, not belonging to ideological superstructure, but, like machines, to the realm of forces of production.[138] This position had some effect on philosophy, esp. on logic and philosophy of science.[139] Two years later, Stalin intervened in the field of political economy with his *Ėkonomičeskie problemy socializma v SSSR* [Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR], claiming that there are general economical laws, valid for socialist economy as well, thus opposing 'voluntarist' and 'subjectivist' tendencies, and in fact clearing the way for 'ideologically neutral' economic science.[140] This 'pragmatic turn' had the effect of restoring the autonomy of some sciences, and gave some room to philosophy, too, namely to the extent to which it leant towards these sciences (logic to mathematics, philosophy of science to natural science).[141]

2.v *The Defrosting of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1955-1966)*

The period of 'thaw [*ottepel'*]' (1955-1968) was a period of hope in philosophy. Stalin's death in 1953 brought little immediate change, but he disappeared as a philosophical genius and *klassik marksizma-leninizma*, his place being taken by the CPSU itself:

> In the new *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* Stalin is scarcely ever mentioned. The eulogy of Stalin which permeated the *Short Course* is replaced by a similar eulogy of the Party.[142]

Stalin's *On Dialectical and Historical Materialism* was quickly replaced by collectively written textbooks.[143] Critical articles in *Pravda*, *Kommunist* and *VF* repeated Ždanov's call to Soviet philosophers to trade their dogmatism, scholastic discussions, and quotatology [*citatničestvo*] for discussion and conflict of opinion, and to produce more and better work.[144]

Ottepel' also meant a cautious internationalization, stimulated by philosophers like Kedrov.[145] In 1954, a large Soviet delegation appeared at a congress of the UIPS [*Union Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences*] in Zürich, apparently the first Soviet delegation at a philosophical congress at all.[146] Soviet philosophers became regular visitors of the international philosophical scene, but delegations were carefully selected and led by Party-philosophers like Mitin, Konstantinov and Fedoseev. This delegation-policy was still in force in 1988, when Frolov headed the Soviet delegation that presented the 'philosophy of *perestrojka*' at the 18th World Congress of Philosophy in Brighton: it was around that time only that Soviet philosophers could accept individual invitations to congresses abroad.[147] Also, a few Western philosophers, beginning with Alfred J. Ayer in 1961, were invited to present their views to a selected Soviet philosophical community, and saw their texts appear in *VF*.[148]

Planning and collectivism formed a major hindrance in the earlier years of Soviet philosophy, but in more recent times it seems to have been of less importance.[149]

Collectivism was largely a mechanism of collective self-control, while planning certainly resulted in many superfluous pages, but a positive effect was secured publication of whatever was collectively approved of and had passed the censor.[150] Access to non-Soviet philosophical material was very limited, due to political and economic reasons. Like good medical treatment and pornography, subversive literature was a privilege of the Party-elite, to which few philosophers belonged. *Istorija russkoj filosofii* [A History of Russian Philosophy] by the emigrated philosopher Nikolaj Losskij, a standard work in the West, was published in Russian in 1954 "in a scanty edition for the bureaucratic elite... disseminated free of charge 'by special subscription [*po osobomu spisku*]'."[151] According to Anatolij Fëdorovič Zotov (b.1931), small editions (50-100 copies) of translated works by Sartre, Marcuse, and Heidegger circulated in specialist circles as did so-called "secret journals [*skrytye žurnaly*]."[152]

A "correction of what Stalin had successfully dogmatized as 'Leninism'" did not take place, and Leninism kept its status as the only true continuation of Marxism.[153] But the 'destalinization' of the 20th (1956) and 22nd (1961) CPSU-Congress did mean a profound change in Soviet philosophy:

> A new stage in the spiritual life of our society, and in philosophy in particular, began after the 20th Congress of the CPSU. (...) Philosophers turned directly to the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, rediscovering in them the wealth of ideas, that had been hidden during the supremacy of the primitive Stalin-Zhdanovian version of Marxism.[154]

Philosophy became less liable to direct politicalization: there had to be room for theoretical improvement of philosophy *within* the boundaries of its subordination, which remained the determining factor of Soviet philosophical culture, but as a subordination of philosophy *as a whole*, not in detail. The period of *ottepel'* saw the establishment of such fields of research as cybernetics, information theory, and sociology.[155] Bocheński very aptly labelled these disciplines "declassified doctrines": released from direct political control '[de-*classified*']', "exempted from the doctrinal authority of the classics of Marxism-Leninism" ['de-*klassik*-ified'] and "politically neutralized," i.e. exempted from class-nature ['de-*class*-ified'].[156]

As Kline stressed, these were not strictly philosophical, but technical or para-philosophical disciplines, and their 'declassification' should be ascribed to pragmatic considerations.[157] Still, this development was significant, as was the emergence of (relatively) independent philosophical disciplines (formal logic, philosophy of natural science [*filosofskie voprosy estestvoznanija*], aesthetics, ethics, history of philosophy) within the framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.[158] These developments led to the establishment of departments of ethics, aesthetics, and history of religion and atheism.[159] The more Soviet philosophy became institutionalized and professionalized, and the more discussions became disputes among specialists, the more it became immune against *direct* Party intervention.

According to Bernard Jeu, "the decision to do philosophy" was made at a conference of the AN SSSR and the *Ministry of Higher Education* in 1958, and a number of measures was taken: the founding of a second philosophical journal,

Filosofskie Nauki [Philosophical Sciences], the decentralization of publishing and research, the establishment of philosophical centers in other towns and republics, the edition of a philosophical encyclopedia, a greater output of qualified cadres, a return to the original texts of Marx, Engels, and Lenin instead of official interpretations, translations of classical texts in philosophy, information on contemporary non-Soviet philosophy, and the introduction of philosophy in higher education.[160]

The *growth* of Soviet philosophy was impressive: the number of professional philosophers grew from some 1,500 in 1955 to some 7,000 in 1967, and doubled to 14,000 over the following 8 years, while the number of workers at the IF more than doubled from 79 in 1951 to 183 in 1961.[161] Also, the level of qualification improved: the trend in the output of candidate's dissertations from 66 in 1947 to 234 over 1953/4 continued: 277 a year in 1964/5, 303 in 1965/6, 388 in 1967/8.[162] The output of doctoral dissertations showed an even greater increase: from 14 in 1953 and the first half of 1954, and a total number of 50 over 1945-1955, to 55 in 1964/5, 37 in 1965/6, and 53 in 1966/7.[163] *VF* started to appear in 12 instead of 6 issues, book publication increased.[164]

The process of decentralization also continued, though more slowly.[165] It often meant the development of local centers within Soviet *Russia*: the non-Russian republics had a longer way to go.[166] Several local centers were established or enlarged, and in a number of republics professional journals appeared that offered room for philosophy.[167] As significant centers Kiev, Central Asia, Tbilisi and Erevan can be mentioned, places with ancient and rich philosophic traditions.[168] The textbooks that had appeared shortly after Stalin's death were severely criticized, and new ones were prepared for the obligatory philosophical instruction in higher education.[169] This new generation of *učebniki* appeared in 1958 and lasted for many years: the most important one was *Osnovy Marksistkoj Filosofii* [The Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy], later renamed *Osnovy Marksistsko-Leninskoj Filosofii*.[170]

The historic decision "to do philosophy" coincided with the formation of a new generation of intellectuals: the 'people of the sixties [*šestidesjatniki*]'.[171] A more sophisticated Soviet intelligentsia came to the fore:

> ...in the forty years since the revolution, a new Soviet 'intelligentsia' has arisen. It is not the old intelligentsia: it consists not so much of critical intellectuals with universal interests as of 'specialists', acquiring competence and confidence in their fields. The merits of such an intelligentsia are more easily displayed in physics, biology, mathematics and engineering than they are in philosophy; but they exist in philosophy too. ...the present Russian philosopher, especially the younger philosopher, is a deadly serious professional.[172]

It was among these "deadly serious professionals" that a return to the ideals of the old, Russian intelligentsia began to take shape.[173] A new batch of philosophers, educated at *Soviet* institutions of higher learning like MIFLI, MGU, and IF, began to populate Soviet philosophical culture.[174]

First of all, a new, 'enlightened' type of party-philosopher came to the fore, people who were, unlike Mitin or Konstantinov, professional philosophers, formed

within an established Soviet philosophical culture, and who did not automatically identify with Party interests, but occupied an intermediary position. To this group belong Khruščëv's philosophical right arm, Leonid Fëdorovič Il'ičëv (1906–1990), Aleksandr Georgievič Spirkin (b.1918), Vladimir Spiridonovič Gott (1912-1991), and Ivan Timofeevič Frolov (b.1929).[174]

This partly coincided with the appearance of 'real philosophers': people formed by the Soviet system of education, but acting as independent thinkers, for example, Il'enkov, Georgij Petrovič Ščedrovickij (1929-1994), Merab Konstantinovič Mamardašvili (1930-1990), Genrikh Stepanovič Batiščev (1932-1990), and Vladimir Solomonovič Bibler (b.1918).[175] They usually started as 'young-Marxists', like many of their contemporaries in other Communist countries and parties.[176] Il'enkov continued to conceive of himself as a Marxist(–Leninist) philosopher, and Mamardašvili asserted the positive influence of Marx on his thought as late as 1991.[177] But their Marxism was 'intellectual', not 'institutional'.

Particularly important was the *return of the original texts* of Lenin, Engels and Marx. According to Blakeley it was "only since the early 1960s that the whole of Marx' literary production has become the object of research in the Soviet Union."[178] This applies in particular to the early Marx: the first complete Russian edition of the *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844)* appeared in 1956.[179] As *šestidesjatnik* Ėrikh Jur'evič Solov'ëv (b.1934) remembered:

> These were manuscripts of a living personality whose image was in sharp contrast with the barracks standard of the perfect human being advanced in Soviet literature in the 1950s. We were fascinated by them.[180]

Soviet philosophers who received their training during *ottepel'* thus saw that the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin did not constitute the unified Marxist-Leninist doctrine Stalin's philosophical henchmen had reduced it to, a reduction that still active pre-Stalinist philosophers like Asmus or Losev could inform their students about.[181] Henceforth, the 'orthodox' version of Marxist-Leninist philosophy was fundamentally in danger: the new generation of philosophers personified the recognition of the fact that *philosophical orthodoxy is a contradiction in terms.*

This implied the partial restoration of the dynamics of philosophical theory according to its inner logic, and, politically, the acceptance of difference of opinion: commentators like Bocheński pointed to rivalling "tendencies" ('orthodox', Hegelian and Aristotelian), and, however limited the variety of opinions, this meant a rehabilitation of the philosopher as a thinking individual.[182] Soviet philosophers were no longer automatically supposed to comply to politically motivated orders.[183] The crux in understanding the Soviet philosophical phenomenon is that there not only was, at several points, a *possibility* to engage in 'genuine philosophy', but that there also was a *demand* for it. This is clearest in the case of conceptual clarification: even the most limited philosophical task presupposes consideration of different possibilities, of possible consequences, contradictions, etc., which implies the development of philosophical thought according to its inner logic.[184] Thus the inner truth criteria were restored, *but at a local level only*, and Soviet philosophers became increasingly aware of the "logical pushes and ideological pulls... operative in Soviet philosophy."[185]. Even if the orthodox philosophy of the 'dead period' was

sincerely held by generations of Soviet philosophers, the decision to *improve* it inevitably leads to philosophy itself.[186]

Inevitably, therefore, old disputes reemerged. One example is the discussion in 1962 between A.J. Ayer, the first 'bourgeois' philosopher invited to publish in *VF*, who defended analytical philosophy, and Ivan Vasil'evič Kuznecov (1911-1970) and Kedrov, who defended philosophy as the science of the most general laws of development of nature, society, and thought.[187] Around this 'general laws formula' a vehement discussion broke out in 1970 between the 'epistemologists' Il'enkov and Engel's Matveevič Čudinov (1930-1980), who treated dialectical materialism as a theory of knowledge, and 'ontologists' like Grigorij Markovič Štraks (1909-1982), Serafim Timofeevič Meljukhin (b.1927), Mikhail Nikolaevič Rutkevič (b.1917), and Igor' Sergeevič Narskij (1920-1993), who drew a radical line between materialism and idealism.[188] The controversy was decided in favor of the latter: the 'epistemologist' position was rejected, and Il'enkov, "was criticized for 'sometimes almost erasing the border between materialism and objective idealism'."[189]

This discussion, like those of the 1920s, evolved into a political discussion between philosophers who wanted to abolish dialectical materialism as an overall philosophical system, and 'ideologists' who wanted to retain it.[190] But it showed the capacity of some Soviet philosophers to develop their thought freely. As a result, the limits of free development of philosophical thought in the USSR were, to some active philosophers at least, a matter of political pressure and disciplinary measures: politically and ideologically unimpeded philosophy became an actual possibility in the minds of the philosophical community, and the dominant feature of Soviet philosophy henceforth was the containment of the possibilities of development *yielded by Soviet philosophy itself.*

The impulses to engage in philosophical thought came 'from below', from the *urge* of individual philosophers to "invest whatever words they have with the meaning they find necessary in order to make sense of their experience," and to stick to their "philosophical inclination to follow an argument to its conclusion," and 'from above', from the Party's *need* for a "progressively more coherent and consistent, more believable and teachable" ideology.[191] The contradiction of Soviet philosophy was a *dual requirement*, both the need and hence the possibility of philosophical thought, and the threat and hence limitation of the development of its content, expressed in the call for creative *development* of a given philosophical doctrine that yet was to *remain the same* doctrine, a contradiction illustrated by party-philosopher Konstantinov in 1963:

> L'académicien Konstantinov... rappelle... qu'il faut 'une pensée créatrice et *indépendante*', [qu']il faut la formulation de problèmes *nouveaux* appelant une réponse *originale*, et il n'est pas impensable qu'on prenne position de façon *divergente* sur des problèmes particuliers. Cette divergence, bien sûr, ne doit pas constituer une fin en soi: on doit viser un *but unique*. Mais c'est la discussion qui permet de l'apprécier de façon plus juste et plus exacte [italics mine, EvdZ].[192]

Soviet philosophy had realized that "the possibility to make mistakes is a condition for the discovery of the truth," but soon after 1963 it also realized, to quote Jeu again, that "...if one has taken the decision to do philosophy, one must go

all the way. It is impossible to foresee all consequences that will come out of the development of the content of thought. Problems and solutions will ineluctably arise."[193] The existence of unorthodox philosophical thought was the inevitable consequence of the "decision to do philosophy," viz to improve the practical efficacy of official doctrine by raising its theoretical quality.

2.vi *Marginalization and Professionalization (1967-1975)*

According to De George, "the year 1968 marked the high point and the beginning of the end of originality in both Soviet and East European Marxism."[194] From 1968 until 1977, Frolov was editor-in-chief of *VF*, starting "the healthiest period in Soviet philosophy of science during the last twenty years."[195] The journal "developed an exceptional activity to revive philosophical research in the USSR, and to raise its level."[196] In 1967 and 1970 the concluding 4th and 5th volumes of the pride of this period, the *Filosofskaja Ėnciklopedija* [Philosophical Encyclopedia, *FĖ*], appeared.[197] This "first Marxist-Leninist philosophical encyclopedia" was written by 768 Soviet philosophers, both those politically leading, like editor-in-chief Konstantinov, as well as those intellectually leading (Il'enkov, Batiščev, Bibler, Losev, Mamardašvili).[198]

The limits of intellectual freedom began to show around 1966, when Daniėl' and Sinjavskij were sentenced to 5–7 years of hard labor for publishing "anti-Soviet works" abroad.[199] The message from the new regime after Khruščëv's dismissal in 1964 was clear: the Party was not ready to let 'thaw' have its natural course towards 'spring'. The period that began in 1967 was a period of repression of newly acquired liberties, and hence of dissent, underground publications [*samizdat*], and publications abroad [*tamizdat*]. These phenomena played a certain role in philosophy, too.[200]

In the 1970s, the fate of dissident positions was depressing: those who were not willing to compromise faced public rebuke (Davydov), removal to 'harmless' posts (Bibler, Batiščev), exclusion from the academic world (Pomeranc), a marginal position (Ščedrovickij, Mamardašvili), or difficulties to have their work published (Il'enkov).[201] Aleksej Dobrovol'skij (b.1938) ended up in *psikhuška* and *GULag* for his protest against the invasion of Hungary in 1956 and for a publication in *samizdat*.[202] Several Soviet philosophers were forced to emigrate: Boris Iosifovič Šragin (b.1926, emigr.1974), Aleksandr Sergeevič Esenin-Vol'pin (b.1925, in exile since 1972), Aleksandr Aleksandrovič Zinov'ev (b.1922, exiled 1978), Pëtr Markovič Egides (arrested 1970, exiled 1980) and his wife Tamara Samsonova (b.1927, emigr.1980), Iegošua Jakhot (b.1919, emigr.1977), P.A. Šarija, Ėrnst Kol'man [Arnošt Kolman] (1892-1979, emigr.1976), Valerij Nikolaevič Čalidze (b.1938, in exile since 1972), Mikhail Meerson-Aksënov (b.1944, emigr.1972), and Aleksandr Mojseevič Pjatigorskij (b.1929, emigr.1974).

It is certainly true, as Bakhurst and Chernyak stress, that Western studies of Soviet philosophy often paid more attention to official doctrine than to the "more inventive Soviet philosophers," but it is equally true that "such remarkable contemporary philosophers as A.F. Losev, V.S. Bibler and M.K. Mamardašvili" were rather marginal in Soviet philosophical culture in the 1970s and 1980s, even if they

occupied central places in philosophical 'counter-culture'.[203] They were not in a position to fully develop and express their ideas, or to see them freely discussed and criticized.

The exclusion of 'intellectual Marxism' meant that the closer Soviet philosophers got to the core of Marxism(–Leninism), the more they had to take into account the 'institutional' version. This explains why attempts to renew Marxism itself, for example by Il'enkov, were suppressed, whereas Losev could work and teach, and after 1953 also publish: Losev limited himself to the history of classical Greek philosophy.[204] His actual work bore little relation to Marxism, except for regular reference to "slave-holding society."[205] He acted as a Marxist from time to time, and was declared a Marxist-Leninist in official sources.[206]

Il'enkov, by contrast, was a convinced Marxist who took historical materialism seriously, and caused a scandal in 1965 with 'Marks i zapadnyj mir [Marx and the Western World]', a paper meant for a symposium in the USA. He was not allowed to go, and the text could not appear in the USSR until 1988.[207] One reason was the content of Il'enkov's text, another its style: "Il'enkov writes not as a Soviet delegate presenting an official line, but as an autonomous scholar addressing the specific concerns of the symposium in his own voice."[208]

Quite symbolically, Il'enkov's first two words were "I think..."[209] He further stated that he gave his *"own* answer to the four questions... of this symposium [italics mine, EvdZ]."[210] Il'enkov's sin thus clearly consisted in *otsebjatina*: the touchstone was not 'Marxist conviction', but non-contradiction of official philosophy, and the more a philosopher would seriously try to be an 'intellectual Marxist', the greater the problems confronting him or her.[211] Free-thinking philosophers like Il'enkov, or Lina Borisovna Tumanova (1936-1985), *had to be* silenced according to the logic of the Soviet system, because "the danger that free thought, even within the Marxist framework, poses to entrenched political parties is too great to be tolerated."[212]

The *principle* of Party control over philosophy was never abandoned.[213] The CPSU was present in Soviet philosophy in many ways: nearly all philosophers were member of the Party, philosophical publications were a State-monopoly, and philosophical work was discussed and planned by Party-committees at faculty– and department-level.[214] As to appointment policy, it is hard to find out which posts in Soviet philosophical industry were part of the *nomenklatura*-system.[215] CPSU-membership was a condition for a smooth career in most walks of Soviet life, as the Party simply *was* Soviet establishment.[216] To be a Communist primarily meant to be a loyal Soviet citizen, and it entailed access to privileges and possibilities.[217]

Total repression of philosophy would have meant the end of Soviet philosophical culture, as had been demonstrated by the 'dead period', and it was more effective to control philosophy by means of a *theory* about philosophy that presented it as an integral part of official ideology, and that was (re)produced by the philosophers themselves. Obviously, this ideology of philosophy did not give an adequate image of Soviet philosophy. For example, the presentation of Soviet philosophy as the creative collective development of Marxism-Leninism reflects the command-structure of Soviet philosophical industry, and eclipses the attempts of the more daring Soviet

philosophers to do the exact opposite of 'collectively developing'.[218] The general opinion among Western philosophers was (and is) that Soviet philosophers were 'ideologists', people who subordinated their theoretical work to the standards of their Marxist-Leninist world-view. But it is hard to believe that the 768 Soviet philosophers who contributed to the *FĖ* failed to notice the tangible contrast between the 'professional' entries about past philosophers or technical subjects, and the quasi-descriptive 'ideological' entries on Soviet philosophy.[219]

Some Soviet philosophers attempted to address the 'Marxist-Leninist' nature of Soviet philosophy, or a central concept of the ideology of Soviet philosophy such as *partijnost'*. An example is Batiščev's stretching of the concept of *partijnost'* "to accomodate previously unacceptable content."[220] In an entry in *FĖ*, he distinguished between subjective and objective partisanship: the first, "the subjective conviction that one is serving the interests of communism... assure(s) one's correctness in a dispute and a true position in the resolution of every problem," and reduces philosophy "to the role of a handmaiden of religious, political, legal, and other ideological forces and institutions," whereas objective partisanship "is the partisanship of the unbiased, unprejudiced pursuit of logic all the way to its ultimate conclusions."[221] Turning the equation '(subjectively) partisan is true' into '(objectively) true is partisan', Batiščev reinvoked the notion of partisanship present in Hegel, defended objectivity against prejudice, and opposed dogmatism and ideologically motivated control.[222] As Scanlan concluded:

> Thus partisanship in the usual sense can be rejected in fact without being rejected in words, and the whole procedure is theoretically justified by the 'dialectical unity' that permits Batishchev to assume the *identity* of proletarian partisanship (properly understood) and objectivity.[223]

Batiščev, an outspoken representative of the unorthodox 'Young Marxism' that was officially criticized in 1969, and reportedly "unique in his ability to elucidate the highlights of controversy,... stirring up disputes and sometimes contradictory judgements," was hardly heard of until the *perestrojka* years.[224]

2.vii *Stagnation in Philosophy: the Limits of Development (1976-1985)*

The end of *ottepel'* in philosophy can be situated around 1975.[225] The following period is marked by a growing discrepancy between the ideological function and the professional standards of Soviet philosophy, in the end leading to 'stagnation' in philosophy, even if the "creative impulse of the 20th Congress of the CPSU did not weaken even in the 1970s and the early 1980s, and allowed to create the *philosophical preconditions of perestrojka*."[226] Marxism-Leninism remained an indispensable part of the ideological legitimatization of the Soviet system, party-philosophers like Mitin, Judin, Fedoseev and Konstantinov still dominated philosophical culture, the obligatory philosophy instruction at all levels in higher education, in which 80% of the estimated 25,000 Soviet philosophers of the 1980s were working, underwent little change, and the *učebniki* of the late 1950s stayed in place until the *perestrojka*-era.[227]

Soviet philosophy 'stagnated' because it had reached the limits of inner development allowed for by its position in the Soviet system. Soviet philosophers could not fail to notice this, and their loyalty to the system became a pragmatic affair: "Soviet intellectuals entered the Brezhnev era almost unanimously contemptuous of the major postulates of Marxism, having been converted into either Westernizers (liberals) or Russophiles."[229]

The terror of the Stalin era had given way to more subtle repression and control, which caused what Vladimir Shlapentokh called a "two-level mentality," a concept meant to "explain how people can easily separate their behavior from their system of values," and what James Scanlan labelled "defensive doublethink" – "a means of enlisting the approbative force of authorized terms... behind sympathetic attention to the exact opposite of what they stand for officially."[230] Soviet philosophers tried to appear as individual thinkers by emphasizing controversy and difference of opinion.[231]

Philosophical culture always entails some kind of ideological self-legitimatization. In the Soviet case, ideology of philosophy 'from above' was far more important than ideology 'from below,' and it is here in particular that one needs that "infinite capacity for dullness and the ability to sustain one's attention in the face of repetition, nonsense, distortion, prosaic style, and banality after banality" that Richard De George pointed to.[232] Though it displayed a varying level of sophistication, the theory *about* Soviet philosophy was quite constant, bordering on a ritual incantation. But this ritual effectively prevented any meta-philosophical discussion and legitimatized the subordination of professional philosophy to the interests of State and Party.

The 'ideology from above' can be summarized as its Marxist-Leninist nature 'by definition': philosophy in the USSR could only be legitimate to the extent to which it was in some way demonstrably Marxist-Leninist, or at least not demonstrably non-Marxist. The ubiquitous phrase 'from a Marxist-Leninist point of view' did not forcibly keep Soviet philosophers from saying what they wanted to say, but it did mean to disappear as the individual philosopher, and to comply with criticism from the side of the authorities in charge of Marxism–Leninism: if official philosophy was felt to be threatened, the author of the text had already accepted the verdict, which took the edge off disagreement among Soviet philosophers:

> ...even *within* this framework the disagreements that arise among Soviet philosophers cannot function in the way in which disagreements function in other philosophical communities. For a further element of the dogmatic framework is the thesis that Soviet Marxism-Leninism *is* in fact monolithic, and as a result the genuine doctrinal differences that do exist within it are slighted and are prevented from evolving naturally and constructively.[233]

The closer a subject was to *diamat* or *istmat*, the less room there was for discussion: fundamental philosophical issues, as well as issues in social and political philosophy were not addressed, or resulted in repetition of earlier discussions.[234] Scanlan's *Marxism in the USSR*, with its claim that "the intellectual culture of the USSR is somewhat richer and more vital today than is often supposed," demonstra-

ted the disappointment of "philosophical sovietologists," and the need to defend one's interest in Soviet philosophy.[235]

There were certain margins between official philosophical culture and philosophical sub- and counterculture, and as long as the actual version of official philosophy and the ideology of Soviet philosophy were not contradicted, professional Soviet philosophers could engage in 'genuine' philosophical work. This is testified by the existence of relatively autonomous regional centers, for example in Georgia, where philosophers succeeded in preserving and continuing their national philosophical tradition, albeit rather anonymously: Mamardašvili, who went from Tbilisi to Moscow to study philosophy, did not even know of its existence.[236] Other examples are the university of Tartu (Estonia), where the semiotician Jurij Mikhajlovič Lotman (1922-1993), banned from Moscow until 1991, and the philosopher of history Eeru Loone were working, or the phenomenological studies in Riga and Rostov-na-Donu.[237]

Institutional marginalization is exemplified by Losev, who taught ancient philology and philosophy at MGPI instead of engaging in philosophy proper at the *filfak* of MGU or the IF AN, and by Bibler, who resided in remote institutes not matching his standing as a philosopher and who did not publish in the central philosophical journals until the late 1980s.[238] A third example is Mamardašvili, whose courses at MGU on existentialism and on Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* in the late 1960s were suspended.[239] From 1968 to 1974 he worked as an editor of *VF*, but he was removed from the IF to work at the *Institut Istorii i Teorii Estestvoznanija i Tekhniki* [Institute of History and Theory of Science and Technology], "which accommodated him and many other undesirable and 'punishable' philosophers," and forced to err from one university or institute to another, until he settled in Georgia in 1980.[240] The meta-philosophical question 'What is philosophy?', answered off-hand by official Soviet philosophy, was not to be questioned, which explains the difficult position of Mamardašvili, who persistently raised that question. Counteracting the official conception of philosophy in content and in form, he propagated and *demonstrated*, through lectures throughout the country, a conception of philosophy as consisting in the *act of thinking*:

> Was auch immer das angekündigte Thema war, ob Descartes, Kant oder Kafka, für Mamardaschwili war die Sache immer dieselbe: Philosophie als solche. Ob er 'cogito ergo sum' interpretierte, Kants Begriff des 'Transzendentalen' oder Husserls eidetische Reduktion, immer ging es um die Demonstration dessen, was das philosophische Denken ist.[241]

Radically free philosophical thought could not find a legitimate place in Soviet philosophical culture: its place was in *illegitimate* philosophical sub- or counterculture.[242] In *Filosofija odnogo pereulka* [Philosophy of a Certain Narrow Street] Pjatigorskij tells us about it:

> So we are in the third period of philosophizing. The first took place in the yard [*vo dvore*], the second in the smoking-room of the Lenin library [*v Leninskoj kurilke*], the third is taking place in the kitchen [*na kukhne*]...[243]

Moscow's free intellectual life took place *na kukhne* anyway, and philosophy made no exception: Soviet philosophical culture did have a public space (conferences, the pages of *VF* and *FN*, the IF, etc.), but this did not coincide with the 'agora' of philosophy in the USSR.[244]

The ultimate form of marginality was the private 'circle [*kružok*]'. Pjatigorskij gives several examples: a lecturer at an Electric Engineering Institute who held seminars on 'Plato, Hegel, Christianity, and our Existence'from 1949 to 1971; a teacher of *diahistomat* at an Industrial Institute who compensated for his teaching by lecturing –to the same audience– at a friend's *dača*; an artist who held seminars on 'Occultism and Godmanhood [*bogočelovečestvo*],' and a scholar at the *Institut Vostokovedenija* [Institute of Oriental Studies], i.e. Pjatigorskij himself, who was invited to lecture on Buddhism at an Aviation Engineering Institute, on which occasion the local CPSU-secretary asked him "not to tell things that are somewhere written," and who after a lecture at a chemical plant was asked questions for four hours on the relationship of science to religion – an issue long resolved in official philosophy.[245] Other examples are the *privatissima* at Losev's home on Arbat Street, at Petrov's house in Rostov-na-Donu, or, for a period of 20 years, at Bibler's place.[246]

Partly coinciding with these forms of marginalization, partly compensating for them, was a process of professionalization and a growing discrepancy between official and professional philosophy. The contrast between *učebniki* and specialist publications reflects a *division of labor* between Soviet philosophers: the *učebniki* were not the *opera omnia* of primitive philosophers, but the product of *apparatčiki*, and the specialist studies were not attempts to emancipate thought from dogma, but elaborations of subordinate questions, the consequences of which for official dogma were not made explicit. This explains the existence of two kinds of philosophers:

> First, those who attempt to argue rationally for their positions, analyze and interpret the concepts they use, and attempt to reinterpret the meaning of the classical Marxist-Leninist statements in the light of rational consistency. Then there are those who merely repeat and paraphrase what is contained in the Marxist-Leninist classics and in the Party proclamations, who oppose any attempt at interpretation or reinterpretation from below, and who argue from authority. *In both kinds of thinker, however, there is the strain and tension of the demands of philosophy on the one hand and of ideology on the other* [italics mine, EvdZ]. For philosophical clarity and consistency are pedagogically and so ideologically useful only if they do not undermine the ideological edifice itself. Yet safe, simple ideological conformity is often pedagogically and so ideologically sterile and ineffective.[247]

Likewise, two 'systems of philosophy' can be discerned: the "system of basic laws and categories of materialist dialectics," and a system of philosophical disciplines.[248] The first system reflects a dogmatic philosophical theory, the second points to a specialization of philosophy. The first, the "scientific-theoretical system, expressing the world-view of the working class," facilitates and legitimatizes the usurpation of the entire field of theory, including science.[249] The second creates a built-in flexibility that has proved to be a *conditio sine qua non* for the existence of creative philosophical thinking in the USSR, legitimatizing the establishment of

relatively independent disciplines and 'declassified doctrines'. In the first case, system means *unity*, in the second it means *differentiation.*

Diamat and *istmat*, colonizing the field traditionally covered by metaphysics, epistemology, and ontology, effectively prevented the development of fundamental philosophy, and in the end *diamatčik* and *istmatčik* became words of abuse.[250] Consequently, the philosophical disciplines –rather than the 'system' of *diamat* and *istmat*– were the place where creative work was done:

> The stagnant atmosphere of scholastic dogmatism forces every somewhat thinking man to escape to the periphery of the dominant paradigm. And we see, in the years of stagnation, a most intensive development of precisely those fields of philosophical investigation to which the metastases of dogmatism had not yet gotten to: philosophical questions of natural science, methodology of science, critical analysis of foreign philosophy, history of philosophy, theory of culture, and the like. Precisely in these areas the most interesting works are created. In the fundamental parts of Marxist philosophy, however, a sepulchral peace and quiet [*kladbiščenskij pokoj*] reigns since long ago.[251]

Increased institutionalization and professionalization made philosophy less susceptible to the immediate effects of political change. This process of gaining self-sufficiency has been progressive.[252] But the valuable work done in various specialisms (aesthetics, philosophy of science / *filosofskie voprosy estestvoznanija* [philosophical questions of natural science], and history of philosophy) could never be more than promising, as studies by Swiderski, Graham and others showed .[253] The conditions for a boom in Soviet philosophy were realized, but it failed to occur.[254] Many Soviet philosophers no longer identified with the system, retreating to the marginal areas indicated above (Mamardašvili, Batiščev), or trying to find room for serious philosophical work in specialist disciplines (Davydov, Bibler), and in history of philosophy (Solov'ëv, Motrošilova), waiting to emerge as leading philosophers in the late 1980s.[255]

Several authors have remarked that Soviet philosophers presented diverging views on the nature and status of philosophy, and of its relation to science, ideology, and world-view.[256] Ojzerman was the chief architect of a conception of philosophy that suited its various actual functions, entailed in his definition of philosophy as "philosophical world-view," and of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a "scientific philosophical world-view."[257] Two other positions, viz 'philosophy as a general science' and 'philosophy as world-view' were 'sublated' in Ojzerman's conception.[258] It legitimatized the subordination of philosophy to a primarily ideological function, and at the same time stated the relative independence of philosophical work, which created "a modus vivendi for still more widely divergent views than appear on the surface."[259] Ojzerman wrote that "the subject matter [*predmet*] of philosophy in general, and of scientific, Marxist-Leninist philosophy in particular, cannot be determined unequivocally or reduced to a single definition, since the development of philosophy inevitably turns the subject matter of philosophical research into a system of objects, into a system of historically developing philosophical disciplines enriched with new content [italics mine, EvdZ]."[260] The relevance of this statement is not difficult to grasp:

Presently Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a system of philosophical disciplines... The *practice of research* has demonstrated the expediency of a *methodic* delimitation of dialectical... and historical materialism... Specialist investigations in the field of epistemology, philosophical questions of natural science, and dialectical logic show that these fields also *are separating* [*vydeljajutsja*]* into special philosophical disciplines. Ethics and aesthetics will, possibly, become independent scientific disciplines *in the near future*, but presently they are component parts of Marxist-Leninist philosophy [italics mine, EvdZ].[261]

The sophistication of the conception of Soviet philosophy created a legitimate place for relatively independent philosophical disciplines, and facilitated their separation from *diamat* and *istmat*. This was done in terms of official philosophy: it was permanently developing reality itself –a basic tenet of *diamat*– that occasioned this emergence of separate disciplines. One could foresee a gradual reduction of *diamat* and *istmat* to the status of specialisms themselves, and a 'dissolution' of the 'system' into separate disciplines. Ideological legitimatization 'from above' and 'from below' meet in sophisticated *theories about* (Soviet) philosophy, developed by Soviet philosophers themselves, which makes it difficult to assess the precise relation between official and professional philosophy. This vagueness, however, was a *condition* for the legitimate existence of professional philosophy.

The notion of *partijnost'* linked established political power to a single doctrine, and legitimatized any extent of actual control over philosophical work. The notion of *naučnost'* warranted the *a priori* superiority of Soviet philosophy and legitimatized Party intervention in the field of science, but it also founded the need to integrate the results of permanently developing science into the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, and immunized philosophy to the extent to which it was itself scientific. The notion of *sistemnost'* founded the presence of an official system of *diamat* and *istmat*, and facilitated philosophical work within the framework of a system of philosophical disciplines.

2.viii *Perestrojka and the End of Soviet Philosophical Culture (1986-1989)*

Soviet philosophy began and ended with the fundamental subordination of philosophy to a primarily ideological function. Strictly speaking, Soviet philosophy ended in the last week of August 1991, when the *partkom* of the Philosophical Faculty of MGU was closed.[262] But in 1991 Soviet philosophical culture had already lost most of its Soviet character.[263] Therefore, it is more appropriate to point to 1989 as the last hour of Soviet philosophy, when the CPSU traded "Marxism-Leninism, the unified revolutionary doctrine" and its "resolute fight against any manifestations of revisionism and dogmatism" for a "creative development of the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, employing the achievements of progressive social thought."[264] In the same year, the new philosophical *učebnik*,

*The use of the *imperfective* aspect at this point indicates a *process* that is actually taking place, and apparently with Ojzerman's approval.

Vvedenie v filosofiju [Introduction to Philosophy], despite its advantage over its predecessors, fell almost dead from the press. It was in 1988/9 that the first frontal attack on Marxism itself, rather than on Leninist or Stalinist distortions of it, was launched by Aleksandr Sergeevič Cipko (b.1941).[265] And it was in 1989 that *FN* organized a *Zaočnaja Teoretičeskaja Konferencija* [Theoretical Conference by Correspondence] on the question 'Is Philosophy a Science?', a question that struck at the roots of the ideology of Soviet philosophy.

The deplorable state of 'stagnated' Soviet philosophical culture had appeared in full when, in 1986, the CPSU attempted to preserve its dominion with the political program of *perestrojka* and, as a means to this end, *glasnost'*.[266] *Glasnost'* had three important effects on the state of Soviet philosophical culture. The first was a flood of hitherto forbidden fruit, made possible by *glasnost'*: texts of both Russian and Western origin that had previously been accessible only to specialists were published (over 400 in Russian philosophy alone).[267] A second effect was an exercise in 'self-criticism' on the part of the philosophical community: in 1987 *VF* organized an *anketa* [survey] about the situation in philosophy - part of the criticism was familiar (dogmatism, schematism, scholasticism), but more pertinent topics were raised, too: the self-inflicted international isolation, the small number of journals.[268] A third effect was a spectacular growth of *samizdat*: in 1988 und 1989 new philosophical journals appeared.[269] Finally, a settlement with the past became manifest in sharply critical articles about Mitin and other party-philosophers, about how Stalin had been made a philosophical genius, and about undeserved academic degrees, as well as in the reappearance of authors like Batiščev, Bibler, and Pomeranc, and in a 'cult' around figures like Mamardašvili, Florenskij, or Losev.[270]

The first *perestrojka*-years saw an attempt, led by Frolov (Gorbačëv's philosophical advisor over 1987-1989), to reform Marxism-Leninism in the direction of a humanist Marxism.[271] With its stress on universal, i.e. not class-bound, human values, and on "global problems" that transcend class struggle (nuclear arms race, environment, hunger) this *filosofija perestrojki* was expected to play a positive role in international detente and in the national mobilization of the "human factor": Frolov's position fitted in perfectly with the official program of those years, as appears from a comparison with Gorbačëv's *Perestrojka i novoe myšlenie* [Perestrojka: New Thinking for Our Country and the World] (1987) and the CPSU-program of 1986.[272] There was an explicit need for a philosophy of *perestrojka*, and philosophers were summoned to take their task seriously.[273]

Gorbačëv made it clear that a successful *perestrojka* presupposed a reform of social science, including philosophy.[274] As Konstantin Nikolaevič Ljubutin (b.1935) and Daniil Vasil'evič Pivovarov (b.1943) indicated, this would mean a victory of one out of two opposed trends in Soviet philosophy:

> One of them was the tendency towards free-thinking, sincere scientific quest for truth, *glasnost'* and the permission of alternative points of view. The other tendency consisted in the attempt to turn philosophy into a handmaid of politics [*služanka politiki*]. (...) The task of philosophical *perestrojka* consists first of all in the struggle for the victory of the first tendency,...[275]

The *Filosofskoe Obščestvo SSSR* [Philosophical Association of the USSR, successor of the OVMD] was accepted as a member of FISP [*Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie*], and the notorious delegation-policy was abolished.[276] Philosophical faculties were founded at other, partly new universities.[277] The call for 'more philosophical journals' was answered a few years later: since 1991 no less than eight philosophical journals have come into existence.[278]

Of particular importance was the *reform* of *vuzovskaja filosofija*, the unpopular instruction in the 'red subjects' that consumed one eighth of every student's time and employed some 80% of the 25,000 professional Soviet philosophers, still using the thirty year old textbook *Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii*.[279] A contest for a new *učebnik* in philosophy, organized in 1983, had remained without result.[280] In 1988 the philosophical journals discussed the project for a new book, which appeared in 1989: *Vvedenie v filosofiju*.[281]

The discussion around Soviet philosophy was primarily a meta-philosophical discussion about the way in which philosophy is done, its place in relation to society and politics, its predominantly ideological function, the way it was planned, etc.[282] Criticism was voiced at 'professional' Soviet philosophical culture, but also at the 'philosophical subculture' that was its antithesis: philosophy as uncontrolled speculation, as philosophical '*kaif*', or as pseudo-philosophical kitsch.[283]

From this perspective, the "conference by correspondence" about the question 'Is Philosophy a Science?' was not a theoretical discussion at all, but a very practical one.[284] As initiator Aleksandr Leonidovič Nikiforov (b.1940) explained later, the discussion was directed against the dominance and ideologization of Marxism.[285] With the categoric statement that "Philosophy never was, is not, and will, I hope, never be a science (this relates to Marxist philosophy as well)," Nikiforov hit twice, as he not only rejected the official view that Marxist(-Leninist) philosophy was a science, but also presented the dilemma that philosophy should be regarded either as a science or as a *Weltanschauung*, thus excluding the possibility of a 'scientific world-view'.[286] Most participants in the discussion rejected Nikiforov's thesis as too radical, and expressed a desire to return to the origins of Marxism-Leninism, but the discussion cleared the way for alternative conceptions of philosophy: philosophy as 'personal world-view' (Nikiforov), as 'capacity to perceive Ideas' (Davydov), or as 'the event of thought' (Mamardašvili).[287] This variety of answers to the question 'What is Philosophy?' also points to a search for new forms of legitimacy.[288]

The fact that 'Marxism-Leninism' was not a philosophical *theory*, but the *form of legitimacy* of any philosophical activity in the USSR, serves to explain the smooth transition of most Soviet philosophers to non-Marxist positions, and it also explains why the discussion about Marxism graded into a meta-philosophical discussion: it was not so much a discussion about philosophical content as one about form and function of philosophy. The discussions that unfolded between 1986 and 1989 turned around the subordination of philosophy to an ideological legitimatization of 'real existing socialism', i.e. around its very 'Sovietness'.[289] In discussions like 'Pereživët li marksizm perestrojku [Will Marxism Survive Perestrojka]?' and 'Umer li marksizm [Has Marxism Died]?' (both 1990) the very existence of Marxism in Russia was addressed.[290] Here, the question about the fate

of Marxism as a social experiment and a ruling ideology was distinguished from the question about the viability of Marxism as a theoretical position among others.[291]

The *inner logic* of development of Soviet philosophy started to unfold as soon as the situation allowed. This is exemplified by fields such as philosophical ethics.[292] Ever since the 1960s, there had been vain attempts to overcome the traditional reduction of morality to the obligation to build communism.[293] It is not surprising, therefore, to see Davydov or Arsenij Vladimirovič Gulyga (1921-1996) stress the absolute character of moral claims and obligations (as opposed to their relativization via the principle of *partijnost'*), or to see Solov'ëv emphasize the personal nature of morality (as opposed to Marxist-Leninist collectivism), closely linked in his case to the theme of personality [*ličnost'*], equally neglected in Soviet times.[294]

Also taboo in Soviet philosophical culture –other than purely negatively– was the relationship of philosophy to religion, as a possible partner in dialogue and as a possible source of inspiration. Naturally, it was easier to lift the first taboo, and dialogue soon took place.[295] As to the second, a call for the renaissance of Russian religious philosophy was made very loudly, e.g. by Gulyga.[296] In post-Soviet Russian philosophical culture, religious philosophy is represented, among others, by Sergej Sergeevič Khoružij (b.1941) and Nikolaj Konstantinovič Gavrjušin (b.1946).[297]

A third major example, finally, is *IFN*, where the inner tensions manifested itself quickly from 1986 onwards. The development of *IFN*, however, is the subject of the following five chapters.

Chapter Three

The Development of *IFN* (1920s–1980s)

> At the basis of Marxist investigation of the history of philosophy lies the brilliant idea of V.I. Lenin that Marxist philosophy is 'the result, the sum, the conclusion of the *history* of knowledge of the world,' and in the first place of the history of philosophy.
>
> Mikhail T. Iovčuk, 1967[1]

Soviet philosophy began around 1930 with the reduction of Marxism to orthodox Marxism-Leninism. In historiography of philosophy, too, the Soviet period was marked by a fundamental subordination of philosophy to its ideological function, a subordination which has continued to exert its pressure on both practice and theory of the history of philosophy. Both practice and theory had to be developed: as Bolotnikov noted in 1933, "there are in our country hardly any specialists in history of philosophy."[2] History of philosophy was one of the fields in which Soviet philosophy was not burdened with an elaborated Marxist(–Leninist) theory, and thus was relatively virgin soil.[3]

From the *klassiki marksizma-leninizma*, *IFN* inherited the *economistic*, *dichotomic*, and *totalizing* impulses outlined above [Ch.1.iii]. Further, from the *klassiki* it inherited some writings on themes from philosophy's past: on Democritus and Epicurus, on Hegel, on Russian philosophers and theoreticians, on philosophers like David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and on the positivists Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. Finally, it inherited a large number of loose remarks and comments by Marx, Engels, and Lenin on a wide variety of philosophers and philosophical positions. These varied in quality and adequacy, but given the authoritative status of the *klassiki*, they could serve as a reservoir of apt quotations for actual work in the history of philosophy.

The idea of dialectical materialism as a philosophical system dominated Soviet philosophical culture. As a result, the combination of the dichotomic and the totalizing view on the history of philosophy has dominated. This is not to say that no other positions manifested themselves: during a short period, 'liquidationist' and 'mechanicist' positions prevailed, which wanted either to abolish philosophy altogether, or regarded it as a method rather than as a doctrine or a system. Economic reductionism was a tendency, employed occasionally to 'expose' philosophers as mere 'mouthpieces of the bourgeoisie', but it has never prevailed, for the obvious reason that it is incompatible with the notion of the leading role of ideas in history.[4] The mutual exclusion of the three impulses was itself excluded by the fact that there was to be a Marxist-Leninist position on this issue as on any other. The three positions therefore could exist only as *tendencies*. Containing these tendencies, *IFN* displayed a *tension*: the core of the Soviet conception of the history of philosophy became the 'basic question', with a strong tendency towards a totalizing

position. Soviet philosophy set itself the task to rewrite the history of philosophy from a Marxist-Leninist perspective and to work out a theory of the history of philosophy. This task ensued from Soviet philosophy's claim to be a *system* of philosophy, totalizing the historical development of philosophy. But it could not consist in the deduction of such a theory from the works of the *klassiki*.

The development of *IFN* as a branch of Soviet philosophy follows roughly the periodization of Soviet philosophy as a whole. The 'pre-history' of *IFN* covers the period until the establishment of Soviet philosophy around 1930 [3.i]; a second period runs from the beginnings of Soviet philosophy to the famous discussion about Aleksandrov's *Istorija zapadno-evropejskoj filosofii* (1931-1946) [3.ii]; the third period begins with that discussion and coincides with the 'offensive period' in Soviet philosophy (1947-1955) [3.iii]; it is followed by the period of *ottepel'*, running from 1955 to approximately 1966 [3.iv]; a fifth period begins with the end of *ottepel'*, and can be called the period of professionalization (1967-1975) [3.v], leading to mature *IFN* (1976-1985, 1986-1989), the subject of the remaining chapters of this study.[5]

3. i *Towards a Soviet History of Philosophy (1917-1930)*

The discussion between 'mechanicists' and 'dialecticians' focused on the status of (Marxist) philosophy with respect to (natural) science, but it was intimately related to the question about Marxism being either a radical break with philosophy as such or a continuation of 'the best' of the philosophical tradition of the West.[6] The main representative of the last position, Deborin, followed his master Plekhanov in regarding dialectical materialism as a synthesis, performed by Marx and Engels, of Hegelian dialectics and Feuerbachian materialism.[7] Like Plekhanov, Deborin and co. identified matter with Spinoza's substance, making thought an attribute of material substance.[8] Plekhanov qualified Marxism as a "variety of Spinozism," and Deborin promoted this interpretation in 1927:

> Deborin states his case quite directly at the beginning of his essay, 'Spinoza's World-View', by saying, "Spinoza is *essentially a great atheist and materialist.*" And... he concludes the section on Spinoza's influences by saying, "...there is no doubt about the fact that Spinoza's 'God' is to be understood as matter (nature), which has two fundamental properties, extension and thought" [italics in Deborin, EvdZ].[9]

In this way, dialectical materialism was understood as a system of philosophy, consisting of Hegelian dialectics, materialistically 'turned upside down' with the help of an identification of 'matter' with Spinoza's *causa sui*. Both operations are historically and philosophically problematic, leaving out of account a lot of Hegel's and Spinoza's philosophy. A materialist interpretation of Hegel's system, where nature is the 'exteriorization [*Entäußerung*] of Spirit', raises the question as to the source of development; this source has then to be situated within nature ('matter') and here the notion of *causa sui* can be useful, but at the price of a restriction of substance to one of its attributes, more precisely, of an identification of *Deus sive Natura* with matter. As John B. Bakker showed, this is not consistent with

Spinoza's philosophy, and the places Deborin referred to were wrongly interpreted by him.[10]

Another important aspect of the discussions around Hegel and Spinoza was that they affected the position of dialectical materialism in Soviet academic institutions, and its right to interfere with science. The 'mechanicists' could invoke classical texts by Marx and Engels in which they claimed the replacement of philosophy by science. However, the 'dialecticians' found support in Engels' *Dialektik der Natur* and *Ludwig Feuerbach...*, and in Lenin, whose admiration of Hegel was manifest in his *Filosofskie tetrady*:

> *Aphorism*: It is impossible to fully understand Marx' *Das Kapital* without having studied and understood *the whole* of Hegel's *Logik*. Hence, not one Marxist has understood Marx $^1/_2$ a century later!![11]

It was Lenin, too, who presented Marxism as the synthesis of "the best" of European intellectual history, including German classical philosophy, who called upon the editors and collaborators of *PZM* to form an "association of materialist friends of Hegelian dialectics," and who wrote in 1921:

> It seems appropriate to me... to remark on behalf of the younger members of the party, that it is *impossible* to become a conscious, *real* communist without studying –and I mean *studying*– all that Plekhanov has written on philosophy, since that is the best there is in the entire international Marxist literature.[12]

Plekhanov was Lenin's political opponent in most respects, and it is therefore likely that this statement by Lenin indeed "embarrassed his followers for close to four decades," but it certainly helped Deborin in the discussions with regard to Hegel and Spinoza that started around 1925.[13] For the 'deborinists', Hegel and Spinoza stood for 'philosophy with a scientific status'; their objective was, as Jakhot showed, not "exegetic", but "apologetic".[14]

Among the 'mechanicists', Aksel'rod [Ortodoks] vehemently criticized the Hegelianism of Deborin and co.:

> In our country, they have now made Hegel a Marxist in order to become, in the end, Hegelians themselves. That is why I emphasize again and again: we are orthodox Marxists, and we see you all as neo-Hegelians.[15]

Against the hegelianizing tendency of the 'dialecticians' she argued, first of all, that to adopt the categorical apparatus of Hegel's *Logik*, without engaging in scientific analysis of natural and social reality, would lead, in the end, to "abstract philosophy," imposing conceptual schemes without any real content. Secondly, she stressed the "reactionary nature" of Hegel's system as opposed to its "revolutionary method."[16] Aksel'rod also attempted to counteract the identification of Spinoza's substance with 'matter' in an article of 1927 with the expressive title '*Nadoelo* [I'm sick of it]!':

My grave mistake, from the point of view of my adversaries, consists in regarding Spinoza's substance as the source of causality [*zakonomernost'*]. From the point of view of my opponents, god or Spinoza's substance is nature, identical with matter. In other words, substance is matter .[17]
Any competent and conscientious reader will understand, that the strict consistency of Spinoza is related to a consistent denial of transcendental teleology. These elements I regard and continue to regard as the soul of materialism.[18]

Spinoza's anti-teleological stance fitted perfectly into Aksel'rod's mechanicist materialism, but she clearly perceived the profoundly religious nature of Spinoza's thought, too, as well as its Jewish background.[19] Deborin replied in '*Revizionizm pod maskoj ortodoksii* [Revisionism Under a Mask of Orthodoxy]' with a paragraph '*Ortodoks i sionistskaja filosofija istorii* [Ortodoks and the Zionist Philosophy of History]', in which he qualified Aksel'rod's attempt to relate Spinoza's philosophy to his Jewish descent as "Zionism." This accusation was all the more painful in view of growing anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia: during the Great Purge (1936-1938), anti-Semitism became a quasi-official pretext to remove people with Jewish ancestors –such as Aksel'rod and Deborin– from leading positions.[20]

The 'mechanicists' sought to defend science against philosophy, while the dialecticians sought to defend philosophy against ideology.[21] Both failed, and the effect was the subordination of science to philosophy and of philosophy to politics through official ideology. The discussion about Hegel was resolved in 1931 with the establishment of an 'official position', which stressed both the importance of Hegel for Marxism and the deeply reactionary nature of his philosophy, using the notorious 'contradiction' between system and method.[22] Mitin accomplished a 'revision [*peresmotr*]' of the interpretation of both Hegel and Spinoza, criticizing Deborin for ignoring the metaphysical character of Spinoza's thought, stressing the "most serious inconsequence of his philosophy, the fact that he had not yet reached a consistent materialism," denying that Marxism was a kind of Spinozism, but then criticizing Aksel'rod with Deborin's arguments, saying that in her position there was "not a grain of Marxism nor of materialism," because she "grants Spinoza a materialism... without material substance, in other words, she assumes a materialism without matter..."[23]

Mitin's 'dialectical versatility' in establishing an official position offers a fine example of *flexible dogma*. Deborin and co. were criticized for "an unjustified rapprochement of Marxism and Spinozism..." in a whole series of works after 1932.[24] Jakhot mentions a discussion in 1934 between the 'deborinist' Grigorij Samuilovič Tymjanskij (1893-1941) and the 'aksel'rodian' Aaron Il'ič Rubin (1889-1961) –both of Jewish descent, too–, but the 'received view' that the 'deborinists', in their ardor to elevate philosophy to the status of a dialectical science, tended to defend absolute truth and to identify Marxist philosophy with Spinozism and Hegelianism, was firmly established.[25]

3.ii *Orthodoxy and Escape (1931-1946)*

After the 'resolution' of philosophical controversy around 1930, the stage was set for the elaboration of a Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy. *IFN* was conceived, from the very outset, as a *philosophical discipline*, an application of historical materialism to a specific realm of 'social consciousness':

> Scientific investigation in the field of the history of philosophy –which... can only be a study, carried out on the basis of materialist dialectics– presupposes two fundamental conditions... In the first place, a careful analysis of the epoch of the philosopher or philosophical trend under investigation, both with regard to the socio-economic relations of that epoch, and with regard to the ideological (scientific, literary, etc.) content proper to it. In the second place, it is imperative to study the thinker himself by means of primary sources (if possible in the original).[26]

First attempts to formulate a Marxist-Leninist conception of the history of philosophy can be found in texts, dated 1937, by Georgij Fëdorovič Aleksandrov (1908-1961) and Viktor Markovič Pozner (1877-1957), where the existence of a "scientific history of philosophy [*istorija filosofii kak nauka*]" is claimed, and where we find the three impulses from the *klassiki* outlined above.[27] The fact that the *klassiki* did *not* supply Soviet philosophy with an elaborated theory of the history of philosophy contradicted the alleged unity of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and therefore part of the ideology of Soviet philosophy was the claim that they *did* furnish such a theory:

> Relentlessly exposing the pseudo-scientific character of bourgeois idealist... history of philosophy, Marx and Engels... elaborated a dialectical-materialist scientific history of philosophy.[28]

Similar formulations have been repeated in official sources ever since, even in such renowned texts as the *FĖ* of 1960-1970:

> The history of philosophy in the full sense of the term arose in the middle of the 19th century with the appearance of Marxism, dialectical and historical materialism, which gave a scientific explanation of the origin and development of all forms of social consciousness, including philosophy.[29]

Only the development of a true, scientific philosophy enables a true, scientific account of philosophy's history.[30] Consequently, we find a Marxist-Leninist history of the 'pre-history' of scientific history of philosophy.[31] Only much later do we find a recognition of the fact that the *klassiki* had not elaborated a 'scientific history of philosophy': explicitly by Anjur Museevič Karimskij (1932-1994) and Vasilij Vasil'evič Sokolov (b.1919), implicitly in the considerable efforts to elaborate such a theory [Ch.6].[32]

When Soviet philosophy was 'bolshevized' in 1930/1, history of philosophy became "the only field where philosophical thought was still glimmering, and

serious philosophical work was accomplished."[33] It was, according to Aleksandr Fëdorovič Okulov (1908-1994) "the personality cult that urged many philosophical cadres to move from actual problems to the problems of the history of philosophy."[34] Early in the 1930s, a department [*kafedra*] of the history of philosophy was established at MIFLI, with a staff of both pre-Soviet (Viktor Konstantinovič Serëžnikov (1873-1944), Mikhail Aleksandrovič Dynnik (1896-1971)), and Soviet educational background (Ivan Kapitonovič Luppol (1896-1943), David Jur'evič Kvitko (1889-1942), Boris Stepanovič Černyšëv (1886-1944), Bernard Ėmmanuilovič Bykhovskij (1898-1980)).[35]

History of philosophy was not only a field of ideologically neutral work (the decision to translate Diderot may be ideologically motivated, the work itself is ideologically neutral), but also a relatively complicated field, a feature which kept 'ideologists' away:

> The philosophical ignorants had a hard time to get there, since here it was necessary to know the works of past thinkers, the literature that polemized with their ideas or analyzed them, and that disclosed the socio-cultural context of the emergence of the philosophical systems of the past.[36]

Philosophers who were sharply criticized as 'idealists' or 'deborinists', such as Asmus, Luppol and Losev, limited themselves to historical work, waiting for better times.[37] They found some backing in Lenin, who had stressed the importance of study and translation of the materialist and atheist traditions, and who had suggested that "the collaborators of the journal *Pod znamenem marksizma* should organize a systematic study of Hegel's dialectics from a materialist point of view."[38] As a result, this field showed remarkable growth over the period 1931-1947, in the form of research into the history of philosophy, and especially in the form of translations of Western and publications of Russian classical philosophers.[39]

Of 108 translations mentioned by Ballestrem for the period 1922-1960, 46 (42%) appeared in the 1930s, and "most editions were done between 1931 and 1940, during the 'dead period' in Soviet philosophy."[40] These translations made "available to the public in large scale, low priced editions, many of the classics of philosophical thought hardly ever printed in Russia previously."[41] It hardly surprises that Mitin, in a survey of 25 years of Soviet philosophy (1919-1944), paid more attention to history of philosophy than to *diamat* and *istmat* together.[42] Preference was given to 'materialists' (French materialists, Spinoza, Bacon, Hobbes) and 'dialecticians' (Hegel, Fichte, Schelling), but classical texts by Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle were also published, the only real taboo being an inveterate idealist like Plato.[43] One of the miracles of this period was the publication in 1937 of a Russian translation of Nicholas of Cusa by Losev.[44]

However, the relative prosperity of *IFN* was short-lived, as later Soviet sources confirmed:

> Gradually... a degradation of the level of work into the history of philosophy is beginning... The number of works by classical philosophers, published in Russian translation, is decreasing.[45]

In the 1940s a mere 11 editions appeared, contrasting with the 46 of the 1930s, and with the 34 of the 1950s.[46] Certainly, the USSR had other priorities during World War II, but then the same could be said of the 1930s with their industrialization, collectivization, famine, and terror. There was another reason, namely that "the influence of Stalin's personality cult was a serious obstacle for the elaboration of a history of philosophy."[47] Three aspects that came to the fore in the 1930s shaped the nature of *IFN*:

i. the establishment of a field of investigation of historical sources, including the production of a material basis in the form of editions and translations;
ii. the writing of a 'Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy' as an application of historical materialism to one form of social consciousness, and the development of a theory of philosophy's history (as a process) and of the history of philosophy (as a discipline);
iii. the subordination of the history of philosophy to the actual demands of Soviet ideology: this subordination has been a permanent factor, but has varied in quality and intensity.

The Great Patriotic War, Hegel, and Russian Philosophy

The publication of *Kratkij kurs* (1938) signified the reduction of philosophy to a single official line. The effect on *IFN* was that one of its tasks became the hagiography of the four *klassiki marksizma-leninizma*, and as the international situation became grimmer towards the end of the 1930s, philosophy was deployed in ideological warfare, too.[48]

The mobilization of the history of philosophy in the confrontation with Nazism and Fascism had lasting effects on *IFN*.[49] One was the playing down of the importance of German philosophy, especially Hegel (but also Feuerbach and Marx) for the development of Marxism, another the inflation of the role of Russian materialist and dialectical traditions.[50] The latter was linked to the general establishment of Soviet Patriotism as a means to mobilize a population that was not easily motivated to defend 'socialism in one country'.[51] The call upon the Russian Orthodox Church, the 'rehabilitation' of Aleksandr Nevskij and Ivan Groznyj, and the upgrading of (part of) Russia's philosophical past formed part of a single development:

> The struggle against Fascist ideology, the tasks of patriotic education of the Soviet people required further investigation of everything valuable, progressive in Russian philosophical and socio-political thought.[52]

The complexity of the relation between dialectical materialism and Hegelian dialectics did not suit 'stalinist' dogma, and was resolved in 1938:

> In characterizing their dialectical method Marx and Engels commonly referred to Hegel as the philosopher who had formulated the basic features of dialectic. This, however, does not mean that the dialectic of Marx and Engels is identical with the dialectic of

Hegel. In reality, Marx and Engels took from Hegel's dialectics only its 'rational kernel [*racional'noe zerno*]', discarding the idealistic shell and developing dialectic further, so as to give it a contemporary, scientific appearance.[53]

For these reasons, the historiography of Marxism and of its immediate predecessor, German idealism, suffered most from 'personality cult'.[54] Although the edition of Hegel's *Collected Works* was continued (11 volumes between 1930 and 1940), the number of studies of his philosophy decreased, and Lenin's *Filosofskie tetrady* were ignored.[55] It is worth taking a look at the reception of Hegel's works during the 1930s. The Russian translation of his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, published 1932-1935 in up to 30,000 copies, was received quite favorably: it was criticized for ignoring materialist philosophy, and in general for absolutizing the history of philosophy, and the 'menshevizing idealists' were attacked for uncritically "trying to transfer the Hegelian history of philosophy... into the arsenal of Marxism, to include it into a dialectical materialist history of philosophy," but on the whole Hegel's *Lectures...* were treated as "the highest point of bourgeois thought about the history of philosophy," and as the starting-point of a Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy.[56] Soviet commentators were cautiously seeking a middle line between "mechanicist underestimation of this great thinker... [and] deborinist overestimation."[57]

By contrast, in a discussion in 1936 by Mikhail Davidovič Kammari (1898-1965) of Hegel's *Philosophy of History* (published in Russian in 1936), we find a strange mixture of, on the one hand, rejection of a simplistic interpretation of Hegel as a reactionary who justified the Prussian monarchy, and protest against a 'shortsighted' perception of Hegel's notorious identification of the real and the rational as a justification of any political status quo, with, on the other hand, primitive accusations of 'mystification' and 'theodicy':

The obscurantists of Fascism... also reach for this arch-reactionary rubbish and superstition. (...) Is it necessary to show that this scheme [of history moving from East to West, EvdZ] embellishes the pitiful reality of bourgeois-landowner Germany, substantiates the bourgeois-nationalist idea of a special mission of 'the German world', justifies the views of European colonizers about the peoples of China, India, Egypt as objects of colonization? Hegel does not recognize these peoples as world-historical [*vsemirnoistoričeskie*].[58]

Anti-Hegelianism matched the revaluation of Russian philosophy. In 1938, idealism (Plato, Kant, Hegel) disappeared from philosophical instruction at MIFLI, where in 1937 the first course in history of Russian philosophy was taught.[59] In 1942/3 a systematic course on the same subject was taught at MGU, and in 1943, a department of the history of Russian philosophy was established within the philosophical faculty of MGU, headed by Iovčuk until 1947, and then, for 36 years, by Ivan Jakovlevič Ščipanov (1904-1983), one of the architects of '*revdemokratizm*' in Soviet historiography of Russian philosophy.[60] In 1942, a book by Grigorij Stepanovič Vaseckij (1904-1983) and Iovčuk appeared, *Očerki po istorii russkogo materializma XVIII i XIX vv* [Studies in the History of Russian Materialism of the 18th and 19th Centuries], in which "a Marxist appraisal of the materialist views of

V.G. Belinskij, N.G. Černyševskij, A.I. Gercen [Herzen], P.N. Ogarëv, N.A. Dobroljubov" was given, and where their views were characterized as "the philosophy of revolutionary democracy [*revoljucionnyj demokratizm*]," and as "the highest form of pre-Marxist philosophical materialism, containing fruitful dialectical principles and indissolubly linked with the ideas of socialism and the people's revolution."[61]

In these *Očerki...*, the *ideologization* of this field of *IFN* is manifest:

> The peoples of Russia, and especially the working class, may be proud that Russia became the native land of Leninism, that in Russia Marxism was not only understood but also developed, raised to a higher level in the works of Lenin and Stalin. (...) Leninism, as comrade Stalin has pointed out, is the highest achievement of Russian culture. At the same time Leninism, incarnated in the works of Lenin and Stalin, is the summit of universal human culture [*obščečelovečeskaja mirovaja kul'tura*]. It is beyond doubt, that the victory of Marxism in Russia and its triumph in one sixth of the earth were to a considerable extent facilitated by the circumstance that 'among the main currents of progressive social thought in Russia' there was, as Lenin wrote, 'a sound materialist tradition'.[62]

Of course, the 'Great Patriotic War' offered a special justification for the subordination of theoretical work to immediate practical ends, but Soviet-Russian patriotism, an indispensable element of Soviet ideology after the War, anti-Hegelianism, and *revdemokratizm* remained key elements in *IFN*. This ideologization of the history of philosophy sometimes bordered on forgery, as is manifest in a text of 1967 by Iovčuk, where Russian materialism was inserted into the development of dialectical materialism:

> ...classical 19th century Russian materialist philosophy –the philosophy of Gercen, Ogarëv, Belinskij, Černyševskij, Dobroljubov– forms... the highest stage in the development of pre-Marxist materialism, representing *a transitory form* from the dialectics of German classical philosophy to the materialist dialectics of Marx [italics mine, EvdZ].[63]

'Seraja Loščad' : The First Marxist–Leninist History of Philosophy

The years until World War II saw a decrease in publication of classical Western philosophical texts (Aristotle, Bacon, Helvétius, Rousseau, Hegel) and an increase in the publication of classical Russian thinkers (Lomonosov, Radiščev, Belinskij, Herzen, Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, Pisarev, Plekhanov), in which "the profound and everlasting power of the best traditions of philosophical thought of the Russian people and of the other peoples of the USSR was shown."[64] In 1941, the faculties of MIFLI were fused with MGU, and the MIFLI-department of the history of philosophy, headed by Černyšëv since 1940, became, after the establishment in 1944 of a department for history of Russian philosophy, one of two historical departments of the philosophical faculty of MGU: *kafedra istorii zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii*.[65] *IFN* thus was firmly established in the country's main philosophical faculty.

First steps were taken towards the production of a Soviet, Marxist-Leninist account of philosophy's past. In 1939, Aleksandrov published *Očerk novoj filosofii nazapade* [An Outline of Modern Western Philosophy] – for his review of this work, in which he "mentioned some of its mistakes and inexactitudes," Evgenij Petrovič Sitkovskij (1900-1989) was sent to a "corrective labor camp" for a couple of years.[66] In 1940, a concise history of philosophy, written by A.V. Ščeglov, appeared.[67]

But the main event was the preparation by the IF of *Istorija filosofii* [History of Philosophy; *IF3*], planned in seven volumes, edited by Aleksandrov, Bykhovskij, Mitin, and Judin, with contributions by historians of philosophy like Asmus, Dynnik, Černyšëv, Orest Vladimirovič Trakhtenberg (1889-1959), and Boris Fëdorovič Poršnev (1905-1972).[68] The first volume [Antiquity and the Middle Ages] was ready for publication in 1939, the second [15th to the 18th centuries] in 1940, both appeared in 1941, serving the cause of war, if we believe Iovčuk:

> ...it was necessary to show, that precisely the Soviet people and those democratic forces that joined it in the anti-Hitler coalition stood for the achievements of world civilization, including the philosophical heritage of mankind. 'Istorija filosofii', in particular,... was dedicated to this cause. It showed that the values of world civilization, including those of philosophy, belong to socialism and democracy.[69]

IF3 was a first attempt to write a history of philosophy from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, marking the transition "from the analysis of the doctrines of separate philosophers... to an examination of the history of philosophy of the world as a whole," and "highlighting its main line, which runs from the philosophy of Antiquity to the sources of dialectical materialism."[70] It focused on materialist and dialectical traditions in the history of philosophy, and aimed, in line with historical materialism and proletarian internationalism, at a *universal* history of philosophy.[71] The work was nick-named '*seraja loščad'* [The Grey Horse]' because of its color and high intellectual level. Designed to instruct future Soviet philosophers, it was received approvingly, and remained an important source for subsequent *IFN*.[72]

In 1942, the authors of *IF3* were awarded the Stalin Prize.[73] But when the third volume [on German classical philosophy] appeared in 1943, it was heavily attacked.[74] In 1944, the Central Committee issued a special resolution, signed by Stalin, and published in *Bol'ševik*, entitled 'On Shortcomings and Mistakes in the Elucidation of the History of German Philosophy of the End of the 18th and the Beginning of the 19th Century' in which the first two volumes were mildly criticized, the third very severely.[75] The Stalin Prize for the latter was withdrawn, and the book itself was withdrawn from scientific use and from the libraries, thus becoming an absolute antiquarian rarity.[76] Aleksandrov, Mitin, and Judin became heroes of Soviet philosophy, and the third volume, edited mainly by Bykhovskij, could not exert its 'disastrous' influence.[77] This episode has been watered down in later Soviet hagiography of *IFN*.[78] But it apparently was serious enough to drive one of the accused, Černyšëv, to death.[79]

What was so inadmissible about this third volume? In the light of the foregoing discussion, it comes as no surprise that it was insufficiently critical on German philosophy, especially with respect to nationalist and racist elements in Hegel's

philosophy.[80] It linked Hegelian and Marxist dialectics too closely, and underestimated Russia's philosophical heritage:

> The third volume of 'Istorija filosofii' was subject to criticism in the Soviet press. Attempting to set off against Fascist ideology the spiritual richness created in the past by the progressive minds of Germany, the authors nevertheless insufficiently criticized the reactionary socio-political aspects of German idealism,..., which was a serious mistake, especially in those years, when these ideas were employed and inflated by Fascism.[81]

The qualification of Hegel's philosophy as an "aristocratic reaction to the French revolution and French materialism" is reportedly a contribution to *IFN* by Stalin himself.[82] It eclipsed more balanced judgments like that of Kammari in 1936: "One should not forget that Hegel stressed the 'universal historical significance' of the revolution of 1789."[83] Such nuancing clearly was unacceptable both "to the obscurantists [*mrakobesy*] of Fascism" and to Stalin.[84]

The fault of *IF3* was that it pursued some level of historical accuracy. The criticism, voiced by Iovčuk as late as 1958, that the first two volumes did not discuss the philosophy of the peoples of the USSR, is absurd at first sight, as that discussion was planned for the 5th volume![85] But the 4th volume was to discuss the emergence of Marxism, which would then appear as a direct result of West European philosophy (vols. I-III), eclipsing Russian philosophy as a forerunner of Marxism-Leninism. Not surprisingly, the authors of *IF3*, and especially the author of the part on Hegel, Černyšëv, were accused of 'objectivism'.[86]

3.iii *The Cold Start of Post-War IFN (1947-1954)*

No further volumes of *IF3* appeared, although the fourth was ready for print.[87] Instead, Aleksandrov was ordered to write a work to replace it.[88] In 1945, his *Istorija zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii* [The History of West European Philosophy] appeared, based on a series of lectures at the central Party highschool: published in 25,300 copies, it was reissued in 1946 in another 50,000.[89] This "elementary exposition of the history of philosophy in Western Europe, abounding in mistakes and inaccuracies," was awarded the Stalin Prize in 1946, but then became the *corpus delicti* of the discussion in 1947 [Ch.2.iv].[90] Aleksandrov showed himself 'self-critical' and aware of his guilt.[91] Many speeches were highly critical of his book:

> Aleksandrov wurde beschuldigt, das Wesen des Marxismus und seine Beziehung zu den früheren Philosophien nicht begriffen zu haben; die russische Philosophie habe er vernachlässigt, er besitze nicht den Kampfgeist der Partei, gebrauche nicht die starke Sprache Lenins und sei objektiv – ganz zu schweigen von den technischen Irrtümern und erheblichen Lücken.[92]

The charges of objectivism and lack of Leninist *partijnost'* are related to Aleksandrov's "overestimation of Hegel" and to his failure to disqualify his philosophy as an "aristocratic reaction to the French revolution."[93] As Bronislav

Vasil'evič Bogdanov (b.1930) remarked, many Soviet philosophers rejected that qualification during the discussion of 1947, but it continued to prevent serious study of Hegel's philosophy until the mid 1950s, becoming part of 'institutional Marxism':

> Im Jahre 1950 wußte jeder Marxist, daß... Hegels Philosophie eine aristokratische Reaktion auf die französische Revolution war... auch... wenn er keine Ahnung hatte, in welchem Jahrhundert Hegel lebte,...[94]

There is some substance in these charges, although Aleksandrov can hardly be blamed for them. The chapter on German philosophy [Kant to Feuerbach] is about three times as long as that on the formation of Marxism: a clear testimony of lack of *partijnost'*. Aleksandrov often merely 'objectively' recounts the position of a given philosopher, which he justifies with the questionable thesis that the conservative and reactionary aspects of the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were not significant in the historical development of science: "Of significance was the progressive aspect of German philosophy of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century – the doctrine of the dialectical development of thought."[95] Aleksandrov further substantiates his positive appreciation of Hegel with Lenin's *Filosofskie tetrady*, but dutifully appeals to Stalin to stress the difference between Hegelian and Marxist dialectics.[96]

The charge of 'eurocentrism' was pertinent, too: Aleksandrov indeed wrote about West European philosophy only.[97] This may sound like accusing the author of a book on bumblebees of not having written one about butterflies, but we are dealing here with an *official* Marxist-Leninist account of the historical development of philosophy. Ending with chapters on German philosophy and the emergence of Marxism, Aleksandrov skipped Russian philosophy, limiting himself to the remark that "the history of West European thought was given greater depth and meaning in the works of the great Russian scientists and thinkers."[98] Aleksandrov can hardly be accused of lack of patriotism, as he begins his work with the declaration that "the Soviet people, fighting, under the guidance of the Bolshevik party, for great and noble ideas, comes forward as the genuine defendant of the centuries-old culture and civilization of the world against its destructors," and ends with the statement that "the fact that the Red Army has gained victory over a German-Fascist army of many millions, is evidence of... the force and truth of the theory that guides the Soviet people."[99] But he did not (re)write the history of philosophy in such a way as to ascribe a crucial role to Russian philosophical thought...

The charge that Aleksandrov did not adequately interpret the relationship of Marxism to previous philosophy, "underestimating" the revolutionary nature of Marxism, was equally pertinent.[100] Despite his obedient declaration of the superiority of Marxism-Leninism and his frequent reference to the philosophical genius of Stalin, Aleksandrov failed to demonstrate that Marxism was at the same time the supreme outcome of the whole history of philosophy *and* the completely original creation of four subsequent philosophical geniuses: Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin.[101] Aleksandrov's failure thus in fact demonstrates the irreconcilable exigencies put before *IFN*.

Aleksandrov's approach to the history of philosophy is not 'historical materialist' in any recognizable sense: he modifies a fundamental thesis of historical materialism, viz that "the spiritual life of society is a reflection of the conditions of its material life," saying that "at the same time, they [the *klassiki*, EvdZ] showed the enormous role of ideas in social development, its organizing significance... for the progressive class of contemporary society," and relativizing it with the thesis that "the history of ideologies is in the final analysis the reflection of the economic and political life of people in this or that epoch of the development of society."[102] This points to two central *theoretical* questions of *IFN*: that of the independent status of philosophy, and that of periodization of its history. Both were stated as early as 1937 by Pozner, and both were recurring themes in *IFN*.[103]

Determination 'In the Final Analysis': the 'Relative Independence' of Philosophy

The question about the (in)dependence of philosophy is a consequence of the dual status of philosophy. On the one hand, philosophy is part of the ideological superstructure and thus falls within the scope of historical materialism, but on the other hand, the Soviet system itself stressed the enormous importance of philosophy as the theoretical basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology: philosophy was seen as a *cause* rather than as an *effect* of social progress, technical development etc., and thus "...historical materialism not only does not deny, but, on the contrary, stresses the important role and importance of ideas in social life."[104]

The Soviet solution to this problem was a wonderful case of 'flexible dogma'. In official sources from the 1930s to the 1980s, one finds a *double statement*, claiming, on the one hand, the determination 'in the final analysis [*v konečnom sčёte*]' of philosophy by socio-economic conditions, and stressing, on the other hand, its 'relative independence [*otnositel'naja samostojatel'nost'*]'.[105] Both formulations have a textual basis in letters by the late Engels, where he is at pains to exclude a vulgar interpretation of historical materialism.[106] The thesis of the relative independence of philosophy entitled Soviet historians of philosophy to treat philosophy as having a history of its own, and the study of this history as philosophically relevant, but it also served the subordination of philosophy to its ideological function, as it substantiated the thesis that philosophy was a major cause in historical development, esp. in building socialism. This shift towards stressing philosophy as a factor in historical development is manifest in an official 'stalinist' source, *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'* [Short Philosophical Dictionary, *KFS*]:

> ...only the ideology of the proletariat –Marxism– yields the sole true criterion and the guiding ideas for the creation of a science of the history of philosophy. (...) Philosophical theories and views... form a superstructure and *change together with* the changes of its basis. Just like any superstructure, philosophical views and theories, forming an *active force* of social development, help their basis to become stronger [italics mine, EvdZ].[107]

Already present in a key text by Aleksandrov in 1937, the 'double statement' occupies a central place in his *Istorija zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii* of 1945/6:

Marxist-Leninist science, having fixed [*ustanoviv*] that the development of philosophical thought is *determined, in the final analysis*, by the conditions of the material life of society, remarks *at the same time* the *relative independence* of the development of philosophical science, as well as the connection and succession of ideas that exist in history [italics mine, EvdZ].[108]

Aleksandrov's argument for *IFN* as a separate field is rather tortuous:

The founders of Marxism-Leninism think that philosophical systems possess in their history only a certain *relative independence* of development. And *therefore* [italics mine, EvdZ] we are entitled to say that history of philosophy has as its proper subject matter not the history of economics, not the history of politics, not the history of art or literature, but precisely the history of *philosophical ideas*. History of philosophy has its own particular subject,... Philosophy possesses in its development a *relative independence*.[109]

The shift from 'only a certain relative independence' to a 'relative independence' legitimatizes *IFN* as an independent discipline. There are two complementary *reasons* for this obvious rhetorical trick: the *urge* of philosophers to engage in the history of philosophy as a 'relatively independent' field of activity, and the *need* of the Party to obtain a defensible account of philosophy's past that could substantiate the ideology of Soviet philosophy. Once these two requirements were met, the further development of *IFN* was a matter of tug-of-war between the historians, who stressed the independence of their discipline, and the 'party-philosophers', who insisted on its *partijnost'*.

It is obviously easier to describe subsequent philosophical doctrines and add a general picture of social, political, cultural, and scientific 'circumstances', than to enter into an analysis of the precise determination of philosophy by the relations of production, and Soviet historians of philosophy generally preferred a less than 'final' analysis for two reasons.

First, it is difficult to write the history of philosophy in a reductionist manner. It is worth looking at Aleksandrov's argument as to why and how philosophical thought is determined by 'social being':

The relations of production between people determine the nature of philosophical theories only in *the final analysis*, being the final source of philosophical theories, the source of the direction [*napravlenie*, i.e. their politically progressive or reactionary nature, EvdZ] of these theories, and their content. In the second place, they determine the *selection of intellectual material that a philosopher turns to*. In the third place, economy determines which content is put into *the old philosophical categories, concepts, theories, and hypotheses by a new social class*. In the fourth place, the relations of production between people... *reveal the laws of nature and society*, and philosophy reflects these laws. The practical activity of people *confronts social consciousness with new tasks*, and finally, in the fifth place, the productive activity of man not only *reveals* new aspects of the objective world and presents new tasks, but also yields *practical means for the realization of these tasks*.[110]

Secondly, a reductionist approach would be incompatible with the educational function of *IFN*, and with the role and claims of Soviet philosophy itself. If, therefore, the account of the determination of philosophy by 'social being' offers an unreflected catalogue of vague forms of determination of theory by practice, this is precisely how it met its purpose. This solution was favored by the historical situation, and in that sense exemplifies the 'determination' of philosophy by 'social being', in this case by the Party's need to turn philosophy into an ideological instrument. As Kamenka wrote in 1965:

> The dissolution of philosophy as a discipline, implicit in the concept of Marxism as the scientific foundation for all knowledge and in its tendency toward economic reductionism, has not become part of the official ideology of Bolshevik Marxism. (...) Marxism-Leninism was proclaimed as the guiding *philosophy* permeating all Communist activities and as the indispensable foundation for all Soviet practical and intellectual work. (...) As Soviet leaders, from Stalin onward, came to ascribe more and more importance to ideology as a means of gaining social support and exercising social control, the economic reductionism implicit in the materialist interpretation of history was modified more and more.[111]

History and Truth: the Problem of Periodization

The other fundamental question of *IFN*, relating to the proper periodization of philosophy's history, displays the tension between the *economistic* and *totalizing* impulses.[112] Marxist periodization was based on Marx' 'Preface' to *Zur Kritik...*:

> In großen Umrissen können asiatische, antike, feudale und modern bürgerliche Produktionsweisen als progressive Epochen der ökonomischen Gesellschaftsformation bezeichnet werden. Die bürgerlichen Produktionsverhältnisse sind die letzte antagonistische Form des gesellschaftlichen Produktionsprozesses, ...aber die im Schoß der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft sich entwickelnden Produktivkräfte schaffen zugleich die materiellen Bedingungen zur Lösung dieses Antagonismus. Mit dieser Gesellschaftsformation schließt daher die Vorgeschichte der menschlichen Gesellschaft ab.[113]

Soviet *istmat* had a problem with the 'Asiatic mode of production': it was ascribed, by Marx, to geographical circumstances, which undermined the absolute primacy of productive forces; it was historically stable, which weakened the inevitability of progress; and, situated between primitive and antique society, but clearly not part of Europe's development, it cut across the universal scheme of evolution of society.[114] In official sources, it was eliminated in favor of the *pjatičlenka* [five-stage sequence]: primitive communalism – slave-holding society – feudalism – capitalism – (socialism) communism.[115]

The relation of historical periodization to the historical development of philosophy presented a problem to *IFN*. On the one hand, if philosophy is part of the ideological superstructure and follows the succession of socio-economic formations, and if that succession is historically inevitable, there must be a parallel development of philosophy in all parts of the world.[116] This led Soviet historians of

philosophy to discern slave-holding, feudal, and bourgeois-capitalist periods in the development of philosophy in Japan, Russia, Georgia, and Argentina.[117] On the other hand, if *diamat* and *istmat* represent true, scientific philosophy, then the history of philosophy must be the history of the development of that single philosophical truth.[118]

Both ideas can be traced back to Hegel's idea of philosophy as 'child of its epoch', as "*ihre Zeit, in Gedanken erfaßt*", and of the historical development of philosophical truth [Ch.1.ii]. In Hegel, these ideas are linked and substantiated by the idea that there is only one process, the appearance and coming-to-itself [*Für-sich-werden*] of the absolute *Idea*. Rejection of this objective idealist foundation implies a conflict between determination of the development of philosophical thought by socio-economic conditions, and the teleology present in the genesis of truth: if manifest truth [*an und für sich wahres Wissen*] is not the immanent goal of reality, then its appearance in history is inexplicable, with respect both to the fact and to the moment of its appearance. Hence it is either a miracle, or a work of pure genius. The latter interpretation fitted well with the ideological function of Soviet philosophy, but is theoretically not satisfying, and at odds with historical materialism.

The universal history of philosophy and the history of universal philosophy conflict: according to the first, philosophy is part of ideological superstructure, and its periodization is in line with the succession of socio-economic formations; according to the second, Marxism signified a revolution in the history of philosophy, dividing it into two epochs: "Philosophy before and philosophy after Marx are really incomparable."[119]

The solution to this problem is to identify the revolution in philosophy, i.e. the transition from pre-Marxist to Marxist thought, with the breakdown of capitalism and the proletarian revolution, i.e. with the transition from pre-history to history. But the price for this solution is recognition of the primacy of ideas in history, since Marxist thought was supposed to have played a major role in the very transition that it predicted: in the second half of the 20th century, international class struggle and the construction of socialism in one country were far from accomplished facts, and required an active role of Marxism.[120]

IFN at a Standstill

The 1947 discussion demonstrated a limit to the ideological use of *IFN*. It is impossible to insert Russian philosophical thought, however materialist, dialectical, or revolutionary it may have been, between Hegel and Marx: even if, in terms of philosophical theory, Russian thinkers *could* have brought Marx and Engels to historical and dialectical materialism, they *did not*. Secondly, to minimize the influence of Hegel on Marxism is to ignore much of what Deborin and Plekhanov, Marx, Engels, and Lenin wrote. Thirdly, it is impossible to regard Marxism-Leninism as the sum-total of everything valuable in past philosophy *and* as a product of original genius.

The ideologization of the history of Russian philosophy was criticized in 1947 by Kamenskij.[121] His article in *VF* was one of the grounds to remove Kedrov as editor-in-chief, as is clear from the commentary by the new board, which claims that it should not have been published, because "it raises questions that are not subject to discussion, and revises the Marxist-Leninist position with respect to the history of Russian social thought."[122] Kamenskij was removed from the *Institut filosofii* for four years, and Bibler, who stood to his defence, was exiled to Siberia for several years: both fell victim to the 'anti-cosmopolitan' campaign of those years.[123]

The 1947 discussion was the beginning of a revival of Soviet philosophy, but not of *IFN*:

> ...A.A. Ždanov... did not so much teach Soviet philosophers how to write the history of their science, but how to get away from their historicism and how to treat current problems in an original way. This may explain the general revival of Soviet philosophy after 1947 and the relatively little interest in the history of philosophy.[124]

The requirements set before *IFN* made *IFN* impossible.[125] The consequences became quickly visible: there was only a slight increase in the number of translations of classical philosophical texts, real growth setting in after 1953.[126] Moreover, there was a sharp decrease in historical studies: a Soviet source of 1965 does not mention a single title in *IFN* over the entire period 1947-1955. [127] Rybarczyk reports a yearly average of 1 review in *IFN* until the mid 1950s, against 10 per year in the period 1955-1970.[128] Of 300 books and articles over the period 1947-1970, 20 fall within the 1947-1955 period (2.2 a year), 280 into 1956-1970 (18.6 yearly).[129] What little work was done fell largely into the categories of history of Russian philosophy and *kritika buržuaznoj filosofii* [Critique of Bourgeois Philosophy, *KBF*]: in the 18 issues of *VF* that appeared between 1951 and 1953, there were only 8 articles on pre-Marxist non-Russian philosophy.[130] Critique of eurocentrism sided with schematic polarization of the history of philosophy into materialists and idealists, stress on ideological struggle, and on the difference between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy.[131] The result was a 'militant' critique of non-Marxist philosophy.[132]

During the 1947 discussion, one philosopher stood out as a 'partisan' of the history of philosophy as a discipline: Asmus. One of the very few who were familiar with contemporary non-Soviet philosophy, he made a plea for critical discussion of the works of "the historians of philosophy of contemporary capitalist society," asking rhetorically :

> Do we, Soviet philosophers, have the right not to keep up with all these phenomena [e.g. non-materialist interpretations of modern science, EvdZ], not to answer them with our own works, our own articles and books, not to expose not only those who talk overt, clear mystical and idealist nonsense, but also those who attempt to dress contemporary idealism in the cloak of strict science? It seems to me, that we not only do not have such a right, but also that, if we act that way, we are making a serious, both theoretical, scholarly, and political mistake.[133]

But it was only towards the end of the 1950s that Soviet philosophy began to show an interest in Western philosophical thought, when Jurij Konstantinovič Mel'vil' (1912-1993) founded a first systematic course in *KBF*, and *KBF* was established as a sub-discipline of *IFN* with a department at the IF in 1958 .[134]

Shortly after the discussion of 1947, "the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party commissioned Comrades G.F. Aleksandrov, M.A. Dynnik, M.T. Iovčuk, B.M. Kedrov, M.A. Leonov, M.B. Mitin, and O.V. Trakhtenberg to write a new *Istorija filosofii*, this time in two volumes, in which the conclusions of the philosophical discussion and the criticism passed during the discussion of Comrade Aleksandrov's book ought to be given close consideration."[135] Two volumes were planned, the first dealing with pre-Marxist philosophy, the second with the development of Marxism. In the *konspekt* [synopsis] of this *IF2*, published in the second issue of *VF*, the editors awaited "criticism from readers, directed toward the improvement of this prospectus and the fullest possible application... of the results of the 1947 philosophical discussion."[136]

Three features are noteworthy in this *konspekt*:[137]

i. The question about the place of Russian philosophy was 'resolved' in such a way as not to violate historical truth too seriously, but upholding the suggestion that Russia had been about to found historical and dialectical materialism:

> The task of these chapters [vol.I, ch.15–16, EvdZ] is to reveal the nature and significance of the philosophy of Russian revolutionary democracy of the 1840s-1860s as the highest form of pre-Marxist materialistic philosophy; to show that the Russian materialistic philosophy was the sole progressive philosophical movement contemporary with Marx and Engels, which subjected the reactionary bourgeois philosophy of that time to sharp criticism...[138]

ii. Non-Marxist philosophy after the formation of Marxism was dealt with in Part Two, but not separately:

> The majority of the authors were inclined to believe that this criticism of bourgeois philosophy should be set forth in terms of the struggle of Marxism against contemporary bourgeois philosophy.[139]

iii. Hegel was dealt with in a chapter obediently labelled 'The Aristocratic Reaction in Germany to the French Bourgeois Revolution and French Materialism'.[140]

This second attempt at a Marxist-Leninist universal history of philosophy never saw the light of day. A discussion within the IF was announced for 1950, and some chapters appeared for discussion in *VF*.[141] It was decided to publish a draft version in 550 copies in 1950, and the book itself was scheduled for 1951, but nothing was heard of it until 1953, when the first volume was announced for 1954.[142] The *maket* of the first volume appeared with references to Stalin on every page, regardless of the subject at hand.[143] The book never appeared and its authors were heavily criticized in 1955.

3.iv *IFN Liberated (1955 - 1966)*

Kline pointed out some relaxation in *IFN* around 1953, and "after 1954 or 1955 studies in history of philosophy became more frequent again."[144] In 1967, an exhibition of the "numerous works in the various branches of historical study in philosophy created in the USSR in 1956-1966" was organized with no mention of works of an earlier date.[145] In this respect, 1955 can be regarded as the year in which *IFN* became recognized as a separate field in Soviet philosophy.[146] In 1954, Ojzerman was appointed chairman of the department of history of West European philosophy at MGU, which he remained until 1968; one of the immediate effects was a renewed study of Marxism: Ojzerman made his name with *Formirovanie filosofii marksizma* [The Formation of the Philosophy of Marxism] of 1962, for which he received the Lomonosov Prize of MGU in 1965 and the State Prize of the USSR in 1983.[147] Though opposing any kind of 'revisionism', and especially any distinction between an 'early' and a 'mature' Marx, at least this implied a return to original sources, as well as a recognition of the fact that Marxism had emerged from a discussion within German philosophy, which thus became a legitimate field of study.

In 1955, the department of history of Russian philosophy was renamed 'department of the history of the philosophy of the peoples of the USSR [*istorija filosofii narodov SSSR, IFNS*]', and became a place where *aspiranty* from the Soviet republics (re)wrote the history of philosophy of their country.[148] In 1957, the department of the history of West European philosophy was renamed 'department of the history of foreign philosophy [*istorija zarubežnoj filosofii, IZF*]', more in line with actual investigations of Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and Arabian philosophy.[149] In 1958, finally, a 'department of the history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy [*istorija marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii, IMLF*]' was established, headed until 1963 by Iovčuk, and by Vaseckij until 1970, when Anatolij Danilovič Kosičev (b.1914) replaced him.[150] The *kafedra IZF* was the least 'ideologized' of the three historical departments: it became renowned and popular for its high quality and relative lack of orthodoxy. Here, comprehensive courses on the entire history of Western philosophy up to Marx were set up in the late 1950s – early 1960s.[151]

There was also qualitative change: a shift in the appreciation of Hegel, whose works had, according to an article in *Kommunist*, "unjustly been underestimated," and a revival of studies on philosophers like Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel.[152] Previous stress on the 'materialist line' gave way to a more balanced division of attention, both in studies and in translations.[153]

Soviet historians of philosophy were accused, in editorials in *Kommunist* and *VF*, of not writing the history of *philosophy*, of "failing to exhibit the process of development of specifically philosophic questions," and of reducing philosophy to ideology.[154] The editors of *VF* objected to "the overvaluation of the role of Russian philosophy," and "Ščipanov was reproached for failing to criticize, in a review, the author's "'groundless' setting up of Russian materialism as superior to foreign materialism" – this author most probably had acted upon guidelines set by Ščipanov himself, who supervised 85 candidate and 15 doctoral dissertations![155] Histories of Russian philosophy by emigrated Russians (Zen'kovskij 1948 and Losskij 1951)

were reviewed for the first time in *VF* and *Kommunist* – critically, to be sure, but the "spasmodic attacks interspersed between paragraphs of quite calm analysis [had] the disconnected air of editorial afterthoughts," and a plea was made to study, again of course critically, Russian idealist philosophers, too, instead of only materialists "as had hitherto been the practice."[156]

In 1955, too, the project of the new *IF2* was submitted to severe criticism: the authors had presented past philosophy as mere ideology, "...rejecting the systems of classical European philosophy and giving the impression that dialectical materialism 'had simply dropped from the heavens'."[157] Aleksandrov was accused of having passed from "bourgeois objectivism" (the accusation of 1947) to "a nihilistic denial of the value of bourgeois philosophers," and of "opportunism [*konjunkturščina*]," i.e lack of principle in his elaboration and evaluation of philosophy's history.[158] Previously he had presented the emergence of Marxism as an evolutionary development out of previous philosophy, thus eclipsing the genius of the *klassiki*, now he failed to take into account "that... the 'revolution', realized in the history of philosophy by Marxism, was the inevitable result of previous development."[159] Also, the "minimizing... of Western influences on Belinskij, Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, and others" was "repudiated as erroneous."[160]

Finally, there was a remarkable change in "style and seriousness of content towards contemporary Western philosophy," part of a "slightly increased hospitality toward the ideas of non-Marxist-Leninist thinkers."[161] Translations of hitherto neglected philosophers appeared in 1954: F. Bacon's *New Atlantis*, Montaigne's *Essays*. And it was deemed "absolutely intolerable" that "publication of the works of outstanding foreign philosophers during the last few years has been neglected," including the absence of a recent edition of Hegel.[162] This also applied to non-European philosophy: the translation of *Introduction of Indian Philosophy* by S. Chatterjee and D.M. Datta was "difficult to imagine in the Stalinist period."[163]

IFN Under Revision: 'Krasnyj Osël'

One of the effects of 'destalinization" was a third attempt at a universal *Istorija filosofii* [*IF6*]: "...after 1954 or 1955... preparations were begun for a new general outline of the history of philosophy, *for which one had still not found a satisfactory solution.*"[164] The first volumes were edited by Dynnik, Iovčuk, Kedrov, Mitin, and Trakhtenberg; from the 3rd volume onwards Ojzerman and Okulov replaced Trakhtenberg, who had died in 1959. Four volumes were planned, but the final edition comprised six, appearing in impressive editions (37,000 – 50,000 copies), and translated into 9 languages.[165] But the book came out with considerable delay: the first two volumes appeared in 1957, the next two in 1959, the 5th in 1961, while the 6th, announced for 1962, then 1964, finally appeared in 1965.[166] This delay is not surprising, as "a central place in this book is occupied by the analysis of the Leninist stage in the philosophy of Marxism after 1917."[167] In the politically turbulent years of destalinization, *ottepel'*, and Brežnevian restoration, this was a sensitive area. With the exception of Aleksandrov, the same people were responsible: Dynnik, Iovčuk, Kedrov, Mitin, and Trakhtenberg had been in charge of

the failed *IF2* as well, and Dynnik, Mitin, and Trakhtenberg had also participated in *IF3*. Nevertheless, the last volume of *IF6* is critical when it looks back on the past:

> The discussion of 1947... drew attention to some shortcomings of philosophical work, especially in the field of the history of philosophy. But it could not, under the conditions of Stalin's personality cult, lead to a radical improvement of the state of philosophical science. (...) In that period, there frequently arose a conception of investigations into the history of philosophy as something irrelevant; attempts to elucidate what is rational in the doctrines of pre-Marxist thinkers were considered by some theoretical workers as an underestimation of the revolutionary overturn accomplished in philosophy by Marxism; attempts took place at a simplistic appraisal of philosophical doctrines according to the scheme: 'materialism – progress, idealism – reaction'.[168]

There certainly is some ground for the pride of Soviet philosophers to have finished a job begun in the 1930s: as late as 1988, Ojzerman proudly and rightly stressed that "until the present day this edition remains the sole investigation in world literature of the process of the history of philosophy as a whole."[169]

However, the work was hardly a success, as its nickname, '*krasnyj osël* [Red Donkey]' suggests: 'red' for the color of the cover, 'donkey' for its intellectual level. In 1966, Aleksej Sergeevič Bogomolov (1927-1983) and Sokolov compared the first two volumes of the 'Red Donkey' with the 'Grey Horse' of 1941-1943, to the advantage of the latter: the exposition of West European philosophy in *IF6* was "more sparingly," suffering from "particular schematism" and a "quotationist exposition of the material."[170]

For a short time, *IF6* was "the standard text in the field," but its shortcomings were only too obvious.[171] The general opinion about the 'Red Donkey' was reflected by Sokolov, who qualified it as "scandalously bad [*stydno plokho*]."[172] Three years after the appearance of the first volumes of *IF6*, another authoritative source appeared, a one-volume general textbook on the history of philosophy: *Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii* [A Short Outline of the History of Philosophy, *KIF*], edited by, among others, Iovčuk, Asmus, Ščipanov, and Ojzerman, and published four times in large editions.[173] As early as 1969, a new *Istorija filosofii* in 10 volumes was announced by Iovčuk.[174] This successor is still to come. In 1985, Viktor Arsen'evič Malinin (b.1921) wrote that "possibly, a new edition of the history of philosophy of the world is going to be prepared."[175] In 1986, Mel'vil and Sokolov confirmed this announcement.[176] In 1988, Ojzerman stated that "in the present five-year plan [1986-1990, EvdZ] the IF AN SSSR is beginning basic scientific research on the creation of a new 'Universal history of philosophy' in 10 volumes."[177] In 1989, he claimed that work on the first (Ancient philosophy) and second (Chinese and Indian philosophy) volume was in progress.[178] The statement by Kamenskij, in 1992, that "Soviet scholars... have started to write a new Universal history of philosophy," sounds more like wishful thinking than a reflection of the actual activities of the historians gathered in the IF.[179]

Together, *IF6* and *KIF* highlight two major problems in *IFN*: the alleged *universal* development of philosophy as related to subsequent modes of production,

and the tension between philosophy as a *reflection* of class-struggle and as a field of theoretical *knowledge.*

Universal Philosophical Development

The first problem results from the "*fight against Western 'Eurocentrism'* in treating the history of philosophy," in connection with the idea of parallel development of philosophy in different parts of the world: "philosophy in the East developed in the same direction as philosophy in the West."[180] In opposition to "bourgeois conceptions" which "regarded the development of philosophy as the result of the creative work of only the so-called 'philosophical' peoples," the authors of *IF6* set out to demonstrate the "universal character of the philosophical thought of mankind," and to "show that contemporary philosophy is the result of the development of philosophical thought of all, not just of the West European peoples."[181] In 1967, Bocheński was "...impressed by a completely new approach... which overcomes our own deplorable Eurocentric attitude," and this feature is certainly worth noting.[182] Optimism was, however, premature:

> Soviet attempts to avoid Europe-centered history of philosophy come down to... popular introductions in which Chinese sages, Indian *gurus*, South American 'progressives', and Cuban orators are all treated as equally important; in which there is no attempt to distinguish the *philosopher* from the poet, priest or sage; and in which we never find any serious discussion of the factors that distinguish the self-consciously autonomous history of philosophy as a discipline in the West from its fusion with moral, political, and religious concerns in the East.[183]

This diagnosis by Kamenka was echoed in Soviet reactions:

> Unfortunately... in the course of exposition the authors of the six-volume work assume a broadened interpretation of the object of a history of philosophy, as a result of which one comes across quite a few names in these volumes that belong not to the history of philosophy, but to the history of socio-political thought...[184]

Ballestrem rightly argued that this universal approach was in fact misleading:

> ...if in a general history of philosophy the Mexican philosopher Diaz de Gamarra is said to have held that 'philosophy is the knowledge of truth by means of reason and understanding' and that in his opinion 'logic is an instrument for the knowledge of truth', this is most misleading... not so much because of the profundity of these statements, but because the unprepared reader will attribute their profundity to Diaz de Gamarra, whose merits, if any, must definitely be placed somewhere else.[185]

Instead of a "self-consciously autonomous history of philosophy as a discipline" *IF6* offers a history of the *presence* of ideas in a succession of socio-economic formations:

...emphasis on the materialist-idealist conflict has tended to focus attention on the conclusions reached by philosophers rather than their arguments, and to encourage the awarding of marks as a substitute for bringing out the problems of the time.[186]

And this point was noted by Soviet philosophers, too:

The authors... have laid special stress on a socio-historical approach, profoundly disclosing the connection of philosophical ideas with the requirements and needs of the epoch, but in doing so they somewhat moved away from a consistent logical exposition of the development of philosophical problems.[187]

This is the consequence of a 'historical materialist' perception of the history of philosophy, both if it stresses the determination by socio-economic conditions, and if stress is laid on the struggle between materialism and idealism:

...the Soviet historian of philosophy will have to mention Diaz de Gamarra, because progressiveness is for them a higher criterion than the originality and scientific quality of a philosopher.[188]

IF6 testifies to this with sections like 'The development of progressive philosophical and sociological thought in the period of disintegration of feudal society and transition to capitalism in Moldavia' and 'Philosophical and sociological thought in Uruguay at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century'.[189] One may sympathize with attempts to abolish eurocentrism, but the underlying assumption is that, *because* these countries were in a specific phase of social development, there *had to be* certain reactionary and progressive philosophical ideas.

In *KIF* this anti-eurocentrism is explicit. Hegel is accused of eurocentrism, because he "wrongly held that the peoples, 'embodying' in their 'national spirit' the philosophical riches of 'absolute spirit', were only the West European peoples: the Greeks, the Romans, and especially the Germans."[190] The authors characteristically mistake Hegel's 'Germanic world' for 'Germany', but Hegel indeed held that "philosophy in the proper sense begins in the West."[191] Few Western philosophers would explicitly subscribe to Hegel's idea of Germanic '*Volksgeist*' embodying Absolute Spirit, but the received view on past philosophy comes quite close with its treatment of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese philosophy as radically different and hence incomparable, its disregard of Russian (not to mention African or Latin American) philosophy, and its reduction of Islamic philosophy to a stage of preparation for Christian Aristotelianism.[192] Attempts at global, comparative, and intercultural philosophy, impressive as they may be, are still marginal in Western philosophical culture.[193] From this angle, Soviet historians of philosophy were right in their criticism of "the majority of contemporary bourgeois historians of philosophy":

The incorrect views that deny the role of Eastern philosophy in the development of universal philosophical thought are refuted by the facts of the history of philosophy. The development of philosophical thought in the countries of the ancient East (Egypt, Babylonia, China, India) began long before the origin of ancient Greek philosophy. Henceforth, philosophy in the East developed in the same direction as in the West.

All this is evidence of how unfounded the 'eurocentric' theories are that speak about the 'eternal' opposition and hostility of the so-called Western and Eastern ways of thinking.[194]

Sokolov rightly remarked that the authors of *IF6* and *KIF* employed the concept of 'Eastern philosophy' uncritically, because "with this concept... are often united the quite strongly differing Chinese, Indian, Islamic philosophy, in spite of the fact that the latter is much closer to ancient European philosophy than to Indian philosophy."[195] This remark points to a contrast between two approaches, present in *IFN*. The *first*, motivated by historical materialism, seeks to investigate philosophical doctrines as part of a sequence of socio-economic formations, assuming that comparable socio-economic conditions 'produce' (or favor) and 'preclude' (or disfavor) similar philosophical positions. This is an interesting hypothesis, which does not imply a projection of a philosophical development that took place in the West onto Africa or Latin America: on the contrary, the actual absence or presence of such a development could be regarded as instructive about the society in question, much like Marx' 'Asiatic mode of production' was an attempt to assess empirical difference. The *second* approach, motivated by the claim of Soviet philosophy to be (universal) philosophy at its highest stage of development, seeks to appreciate everything in philosophy's past as either a contribution to *diamat*, or a (vain) attempt to develop an alternative position.

Combining these two approaches, Soviet historians were logically obliged to look for a struggle between materialism and idealism everywhere. If *diamat* is both the highest possible form of philosophy and the necessary outcome of socio-economic development, then any empirical development of society must display a similar philosophical development. That this is not the case was recognized by Soviet historians of philosophy, too: the authors of *IF6* acknowledged that "under the conditions of oppression not all peoples could make an equal contribution to the development of philosophical thought."[196] And in the third edition of *KIF* an 'Asiatic mode of philosophy' was introduced:

However, in comparison with the West, where the epoch of Renaissance, the revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, scientific and technological progress, and especially the liberation movement of the working class gave rise to a stormy development of scientific-philosophical and social thought, in the countries of the East, where for many ages the predominance of feudalism and of religious ideology dragged on, the conditions for the development of progressive philosophy were less favorable...[197]

The Soviet critique of 'eurocentrism' was not only a consequence of historical materialism, but performed an ideological function, too: it substantiated the stress on the importance of Russian philosophy, but any exaggerated 'slavocentrism' could be contested with it, too, as well as any form of 'asiacentrism' on the part of the Chinese or North-Korean comrades, who were doing with Confucius what the Soviets did with Herzen.[198]

From Class Struggle to Philosophy

The second problem is related to the 'double statement', due to the fact that *IF6* was produced while an important shift in the Soviet conception of the history of philosophy was under way:

In the last seven years [1958-1965, EvdZ] Soviet philosophy has completed a marked shift from treating the history of philosophy as the history of a 'superstructure' mirroring class conflict, through treating it as primarily the growth of materialism and the discomfiture of idealist 'ideologists', to seeing it as the conflict of idealist and materialist theories themselves.[199]

This shift was brought out by Ballestrem when he drew attention to three official 'definitions' handed down between 1947 and 1960:

In his famous speech in 1947 A.A. Ždanov still defined the object of 'history of philosophy as a science' as: "the history of the birth, of the appearance and of the development of the scientific materialist world-view and its laws. As [*poskol'ku*] materialism grew and developed in the battle against idealist currents, the history of philosophy is therefore also the history of the battle between materialism and idealism."
This definition was still accepted in 1954 in the fourth edition of the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* [*KFS*].
A new definition is given in the first volume of the large *History of Philosophy* (1957) [*IF6*]: "The object of history of philosophy as a science is the history of the development of philosophical ideas in the different periods of development of society, above all the history of origin, formation and development of the basic philosophical tendencies –materialism and idealism–, and of the struggle between them."
Finally, in a definition of 1960 [*KIF*] the second aspect is clearly accepted: "The object of Marxist history of philosophy as a science is the origin and development of doctrines about the general foundations of being and knowledge, that give one or another solution to the basic question of philosophy. History of philosophy as a science examines the doctrines about the general laws of being and thinking that originate in the process of development of philosophical thought. The object of history of philosophy as a science is the history of the philosophical thought of mankind, above all the history of the formation and development of the basic philosophical tendencies – materialism and idealism, of the struggle between them and the therewith tightly connected history of the formation and development of the struggle between dialectics and metaphysics."[200]

In the revised third edition of *KIF* (1971; Ballestrem referred to the first edition), this shift from ideological class-struggle to philosophical problems is completed:

The object of Marxist history of philosophy as a science is the history of the origin and development of the doctrines that give one or another solution of the problems of philosophy, one or another materialist or idealist, dialectical or metaphysical explanation of the general laws of being and knowledge. *The object of history of philosophy as a science is the history of the origin and solution of philosophical problems*, and most of all the history of the formation and development of the basic

philosophical tendencies – materialism and idealism, of the struggle between them and the therewith tightly connected history of the formation and development of the struggle between dialectics and metaphysics [italics mine, EvdZ].[201]

Thus, Kamenka concluded, "Soviet philosophers... have been forced to concede that the *center of interest* of any history of philosophy must be philosophical ideas themselves and that merely reducing philosophical positions to class interests will miss most of what is important and philosophical in these positions."[202]

This return to *philosophical problems* as the proper object of *IFN* was effectuated, in the first place, through an upgrading of the other 'basic question' of philosophy, viz the 'struggle' between dialectics and metaphysics:

> As early as Antiquity two contrary tendencies take shape in philosophy — *materialism* and *idealism*, and the struggle between them becomes a regularity [*zakonomernost'*] of the development of philosophical knowledge. *Side by side with* [*narjadu s*, italics mine, EvdZ] the opposition of materialist and idealist world-views, the opposition between *dialectical* and *metaphysical* methods of thought emerges and deepens in the course of development of philosophy.[203]

This juxtaposition of two oppositions yields a more complex picture of the history of philosophy. If philosophers are merely classified as "materialists, idealists or holding an intermediary position," and judged according to the scheme: 'materialism – progress, idealism – reaction', the resulting picture is one of dichotomous simplicity: the 'line of Plato' against 'the line of Democritus', as Lenin had it.[204] To be sure, this polarity never disappeared, and was dutifully repeated in *IF6* and *Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii*.[205] But if the second opposition, of dialectics and metaphysics, receives equal importance, not only are there four categories to classify philosophical positions by –metaphysical idealism (Plato), metaphysical ('mechanical') materialism (Democritus, Hobbes, Holbach), dialectical idealism (Hegel), dialectical materialism (the *klassiki*)–, but also, and more importantly, the 'right' position, dialectical materialism, only emerges at a certain point in history: it would be ridiculous to construct a struggle between dialectical materialism and other philosophies *before* the emergence of dialectical materialism. Instead of a battle-ground for the perennial struggle between two lines or camps, the history of pre-Marxist philosophy becomes the history of the struggle for dialectical materialism, i.e. its *prehistory*.

Together with the recognition of 'intermediary positions' between idealism and materialism (Aristotle) or between dialectics and metaphysics (Kant), and the recognition of the historical nature of philosophy, the stage is thus set for a fairly objective account of the history of pre-Marxist philosophy. By contrast, the situation with respect to post-Marxist non-Marxist philosophy barely changes: Marxist philosophy still stands out as the superior form of both materialist and dialectical philosophy. The vertical dichotomy of materialism and idealism is overruled by a horizontal dichotomy of pre-Marxist and post-Marxist philosophy, indeed making philosophy before Marx and philosophy after Marx incomparable.

In the second place, the return to philosophical problems was effectuated through the 'cognitive aspect', the recognition of the fact that philosophers not only take positions, but also *argue* for them, and that these positions claim an understanding of reality. This means a rehabilitation of the intrinsic, 'epistemic function' of philosophy. At this point, the 'double statement', asserting the determination 'in the final analysis' of philosophy by socio-economic conditions, while stressing the 'relative independence' of philosophy, gains importance, as becomes clear when we compare the first and the third edition of *KIF*.

In 1960, the first lines of the section on 'Basic characteristics of the Marxist method in history of philosophy' read as follows:

> Dialectical and historical materialism regard philosophy as a component of the ideological superstructure, determined in the final analysis by the mode of production of the material life of society. This is what explains the motives by which philosophers are guided as they create their doctrines, and the fundamental causes by virtue of which philosophical ideas... obtained a definite political orientation.[206]

In 1971, tone and content both had changed:

> Dialectical and historical materialism perceive *two aspects* in philosophy: a *cognitive* aspect, in so far as philosophy to a greater or lesser extent carries out the functions of knowing the world, and under certain conditions the functions of a science, and an *ideological* aspect, in so far as it is a component part of the ideological superstructure. Revealing the dependence of philosophical doctrines on the social relations of a given epoch..., on class-struggle, on the development of science and other forms of social consciousness, history of philosophy explains the motives by which philosophers are guided as they create their doctrines, and reveals the fundamental causes according to which philosophical ideas, expressing the world-view of one or another social group, obtained a definite political orientation [italics mine, EvdZ].[207]

An *almost* identical criticism of 'vulgarizers of Marxism', who tried to "deduce every philosophical idea directly from the conditions of the material life of society," is present in 1960 and 1971:

> If in the final analysis the direction of development of philosophy is conditioned by the economic life of society, then the *content* of philosophical ideas and especially the logical categories, the *forms* in which philosophical thought develops, do not directly follow from economics, but are connected to a considerable extent with the ideological struggle of that period, with the development of adjacent forms of social consciousness (science, art, religion, and others), and with the thought-material that is left to philosophers by their predecessors. In this, the relative independence of philosophy manifests itself most of all.[208]

The significant difference between the two versions is that in the 1960 edition just quoted science is among the "adjacent forms of social consciousness," whereas in the 1971 edition it is placed outside, i.e. it no longer appears as a form of social consciousness. This means that philosophy, to the extent to which it is scientific, is

not class-bound, and hence is determined by socio-economic conditions only in as far as it is *not* scientific. The impact of this difference appears from a comparison of a crucial passage about the inner logic of development at work in philosophy's history. The text is identical in both editions, with the exception of one extra line –here italicized– in 1971:

> The inner logic of development of philosophical thought consists in the fact that this process goes, mainly, from the simple to the complicated, from the lower to the higher. This process of 'increase' of philosophical learning is not rectilinear, but zigzag-like. In its course, digressions from the correct cognition of reality in the direction of idealism, mysticism, religion occur quite often. *But as a whole this process is progressive and, in the final analysis, leads to knowledge of objective truth.*[209]

A Mixed Periodization

The two problems just discussed come to the fore in the Soviet periodization of philosophy's history, which combines the succession of socio-economic formations with emphasis on the 'horizontal dichotomy' of pre-Marxist and (post-)Marxist philosophy. The link with the 'double statement' is obvious in the brief remark on periodization in *KIF* of 1960 and 1971:

> In so far as the development of philosophy, as of other forms of social consciousness, is *in the final analysis determined by* the rise and development of socio-economic formations and their shift, Marxism divides the history of philosophy into periods that correspond to the basic socio-economic formations or the periods of transition from one socio-economic formation to another [italics mine, EvdZ].[210]

This correspondence with socio-economic formations and transitions yields a periodization made up of seven stages, preceded by a 'zero-stage' [between square brackets and in Latin numbers the five stages of the *pjatičlenka* are indicated]:[211]

0. [I] absence of philosophy in primitive communal society
1. [II] philosophy in slave-holding society
2. [III] philosophy in feudal society
3. [IV] philosophy in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism
4. philosophy in the era of consolidation of capitalism until the beginning of the revolutionary movements (in *KIF*: until the origin of Marxism)
5. philosophy in the era of pre-monopolistic capitalism
6. philosophy in the period of imperialism until the great socialist October Revolution
7. [V] philosophy in the time of revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, of socialist and national liberation movements, of the crumbling of imperialism, of the global triumph of socialism and communism.

However, this is only one side of the 'double statement':

> Regarding *as decisive* the principle of the periodization of the history of philosophy in dependence on the shift from one socio-economic formation to another and the development of class struggle, Marxist history of philosophy takes into account the *relative independence* of the development of philosophy. The scientific history of philosophy divides the history of philosophy into two eras: 1) the history of philosophy until the beginning of Marxism and 2) the history of philosophy after the beginning of Marxism [italics mine, EvdZ].[212]

Thus, the 7 stages outlined in the first periodization form 2 eras, **A** and **B**, which are fundamentally different in character: **A** [**1-4**] is marked by the struggles between materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics, whereas **B** [**5-7**] is divided into **B+**, Marxist philosophy, and **B–**, non-Marxist philosophy. The importance of this 'relative independence' of philosophy becomes fully apparent when we realize that only in the history of West European philosophy the transition from **A** to **B** coincides with that from **4** to **5**. The philosophy of the peoples of the USSR, e.g. of the Uzbeks, would make an instant jump from 'philosophy in feudal society' [**2**] to **B+**, and Siberian tribes would make a giant leap from the 'zero-stage', a leap that would then *precede* their equally sudden leap from primitivism into the planned construction of socialism.[213] Once found, philosophical truth cancels socio-economic determination. Moreover, the development of philosophical thought partly coincides with the *pjatičlenka* of *istmat*, but the revolution in philosophical history [from **A** to **B**] falls in the middle of the fourth period of general history, preceding the main social and political revolution. Finally, this periodization changes the meaning of anti-eurocentrism: the parallel development of philosophical thought through stages **1** to **4** becomes, at stages **5** to **7**, the progressive dissemination of Marxist philosophy, particularly at stage **7**, at least in the socialist part of the world.

3.v *IFN Blooming and Booming (1967-1975)*

A period of continuous growth in *IFN* began around the end of *ottepel'*.[214] In 1967, a large symposium of historians of philosophy was held, the first since 1947.[215] Rybarczyk gave a total of 300 titles of books and articles in *IFN* over the period 1947-1970, a mere 20 of them falling into the 1947-1955 period (2.2 a year), the remaining 280 into 1956-1970 (18.6 yearly).[216] A Soviet bibliography from 1977 listed 261 book titles in *IFN* over the years 1972-1975, an average of 65.[217] And a survey in *FN* of philosophical monographs gave an annual average of 41 in *IFN* (including 16 in *KBF*) over the period 1961-1974 (excluding translations and editions of classical philosophical texts):

Field / Year	*1961*	*1965*	*1966*	*1969*	*1974*	*total*	*average*
Istorija filosofii	20	29	33	23	20	125	25
KBSF	18	17	18	14	13	80	16
Total	38	46	51	37	33	205	41

Three factors explain this growth. First of all, a major condition was fulfilled by the broadening of the official conception of the history of philosophy, described above. The theoretical legitimatization of a more or less 'objective' rendering of past and, to a lesser extent, of contemporary non-Marxist philosophy was provided by the turn to philosophical ideas and theories themselves as the (main) object of *IFN*.[218] Kamenka rightly remarked that the *FĖ* of 1960-1970 presented "a fair and reasonably accurate account of the work of contemporary Western philosophers..."[219] 'Fair and reasonably accurate accounts' of philosophical positions may be an obvious part of Western philosophical culture, but under Soviet conditions they meant a radical improvement: a distinction of presentation and interpretation.[220]

A second cause for the blooming of *IFN* was the running-down of *ottepel'*, which made it possible to adress philosophical issues within an historical setting. As Ballestrem concluded his account of Soviet *IFN* of the first decade since Stalin's death:

> It is indeed probable that Soviet philosophers... became historians of philosophy in order to escape the risks involved in the field of systematic philosophy. But this move has certainly not damaged the developments of systematic philosophy. On the contrary, the intensive study of the history of philosophy has enlarged and ameliorated Soviet philosophy in at least three regards: (1) It has enlarged the number of problems and fields known and studied by Soviet philosophers; (2) it has taught them to see systematic problems in their historical context...; (3) it has established the study of the history of philosophy as a branch of Soviet philosophy.[221]

Subsequent development has confirmed this judgment. As a matter of fact, its essence is contained in the first and last sentence: the freedom of *ottepel'* was soon to disappear, and a number of philosophers who received their training during these years, the *šestidesjatniki*, turned to *IFN* as to a relatively safe area, remote from ideological turmoil. This move was made possible by the establishment of *IFN* as a separate discipline, but by the same token it formed a powerful impulse for its further development. In Solov'ëv's words:

> Somewhere near mid-1966, I realized that I was obliged to deploy my capacities in *historico-philosophical writing*, i.e. to try to speak about the present, the direct... investigation of which was increasingly subject to the prohibitions of ideological censorship, in an indirect language, by means of a present-day (and, preferably, topical [*zlobodnevnoe*]) molding of events that belong to the past history of society, culture, and social thought.[222]

The establishment of *IFN* as a professional discipline thus served as an *alternative* to the *marginalization* that was characteristic of Soviet philosophical culture, a phenomenon clearly perceived by the guard dogs of *partijnost'*: on several

occasions, Soviet philosophers were criticized for turning to the history of philosophy instead of turning their attention to actual social and political problems: in 1947 by Ždanov, in 1955 by the editors or *VF* and *Kommunist*, and as late as 1987 by Gorbačëv.[223]

A third major cause was the presence of a few 'relics from the past'.[224] First of all Losev, because of his longevity, and because he was the sole surviving representative of pre-revolutionary Russian philosophy. But also Bakhtin, who studied at Petrograd University from 1914 till 1918, Asmus, who finished his studies in Kiev in 1919 (together with Dynnik), and Bakradze, who studied philosophy in Germany under Edmund Husserl in the 1920s.[225] The ways in which these 'relics' influenced *IFN* vary: generally speaking, Bakradze and Asmus represent an unorthodox Marxist approach to the history of philosophy, while Losev and Bakhtin stand for a thin thread of continuity with pre-Soviet philosophy.

Losev, condemned in the 1930s, resumed teaching in Moscow during World War II, and although he could never teach philosophy proper, he taught classical philology, logic, psychology, history of philosophy, and history of aesthetics, which testifies to both the general level of education and to the importance of Losev in the 'production' of new generations of scholars.[226] Placing the aesthetic moment at the center of his interpretation of Greek Antiquity, he in fact combined classical philology and history of Greek philosophy.[227] He grew into the first and foremost Soviet specialist in classical philosophy, and into the 'patriarch' of Soviet aesthetics.[228] He published some 500 works, including an 8-volume *Istorija antičnoj ėstetiki* [History of Ancient Aesthetics]. The first volume, completed in 1941, could not appear until 1963, the last was completed shortly before his death in 1988 and appeared 1994.[229] In 1983, he received the Order of the Red Banner of Labor for the training of philosophical cadres, and, in 1986, the State Prize for the first six volumes of *Istorija antičnoj ėstetiki*.[230] Losev's importance for *IFN* lies in his stress on philosophically critical and philologically adequate, i.e. 'scholarly' work.

Bakhtin, well-known linguist and philosopher, was arrested in 1929 on the accusation of the Socratic crime of 'spoiling the young'. He was exiled to Kustanaj in Kazakhstan in 1930, and in 1936 moved to Saransk, the capital of the Mordovian ASSR, where he taught literature at the local Pedagogical Institute (later Mordovskij State University).[231] He worked in Saransk with interruptions until 1967, when, seriously ill, he was taken to the Kremlin hospital with the help of the daughter of Jurij Andropov, longtime head of the KGB and short-term leader of the USSR. From 1972 until his death in 1975 he was allowed to work in Moscow.[232] Bakhtin's conditions of work and publication were difficult, but he worked more or less continuously, and lectured widely.[233] During *ottepel'*, Soviet *intelligenty* started visiting him in Saransk. By the late 1950s, "students in senior seminars at Moscow University were discussing Bakhtin's book on Dostoevskij, which had never been mentioned in class before," and during his last years in Moscow, his influence as an example of independent scholarship was considerable.[234]

Asmus' career was less troublesome. He came to Moscow in 1927, and started working as a philosopher and logician in a number of institutions, including IKP and MIFLI, and then at MGU as a professor of the history of philosophy, (formal)

logic, and aesthetics from 1942 until 1972.[235] An associate of Deborin, he was accused of "idealist mistakes" and "formalism" in 1930, but this did not ruin his career.[236] He became a professor in 1935, and from the reminiscences of Gulyga appears as a ray of hope in the dark 1930s:

> ...at MIFLI in 1938, I heard V.F. Asmus for the first time. His lectures on the history of philosophy were distinguished by a highly refined language, a profound understanding of the subject, and boundless erudition. In those years we were not spoilt with such things. When V.F. Asmus lectured, the auditorium was full.[237]

A convinced Communist, Asmus also was, through his sound knowledge of philosophy's past, a living protest against simplified accounts of the history of philosophy.[238] He wrote on Plato, Descartes, and Kant, whom he greatly admired (he took a small engraving of Kant with him in his grave).[239] His book on Descartes is a combination of intellectual biography and immanent exposition of the philosophy of this "pride of all progressive mankind", based on original sources, and defending Descartes as a rationalist and scientist against "the myth about Descartes, created by idealist reaction," by which he refers to J.–P. Sartre in particular.[240] Asmus thus formed the basis of a 'professionalist' trend in *IFN* in accordance with which knowledge of past philosophy retains its value irrespective of Marxist-(–Leninist) appreciation.

Bakradze, finally, can be regarded as the founder of the (relatively) independent philosophical center of Tbilisi in Georgia. Active as a logician and historian of philosophy, he formed generations of Georgian and other Soviet scholars. Particularly influential was his *Sistema i metod filosofii Gegelja* [System and Method of Hegel's Philosophy] of 1958.[241] Fighting the 'stalinist' qualification of Hegel as an "aristocratic reaction to the French Revolution", and loosening the classical Engelsian opposition between metaphysics and dialectic by pointing out that "Hegel distinguished between critical *Verstandsmetaphysik* and speculative *Vernunftsmetaphysik*," Bakradze, like Asmus, personifies the distinction between presentation and interpretation.[242]

Despite difficulties of varying degrees, these 'relics' did have their place in *IFN*.[243] Their importance can hardly be exaggerated, and should not be measured by 'universal' standards, but by the standard of quality *within* Soviet philosophical culture, as was highlighted by Motrošilova, a pupil of Asmus':

> Perhaps some people will say today, that V.F. Asmus followed elementary norms of scientific research, indisputable for philosophy, too. That is true. But he had the courage to follow those elementary, but, in essence, elevated 'golden' rules of human and scientific activity at a time when rules turned into exceptions, and when to follow them simply became a dangerous affair.[244]

As a whole, the development of *IFN* from the 1930s to 1975 shows, in the first place, the subordination to the ideological function of Soviet philosophy, directly, in the mobilization of an account of philosophy's history in 'ideological battle', and indirectly, in *IFN* providing an historical legitimatization of 'the philosophy of

Marxism-Leninism'. Secondly, it demonstrates the steady development of a specialist subdiscipline, with its relatively independent status and its 'inner logic' of a cumulative coverage of philosophy's past together with increasing professionalism. Thirdly, it shows an influx of philosophers who found, in historical studies, a possibility to address philosophical issues that could not be discussed within the system of Soviet philosophy.

With the 'double statement' and the mixed periodization as two ways of dealing with the tension between the three impulses inherited from the *klassiki*, with a sympathetic though poorly elaborated anti-eurocentrism, a gradual turn to philosophical problems, arguments and theories as the proper object of *IFN*, and with *revdemokratizm* and the 'revolution' in philosophy's history created by Marxism as two points in which *IFN* performed a direct ideological function, the stage was set for the existence of *IFN* within definite limits. This *IFN* of the late 1970s and 1980s is the subject of the next chapters.

Chapter Four

IFN: A Soviet Philosophical Discipline

> ...in times that were hard for our philosophy, some of my colleagues still managed to survive as philosophers. They were forced to find themselves some 'ecological niches' (for example, in history of philosophy, in logic, etc.) and to continue their work *staying within them.*
>
> Merab K. Mamardašvili, 1989[1]

The aim of this chapter is to present the outlines of *IFN* as it existed in the period of 'stagnation': from about 1975 until the beginning of *perestrojka* in 1986. This was a period of unprecedented bloom in *IFN*, both quantitively and qualitatively making it an important part of Soviet philosophical culture. Its prosperity was partly caused by unfavorable political conditions for philosophy in general, which made *IFN* an 'ecological niche' to which Soviet philosophers, esp. the *šestidesjatniki* escaped [Ch.2.vii, 3.v]. But even as 'second best' it was of great importance, yielding results that otherwise might not, or to a lesser extent, have been achieved: it made an impressive body of texts and other source material available in Russian, it created a vast army of specialists who studied many philosophers, schools and currents from philosophy's past, it produced a fairly complete account of philosophy's history, and it led to the develoment of a theory of the history of philosophy that was immediately linked to historiographical practice. At the same time, it left out significant parts of the philosophical heritage and severely distorted others, it was an important pillar of the ideology of Soviet philosophy, and it had to find a compromise with official Soviet philosophy.

This twofold character of *IFN* means that an account of it can stress either aspect: one can present it as an historiography of philosophy like any other, lagging behind its Western counterpart in terms of source material and textological scrutiny, but quickly moving forward in at least some of its parts, and surpassing it in the development of a systematic theory of the historical development of philosopy; but one can also present it as an integral part of the vast Soviet machinery of ideological self-legitimatization, essentially dogmatic and in many respects primitive, applying the same Marxist(–Leninist) schemes of interpretation to any past philosophy or philosopher. Paradoxically though it may seem, *IFN* was *both* a professional historiography *and* an integral part of 'Soviet philosophy', which is why both aspects will receive due attention in this and the following chapters.

As with any philosophical discipline, one must distinguish between four aspects: its place, its function or functions, its form, and its content. It is only because we are so familiar with our own philosophical culture that we can disregard the first three aspects and concentrate on the fourth, limiting ourselves, moreover, to one part of it: the output in terms of texts and of the theories they contain. This, to be sure, is fully legitimate, since the output of a philosophical discipline is what it is about,

but in doing so we tend to disregard the conditions for this output, the need to reproduce these conditions, and the necessity to elaborate and reproduce an ideology of, in this case, history of philosophy as a discipline, in order to secure its legitimate place within philosophical culture. The present chapter therefore discusses all four aspects in the order just indicated: the place of *IFN* and its ideological legitimatization [4.i], its functions [4.ii], its form [4.iii], and its content [4.iv], the latter being made up of the historians of philosophy, the material basis (texts, translations) and the output (the teaching of history of philosophy in Soviet higher education, the training of new historians of philosophy, and the production of an account of philosophy's history).

4.i *The Place of IFN in Soviet Philosophical Culture*

IFN was, first of all, a discipline within the framework of 'the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism':

> The concept 'philosophy of Marxism' has a wider range than the concept 'dialectical and historical materialism', because it also includes a scientific history of philosophy, as well as, by the way, a few other philosophical disciplines (ethics, aesthetics, etc.).[2]

Its position as an integral part of Soviet philosophy implied that *IFN* could not contradict main tenets of the core disciplines of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, *diamat* and *istmat*, and that it was, at least formally, an application of this systematic philosophy. Secondly, the system of Soviet philosophy was conceived as a *system of disciplines*, each of which was relatively independent from the others, with its own subject matter, its own methodology, and its own institutions. Thirdly, the systematic character of Soviet philosophy determined the position of *IFN* as the 'historical self-awareness' of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, one of its tasks being to demonstrate the superiority of Soviet philosophy. These three aspects are recognizable in Soviet theory of the history of philosophy [Ch.6].

At the same time, *IFN* was as important element of Soviet philosophical culture, which many Soviet philosophers chose for its *remoteness from ideology*. This is also why *IFN* was an attractive field for students in philosophy, especially for those who took an interest in other than Marxist-Leninist philosophy.[3] Further, to be an historian of philosophy was a way to get *access* to non-Soviet philosophers in the original.[4] And finally, *IFN* opened the way to vast *virgin territories*: recent developments in non-Soviet philosophy, as well as yet uninvestigated periods and philosophers. For the same reasons, it was popular among a wider audience, books selling much better that those in *diamat* or *istmat*, and public lectures by historians of philosophy attracting large audiences.[5] Classical philosophical texts were particularly popular: Ojzerman expressed his wonder about the "incomprehensibly large interest" for the *Collected works* of Aristotle (220,000 copies) or Nicholas of Cusa (140,000), both sold-out instantly, and suspected that it was fashionable among intellectuals to have these books standing unread on their bookshelves.[6] That

may well be part of the truth, but such editions were also popular because they offered access to 'unprocessed' philosophical thought.

Moreover, the inflow of 'systematic' philosophers around the end of *ottepel'* turned *IFN* into an important preserve of philosophical culture, a place where philosophers tried to do philosophy under the cover of historical investigation. This applies, for example, to Solov'ëv, Motrošilova, Piama Pavlovna Gajdenko (b.1934), or Violetta Pavlovna Gajdenko (b.1934).[7] In 1986, Motrošilova wrote:

> Auch P. Gajdenko teilt die Überzeugung, daß gerade 'Geschichte die drängendsten Fragen unserer Gegenwart beantworten kann und soll'. (...) Solov'ev versucht nicht, Gegenwart mit Hilfe der Vergangenheit zu klären: er versucht lediglich, Gegenwart besser, deutlicher zu sehen. Die Vergangenheitsbeschreibung ist bei ihm *metaphorisch*,... Wenn auch Solov'ev von der Gegenwart als der primären sinngebenden Instanz ausgeht, so sucht er doch zugleich historische Epochen und Situationen, die in den ihn interessierenden Dimensionen wirklich der Gegenwart *isomorph* sind [italics mine, EvdZ].[8]

Solov'ëv explicitly subscribed to this analysis.[9] Motrošilova's own systematic interests are manifest in most of her work, but she also points out the other side of the coin:

> ...it is hardly possible not to accept the reproach, directed in a mild form by Mamardašvili at those of our philosophers who, in hard times and in the name of their own rescue as working professionals, sought shelter in the 'ecological niche' of the history of philosophy, and sometimes lost 'the spirit of philosophizing [*temperament filosofstvovanija*] – not as a professional occupation, in universities or the academy, but precisely as a vital self-awareness'.[10]

IFN thus was one of the branches of Soviet philosophy *and* one of the elements of Soviet philosophical culture. Accounts of the nature, status, functions, and main tenets of *IFN*, given by Soviet historians of philosophy, especially in sources of an official nature, are neither merely descriptive statements, nor prescriptions as to what historians of philosophy should do. They performed an *ideological* function, legitimatizing *IFN* as it existed in terms of the dominant 'ideology of Soviet philosophy'. It is necessary, at this point, to discern two ideological functions. On the one hand, *IFN* participated in the overall ideology of Soviet philosophy, presenting the latter as the 'result' of the historical development of philosophy: "Dialectical materialism is the highest form of materialism, constituting the result [*itog*] of the whole preceding history of the development of philosophical thought."[11] On the other hand, an ideological legitimatization of *IFN* itself was required, capable of mediating between official ideology and the actual practice of Soviet historians of philosophy. As part of 'the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism', *IFN* was a legitimate element of Soviet philosophical culture, but at the same time it had its own factuality and professional standards, which had to be legitimate in terms of the same ideology. As a result, Soviet accounts of *IFN* are a mixture of ideological moves 'from above' and 'from below'.

The main elements of the 'ideology of Soviet philosophy' reappear in the foundation of *IFN* as a branch of Soviet philosophy. First of all, *IFN* was claimed to be a *Marxist(–Leninist)* history of philosophy. As we have seen, the Marxist-Leninist heritage consisted of three impulses: an *economistic reduction* [**i**], a *vertical dichotomization* [**ii**], and a *totalizing view* that yields a *horizontal dichotomy* of philosophy *before* Marx and philosophy *after* the Marxist revolution in philosophy [**iii**] [Ch.1.iii]. These impulses are easily retraced in official sources, e.g. in the *FĖS* of 1983:

> Counterbalancing the Hegelian idealist theory, they [the *klassiki*, EvdZ] regarded philosophical development as a process, the inner moving forces of which are in the final analysis brought about by socio-economic progress, by the achievements of science and the development of the forms of social consciousness as a whole, by the struggle between progressive and reactionary classes and social groups [**i**]. (...) ...the Marxist-Leninist theory of the historical process of philosophy,... reveals the development of philosophy to be the struggle of different doctrines, trends, tendencies, in the course of which a radical polarization takes place into main trends –the materialist and the idealist trend–, the struggle of which forms the ideological motive force [*dvižuščaja idejnaja sila*] of philosophical development [**ii**]. (...) The genesis of dialectical and historical materialism is the supreme revolution in philosophical development, commencing the history of Marxist philosophy [**iii**].[12]

The claim of a Marxist(–Leninist) history of philosophy further implied its *partisan* character, its place within the *system* of Soviet philosophy, and its claim to the status of a *science* [Ch.2.i]. The *partisan* character of *IFN* resided in the well-known 'basic question of philosophy', connected to the idea of the partisan, class-bound nature of all forms of social consciousness, and the resulting struggle of two philosophical 'camps' without the possibility of a neutral position 'above' class struggle.[13] As part of Soviet philosophy, *IFN* was further claimed to be a *scientific* history of philosophy [*istoriko-filosofskaja nauka, istorija filosofii kak nauka*]. Like general history, *IFN* was subsumed under historical materialism, and the laws governing historical development in general applied to the development of philosophy. Moreover, the universal laws established by *diamat*, due to their universality, governed the historical development of philosophy, too.

It is important to point out the distinction made by Soviet philosophers between the concepts of *zakon* [*law* in the strong sense of the term, having the force of a law of nature], and *zakonomernost'* ['(lawlike) regularity' or 'lawlikeness', having less than absolute force].[14] As Scanlan has shown, attempts were made in the 1960s, by Aron Jakovlevič Gurevič (b.1924) and Eeru N. Loone, to replace the notion of 'law' by that of 'lawlikeness'.[15] In works from the 1980s by established Soviet historians of philosophy like Ojzerman, one also finds *zakonomernost'* rather than *zakon* [Ch.6.ii].[16] And in official sources the notion of *zakonomernost'* dominates, too:

> In this manner the history of philosophy created by Marxism-Leninism not only founds the methodological principles of the investigation of the historical process of philosophy, but also reveals its regularities [*zakonomernosti*]...[17]

Following the 'top-down' order of the *system* of Soviet philosophy, the 'laws' and 'regularities' that were relevant to a scientific history of philosophy include, first of all, the three universal laws of materialist dialectics: the unity and struggle of opposites, the transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones and vice versa, and the law of the negation of negation.[18] Further, philosophy, a form of social consciousness, falls within the scope of *istmat*, and therefore its laws apply as well.[19] At this point, however, Soviet sources are unclear: although the same six elements recur, their status is difficult to decide upon: are they (universal) laws, (particular) regularities, or (methodological) principles? Determination 'in the final analysis [*v konečnom sčëte*]' of social consciousness by social being, and the progressive historical development of society through a series of socio-economic formations clearly belong to the first category. The second category, one would think, includes the 'relative independence [*otnositel'naja samostojatel'nost'*]' of forms of social consciousness, closely linked to the notion of continuity [*preemstvennost'*] *within* a given form of social consciousness. The principles of historicity [*princip istorizma*] and of partisanship [*princip partijnosti*], finally, may be placed in the third category.

Whatever their exact status, six recurring elements can be discerned:

1. determination 'in the final analysis' by socio-economic conditions;
2. historical sequence through the 'five stages' [*pjatičlenka*];
3. the 'relative independence' of social consciousness;
4. continuity within a form of social consciousness;
5. the principle of historicity;
6. the principle of partisanship.

In an official definition of *IFN* of 1982 these six elements are easily discernible:

> Little by little, the principle of *historicity* [*princip istorizma*] permeates in work in the history of philosophy: the idea that philosophical doctrines of the past contain correct tenets, grains of truth tool, which must be detached from delusions [**5**]. (...) A scientific history of philosophy was made possible with the genesis of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. As a result of the knowledge of the regularities [*zakonomernosti*] of development of society, and first of all of the law [*zakon*] of the determining role [*opredeljajuščaja rol'*] of social being with respect to social consciousness [**1**], it proved to be possible to understand correctly and to explain the development of philosophical thought. (...) The methodological basis of a scientific history of philosophy is materialist dialectics. The initial principles of Marxist history of philosophy make it possible to single out definite stages in the historical development of philosophy, connected with the shift in socio-economic formations [**2**], they explain the genesis of different philosophical trends and tendencies, showing that their character is determined by the level of development of society... (...). In judging philosophical doctrines from the past, Marxism-Leninism is guided by the principle of partisanship [*princip partijnosti*] [**6**]... (...) In reality the process of historical development of philosophy is highly complicated. The content of philosophical doctrines is influenced by the development of *science* and other *forms of social consciousness* [**3**]. Elaborating their own doctrines, philosophers refer to [*opirajutsja*] the ideas of their predecessors [**4**].[20]

These six elements mark the field of *IFN* as a legitimate activity within the framework of Soviet philosophy. The fact that this official account coincides *partly* with the elements indicated in the previous chapter [Ch.3.v] points to the accomodation and legitimatization in terms of official ideology of what was *actually* being done. This underlying tension becomes apparent if we look at the functions *IFN*performed.

4.ii *Knowledge and Ideology: the Functions of IFN*

Within the framework of Soviet philosophy, *IFN* performed three distinguishable functions:[21]

1. an *epistemic* function: providing knowledge of the history of philosophy. This function can be further divided into:
   a. an *historiographical* function, aiming at an account and analysis of the history of philosophy;
   b. an *appropriative* function, aiming at an assimilation of past, and of contemporary non-Soviet philosophical theories and positions;
   c. a *systematic* function, providing the system of Soviet philosophy with a reconstruction of its (pre)history;
2. an *ideological* function, consisting in the legitimatization of 'the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism' by means of a (hi)story that presented it as the supreme outcome of the whole historical development of philosophy, resulting from a revolution in philosophy performed by Marx and Engels;
3. *technical* function, improving the professional skills of Soviet philosophers.

These functions are easily discernible in official accounts of, e.g., 1970 and 1983:

> Marxism-Leninism does not reduce the function of the history of philosophy to the study, description, analysis, and appreciation of past and present philosophical doctrines, even though without the cognitive-analytical function [**1a**] a scientific investigation of the historical process of philosophy is unthinkable. Marxist *IFN* conceives of philosophical doctrines of past and present as a component part of... the whole ideological process; ...thus *IFN* performs an important ideological function [**2**]. However, the basic tasks of Marxist *IFN* are the critical assimilation [*usvoenie*] of the 'intellectual material [*myslitel'nyj material*]' of the past, the all-sided investigation of the regularities [*zakonomernosti*] of the development of philosophy, its results and conclusions for a creative development of ideological [*mirovozzrenčeskie*] and methodological problems at a contemporary, scientific level. The synthetic-generalizing, methodological, and to a considerable extent heuristic function of Marxist *IFN* obtains paramount scientific significance under the conditions of the last third of the 20th century [**1b**]. (...) Without a profound mastery of philosophical culture,... it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop and perfect peoples's capacities of theoretical thinking [**3**]. (...) *IFN* is by no means... a descriptive-narrative branch of knowledge; in reality it is, like the other philosophical sciences, called upon to reveal the profound processes of development

and their general regularities and correlations, in this case with respect to the sphere of philosophical knowledge itself, to its main stages [function **1c**].[22]

History of philosophy, the science of the development of philosophical knowledge [**1a** and **b**], of the struggle of the fundamental –materialist and idealist– trends in philosophy, of the coming-to-be and development of the scientific-philosophical, dialectical materialist world-view [**1c** and **2**]. (...) The study and investigation of the historical process of philosophy is, as Engels pointed out, a school of theoretical thought... [**3**].[23]

The ideology of Soviet philosophy tended to blurr the differences between the appropriative [**1b**], systematic [**1c**], and ideological function [**2**], as the first two were subordinated to the latter. This leaves us with the historiographical function [**1a**] and the technical function [**3**] as obviously distinct functions, exerting considerable influence on Soviet philosophy as a whole: the increased professionalism of Soviet philosophers that Western commentators have pointed to was to a large extent due to increased familiarity with the historical heritage of philosophy.

Still, the less obvious distinctions between the other three functions have to be observed in order to understand the nature and development of *IFN*. Particularly important was the appropriation of recent developments in non-Marxist philosophy: *IFN* served the *assimilation* by Soviet philosophy of the results of, e.g., Western philosophy of language or philosophy of science. However, study of contemporary non-Soviet philosophy was not a self-evident occupation for a Soviet philosopher, given its *a priori (dis)qualification* as 'bourgeois' or 'revisionist'. Soviet historians of philosophy had to present these 'forbidden foreign philosophical fruits' in an objective manner, i.e. to distinguish clearly between presentation, interpretation and comment, but at the same time they had to 'wrap' these presentations in a Marxist-Leninist 'critique'. But even if the comment was sometimes primitive or dogmatic and the interpretation perhaps not very illuminating to Western philosophers, this was of utmost importance for the development of Soviet philosophical culture.

Likewise, it is important to distinguish between the ideological and the systematic function, because the latter contains the seeds of the former's destruction. *IFN* moved between two poles: on the one hand the foundation of dialectical and historical materialism as the supreme outcome of the historical development of philosophy, in the service of official ideology [**2**], and on the other hand 'pure' historiography, in the service of formal training and the appropriation of the content of contemporary non-Marxist philosophy [**1a**, **3** and **1b**]. What the latter three have in common is a concentration on philosophical ideas, problems, positions, and theories, thus making research that focuses on texts and on philosophical content a legitimate affair. By contrast, the ideological function resided in a preconceived interpretation of the history of philosophy as 'leading up to' Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and of contemporary non-Soviet philosophy as *inferior*. The systematic function stands between these two poles, and in that respect forms the *core* of *IFN*, implying two distinct tasks: the production of an overall *account* of philosophy's history and the elaboration of a Marxist-Leninist *theory* of the history of philosophy [Ch.5 and Ch.6].

So, *IFN* occupied a particular place in Soviet philosophy. On the one hand, it was remote from ideological battle and official philosophy, and indeed it is not difficult to find studies by Soviet historians of philosophy that could have been written by any scholar, East or West.[24] On the other hand, no field in Soviet philosophy was more closely related to the ideological self-defense of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. *IFN* thus performed strongly different, not to say incompatible functions, and hence one more fuction can be distinguished:

4. an *ideological self-legitimatization* of *IFN*, consisting in the attempt to accommodate these potentially conflicting functions [**1–3**] in terms of the ideology of Soviet philosophy.

Not only is this function difficult to distinguish from the others (which is part of its efficacy), but it also blurs the distinctions between the others. Yet it was essential for the very existence of *IFN*, and it is ideological in the proper sense of the term: it is a function of a theory about what Soviet historians of philosophy are doing which –regardless of whether it adequately describes what they are doing– serves to make their activity legitimate within the context of the Soviet system and its ruling ideology.

4.iii *The Disciplinary Structure of IFN*

A clear sign of the development of *IFN* was its *professionalization*, manifest in such things as specialization, attention for methodological and didactical questions, and recourse to original sources. In the late 1950s and the 1960s, a process of specialization began that led to separate departments at the philosophical faculty of MGU for *IMLF*, *IFNS*, and *IZF* [Ch.3.iv]. Within these fields, a further differentiation took place, displaying a predominance of the *horizontal* dichotomy (philosophy before Marx versus philosophy after Marx) over the *vertical* dichotomy (materialism versus idealism), and a predominance of a *geographic* principle of division over the socio-economic *pjatičlenka*. This differentiation thus only partly follows the periodization indicated earlier [Ch.3.iv]. The reason for this was largely pragmatic in terms of the skills required: it is obviously easier to train somebody to study German philosophy in its subsequent feudal and capitalist stages, than it is to train someone to study 'philosophy in slave-holding society' in Greece, Japan, China, Egypt, and India.

History of philosophy is not only a matter of studying, describing, and analyzing past philosophy, it also presupposes and produces a theoretical field: in *IFN* –just as in Western philosophy– we find next to the *practice* of historiography a *theory* of the history of philosophy. An attempt to outline a full conception of *IFN* as a discipline, comprising both a practical and a theoretical part, was undertaken by Kamenskij in 1984, who distinguished three meanings of the concept of 'history of philosophy' [Ch.1.i]:

1. an objective process;
2. historiography (empirical and scientific);
3. a science, [also] including:
   a. a theory of research into the history of philosophy;
   b. a doctrine about the forms and goals of research into the history of philosophy;
   c. a methodology of research into the history of philosophy;
   d. an historiography of the scientific history of philosophy (the self-awareness of *IFN*);[25]

These subdisciplines did not form separate realms. Historiography [**2**] and theory of the history of philosophy [**3**], characterized by Kamenskij as a "reflection upon the regularities [*zakonomernosti*] of the historical process of philosophy," and as a "reflection with respect to the goals, forms and methods of investigation into the history of philosophy" [**3a-c**] formed a unity:

> We are speaking of history of philosophy as a unity of historical and theoretical investigation. (...) ...a theoretical interpretation of the historical process of philosophy is indispensable for any study in this field.[26]

But if we follow Kamenskij's distinctions, add to his considerations that besides a *methodology* there also was a *didactics* of history of philosophy, and furthermore agree with Ojzerman that, from the perspective of Soviet philosophy, "an integral component of Marxist-Leninist *IFN* is the critical analysis of contemporary bourgeois philosophy, including the latest idealist theories of the historical process of philosophy," we can include these as further theoretical subdisciplines within *IFN*.[27] With this account of the place, functions, and disciplinary structure of *IFN* the ground is prepared for a survey of its content.

4.iv *The Content of IFN: Translations, Textbooks and Teaching*

The quantitative importance, the relatively high qualification, and the differentiation of *IFN* are manifest when we look at the place of *IFN* among the staff of MGU's philosophical faculty. It had, in 1986, 14 departments, with a total of 41 professors, 6 of them working within the section of scientific communism, the remaining 35 within the philosophical section, which comprised 9 departments [*kafedry*].[28] Nearly half of these professors (15 out of 35) where working in the three historical departments: 6 at the department of *IZF*, 6 at the department of *IMLF*, 3 at the department of *IFNS*.[29] To give an idea of the number of specialists in *IFN*: 280 Soviet specialists participated in a conference held in 1967 on 'Actual problems of history of philosophy', and 400 Soviet historians of philosophy attended a similar conference on 'Methodogical and ideological problems of the history of philosophy', organized by the IF in 1986.[30] Finally, the importance of *IFN* is also attested by the themes of candidate's and doctoral dissertations: in the period 1981 to the first half of 1983, 20.5% of doctoral dissertations (22 out of 107), and 15.2% of candidate's dissertations (148 out of 971) were on subjects within the field of *IFN*.[31]

The Material Basis of IFN: Editions and Translations

One of the major achievements of *IFN* was the creation of an impressive body of classical philosophical literature. A central place is occupied by a series called '*Filosofskoe nasledie* [Philosophical Heritage, *FN*]', begun in 1963 by the IF and the publishing house of the AON, *Mysl'*, and intended to cover "all fundamental stages of the development of philosophical thought."[32] The overall plan consisted of 500 volumes by 200 different authors, and in 1987, the 100th volume appeared.[33] The volumes in the *FN* series appeared in large editions: from 6 to 10 thousand for the first volumes, to tens of thousands towards the end of the 1960s, and 100,000 and 200,000 in the 1970s, raising the average over the first 100 volumes to 80,000.[34] The series received a lot of praise, but also critical remarks about the weak representation of Russian idealists, which "gives rise to dilettante, narrow-minded judgments about them, creates the ground for an inadequate interpretation of the relation between religious and secular sources in the history of Russian culture, and for erroneous ideas about the hypertrophied role of religion in the spiritual life and artistic culture of Russia."[35] Other critical remarks concerned the absence of Descartes, Bruno, and Spinoza, of main works by Fichte and Schelling, of Feuerbach's *Wesen des Christentums*, and of Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*.[36]

Another serious shortcoming was that in series like *FN*, or '*Istorija ėstetiki v pamjatnikakh i dokumentakh* [The History of Aesthetics in Texts and Documents]', published by *Iskusstvo*, "nothing is published from the period of the development of bourgeois thought since Feuerbach."[37] There was in fact a gap of some 100 years between these two series and the main series in contemporary 'bourgeois' philosophy, published by *Progress*: texts by philosophers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Cassirer, Peirce, Bergson, or Russell were simply lacking.[38]

It is obvious that, as "no textbook can replace the study of primary sources," this series "raises the level of philosophical culture, contributes to the development of philosophical training, performs an important enlightening function [*prosvetitel'skaja funkcija*], and is an irreplaceable remedy for philosophical dilettantism, since only the study and assimilation of philosophical texts can mould a truly professional philosopher."[39] The conditions to become acquainted with a considerable part of the philosophical heritage of mankind were realized, but being informed about a philosophical heritage is quite another thing than deploying that knowledge in present philosophical thought.

With respect to contemporary non-Soviet philosophical literature, the situation was only slightly better (though perhaps better than one would expect).[40] Few works were published, editions were small, access therefore limited. In 1947 and 1948, "two classics written by major contributors to the development of modern logic" (Hilbert and Ackermann, and Alfred Tarski) appeared in Russian, and the emancipation of symbolic logic into a mathematical rather than philosophical discipline around the end of the 1950s was accompanied by translations of classical texts by Rudolf Carnap, Alonzo Church, and Jan Łukasiewicz.[41] Texts by Western philosophers often appeared when they had long become 'classics': Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (1921) appeared in 1958, Gottlob Frege,

'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' (1892) in 1977, a Karl R. Popper reader was published in 1983, containing parts of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1959), chapters from *Conjectures and Refutations* (1963) and *Objective Knowledge* (1972), Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale* (1958) was published in 1983, Robin G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (1946) in 1980, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960) appeared in 1988.[42] Some major texts in Western philosophy were translated more rapidly: Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses* (1966) appeared in 1977, and Ilya Prigogine, *From Being to Becoming* (1977) in 1985, followed a year later by *Dialogue With Nature* (1980).[43] In these examples we recognize the phenomenon of 'declassified doctrines' [Ch.2.iv and 5.iii]: philosophical texts in logic or oriented on 'hard science' penetrated the Soviet market more easily than those on social or political theory, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. Further examples of the first category are Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Rudolf Carnap, Michael Ruse, René Wellek and Austin Warren, Stephen Toulmin, and Gerald Holton.[44]

With respect to 'irrationalists' and 'subjective idealists', the situation was much worse: Martin Heidegger, for example, whose "irrationalist philosophy" was qualified in *FĖS* as "one of the acute manifestations of the crisis of contemporary bourgeois consciousness," did not exist in a Soviet edition until 1981 (to do justice to P.P. Gajdenko, the author of the epithets just quoted, it should be added that they conclude an otherwise fair account of Heidegger's thought – in the second edition of *FĖS* of 1989, this last sentence was simply dropped, a clear indication of its 'official' nature).[45] In that year, a collection of articles appeared, translated by Vladimir Veniaminovič Bibikhin, in an edition 'for official use only [*dlja služebnogo pol'zovanija*]', and it was only in 1986 that public editions began to appear.[46] In 1989 the collection by Bibikhin re-appeared in a 50,000 copy edition, in 1991 Dobrokhotov edited a collection of articles and interviews, *Razgovor na proseločnoj doroge* [Conversation on a Country Road], which appeared in 65,000 copies, and in 1993 a collection of translations by Bibikhin appeared in 51,000 copies.[47] These editions testify to the enormous gap in literature (and to the 'Heidegger-boom' in post-Soviet philosophy). As far as other prominent 20th century philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Jürgen Habermas or Paul Ricœur were concerned, the situation was comparable: no public editions until 1986 or later.[48] This situation was indicated by the authors of the recent lexicon *Sovremennaja zapadnajafilosofija* [Dictionary of Contemporary Western –no longer 'bourgeois'!– Philosophy]: "For many long years, acquaintance with the creative work of contemporary foreign philosophers was, for the Soviet reader, hampered by the difficult access to their works, the very limited number of translations."[49]

With respect to non-Soviet Marxism, editorial policies were very selective, too: D. L'uis [John Lewis], *Socializm i ličnost'* [Socialism and the Individual] (M.: 1963). L. Sėv [Sève], *Sovremennaja francuzskaja filosofija* [Contemporary French Philosophy] (M.: 1978), M. Kornfort [Cornforth], *Otkrytaja filosofija i otkrytoe obščestvo* [The Open Philosophy and the Open Society] (M.: 1972; orig. 1968) were published in Russian, but *Der junge Hegel* by the Hungarian 'revisionist' György Lukács could not appear until 1987. Still, these translations were valuable, if only for their lengthy discussions with non-Marxist authors.

A small miracle was the translation, in 1960, of *Contemporary European Philosophy* by Bocheński, with its highly critical discussion of Soviet *diamat*.[50]

It should be remembered that the *original* publications of major texts of 20th century philosophy were not accessible in the USSR. Philosophers often depended, in practice, on the odd copy sent to them by a foreign colleague.[51] Moreover, philosophical journals from outside the socialist world were difficult to obtain. As a result, translations remained isolated phenomena, lacking the background of reception and discussion in which they were 'embedded' in their countries of origin.

It is interesting to note the strong accent on the Western philosophical tradition when we look at the topics, the number of volumes, and the philosophers whose works were translated in the *FN* series (1963-1987):

German philosophy	30	Feuerbach (3), Schelling (1), Kant (6)
French philosophy	15	Gassendi (2), Condillac (3), Lamettrie
British philosophy	14	British materialists [Toland *et al.*] (3), Locke (2), Hume (2)
Greek philosophy	13	Aristotle (4), Diogenes Laërtius (1), Plato (3 + 1), Sextus Empiricus (2)
European Medieval philosophy	2	Nicholas of Cusa (2)
American Enlightenment	2	*Amerikanskie prosvetiteli* (2)
Western philosophy	***76***	
Latin American philosophy	1	Progressive thinkers
Chinese philosophy	2	Anthology (2)
Indian philosophy	1	Anthology (1)
Non-Western philosophy	***4***	
Armenia	1	David Anakht
Georgia	1	Ioanė Petrici
Ukraine	2	Skovoroda (2)
Russian philosophy	10	Radiščev *et al.* (2), Herzen (2), Lavrov (2), Tkačëv (2), Fëdorov, Černyševskij (2)
Philosophy of the Fatherland	***14***	
Philosophy of the World	***4***	*Antologija mirovoj filosofii* (4)

The scanty representation of Medieval and Eastern philosophy was attributed to lack of specialists, although in the case of Medieval philosophy the overall rejection of 'Christian philosophy' played a part, too.[52] Soviet philosophy was a true heir of European Enlightenment in this respect, one of its main contemporary philosophical enemies being Neo-Thomism. In the case of Russian philosophy, there is a clear predominance of *revdemokratizm* in the editorial policy: all the authors belong to this category, with the unlucky exception of Fëdorov: the publication in 1982 of a volume of his works, edited by Gulyga, raised a scandal which led to the confiscation of all unsold copies and to a vehement anti-Fëdorov campaign.[53] This, too, was regretted: "... we should not forget the idealist thinkers of Russia, otherwise our idea of the struggle of materialism and idealism will be extremely impoverished (note that foreign philosophy is represented in the *FN* series by both

materialists and idealists)."[54] And although Aleksandr Ivanovič Volodin (b.1933) complained about a lack of specialists in Russian philosophy "who love and are able to work with the texts," the choice of authors was also motivated by ideological reasons, viz the needto stress the important role of progressive Russian thought in paving the way for revolutionary Russian Marxism.[55]

On the whole, the presence of source material in pre-Marxist philosophy was impressive, though showing serious gaps, especially in Medieval philosophy; there was an attempt to remedy this situation, and the preference for 'materialist' philosophers did not exclude 'idealists'. With respect to Russian philosophy, there was a trend to reduce Russian philosophy to the 'revolutionary democrats'. With respect to non-Russian 'philosophy of the peoples of the USSR' there was a mixture of emphasis on 'forerunners' of *istmat* and *diamat*, and 'national pride': the *Russian* editions of works by Al-Farabi and Ibn-Sina [Avicenna], published in Alma-Ata and Dušanbe (capitals of Kazakhstan and Tadžikstan), as well as those of David Anakht [David Invictus] and Ioanė Petrici [Petricius] testify to this mixture.[56] As to contemporary non-Soviet philosophical thought, the material was very limited, highly selective, and often outdated. Here, the problem was not simply a lack of sources, but lack of foundation for philosophical assimilation and discussion: Soviet philosophical culture passively absorbed lots of information, but it lacked the necessary conditions for using it.

History of Philosophy in Soviet Higher Education

Every student in any discipline had to pass a State exam in his proper specialization, e.g. physics or history, and in 'foundations of Marxism-Leninism [*osnovy marksizma-leninizma*]', which included philosophy, and was popularly referred to as 'the boring subject [*skučnyj predmet*]'. What precisely was done in philosophy depended on the *special'nost'*, and there was more stress on philosophy in the humanities than there was in the natural sciences: a student in physics would have to do courses in scientific atheism, scientific communism, political economy, and *diamat* and *istmat*, while students in the humanities would have one 'red subject' each year, amounting to a total of 10.[57] Every Soviet student thus was presented an historical account of philosophy, and even *učebniki* like *Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii*, which were not meant for university students but for those in a wide range of institutes, contained a lot of historical reference, inserted to demonstrate the superiority of Marxist philosophy over previous philosophical thought:

> The revolution in philosophy, carried out by K. Marx and F. Engels, had nothing in common with a nihilistic denial of the achievements of previous philosophy and of knowledge in general. As V.I. Lenin has pointed out, the very genius of Marx consisted in the fact that he answered the questions, raised by his outstanding predecessors; in this he 'leaned on the sound foundations of human knowledge, won under capitalism...[58]

The historical material in this type of textbook is highly predictable: the mechanist and 'metaphysical' nature of pre-Marxian materialism, the idealist nature

of pre-Marxian dialectics, the revolution in philosophy, prepared by Hegel who formulated "the for its time most complete theory of development, albeit developed from erroneous, idealist positions."[59] Chapters like 'Matter and the basic forms of its existence' or 'Historical progress' begin with a discussion of Milesian materialists, Greek atomism, Gassendi and Hobbes, or, in the second case, Herder, Hegel, Comte, and Spencer.[60] A standard element, finally, was the implicit insertion of the Russian revolutionary democrats as "outstanding representatives of materialism" *between* French materialism and Feuerbach on the one hand, and "the highest form of contemporary materialism – dialectical and historical materialism" on the other, without any further indication of their historical role, and their presentation as one of the "basic stages in the history of dialectics," situated between German classical philosophy (preceded by "the spontaneous, naive dialectics of ancient thinkers" and "the dialectics of Renaissance materialists"), and "Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics – the highest form of contemporary dialectics."[61]

History of philosophy was not the least interesting element of the obligatory philosophy courses at universities and other *VUZy*, where it occupied a well-determined place. For example, in the case of a 140-hour program, 4 hours were dedicated to 'The struggle of materialism and idealism in pre-Marxist philosophy', 2 to 'The emergence and basic stages of development of Marxist philosophy', 4 hours were reserved, within the *diamat* section, for *KSBF*, and 2, within the *istmat* section, for *KSBS* (12 hours out of 140, 4 subjects out of 24). A closer look at this 'Struggle of materialism and idealism in pre-Marxist philosophy' gives an idea of what Soviet students were expected to make themselves familiar with:[62]

* The historical stages of development of philosophy, and their connection with socio-economic formations. Forms of materialism and idealism.
* Philosophy in the period of slave-holding society. Basic peculiarities of materialism in the countries of the ancient world. The 'line of Democritus' and the 'line of Plato'. Aristotle and his place in the history of philosophy.
* Philosophy in the period of feudal society. Medieval scholasticism as 'ancilla theologiae'. The struggle of nominalism and realism. Materialist tendencies in Medieval philosophy.
* Philosophy in the period of capitalist society, its bond with the development of natural science. Metaphysical limitedness [*metafizičeskaja ograničennost'*] and elements of dialectics in Modern philosophy. Empiricism and rationalism. Objective and subjective idealism of the 17th and 18th centuries. The struggle of 17th and 18th century materialists against idealism and religion.
* Classical German philosophy. The philosophy of Kant. Kantian agnosticism. Hegel's objective idealism and dialectics. The contradiction of method and system in Hegel's philosophy. The anthropological materialism of Feuerbach and his struggle against idealism and religion.
* Basic features of the philosophy of the revolutionary democrats. The materialism of the revolutionary democrats, their struggle against idealism and religion. Elements of dialectics in the philosophy of revolutionary democracy. The most prominent representatives of revolutionary democracy in Russia: V.G. Belinskij, A.I. Herzen, N.G. Černyševskij, N.A. Dobroljubov. The international nature of revolutionary democracy.

The literature to be studied in this connection consisted of some 105 pages by the *klassiki*: parts from *Die heilige Familie*, *Anti-Dühring*, and especially *Ludwig Feuerbach...*; *Materialism i ėmpiriokriticizm*, *Pamjati Gercena* [To the Memory of Herzen], and *Filosofskie tetrady. Ludwig Feuerbach...* and *Materializm i ėmpiriokriticizm* were studied in 4 and 8 seminar hours respectively. With Lenin's *Gosudarstvo i revoljucija* [State and Revolution] they were the only obligatory philosophical texts.

What was actually done during those hours depended on the capacities and courage of the teacher, but the exams were identical for all students. Philosophers like Ojzerman or Mel'vil'were strongly critical of these programs, but as late as 1987 there was very little change in them.[63] The program was hardly changed, but teachers were granted some freedom to "increase the amount of time for holding seminars and the organization of independent work of students, at the expense of the number of lecture hours, provided that they guarantee the full mastery by the students of the content of the corresponding course."[64]

More elaborate, but with the same structure, were courses in the history of philosophy for Soviet post-graduates [*aspiranty*] in disciplines other than philosophy. They had to pass an obligatory and centralized candidate's exam in *diamat* and *istmat*, and were supposed to have passed the exams in Marxist-Leninist philosophy at *VUZ*-level.[65] The program was made up of three parts: historical introduction to philosophy (8 sections), *diamat* (5 sections, including *KSBF*), *istmat* (10 sections, including *KSBS*).[66] The historical introduction comprised the following subjects: 1) philosophy of slave-holding society; 2) philosophy of feudal society; 3) the struggle of materialism and idealism in the 16th and 17th centuries; 4) the struggle of materialism and idealism in the 18th century; 5) classical German philosophy; 6) the philosophy of the [Russian] revolutionary democrats of the 19th century; 7) the emergence and development of Marxist philosophy; 8) the Leninist stage [*leninskij ėtap*] in the development of Marxist philosophy.[67]

The literature to be mastered was, again, largely 'classical' (79 titles by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, 19 Party-documents and texts by the current CPSU-leaders, but included some primary sources, too: G.V. Plekhanov, V.G. Belinskij, A.I. Herzen, N.G. Černyševskij, F. Bacon, G.W.F. Hegel (the 1st volume of the *Enzyklopädie...*, i.e. the *Logik*), R. Descartes (*Discours de la Méthode*), D. Diderot, and L. Feuerbach (*Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*).[68] As to secondary sources, the *aspiranty* were supposed to master *KIF* and *Formirovanie filosofii marksizma* by Ojzerman.

Here, too, the approach of 'philosophy before Marx' and 'philosophy after Marx' is radically different. The historical introduction follows the development of philosophy from its very beginning to the 'Leninist stage' of Marxist philosophy in 6 subsequent stages, corresponding to the *pjatičlenka* [Ch.3.iii], and inserts Russian revolutionary democracy between German classical philosophy and Marxism. The genesis of Marxism is reconstructed, employing the historical remarks of the *klassiki*.[69] Then a section on "the essence and significance of the revolution in philosophy accomplished by K. Marx and Engels" follows, after which "the creative development by V.I. Lenin of dialectical and historical materialism" and "the further creative development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy" are discussed.[70] Non-Marxist

philosophy after Marx, however, is not discussed from an historical perspective, but from that of *diamat* and *istmat*, and its treatment is entirely 'critical', as appears from the synopsis:

* The essence of contemporary bourgeois philosophy and the diversity of its appearance. The reflection of the crisis of capitalism in contemporary bourgeois philosophy: the predominance of idealism and metaphysics, the dissemination of irrationalism, mysticism, and religious ideas, their anti-humane nature.
* The basic trends of contemporary bourgeois philosophy: neo-positivism, irrationalist anthropologism, religious philosophy. (...)
* The eclectic nature of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. The use of the principle of 'pluralism' in the struggle against the monism of the dialectical-materialist world-view. New trends in bourgeois philosophy: structuralism, hermeneutics, critical rationalism.
* The significance of the works by K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin for the critique of contemporary bourgeois philosophy.
* The 26th Party Congress, and the plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 1983 about the necessity of an intensification of the struggle against bourgeois ideology.[71]

Thus, instruction in history of philosophy for students and *aspiranty* of specializations other than philosophy was strongly orthodox and highly predictable. It contrasts with the instruction of future philosophers, especially of future historians of philosophy. But even so, the stress on the philosophical roots of Marxism is significant.

IFN at the Faculty of Philosophy

History of philosophy at philosophical faculties was quite a different matter. In the course of a full programm in philosophy at MGU, students would get introductory courses in 4 historical subjects: *IMLF*, *IFNS*, *KSBF*, and *IZF*.[72] *IFN* was one out of 7 possible specializations in philosophy at MGU (the others being diamat, *istmat*, logic, atheism, aesthetics, and ethics).[73] At this level, the program in *IZF* alone comprised 476 hours (half lectures, half seminars, in which both primary and secondary literature were discussed):[74]

	Subject	*Lectures*	*Seminars*
1.	Introduction	2	
2.	Phil. of slave-holding society	48	60
3.	Philosophy of feudal society	18	8
4.	W. Eur. phil.; transition feudalism – capitalism (Renaissance)	16	8
5.	W. Eur. phil.; early bourgeois revolutions (17th c.)	32	36
6.	British idealism and Enlightenment (17th century)	28	22
7.	German Enlightenment & classical philosophy (18th-19th c.)	26	36
8.	History of bourgeois philosophy; imperialist period	68	68
	Total	*238*	*238*

History of foreign philosophy in the philosophy curriculum (MGU, philosophical faculty).

Further qualification was possible in the form of an *aspirantura* in *IFN* or *KBF*.[75]

Textbooks like *KIF* or *IF6* [Ch.3.iv] were too schematic, as well as outdated by current research, which is why Soviet historians of philosophy engaged in a large project: the creation, over the years 1973-1980, of a set of "textbooks [*učebnye posobija*] on the history of philosophy for students and post-graduates of the philosophical faculties of state universities."[76] They were written by the staff of the philosophical faculty of MGU, published by *Vysšaja škola*, and completed in 1980 with an 8th volume.[77] This series would provide an alternative to *IF6* as "a first Soviet history of philosophy in many volumes that meets today's elevated theoretical and ideological demands," if it were to include, as was urged in several reviews, volumes on Russian philosophy and on Marxist-Leninist philosophy.[78] Although this goal was never realized, the series proved successful: by 1981, all volumes had become bibliographical rarities and editions were judged to be too small.[79] Reviews were generally favorable: the book by Asmus on classical philosophy, for example, was praised for "the first sufficiently complete and precise appreciation of Plato's dialectics in Marxist literature on the history of philosophy."[80] This positive appreciation meant that the conception of the history of philosophy as essentially being the history of materialism was abandoned once and for all (too high a price for the reviewer who complained about the portraits of Plotinus and Proclus rather than Democritus and Epicurus on the cover of Asmus' book).[81]

In spite of this success, additional volumes appeared to replace earlier ones: one by Sokolov on European philosophy in the 15th-17th centuries, and another by Vitalij Nikolaevič Kuznecov (b.1932), Boris Vladimirovič Meerovskij (b.1922), and Aleksandr Feodosievič Grjaznov (b.1948), on 18th century West European philosophy.[82] Soviet reviewers wondered why a new series was required, if "of the authors [of the first series, EvdZ], six were working at the same department where the publication under review was prepared."[83] The reviewers further asked about differences in methodology and content, noting a contrast between Sokolov, who presented John Locke as an agnostic with respect to spiritual and material substances, and Kuznecov, who treated him as an immediate predecessor of English materialism.[84]

With respect to the volume by Sokolov, the answer is partly provided by his own review of one of the books that his work came to replace, namely where he criticized A.Kh. Gorfunkel' for not dedicating a full chapter to Nicholas of Cusa, for overestimating Jakob Böhme, and for omitting both Reformation and Counter Reformation.[85] These flaws, as well as that of paying too little attention to neo-scholasticism (Suárez) in Sokolov's earlier book on Medieval philosophy, were remedied in this new book.[86]

Kuznecov's book on 18th century philosophy focused on (deist) materialism in Britain and France (Toland, Collins, Hartley, Priestley; Meslier, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Condillac, and, of course, the "militant materialism" of Lamettrie, Diderot, Helvétius, and Holbach), pointing out that the "knowledge of these [philosophies, EvdZ] has not only historical, but also actual significance:"

On the one hand, it can equip [the reader] with the capacity to diagnose the idealist, fideist, and agnostic essence of a whole series of contemporary bourgeois philosophical conceptions, that lay claim to ideological 'neutrality', and... to use it as a sharp historico-philosophical weapon [*ostroe istoriko-filosofskoe oružie*]. On the other hand, this knowledge assists the formation of a scientific-materialist world-view and an ideological education on the basis of revolutionary democratic traditions.[87]

Kuznecov's book on 18th century philosophy replaced the volume on the same subject by Narskij, who apparently had not paid sufficient attention to the possible use of historical work in philosophy as a 'sharp weapon'. Narskij discussed the major British philosophers of that period –Locke, Berkeley, Hume–, and French Enlightenment, as did Kuznecov, but he was criticized for concentrating on 'big names'; in his book on West European 19th century philosophy, he dedicated 93% of the pages to five representatives of German classical philosophy (from Kant to Feuerbach): 30% to Kant, and even more to Hegel, leaving 7% for Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, and not discussing non-German philosophy at all.[88]

Narskij's leading idea was the "transformation of rationalism," from an ontologico-epistemological (17th century), through a naturalistic and political (18th century), to an historical and dialectical phase (19th century) that found its scientific foundation in Marxism, an approach that focused on *philosophical theory* itself rather than on its connection with class-struggle.[89] His focus on rationalism (a form of objective idealism) at the expense of materialism was remedied by Kuznecov (as well as by Sokolov) with discussions of the 'minor figures' (Toland, Shaftesbury, Mandeville) omitted by Narskij.[90]

Apart from their stress on materialist traditions, these series of textbooks offer a very *traditional* account of the history of West European philosophy. Whoever might expect an historical materialist approach, or Leninist militancy, is bound to be disappointed; full stress is on philosophical theories, and this emphasis is presented, moreover, as Marxist-Leninist *pur sang*:

Already in the very choice of figures and in the division of the history of philosophy into periods dealt with in the separate volumes, a plan can be clearly perceived to realize Lenin's idea of the *inner* dialectical contradictoriness of the historical process of philosophy, the / an* essential feature of which is the struggle of materialism and idealism. (...) It seems to us, that in the series of books at hand a most successful solution has been found: a problem-oriented theoretical analysis of those philosophical doctrines, by means of which *the philosophical thought of mankind has accomplished* 'breaches' forward and into the depths [*'proryvy' vperëd i vglub'*] on the road of knowing. Out of the entire varied historico-philosophical material the outstanding philosophers are taken, regarded... 'as the personification of the utmost achievements of the epoch [*olicetvorenie predel'nykh dostiženij ėpokhi*]'. (...) This way, the object of analysis turn out to be those *qualitative jumps*, of which K. Marx said: '...in the history of philosophy there are junction points, that *elevate philosophy in itself* [*vozvyšajut filosofiju v samoj sebe*]... that break off rectilinear development...' [all italics mine, EvdZ].[91]

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*The Russian language characteristically leaves it undecided whether this is *the* essential feature or *an* essential feature).

One really has to go back to the *very early* Marx, the Marx of 1839-1840, to present as 'Marxist' a position that in fact restores to philosophy its inner history.[92] Via the young Marx, Hegelian dialectics is used to legitimatize a shift to philosophical theory [cf. Ch.6.iii]. This leads to books, used for the training of future philosophers, that do not really differ from standard Western histories of philosophy, as is in fact recognized by Sokolov:

> The second part of the book is dedicated to the most important philosophers of the 17th century – Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Locke, whose doctrines for a long time already make up the gold reserves [*zolotoj fond*] of the philosophical thought of the world.[93]

In this connection, it is worthwhile taking a look at the division of subjects of Sokolov's survey of 15th-17th century philosophy, and comparing it with three Western histories of philosophy: Châtelet, Vorländer, and Copleston:[94]

Subject / *Author*	*Sokolov*	*Châtelet*	*Vorländer*	*Copleston*
1. Renaissance and humanism	7			24
2. Italian anti-scholasticism [Valla, Mirandola]	26		8	[–>1]
3. Nicholas of Cusa	24	27	27	17
4. Humanists [Macchiavelli, Montaigne,...]	43	[–>3]	10	24
5. Religious movements [Reformation, Suárez]	23	23	19	53 [Suárez]
6. Renaissance science [da Vinci, Kepler]	17			17
7. Philosophy of nature [Paracelsus, Bruno *et al.*]	35	[–>3]	22	
8. Francis Bacon	27		8	18
9. Galileo Galilei	11	22	4	
10. René Descartes (+ Malebranche)	38	38 + 11	23	90 + 25
11. Thomas Hobbes (+ adversaries)	28	24	10	56
12. Pierre Gassendi	12		10	
13. Blaise Pascal	12		[–>10]	21
14. Baruch de Spinoza	34	34	15	59
15. Isaac Newton	9		[–>12]	14
16. G.F. Leibniz	30	23	20	67
17. John Locke	25	27	6	91
18. Pierre Bayle	7			

If anything, Sokolov is *more* traditional than the other three, paying attention to all 'classical' philosophers equally and systematically, whereas the others omit Bacon, Gassendi, Pascal, or Newton. The only surprise is Pierre Bayle, who appears in Sokolov as a major skeptical critic of Locke's "theological and metaphysical dogmatism."[95] In Copleston and Vorländer, Bayle is treated as part of French

Enlightenment. Sokolov's reason may have been purely chronological, and he was criticized by his Soviet reviewers on this point.[96]

He effectively breaks through the traditional 'division' into rationalists and empiricists, observed by Copleston, Châtelet and Vorländer, but questioned in Western historiography of philosophy, too.[97] Sokolov largely ignores the 'basic question', limiting himself instead to stating the presence, in several authors (Descartes, Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, Locke), of both materialist and idealist doctrines or elements. The philosophers of the 15th-17th centuries cannot be regarded as belonging to 'two camps' in terms of materialism and idealism, nor can we, Sokolov states, construct rationalist and empiricist 'camps':

> As shall become clear from the concrete exposition, these two trends did not form isolated 'camps', but found themselves in complex interaction with each other and in even more complex interaction with materialist and idealist traditions, dating from Antiquity.[98]

As we see, Sokolov pays more attention to what H.J. Störig called "the three great systems of Baroque," Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, than to materialists like Hobbes and Gassendi.[99] Nor does he try to make a materialist out of Spinoza: stressing his naturalism, and his mechanicist conception of matter, he argues that Spinoza's "naturalist pantheism... virtually acted as materialism," recognizing (opposing a long-standing Soviet tradition [Ch.3.i]) that "it is impossible not to take into account the fact that the philosopher himself by no means identified the substance-nature with matter, which he understood in a simplistic mechanicist way [*uproščenno-mekhanističeski*]."[100]

What remains is anti-clericalism, stress on the progressive development of philosophical thought, and special attention to the development of natural science (from Galilei to Newton).[101] None of these three elements is specifically Marxist or Marxist-Leninist: they are part of a received self-image of Modern Western philosophy, as is the reduction of European philosophy to West European philosophy, thus excluding Russian philosophy, a reduction Sokolov was criticized for, too.[102]

It is clear that this traditional account, "useful more for post-graduates than for students," not only served to improve the historical competence of future Soviet philosophers, but also made acceptable non-Soviet secondary literature.[103] Sokolov employed general histories of philosophy by many 'bourgeois' authors: W. Windelband, G.W.F. Hegel, B. Russell, R. Falkenberg (these existed in Russian translation), F. Überweg, W. Totok, F.C. Copleston, J. Chevalier, W.T. Jones, W. Tatarkiewicz, W. Weischedel, A. Kenny, and E. Bréhier, and he made use of, among others, M. Guéroult's commentary on Spinoza, R. Peters and L. Strauss on Hobbes, works by E. Gilson, A. Koyré, K. Fischer and many others.[104] Sokolov's work is based on his "many years of lecturing at the philosophical faculty of Moscow university in the classes of students and post-graduates," and someone who –like the present author– has had the opportunity to attend those classes knows that they focused on knowing and understanding main philosophical positions, carefully separating presentation and interpretation.[105]

In the program for students specializing in *IFN* these textbooks played an important role.[106] Generally speaking, future historians of philosophy received a fairly complete and highly traditional training in knowing philosophy's past, rather than a dogmatic Marxist-Leninist interpretation. This is different with respect to post-Marxist philosophy: suddenly the CPSU program and the proceedings of subsequent Party congresses pop up as main literature to the subject 'General characteristic of bourgeois philosophy of the imperialist period'.[107] It seems questionable whether these texts played any major role other than as obligatory displays of orthodoxy. It is more instructive to see that students were, in 1982, expected to read (partly as 'supplementary literature' [**s**] partly in pre-revolutionary translations [**p**]), (parts of) works by A. Comte (**p**), Herbert Spencer (**p**), J. S. Mill (**s**, **p**), P. Natorp (**p**), H. Rickert [*Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*] (**p**), E. Cassirer (**s**, **p**), E. Mach (**p**), R. Avenarius (**s**, **p**), F. Nietzsche [*Wille zur Macht*] (**p**), W. Dilthey (**p**), G. Simmel (**s**), E. Bernstein (**s**, **p**), H. Bergson [*Évolution créatrice*] (**p**), O. Spengler, B. Bosanquet (**p**), W. James [*Pragmatism*] (**p**), J. Dewey (**s**, **p**), E. Husserl [*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (**p**), and *Logische Untersuchungen* (**s**, **p**)], J.-P. Sartre [*L'existentialisme – c'est un humanisme*, *Les Mots*] (**s**), A. Camus (**s**), L. Wittgenstein [*Tractatus logico-philosophicus*], R. Carnap, B. Russell, M. Cornforth (**s**), E. Gellner (**s**), Th. Kuhn [*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*], I. Lakatos, and M. Foucault [*Les mots et les choses*].[108]

At the same time, students were supposed to master the essentials of the Marxist-Leninist *critique* of these 'bourgeois' philosophers. Works by Lenin were prescribed –and not as 'supplementary' literature– with respect to: the general characteristics of bourgeois philosophy, positivism [Comte, Spencer], neo-kantianism, second positivism [Mach, Avenarius], vitalism, pragmatism, American and English 'realism', phenomenology, neo-hegelianism, existentialism, neo-positivism [Wittgenstein, Carnap], and "the historical trend in bourgeois 'philosophy of science' [Kuhn, Lakatos]."[109] In fact, Lenin's *Materializm i èmpiriokriticizm* was obligatory with respect to *every* subject, with the exception of neo-thomism and "some of the latest tendencies in contemporary bourgeois philosophy [system theory, structuralism, hermeneutics, and philosophical anthropology]."[110] Dissertations in *KBF* were to be conceived from a Marxist-Leninist point of view, although it was not evident what such a point of view would mean *apart* from regular reference to *Materializm i èmpiriokriticizm*. Mel'vil', one of the generals of *KBF* (and major of the KGB), and chairman of the department of *IZF*, assured me that "we all regard ourselves as Marxists, but that is a basic position, creating a large space in which substantial discussions take place."[111] The same Mel'vil' sent home an *aspirantka* who was writing her *kandidatskaja dissertacija* on Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, remarking that she had only described, not analyzed, and suggested that she should read Lenin's *konspekt* of Hegel's text.

The Output: Soviet Texts on the History of Philosophy

IFN was an important part of Soviet philosophical culture from the perspective of quantity. A survey over the 11th five-year plan (1981-1985) lists 70 monographs in the fields of history of West European philosophy, methodology and theory of the

history of philosophy, as well as large numbers of monographs and articles on the history of Russian philosophy.[112] In 1985, the areas of history of West European philosophy, methodology, and theory together constituted some 27% of all publications in *IFN* [see below]. Given the selective nature of the source referred to, this suggests a number of monographs over 1981-1985 of at least 300, an average of 60 per year, as opposed to the annual 18.6 over 1956-1970, but in line with the average of 65 over 1972-1975 [Ch.3.v] and with the 67 monographs and collections of articles listed for 1985 in the first *Istoriko-filsosofskij ežegodnik* of 1986.[113] *IFN* represented a considerable share of Soviet philosophical production: a subdivision of articles in *VF* over the period 1980-1986 according to 7 main subjects shows that some 11% of all publications belong to *IFN* in the strict sense, and if we take into account the investigations of contemporary non-Soviet philosophy, gathered under the headings of *KSBF* and 'philosophy abroad [*filosofija za rubežom*]', the proportion rises to 30%:[114]

Field:	*1980*:	*1982*:	*1984*:	*1986*:	*total*:
diamat	54 (34%)	29 (20%)	41 (28%)	48 (40%)	*172* (30%)
istmat	54 (34%)	48 (33%)	53 (37%)	26 (21%)	*181* (32%)
ethics		9 (6%)	5 (3%)	1 (1%)	*15* (3%)
aesthetics	8 (5%)	5 (3%)	7 (5%)	8 (7%)	*28* (5%)
hist. of phil.	20 (13%)	18 (12%)	16 (11%)	8 (7%)	*62* (11%)
KSBF	5 (3%)	13 (9%)	5 (3%)	5 (3%)	*28* (5%)
'philosophy abroad'	17 (11%)	24 (17%)	18 (14%)	24 (20%)	*83* (14%)
hist. disciplines	*42* (27%)	*55* (38%)	*39* (27%)	*37* (31%)	***173*** (30%)
(total)	(158)	(146)	(145)	(120)	(569)

Distribution of articles in *VF* over philosophical disciplines (1980-1986)

Having thus distinguished the place, the functions, the form, and the content of *IFN*, it is important to stress that all four are equally real, and that the actual nature of *IFN* can only be understood by taking into account all four of them. Bearing this in mind, the ground is prepared for a survey and selective analysis of the account of the history of philosophy provided by *IFN* in the next chapter.

Chapter Five

The Practice of *IFN*

> In order to really understand the connection of even Medieval discussions to the history of materialism would require a special investigation.
>
> Vladimir I. Lenin, 1914[1]

The aim of Soviet *IFN* was a complete Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy. This project was understood, firstly, as the *reproduction* of the historical process of philosophy, and, secondly, as a Marxist-Leninist *science* of that process, i.e. an explanation in terms of laws or regularities [Ch.4.iii].[2] This points to a division of labor in *IFN* between presentation and interpretation, already noticed by Ballestrem in 1963, but it leaves unaffected the claim to a *scientific* understanding of an *objective* process.[3] One of the consequences of this claim is the idea of a definitive account and explanation of that process, reflected by the project of a universal history of philosophy [Ch.3.ii–iv].

IFN was a highly specialized discipline, much more so than its Western counterpart. For example, the largest department in history of philosophy, the *kafedra IZF* at MGU, housed experts in American philosophy, French philosophy, and Spanish philosophy, and tended to 'cover' the entire history of philosophy with specialists.[4] The overall results were impressive: monographs appeared on philosophical schools, individual philosophers, and historical periods, on specific philosophical problems, and on aspects of the work of a particular philosopher.[5] The most widely studied philosopher (apart from the *klassiki*) no doubt was Hegel, but on Kant, too, no less than 275 Soviet titles were mentioned in a bibliography over 1960-1975.[6] Aristotle and Spinoza also received much attention.[7] Three fields were of particular importance for Marxist-Leninist philosophy: West European philosophy, esp. German classical philosophy, philosophy of the peoples of the USSR [*IFNS*], especially Russia, and Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy [*KSBF*], as appears from the distribution of publications in *IFN* over subdisciplines (1985-1987):[8]

Field	*1985*	*1986*	*1987*	*total* (%)
[i] Ancient and Medieval Philosophy	14	8	15	37 (7.2)
[ii] Renaissance and Modern Philosophy	15	20	39	74 (14.3)
[iii] *KSBF*	25	38	32	95 (18.2)
[iv] History of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy	13	17	19	49 (9.4)
[v] History of Phil. of Asia and Africa	17	17	22	56 (10.7)
[vi] History of Phil. of the Fatherland	25	36	32	93 (17.9)
Methodological and Theoretical Questions	8	18	18	44 (8.4)
Translations and Editions	17	24	31	72 (13.9)
Total	*134*	*178*	*208*	*520* (100)

In this chapter, I shall follow this division of subjects, which corresponds to the disciplinary structure of *IFN* [Ch.4.iii], in a survey of the research done by Soviet historians of philosophy. Given the wealth of material this survey is highly selective, but representative. I shall largely refrain from an attempt to assess the value or significance of Soviet work as compared to the work of Western specialists, because that is both impossible and inappropriate: impossible because to judge the scholarly value of a hundred texts on Kant it takes a Kant-specialist; inappropriate since our objective is not that of a comparative study, but of *IFN* as a phenomenon in its own right.

Particular attention shall be given to, first of all, the aspiration for a *complete account* of the history of philosophy, and the attempt to fill remaining 'gaps', secondly, to the *'totalizing' tendency* to regard all past philosophy as somehow contributing to present philosophy, bringing *IFN* close to a 'Hegelian' conception of the history of philosophy, and, thirdly, to the *professionalism* manifest in the attempt of Soviet historians of philosophy to base their account on original sources. A fourth important aspect, finally, is the attempt, by a number of Soviet philosophers, to address *philosophical* questions in an indirect way. This attempt explains the strong interest in Hegel: he was the major predecessor of Marxism, and a 'gateway' to philosophical tradition.

The standard Soviet discussion and periodization of philosophy's part was partly traditional, partly revolutionary. The horizontal dichotomy of philosophy before Marx and philosophy after Marx led to a conventional periodization of Ancient, Medieval, Renaissance, and Modern philosophy: philosophy (really) began in Ancient Greece, slumbered through the Middle Ages, and bloomed in Modernity, beginning with Italian Renaissance [5.i, 5.ii]. It is only with the advent of Marxism that the Soviet view of the history of philosophy begins to differ, and radically so, from standard accounts in the West. The vertical dichotomy of 'bourgeois' versus Marxist(–Leninist) philosophy yields two opposed fields of investigation: the critique of bourgeois philosophy and the hagiography of Marxist(–Leninist) philosophy [5.iii, 5.iv]. Finally, the global perspective of historical materialism, and the alleged fact that Marxism found its true, Leninist continuation not in the Western world, but in the USSR, produces two further subdisciplines: history of non-Western philosophy and history of the philosophy of the Soviet peoples [5.v and 5.vi].

5.i *IFN on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*

From a Marxist-Leninist point of view, the main event in the first phase of philosophy's historical development was the formation of the opposition materialism – idealism, the emergence of the 'line of Democritus' and the'"line of Plato', the second being a reaction to the first, and in that sense quite literally *reactionary*. There was a marked stress on Greek and Roman materialism, especially on atomism. Second best was Aristotle, the most widely appreciated author from Antiquity in Soviet times, reflecting Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle as a first major synthesis.[9] (Aristotle appears as a forerunner of Soviet philosophy in another

respect, too, namely as the first historian of philosophy [Ch.6.ii].) For Soviet philosophy, the development both of materialism and dialectics began, basically, in Greece:

> The first philosophical doctrines emerged 2500 years ago in India..., China... and ancient Greece. The early ancient Greek philosophical doctrines had a spontaneous-materialist and naive-dialectical character. The historically first form of dialectic was ancient dialectic, the most important representative of which was Heraclitus. The atomistic variant of materialism was brought forward by Democritus; Epicurus and Lucretius developed his ideas. First in the Eleatic and Pythagorean school, then in Socrates, idealism took shape, coming out as a tendency opposed to materialism. The father of objective idealism was Plato, who developed an idealist dialectics of concepts. Ancient philosophy reached its summit in Aristotle, whose doctrine, despite its idealist nature, contained profound materialist and dialectical ideas.[10]

Soviet studies of ancient philosophy gradually became less dogmatic and schematic, more source-oriented and focussed on philosophical problems and categories, employing non-Soviet sources when possible. For example, three studies (all published in 1984) on the categories of necessity and chance in Democritus by Vasilij Pavlovič Goran (b.1940), and on the logic of Aristotle by Ratmir Konstantinovič Lukanin and by Vjačeslav Aleksandrovič Bočarov (b.1937), share these qualities.[11] Remarkable about these studies is that their 'Marxist-Leninist character' is largely reduced to inclusion of the collected works of the *klassiki* at the beginning of the bibliography, and to standard references to their works in order to legitimatize the very study of the subject.[12]

Plato was important as a major *enemy* of materialism, but of neo-Platonism *IFN* barely took notice. Aleksandrov jumped from Epicureanism and Stoa to Patristic philosophy, implicitly disqualifying neo-Platonism as 'mysticism' in 1946, explicitly in *IF3* [Ch.3.iii]:

> All... peculiarities of the decadent [*upadočnaja*] philosophy at the end of slave-holding society found their clearest expression in neo-Platonism. Neo-Platonism is the final product of the decomposition and vulgarization of classical philosophy, and at the same time one of the major philosophical sources of medieval theology.[13]

In 1983, there was a purely historiographical and factual entry on *neoplatonizm* in the *FÈS*; it neither mentioned the key notions of 'idealism', 'materialism', 'dialectics', and 'metaphysics', nor referred to historical background, thus managing not to classify or evaluate at all, and it referred to a single Soviet source: Losev's *Istorija antičnoj èstetiki*.[14] In passing, the author mentioned the influence of neo-Platonism on late 19th, early 20th century Russian idealism: Vl.S. Solov'ëv, P.A. Florenskij, S.L. Frank. This offers the key to understanding the special position of neo-Platonism: the rejection of neo-Platonism in official Soviet philosophy was due to the fact that, for Russian philosophy, the most important part of the philosophy of Antiquity was neither materialism, nor Aristotle, but the Platonic and especially neo-Platonic traditions of Byzantine Patristic philosophy.

Losev, the leading specialist in the philosophy of Antiquity, was at the same time the only remaining representative of Russian religious philosophy, and profoundly influenced by neo-Platonism himself. His main contribution to *IFN* was a monumental 8-volume *Istorija...*, the best source for Soviet philosophers in the field of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, but also a continuation of Russian interest in neo-Platonism, as is testified by the fact that three out of eight volumes of Losev's work were dedicated to it, which is disproportionate by any standard but that of a philosophical position sympathetic to neo-Platonism.[15] Losev himself hinted at the 'hidden motivation' behind his work:

> The author studied the history of ancient aesthetics already in the 1920s. The *History of ancient aesthetics* in many volumes was conceived by him in 1934.[16]

If we realize that Losev had developed his religiously inspired idealist philosophy in the 1920s [Ch.2.ii], and that in 1934 he had just returned from the labor camp, little imagination is needed to understand why Losev chose this path.

One must distinguish clearly between Losev's importance as an historian of philosophy and his importance within Soviet philosophical culture. As A.A. Takho-Godi wrote, his *Istorija...* "was, as the clever reader [*umnyj čitatel'*] had understood a long time ago, a genuine history of all classical philosophy and of classical culture."[17] We may assume that there were many "clever readers" among his vast audience who understood why, e.g., he wrote more than 300 pages on Proclus, only some 30 of which dealt with his aesthetics, the other 270 discussing his philosophical system, his 'dialectics of myth' (also the theme and title of one of Losev's major early works), his doctrines of unity and trinity, etc.[18]

The chief lacuna in *IFN* was Medieval philosophy, both West European and Eastern (Middle East, Georgia and Armenia, Eastern Europe, Russia). The importance of developing this field, and the necessity of using non-Soviet sources in doing so, were explicitly recognized:

> Some results have been achieved in the investigation of the Eastern and Western Middle Ages. But in this field, too, they have been, with few exceptions, insufficient. ...the numerous works of contemporary non-Marxist medieval studies ... contain serious errors of both scientific and ideological nature. This material requires a Marxist-Leninist interpretation and critical re-casting. The more so since one of the founding instructions [*osnovopolagajuščie ukazanija*] of Lenin has remained unexecuted until the present day: 'In order to really understand the connection of even Medieval discussions to the history of materialism would require a special investigation'.[19]

Of 37 publications over 1985-1987 on Classical and Medieval philosophy, 27 were on Classical Greek and Roman philosophy, and only 10 on Medieval philosophy (including Augustine and Boethius). Still, this was mass production in comparison to earlier times. As was indicated in a 1982 review of an introduction to West European Medieval philosophy, there had appeared only five Soviet studies in the field of Medieval philosophy until then, three of them published in the 1970s.[20]

A few years later, in a survey in 1986, the authors stated that "as for Medieval philosophy, the first works appeared only in the years immediately preceding the five-year period considered here, laying the basis for Soviet philosophical medieval studies," and they could add five more titles over 1979-1985.[21] In spite of this increase, Soviet medieval studies in philosophy still were in their infancy when they became post-Soviet, and it is unlikely that such projects as "the creation of a collective work on the philosophy of the Middle Ages, in which a Marxist-Leninist approach is combined with an effective rebuff of neo-Thomist interpretations of the problems of philosophical medieval studies, and in which, in particular, a fully convincing periodization of the development in Medieval philosophy will be given," will ever be completed.[22]

Apart from stress on 'progressive tendencies' in Medieval philosophy –Ockhamism, Averroism– it is difficult to perceive anything strongly Marxist-(–Leninist) in Soviet studies into Medieval philosophy.[23] This impression becomes even stronger when we read that "the analysis of Medieval philosophical doctrines is conducted... on the basis of a subdivision of the teachings of those days into *fundamental tendencies* [italics mine, EvdZ]: realism (Thomas Aquinas and the Thomists), conceptualism (Duns Scot and his followers), nominalism (Ockham and the Ockhamists)," along with the claim that "the specific nature of the struggle of materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics in that epoch is convincingly brought to light."[24] In Marxist-Leninist historiography of philosophy the only 'fundamental tendencies' were materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics, but it is difficult to let the opposition between materialism and idealism play a major role in a rendering of Medieval philosophy, as was in fact recognized by Soviet authors. For example, the entry Materializm in the *FĖS* of 1983 has it that "under the conditions of the supremacy of religious ideology, materialism was ousted by idealism," a fact attributed both to social factors and to the "incapacity of the materialism of Antiquity to explain the relationship of thought to matter, to disclose the genesis of consciousness."[25] It is not at all absurd to state that in "Medieval scholasticism the struggle between materialism and idealism took the form of the struggle between nominalism and realism," but if, in spite of "sprouts of materialist views (a first approaching of the conception of sensual experience in R. Bacon; Scotus' question 'Can matter think?')," it is impossible to speak of the formation of a materialist line of thought, it is questionable what sticking to these oppositions can bring in terms of an understanding of Medieval philosophy.[26]

The general 'condemnation' on the grounds of its subordination to Christian theology and faith –again: a *modern* theme– has hindered study of Medieval philosophy in its own right.[27] The more surprising, perhaps, that it nevertheless took place: an important figure in this respect is Sergej Sergeevič Averincev (b.1937), who wrote on a variety of subjects in early Medieval philosophy, and contributed a series of 'ideologically neutral' entries to the *FĖS*.[28]

5.ii *Modern West European Philosophy Revisited*

It is impossible to enter into a full discussion of Soviet studies into the history of Western philosophy between the Middle Ages and Marx: a selective bibliography in 1986 gave 36 titles of monographs over 1981-1985 alone, and the number of articles is several times greater.[29] The later period of *IFN* saw the production of large numbers of studies into a wide variety of philosophers, schools, philosophical problems, and discussions, and among a considerable amount of dull and repetitive standard Soviet production, more appealing attempts can be discerned. Three elements can be distinguished: i) attempts to *evade* the 'orthodox' interpretation of a given philosopher or period, ii) attempts to *sophisticate* that interpretation, and iii) attempts to *influence* Soviet philosophy itself through historical discussion. In what follows, I shall discuss the attempt at an 'integral approach' to the history of 'philosophy of the period of early bourgeois revolutions', and dwell at some length upon Soviet discussions of Hegel.

The Integral Approach: Early Bourgeois Philosophy

One of the valuable achievements of *IFN* is the attempt to regard the development of philosophy within a given historical period as part of that period without reducing it to class-struggle and the development of socio-economic formations. A famous product of this approach, consisting in "the transition from an analysis of separate philosophical conceptions and trends to a study of the philosophy of a fixed historical period in the context of the entire spiritual and material life of society of that period as a whole," was *Filosofija ėpokhi rannikh buržuaznykh revoljucij* [Philosophy in the Age of Early Bourgeois Revolutions] (1983), proudly announced as "the first systematic investigation, in Marxist history of philosophy, of the philosophy of the 16th-17th century, regarded in close connection with the epoch of early bourgeois revolutions."[30] The aim was set very high:

> ...an attempt to analyze the philosophical strivings [*iskanija*] of the 16th-17th centuries as the expression of a single socio-historical situation, to show their connection with the contradictory processes of the genesis of capitalism, with the profound reorientation of mass consciousness, with the scientific revolution that took place in the 17th century. The collective work... is dedicated to a bringing to light of these multilayered dependencies, to an analysis of early bourgeois philosophy as a form of self-consciousness of a particular historical epoch.[31]

The book was reviewed in the wto Soviet philosophical journals and in *Kommunist*.[32] What is striking is the uncommonly serious slant of the reviews, made explicit by Mitrokhin: "this work to us seemed to be too serious and fundamental as to respond to it with a trivial review."[33] The reviews contained a lot of criticism, but it was not concerned with orthodoxy, and to the point, for example, when Gorfunkel' criticized Solov'ëv for simplifying medieval theological orientations as denying human freedom, and for turning Reformation into the main source of Enlightenment by eclipsing the persisting influence of "the first forms of

bourgeois enlightenment," viz the "undogmatic, free-thinking humanists" of Renaissance.[34]

A positive appreciation of Reformation in connection with philosophy, as present in the parts written by Solov'ëv and Valentin Vasil'evič Lazarev (b.1937), was a novelty in Soviet philosophy.[35] In this respect, the book as a whole was programmatic:

> Behind it stands not only the intensive many years' work of an experienced collective, but also... a genuine scientific passion of its participants. It only remains to be hoped, that the method applied in this book, and the accomplished results, will be incarnated in different students' textbooks, and that the authors will realize a similar approach with respect to other periods in the development of philosophical thought.[36]

One of the most interesting parts of the book is the chapter on *skepticism* by Venjamin Mojseevič Boguslavskij (b.1908). Skepticism, in the sense of a disbelief in the capacity of the human mind to achieve objectively true knowledge, was unacceptable to Marxism, and almost absent in the Russian philosophical tradition that Marxism was grafted onto.[37] It is interesting, therefore, to see Boguslavskij arrive at a more positive appreciation:

> But does this mean that, oscillating between opposite solutions of fundamental epistemological problems, the 'new Pyrrhonians' did not occupy any specific epistemological position?[38]

The answer is "no": pointing out the stress of skeptics like Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Gassendi, and Pierre Bayle on empirical (as opposed to speculative) science of nature, their close contact with leading scientists of their age, and their own scientific work, Boguslavskij concludes:

> Thus... the skeptical thought of the period of early bourgeois revolutions performs a great constructive task – it assists the confirmation [*utveržđenie*] of the new science. (...) Once more we face a paradoxical situation: we discover epistemological optimism in the representatives of that tendency of philosophical thought which is commonly regarded as a pessimistic conception of knowledge.[39]

Discussing the emancipatory function of skepticism with regard to both Medieval science (Gassendi) and religious dogmatism (Bayle, Pascal), and stressing that concentration on rationalism and empiricism as the main opposite trends of Modern philosophy tends to eclipse the role of skeptic ideas in the philosophy of Enlightenment, Boguslavskij concludes with implicit criticism of Soviet traditions:

> The extraordinarily important role played by skeptical thought of the period of early bourgeois revolutions in the process of development of the theory of dialectics in the philosophy of the Modern age, must finally be appropriately appreciated.[40]

What if the period under discussion were extended to the 18th century, thus including David Hume, who stressed the distinction between excessive and mitigated

skepticism, and who was, along with Kant, a main target of Lenin's biting criticism?[41]

The general tendency of the book was adequately rendered by Ojzerman's definition of philosophy as 'self-consciousness of its epoch' [Ch.6.iii]. The contributors interpret philosophical theories as rational answers to problems of a social, scientific and religious nature, i.e. problems that not just individual philosophers were facing, but society as a whole. The 'relative independence' of *philosophy* as a form of social consciousness becomes the relative independence of *philosophers* as thinking individuals, and the attempt to "represent an historical stage in the development of philosophical thought as *the philosophy of* a particular *epoch*, integrating the various philosophical doctrines of different countries," inescapably leads to a neglect of "the inner contradictions in bourgeois philosophy... which, through the confrontation of empiricism and rationalism, sensualism and the conception of innate ideas etc., appeared in the final analysis as the struggle of materialism and idealism."[42] This way, not only the determination 'in the final analysis' of philosophy by the socio-economic basis, but also the reduction of philosophical controversy to the single dichotomy between materialism and idealism, lose ground. What remains is the attempt to see philosophy as *part* of the historical process, an approach especially manifest in the part written by Motrošilova on 'philosophy of man', the part that received most favorable criticism.[43]

The book appeared in 1983, when 'stagnation' was at its height. A few years later, it was heralded as "an especially outstanding expression" of "a fruitful tendency in the recent work of Soviet historians of philosophy."[44] The book resulted from the *inner* development of *IFN* as a discipline within the framework of Soviet philosophy. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the approach developed in this work did not vanish after the disappearance of Soviet conditions. On the contrary, it became more explicit, e.g. in later work by Motrošilova, who presented her article on 'The Orientation of the New Personality and its Expression in 17th Century Philosophy of Man', as a supplement to her contribution to *Filosofija ėpokhi...*[45]

Hegel, the Crowbar of Soviet Philosophy

The historical bond of Marxism with the history of West European philosophy manifested in the numerous studies on 'classical German philosophy', especially on Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach: 18 out of 59 monographs on pre-Marxist West European philosophy, listed in a selective bibliography over 1981-1985, deal with this period: 9 on Kant, 1 on Schelling, 6 on Hegel, and 2 on Feuerbach.[46] An important specialist was Gulyga, author of a series of 'intellectual biographies' of Kant, Herder, Hegel, and Schelling, 'simply' recounting their lives and ideas, with only a few, easily detectable indications of the 'solution' by dialectical materialism of the problems troubling the philosopher under discussion.[47]

Hegel was a figure of special significance because of the ambiguous attitude to his philosophy from the side of (Soviet) Marxism, and because of his strong influence on Russian philosophy.[48] Important Soviet specialists on Hegel and

Hegelianism were Bakradze, Ojzerman, Motrošilova, Karimskij, Mikhail Antonovič Kissel' (b.1934), Viktor Arsen'evič Malinin (b.1921), and the Georgians Méri Ivanovna Čelidze and Guram Benediktovič Tevzadze.

In spite of Ždanov's claim in 1947 that "the question about Hegel was resolved a long time ago," Hegel remained at the very heart of *IFN*: in the early 1960s Ballestrem and Blakeley noted renewed interest in Hegel, mentioning the recent appearance of 6 studies, and especially after 1955 many studies on Hegel began to appear, a fact clearly related to his 'rehabilitation'.[49] A Soviet bibliography of 1973 mentions 289 studies (monographs and articles) on Hegel over the period 1960-1970, and in 1982 Ojzerman stated that the total number of studies on Hegel in the Soviet period (1917-1982) came close to 1000.[50] It is this large-scale occupation with Hegel's philosophy that allowed Zubatý and Rakitov to state, in 1975 and 1985 respectively, that no philosopher was more intensively studied by Soviet historians of philosophy than Hegel.[51]

Hegel was important enough for Soviet philosophy to be the subject of an *official* position. In fact, the attitude to his philosophy can be seen as an indication of the 'level of orthodoxy' of Soviet philosophy. Whenever the (current) official position left room for it, a variety of positions emerged, ranging from 'hegelianizing Marxism' (Deborin and his school, Il'enkov and his followers) to a critical approach, inspired by Kantianism or neo-positivism. Given the close bond between Marxism and Hegel, his thought contains many possibilities to point out problematic aspects of Marxism, and it therefore is only partly pertinent to construct, as Zubatý did, an opposition between Hegel and Kant as congruent with the opposition of dogmatic and critical.[52] Attempts to 'loosen up' Soviet philosophy via Hegel could never be more than partly successful, because studies into Hegel's philosophy were wrapped up in a number of 'Marxist-Leninist' dogmas, especially that of the 'contradiction' between dialectical method and idealist system.

'System' and 'Method': A weak Spot in Soviet Philosophy

The existence of an official position on Hegel explains the importance of texts that merely expound his views, such as an article by Asmus from 1970 in which he asked "whether Hegel acknowledged... the rights of formal reasoning."[53] Naturally, the answer was affirmative: full recognition and realization of 'form' means consistent rejection of any abstract opposition between form and content, and hence rejection of *mere* form is not identical with rejection of form as such. The importance of this text was its opposition to the received view that Hegel was the advocate of a 'dialectical logic' as opposed to formal logic. The same holds for Bakradze's *Sistema i metod v filosofii Gegelja* [System and Method in the Philosophy of Hegel]. Kamenka may well be right that he "...never goes beyond the achievements of Hegelian scholarship in Germany...," but this already was of great importance in the Soviet context.[54] A fair account of Hegel's thought also served as an indirect means to address philosophical issues, 'colonized' by official Soviet philosophy; this significance of Bakradze's book was brought forward by Bogdanov:

K.S. Bakradze departs from the idea of the identity of method and system, considering that their correlation must be understood by analogy with the solution of the problem of the correlation of content and form. (...) Departing from this, K.S. Bakradze considers as simplified the view, according to which the philosophical system and the method in Hegel's doctrine are independent from one another, and that Marx and Engels rejected Hegel's system as something absolutely false and reactionary, accepting his method as something unconditionally positive and revolutionary.[55]

Marx and Engels held that there was a contradiction in Hegel's philosophy between revolutionary dialectical method and reactionary idealist system, the latter being the "mystifying veil" of the former.[56] This 'dissection' of Hegel, was strong in Russian 'revolutionary democratism', too, e.g. in the qualification by Aleksandr Ivanovič Herzen [Gercen] (1812-1870) of dialectical method as the "algebra of revolution."[57]

At the same time, Soviet philosophy itself was claimed to be a system. Consequently, the notion of system was of crucial importance to Soviet philosophers, and a plausible way of discussing it was to return to Hegel. It is impossible to separate Hegel's method and system in such a way as to retain the former and discard the latter: the system is the result of a method that consists in the development of the (absolute) idea into the totality of its determinations. The result of this procedure appears in concrete history as a system of philosophical disciplines, but to treat this system, as it took shape in a series of books and recorded lectures, as identical with Hegel's absolute idealism, is to take the objectivization for the idea [Ch.1.ii].

Philosophers like Bakradze paved the way for a more adequate interpretation of the relation of 'system' and 'method' in Hegel. The attempt to get over the opposition of system and method is manifest in the rather non-dialectical question by Anatolij Il'ič Rakitov (b.1928) "whether there is not *also, next to* the contradiction, a unity between these two components of his philosophy, and what this would consist in [italics mine, EvdZ]."[58] Well before *perestrojka* an affirmative answer to this question was given by Motrošilova, who distinguished between 'system' in the sense of a "system of related disciplines and subdisciplines," and in the sense of a systematic principle, which presented "a side... of dialectical method."[59] "System" then means "totality of theory... inner coherence of concepts, categories, and fundamental laws by virtue of a specific immanent dialectic."[60] Studies like Motrošilova's *Put' Gegelja k 'Nauke Logiki'* [Hegel's Road to the *Science of Logic*] (1984) testify that Soviet historians of philosophy attempted to take Hegel seriously beyond the 'received view', to keep up with Western studies in the same field, and to use elements of his philosophy in order to amend Soviet philosophy:

...the philosophy of Hegel is notable for its richness of approaches to the system-problematic, the diversity of its aspects, which have not lost their actual meaning even today.[61]

In *Gegel' i sovremennyj mir* [Hegel and the World Today] (1982), Kissel' equally emphasized the need to overcome dogma as a necessary prerequisite for an objective study of Hegel's philosophy: appealing to Lenin's *Filosofskie tetrady*, he pointed

out that a first component of the "dialectical-materialist 'sublation' [*snjatie, Aufhebung*] of a past philosophical doctrine" is the "reproduction of the object in its entirety," the "immanent reconstruction of the object" being a "necessary condition for further work with it."[62] This occasioned a restatement of the "dialectic of system and method:"

> The system is nothing but the fully deployed method, and the method is the system, condensed to the characteristics here summarized. Therefore, if you value the Hegelian method you cannot approach his system with disdain. On the other hand, the shortcomings of the system are, at the same time, defects of the very method. It is a completely mistaken view that the method is what is 'positive' in Hegel, but the system 'negative', or that the method is dialectical, but the system 'metaphysical'. (...) The identity of method and system lies at the basis of the Hegelian way of philosophizing...[63]

Progress and Freedom: A Revaluation of Hegel's Idea of History

Criticizing Soviet stereotypes of Hegel as an 'hidden atheist', a defender of aristocracy, or a German nationalist, Kissel' arrived at a positive appreciation of "the use for us today of some Hegelian ideas, *apart from* those that long ago have entered (in a materialistically re-cast form) the custom of Marxist philosophical thought [italics mine, EvdZ]."[64] These include his stress on human labor and in general on 'action' as essential for the realization of ideas, the "working of spirit" in history, his analysis of the struggle for mutual recognition of self-consciousness [*Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*], and his conception of history as progress in the *consciousness* of freedom.[65] Hegel was right, Kissel' argues, that bourgeois society achieved consciousness of freedom as "the democratic consciousness of the fundamental equality of people," but "what Hegel did not demonstrate was his thesis about the *synchrony* of the development of consciousness with the transformation of social institutions, the social structure as a whole [italics mine, EvdZ]."[66]

At this point, Kissel' is wrong, I think, to claim that "Hegel as an observer and investigator of the reality that was contemporary to him entered in contradiction with himself as the speculative system-builder, deducing actual reality [*dejstvitel'nost'*] out of its concept."[67] The problem lies in the ambiguous word 'synchrony': both the realization of 'free institutions', and the developing consciousness of freedom take place in history, and the two processes are intimately related, but that does not imply that the idea of freedom is ever fully realized (in consciousness), nor that it is synchronic with the realization (in time and space) of a society that would correspond to that idea. Hence, the contradictions observed by Hegel in contemporary political reality were not contradictions between his system and 'actual reality', but between actual reality and the idea at work and realized *within* that reality.

Kissel' in fact rehabilitates Hegel as a *critic* of contemporary society, both of his day and of *our* present:

> Hegel, the philosopher of 'real freedom' is our contemporary and ally. He is our contemporary, for he clearly understands that man's freedom is a world-historical

achievement, and not the result of a simple change of individual adjustment to the world, as the adherents of personalist and existentialist robinsonads think. (...) He is our ally, for he knows that not the efforts of individual minds [*usilija otdel'nykh umov*], looking for a formula of salvation, are moving history, but the 'desires..., the labor and struggle' of the masses in the course of a long time lead to essential changes of social organization.[68]

Of course, the USSR claimed to have realized 'freedom for all', but it is not difficult to imagine a critical employment of these ideas within 'real existing socialism'.

Kissel' also praised Hegel as the first philosopher to include *political economy* in his field of considerations, which "testifies... to the depth of his understanding of the nature of the new epoch that Europe was entering before his very eyes, the epoch of the triumph of the bourgeoisie."[69] Several years later, as the program of *perestrojka* was in progress, Hegel's contribution to political economy was the subject of a monograph by the economist Aleksandr Andreevič Khandruev. Sympathetic to the 'revisionist' G. Lukács in *Der junge Hegel* (1948), but claiming an economic rather than a philosophical (as was Lukács') approach, Khandruev argues that Hegel was ahead, in his *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, of A. Smith and D. Ricardo in the analysis of money, calling it "the form of unity or of the possibility of all objects of demand."[70]

One may wonder why Khandruev believes that "it *now* becomes important to regard the philosopher Hegel through the eyes of an economist."[71] The answer appears in the concluding chapter, entitled 'Dialectical Method Since Marx', in which a sharp critique of the Soviet canonization of Marxist political economy is given. Soviet political economy suffered, according to Khandruev, from "scholastic theorizing" and from lack of serious application of dialectics to real existing socialism:

After 1956 the political economy of socialism was given an historical chance to clear its theoretical conscience. However, after a short-lived splash of creative activity the habit of constructions in which the real dialectic of economic life was made to fit preconceived schemes, got the upper hand again.[72]

Khandruev employs the positive appreciation of Hegelian dialectics by Marx and Engels to urge a return to serious Marxist economics, opposing any simplistic opposition of Hegelian, idealist, and Marxian, materialist dialectics.[73] In the field of economics, too, Hegel served as a crowbar to reopen issues central to 'intellectual Marxism', issues that had been closed due to the subordination of theory to its ideological function.[74]

Hegel was a means within Soviet philosophical culture to adress philosophical issues like human freedom as the ultimate goal of history, and the distinction of *consciousness* of freedom and 'real' freedom within a given state.[75] These issues had been addressed by the *klassiki*, but their answers were petrified in the official version of *istmat*. To emphasize that "Hegel's ideas in philosophy of history are... very up-to-date" (Karimskij), and to make him "a contemporary and an ally" (Kissel') also is to take seriously Marx' struggle with the Hegelian heritage.[76]

5.iii *Critique of Bourgeois Philosophy [KBF]*

An important sub-discipline of *IFN* was *kritika buržuaznoj filosofii*, a field marked by the idea of *diamat* as the supreme outcome of the development of philosophy beforeMarx.[77] As we have seen, the result of the supposed revolution in philosophy performed by Marx and Engels was a 'horizontal dichotomy' between philosophy *before* and *after* Marx and a vertical dichotomy of post-Marxist philosophy into 'bourgeois' and Marxist-Leninist philosophy [Ch.3.iv]. Consequently, any positive appreciation of 'bourgeois philosophy' presupposed a relativization of the 'revolution in philosophy', the 'basic question', the two dichotomies, and the class-bound nature of philosophy [Ch.4.i].

One of the characteristic features of *KBF* was its insistence on the *unity* of bourgeois philosophy, which makes it the counterpart of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, instead of presenting the latter as one among a large number of philosophical positions. Soviet philosophy was a unity due to its overall basis, dialectical materialism, and so was bourgeois philosophy, due to its failure to recognize that basis. The diversity and pluriformity of Western philosophy were explained as a 'symptom' of its linkage with capitalist society and its crisis:

> It has been incontestably demonstrated in Marxist critique that the pluralism of contemporary idealist theories, unequalled in the history of philosophy (with the possible exception of the period of crisis of slave-holding society [i.e. late Hellenism, EvdZ]), stems from the general crisis of modern capitalism and from the ideological disorder proper to that capitalism... No less convincingly the epistemological roots [*gnoseologičeskie korni*] of that same pluralism have been uncovered: the absolutization of different aspects of the complex and multifaceted process of knowing objective reality.[78]

This last explanation of bourgeois pluralism is in a way Hegelian, and runs counter to the economistic reductionism manifest in the first part of the quotation. Moreover, it provides ample reason to analyze pluralist bourgeois philosophy, focusing on its philosophical content and argument, while at the same time it assumes the superiority of the (Soviet) position from which such analysis would ensue.

Bourgeois philosophy after the rise of Marxism was divided into two main periods: before and after the Great October Revolution, marking the beginning of the world-wide victory of communism. Given the inevitability of the latter, bourgeois philosophy was a necessarily futile struggle against it. Hence post-Marxian non-Marxist philosophy was *essentially reactionary*, reflecting the 'ever-sharpening' crisis of capitalism. After the 'declassification' of language, logic, and natural science, and the abolition of their dichotomic qualification as either 'bourgeois' or 'proletarian', a positive appreciation of Western science was possible, and, consequently, a positive appreciation of logic, philosophy of science, and, to a certain extent, philosophy of language [Ch.2.v]. This explains the difference between the vehement rejection of a philosopher from the imperialist period like Nietzsche, and the more balanced treatment of *contemporary* bourgeois philosophy.

Sickle Against Hammer: Soviet Philosophy on Nietzsche

From the perspective of the Marxist-Leninist periodization of philosophy's history, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) fell within the period of monopolistic capitalism [Ch.3.iv]. The Soviet reception of Nietzsche offers an illustrative example of the development of *IFN*.[79] Nietzsche was widely received in Russia around the turn of the century, and his thought was influential until the beginnings of Soviet philosophy (±1930).[80] His influence on Russian Marxists was considerable too, especially on so-called '*bogostroitel'stvo* [Godbuilding]' (Bogdanov, Lunačarskij).[81]

For Soviet philosophy, however, Nietzsche was not acceptable: he was used "as a... whipping boy for trends or traits they consider undesirable or dangerous."[82] He was a "proto-nazi" and an irrationalist, an aristocratic defender of *Herrenmoral*, an anti-socialist and anti-humanist, a racist, a fake atheist, and a general danger to Marxism.[83] As early as 1922/3 Nietzsche's works were removed from public libraries, and made accessible to a few specialists only.[84] Soviet editions appeared only in 1990, and there was only one study of his thought, pregnantly entitled *The Reactionary Essence of Nietzscheanism*, until its author, Stepan Fëdorovič Oduev (b.1918), published *Tropami Zaratustry* [In the Footsteps of Zarathustra] (1971), which then became the standard text.[85] Oduev emphasized "the necessity to struggle against Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism, for they appeal to 'the hidden instincts that break down capitalist man, gradually arousing in him all that is evil, barbaric, and wild, destroying his reason and soul, silencing his conscience'."[86]

What is of interest to our investigation is that the revival of legitimate interest in Nietzsche and his influence in Russia was mediated through historical study of early 20th-century Russian modernism and symbolism, and through ideological controversy.[87] A prime example in this respect is *Ėtika ljubvi i metafizika svoevolija* [The Ethics of Love and the Metaphysics of Self-will] by Davydov.[88] Sharply critical of Nietzsche, Davydov contrasted the moral views of Tolstoj and Dostoevskij with the nihilism of Western philosophers like Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This leads to an interpretation of Nietzsche that diverges from Western views, especially in the comparison of Nietzsche and Dostoevskij, often regarded as kindred thinkers in the West, but strongly opposed by Soviet authors, "invariably to Nietzsche's detriment".[89]

It raised a scandal for its rehabilitation of the moral views of Tolstoj and Dostoevskij as a means to save Russian (not Soviet!) youth.[90] It was published in a 50,000 copy edition in 1982 by '*Molodaja gvardija*', known as a stronghold of 'national bolshevism': one of the *recenzenty* (people who were politically responsible for publication) of this book reportedly was Mitin, an indication that permission for print came from above, presumably from M.A. Suslov in person.[91] Later in 1982, when Suslov was dead and Andropov the new *gensek*, Russophilism received a severe blow, and Davydov's book was severely criticized in *Kommunist*, as was '*Molodaja gvardija*' for publishing it, "the like of which, we may venture, will not soon happen again" [cf. Ch.7.iv].[92]

When *VF* started to publish *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* in 1989, this had to be justified by pointing to its *historical* importance:

Although..., Nietzsche's teaching is not 'the philosophy of the future', acquaintance with it is essential to anyone who tries to understand the course of development of European philosophy in our century.[93]

The editor opened his introduction by stating that "for decades our science has hardly known a quiet, balanced academic attitude towards Nietzsche... According to the logic of the time ...it was necessary to give an ultra-right political interpretation of the philosophy of Nietzsche, on the basis of which he was subject to a crushing critical defeat."[94] He concluded by saying that "*Beyond Good and Evil* occupies a particular place in Nietzsche's works,... and this entitles us to think that it may serve as a convenient introduction to the whole range of ideas and notions of Nietzsche for those who... have had no opportunity to read his texts (and there are, no doubt, many such readers)."[95]

Between Struggle and Dialogue: Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy

Because of the horizontal dichotomy of philosophy before Marx and the vertical dichotomy of philosophy after Marx, post-Marxist bourgeois philosophy was inevitably interpreted negatively, being outdated by historical progress. However, as capitalist society persisted, and bourgeois philosophy became 'simultaneously developing' Western philosophy, it continued to contain valuable elements –as it had done *before* Marxism– in various forms of dialectical and materialist philosophy. Marxist philosophy had to take seriously the *content* of bourgeois philosophy, and, consequently, the superiority of Marxist-Leninist philosophy had to reside in its capacity to *assimilate* everything valuable in contemporary non-Marxist-Leninist philosophy [Ch.6.ii]. As a result, a significant shift gradually took shape in the field of *kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* [*KSBF*].[96]

The conflict between splendid isolation plus ideologically motivated 'critique' and serious study plus philosophically motivated criticism (already pleaded for by Asmus in 1947 [Ch.3.iii]) tended to be resolved in favor of the latter. From the 1950s onwards, "special courses, especially dedicated to the critique of separate currents of contemporary bourgeois philosophy" were started at the *kafedra IZF* at MGU.[97] In 1967, one of the leading specialists in *KBF*, Bogomolov "subscribed to the conclusion, expressed by many, that one ought to combine critical work with positive investigations of problems, and that, moreover, the creative development of Marxist philosophy would be noticeably hampered without a scrutiny of problems and a critical analysis of their solution by bourgeois philosophers."[98]

At a similar conference in 1986 on methodological problems of *IFN*, one of the 'generals' of *KBF*, Mel'vil', distinguished three periods in his discipline:

...the first... covers the 10 to 12 years when critique sought to unmask [*razoblačat'*] bourgeois philosophers as hired ideological henchmen [*naëmnye ideologičeskie oruženoscy*] of imperialism, and perceived a reactionary political meaning and *mauvaise foi* [*zlaja volja*] in all their pronouncements. The second period began... in 1957... It was marked by a transition from pigeonholing to a sorting out [*razbor*] and theoretical analysis of Western conceptions. However, critique here was primarily negative, oriented towards unmasking... the reactionary theoretical character of

idealistic constructions... A third period begins at the end of the 1960s. The previous tendency is basically preserved, but critique obtains a positive character, too: real problems are being distinguished, interesting solutions and approaches are being accentuated; a series of problems, presented by Western philosophers, is being elaborated by Soviet authors in a positive manner, most of all in that field which in the West is called 'philosophy of science'...[99]

What *KBF* looked like in Mel'vil's 'second period' appears from a characterization given by Kamenka:

There is an official Soviet recipe for writing the 'scientific', Marxist study of any philosopher. The author begins by portraying briefly the economic and political situation at the time the author lived, paying special attention to any direct links he has with dominant or emerging (or oppressed) classes. He refers to the philosopher's non-philosophic activities, especially to any political or social engagements, but also to his scientific interests (if any) and to the general state of science at the time. The author then goes on to present and discuss the subject's philosophical work. In general, the more philosophically serious the work being produced, the more perfunctory this 'social' introduction and the less related to the fairly conventional philosophic exposition that follows.[100]

In 1963, Kline reported on the lack of knowledge of contemporary Western philosophy among the Soviet delegation to the 13th International Congress of Philosophy in Mexico City, an ignorance that went hand in hand with severe criticism of that same Western philosophy.[101] Twenty years later, this situation was considerably remedied in both respects: Soviet specialists in *KBF* knew what they were talking about and criticism had largely given way to a more or less objective account. This in fact points to the main, *assimilative* function of *KBF*. It should be remembered that to write a *critical* dissertation or monograph on Heidegger or Wittgenstein was the only legitimate access to the texts of these philosophers, and virtually the only way to become informed about contemporary non-Soviet philosophy was to *read* those 'critical' studies:

When a reader in the USSR opens a book that is named 'The Anti-Scientific Nature of the Bourgeois Conception of...', 'A Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Theory...', 'The Conception of... in Bourgeois Philosophy'... etc., he may expect from such a book one of two things: that it proves to be a primitive collection of misquotations from Western authors, alternated with bad language pointed against them, and does not contain any hint at thought or information; or that the book is an attempt at serious analysis. In the latter case, the book may, regardless of all mutilation by outer and inner... censorship, give the reader some information, and urge him to considerations that are new to him. This is the case especially if we are talking about the Soviet reader, who has become used to read between the lines for over 60 years now...[102]

The attitude to contemporary idealism changed from an abstract negation to a concrete appreciation of its role and significance."[103] The link of this tendential shift from Marxist-Leninist critique to a philosophically motivated study of contemporary non-Marxist philosophy with the principle of *partijnost'* [Ch.2.i], as well as with

the 'double statement' [Ch.3.iii], is obvious. It clearly makes a difference whether *partijnost'* is understood as determination of a philosophical position by its 'embeddedness' in an ideological superstructure [*partijnost'* **1**], or as 'conscious' partisanship, 'taking sides' with one social class or another [*partijnost'* **2**]. And it equally makes a difference whether the *relative independence* of philosophy is understood as independence from socio-economic conditions, or (also) as independence from class-struggle. Just as it is hard to blame the capitalist for being a capitalist, if you regard him as a mere instrument of historical development, it is hard to reproach a bourgeois philosopher for being an apologist of imperialism, if his theory merely reflects the objective contradictory conditions of society: he is a 'victim' rather than a 'criminal'. As Ignatow rightly remarked:

> Such a version of *partijnost'* comes closer to Marx' *camera-obscura* thesis or Engels' 'final analysis' argument than to the formulations of Lenin. In the end, 'bourgeois' theoreticians are not so much active reactionaries, as passive objects, or even victims, of the class-conditioned aberrations.[104]

So, Leninist voluntarism with its concomitant *praise and blame* gave way, in later *KSBF*, to a more historical approach that freed Soviet philosophers of the obligation to accuse their philosophical opponents.

KSBF was an area with an extreme *division of labor*. Since it was supposed to be a Marxist-Leninist critique of foreign philosophy, there was no good reason why many people should deal with one and the same author: the results would in principle be the same, being the outcome of an application of a shared philosophical position. There were Soviet specialists on a wide range of non-Soviet philosophers and currents, but for each subject there were only a few specialists. For example, I know of only two Soviet authors on Collingwood, Kissel' and Eeru N. Loone, in spite of the fact that Collingwood's *The Idea of History* appeared in Russian translation in 1980. Both Kissel' and Loone were 'specialists' who attended international conferences on Collingwood, but they were, within the USSR, virtually the only people who knew something about his views. As a result, there could not be a *discussion* of recent developments in non-Soviet philosophy, something akin to, e.g., a discussion in (West–) Germany about developments in French philosophy. As a matter of fact, Western philosophers were in a far better position to know something about Soviet philosophy than the other way around: books like Scanlan's *Marxism in the USSR* or Jeu's *La Philosophie Soviétique et l'Occident* did not and could not have their Soviet counterpart.

It would be a gross mistake, and a confusion of the epistemic and ideological functions of Soviet philosophy, to regard *K(S)BF* simply as what it claimed itself to be, namely a *critical analysis* of non-Soviet philosophical thought from a Marxist-Leninist point of view.[105] There probably was no field where the different functions of *IFN* were more manifest than *K(S)BF*. The *ideological* function was the primary one, but in order to perform this function convincingly the *kritik* had to study the works of the bourgeois philosophers, preferably in the original, and in order to *demonstrate* the reactionary nature of their views he or she had to recognize their complexity and 'seriousness': this inevitably led to a sophistication of the 'critique'

and to an increase of professionalism. Moreover, since Western philosophy contained valuable material for the improvement of *Soviet* philosophy, a professional approach was required. Further, *K(S)BF* offered excellent possibilities to discuss philosophical topics, especially in such relatively neutral fields as philosophy of science and philosophy of language, but also in relation to psychology or psycho-analysis. Here, *K(S)BF* merged with such fields as *filosofskie voprosy estestvoznanija* and *filosofskie voprosy psikhologii*, and critical discussion of Western theories was one of the ways in which more sophisticated positions, departing from *diamat*, could be developed.

An example is *Priroda nauki* [The Nature of Science] (1985) by Viktor Vasil'evič Il'in (b.1952) and Anatolij Terent'evič Kalinkin, in which the authors make wide use of Western literature in history and philosophy of science. To quote a Western reviewer, it "really offers some interesting ideas, particularly concerning the dynamics of science" to "the unbiased, critical and patient reader, not repulsed by frequent assurances that any non-Marxist attempt to create an acceptable model of the scientificity of knowledge must fail due to the inadequacy of its philosophical-methodological foundations."[106] As Graham and Scanlan have shown, there was no real ban on Western literature in Soviet philosophy of science [Ch.4.iv].[107]

Other examples, from philosophy of language and 'philosophical questions of psychology' respectively, are *Filosofija i jazyk* [Philosophy and Language] (1972) by Wittgenstein-specialist (1889-1951) Marija Semënovna Kozlova (b.1933), and the work by Natalja Sergeevna Avtonomova (b.1945) on French structuralism and psycho-analysis (C. Lévi-Strauss, J. Lacan).[108] When parts of these monographs appeared in German translation, marked by a complete absence of 'militant partisanship', a sound knowledge of Western literature, and philosophical criticism instead of Marxist-Leninist *kritika*, one reviewer stated that texts like these "could have been written in our country as well."[109]

5.iv *History of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy [IMLF]*

The most strongly ideologized part of *IFN* was the historiography of Marxist philosophy, "the most important period in the history of mankind."[110] Any philosophical position will present itself as somehow the supreme, or at any rate an important 'result' of the history of philosophy, and such a 'proper history' usually takes the form of a reconstruction of the pre-history of a present philosophical position [Ch.1.i-ii]. In the Soviet case, however, Marxist philosophy itself had a history of more than a century, and therefore, on top of the rational reconstruction of the *prehistory* of Marxism [Ch.5.i-ii], there was an *inner history* of Marxism-(–Leninism) in which the current stage determined the interpretation and valuation of the past.

Given this ideological function, it is not surprising that the historiography of *Soviet* philosophy was a permanently adapted chronicle, singing the praises of its successes, presenting the 'party-philosophers' as its figure-heads, turning controversy into 'creative development', and inflating dutiful production into profound discussion. The running historical account of Soviet philosophy as Marxist-

Leninist, reinforcing the ideology of Soviet philosophy from an historical angle, could not but eclipse what was really done in philosophy. It seems doubtful whether this hagiography was very much believed in by its authors, but it precluded investigations into 'real' history. Moreover, it was the only information accessible to larger audiences, and thus determined the public image of Soviet philosophy.

History of Marxism-Leninism was divided into two main periods: the formation of Marxism, and the 'Leninist stage [*leninskij ėtap*]', corresponding to the division of post-Marxian bourgeois philosophy. Just as philosophy before and philosophy after Marx were incomparable, so were Marxist philosophy before and after Lenin, when. Marxism split in two parts: the right, Leninist line, and a multitude of wrong, non-Leninist lines. Soviet philosophy did not distinguish between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism [Ch.2.iii]. Hence there was no real distinction between historiography of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the critique of revisionism.

Still, attempts to engage in serious study of Marx and Engels themselves were made, partly in connection with attempts to reform Marxism itself. One of the landmarks in this field was Ojzerman's *Formirovanie filosofii marksizma* [The Formation of the Philosophy of Marxism], published for the first time in 1962 and twice republished, translated into several languages, and reviewed rather favorably by Nemeth as "especially useful" to "those who would welcome a refresher course with time in short supply."[111] Ojzerman's book deals with the period until 1848, and is the first Soviet study of "the whole period of formation of the philosophy of Marxism."[112] It is to the point, informative, and pays due attention to biographical and bibliographical questions such as the period of writing of Marx' *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*, which he regarded as a "patchwork" of idealist and materialist positions, written partly in 1842-1843 and thus testifying to the rapid development of Marx' philosophical conception.[113]

The main shortcoming of this book is that it takes for granted Lenin's interpretation of the development of Marxist philosophy. This "more than slightly irritating" (Nemeth) feature belonged to the Soviet preconditions of this kind of work: the very idea that Marx' and Engels' doctrine would *not* constitute a coherent whole, or that there were 'unsuperseded' remnants of Hegelianism in it, could not be acceptable.[114] The chief merit, therefore, of books like this was that they presented historical material and offered access to the ideas of 'the real Marx', and to Western discussions of the development of Marxism, however critically it opposed "bourgeois and revisionist interpretations."[115]

The sensitive nature *IMLF* becomes manifest from attempts to turn an historical study of Marx' thought into an innovation of Marxism, such as the famous article by Mamardašvili on 'The Analysis of Consciousness in the Works of Marx [*Analiz soznanija v rabotakh Marksa*]', in which he discusses Marx' conception of human consciousness in *Das Kapital*. In his opinion, "Marx was the first to place consciousness into the domain of scientific determinism, and to reveal its social transformation and social mechanisms."[116] He labels this approach "the impersonal, or (reductive-objective) analysis of consciousness and culture," departing not from the perception by the subject, but from the mechanisms that form the ways social relations are perceived as objective (e.g. as 'commodity form [*Warenform*]')![117] This

approach "reveals the phenomenological nature of consciousness (its quasi-objective character) and introduces an abstraction that makes it possible to analyze consciousness objectively as a transformation of objects into quasi-objective forms, derived from processes occurring in the internal world of the subject," making clear that "to go 'beyond the phenomenon' means to explain the social system of communication that supplies the phenomena to consciousness."[118]

Mamardašvili excludes any dualist understanding of Marx' famous dictum that "it is not people's consciousness that determines their being, but on the contrary their social being that determines their consciousness."[119] Official Soviet Marxism-Leninism adhered to a distinction between 'consciousness' and 'social consciousness', but Mamardašvili's point is that all consciousness is social consciousness, not that social consciousness would determine individual, non-social consciousness.

This was a contribution to Soviet theory of consciousness indeed, but it was unacceptable for official Soviet Marxism-Leninism. First of all, it contradicts Lenin's naive 'reflection theory', and, secondly, it emphasizes –quoting the *klassik* Marx– the fact that the human beings that live in society are the objects rather than the subjects of ideology, its product rather than its producer.[120] The "structural analysis" which Mamardašvili derived from *Das Kapital* focuses on "systemic causation," and indeed leads to conclude that "man as a reflective and intentionally oriented being is not master of his own ideological house."[121] The resulting deterministic account of consciousness is incompatible with Soviet voluntarism.

Mamardašvili's analysis equally applies to *socialist*, i.e. Soviet society in its transition to communism. If there, too, forms of "objectivization [*Verdinglichung*]" and "alienation [*Entfremdung*]" determine the way people perceive social reality, the 'transparency' of a society in which a vanguard Party leads the Soviet people in full awareness of the relations that constitute the social system vanishes.[122] In Soviet society, the continued existence of the 'commodity form' etc. led to an even worse 'alienation' of consciousness, since in 'socialist' economy the form was retained, but the content disappeared: 'price', 'labor', 'wage' reflected objective social, but not economic relations, 'reflecting' the decision of the Party-apparatus to keep the population at a certain level of existence. The price of labor force, for example, was fixed regardless of any market mechanism, nor was there free trade of labor force, given the legal obligation to have a job.[123] As we see, Mamardašvili's attempt to address basic issues of historical materialism *eo ipso* touches upon the ideological limitations of official *istmat*.

Soviet studies on contemporary non-Soviet Marxism seem often to have been attempts to initiate discussions in Soviet philosophy, too, as is strongly suggested by Grier in his discussion of the critique by Otar Ivanovič Džioev of Althusser's anti-humanist Marxism:

> The affinity between recent French structuralist Marxism and certain tendencies... in Soviet historical materialism leads me to suggest that in criticizing the French work, Džioev may well be attempting to initiate a discussion within the Soviet Union which would renew the development of philosophy of history which has in many respects been arrested since the 1920s...[124]

Given the alleged scientific status of Soviet Marxism and the requirement not to contradict official ideology, it comes as no surprise to find a "standard Soviet work by Kelle and Koval'zon, in which the 'objectivist' view of history as a process analogous to natural history and obedient to natural laws is enthusiastically expounded for more than 100 pages, only to reach the conclusion that actual history is 'the result of the activity of man'."[125] Rather than a case of lack of "courage of consistency to draw the conclusions toward which their analysis inevitably moves," this seems to be an instance of ritual invocation of safe tenets of official *istmat*.[126] Historical investigation could offer an alternative for illegitimate 'intellectual Marxism', as appears from the examples just given, but it is obvious that there was no field of *IFN* that ran against the ideology of Soviet philosophy more easily.

5.v *Outside the Western World: the Limits of Anti-Eurocentrism*

One of the effects of linking philosophy's historical development to the succession of socio-economic formations was *universalism*. Generally speaking, every feudal society would have its corresponding 'feudal philosophy', capitalism would be accompanied by bourgeois philosophy in every part of the world, and the global victory of communism would go along with the world-wide development of a single 'philosophy of Marxism-Leninism' [Ch.3.iv]. By the same token, the fecundity of such a 'universalist' approach would be a major argument in favor of a link between philosophy and socio-economic formations.

So, two further objects of *IFN* were the great philosophical traditions of the Far East (India, China, and Japan), and philosophy in the rest of the world. The latter was largely left to scholars from developing countries, staying at Moscow's *Universitet Družby Narodov imeni Patrisa Lumumby* [University of the Friendship of Peoples named after Patrice Lumumba], to study 'the development of progressive philosophical and social thought' –to use a standard phrase– in their respective countries of origin.

However sympathetic the declared anti-eurocentrism of *IFN* may appear, it did not lead to the study of non-Western philosophical traditions (African philosophy, Aboriginal thought, etc.), but to that of the spreading of European thought through the dogmatic funnel of Marxism(–Leninism). The basis for serious investigation of philosophy in subsequent historical stages was precluded by the fact that Marxism itself was a product of *European* thought, and Marxism-Leninism its continuation by the Soviet peoples. In this respect, Soviet historians of philosophy were even in a worse position than their Western colleagues, since there was no place for the kind of cultural relativism that feeds interest in 'world philosophy'.

The situation was different with respect to the philosophical traditions of the Far East, which were taken quite seriously: anthologies of classical Indian and Chinese philosophy appeared in the *FN* series, classical histories of Indian philosophy existed in Russian translation, there were specialists in these fields, and courses and seminars were offered to future Soviet historians of philosophy.[127] There is ample ground in the general Marxist(–Leninist) account of human history for an interest in these philosophical traditions: if the struggle between idealism and materialism

'accompanies' the sequence of socio-economic formations, and is 'in the final analysis' determined by it, then there *must* be parallel developments of philosophy in feudal Europe and China.

Soviet studies in this field moved far from early attempts to reconstruct these philosophical developments exclusively in terms derived from West European philosophy: one finds sophisticated attempts to explain the differences between the philosophical traditions of the West, the Middle East, and the Far East out of the different (revelationist versus non-revelationist) religious traditions, linked with an attempt to replace the Hegelian reduction of Oriental philosophy to religion by a study of the different ways in which both philosophy and religion emerge from mythology.[128] These studies further regard such differences, rather than the connection with socio-economic formations (judged to be too general), as decisive:

> As regards the socio-historical conditions that form a type of philosophical thought, it is, when we are dealing with materials from the East, highly difficult to single out a specific one, to earmark the intermediate links between social groups, the productive process and the spiritual life of society, that would possess an exit to philosophy. (...) The currently accepted stage-approach to the clarification of the socio-historical factors of the historico-philosophical process of philosophy in the East, *though undoubtedly true* as a whole, at the same time proves to be too general, *offering little for the analysis of philosophy as such*, as a result of the extraordinary diversity and differentiation of the concrete local material [italics mine, EvdZ].[129]

Here, as elsewhere, Soviet historians of philosophy were at pains to *evade* the application of the abstract schemes of orthodoxy, not so much because they were not Marxists, but because they were historians, and although they complained about the relative underdevelopment of their field, it certainly had its place in Soviet academic philosophy – one of the advantages of the 'division of labor'.[130] It remains to be seen what will be left of the efforts of Soviet historians of philosophy, and whether or not the ex-Soviet republics will continue to afford themselves this type of specialists, who certainly have the material basis to contribute to comparative analyses of Western and Eastern philosophy.[131]

5.vi *History of the Philosophy of the Peoples of the USSR [IFNS]*

An important part of *IFN*, finally, was the history of the philosophical traditions of the nations that constituted the "one united multinational state formed on the basis of the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the free self-determination of the nations," i.e. the USSR.[132] This *Istorija Filosofii Narodov SSSR* included not only the history of Russian philosophy, but also of the Islamic philosophy in Central Asia (Ibn-Sina, al-Farabi) and of the philosophical traditions in Transcaucasia, the Baltic republics, etc. The main results of the work done in this field were united in a 5-volume *Istorija filosofii v SSSR*, appearing 1968-1985, edited by Vasilij Evgrafovič Evgrafov (1918-1982).

Cuddling Russian Philosophy to Death

The historiography of Russian philosophy was strongly politicized, focusing on social and political thought, and 'ideologized' through the notion of *revdemokratizm* [Ch.3.ii]. Moreover, there were a number of polemical works on Russian thought by Plekhanov and Lenin. In this field, any approach that might indeed be called historical-materialist was eclipsed by the requirements to present the history of philosophy as the prehistory of Marxism, and Marxism-Leninism as the outcome of *Russia*'s philosophical development rather than as European import.[133] Further, ever since the merging of Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism, an unholy alliance had come into existence between the hagiography of Russian 'progressive thought' and the veneration of Russian philosophy, an alliance that is perhaps less absurd than it may seem, given the actual bond of Marxist and non-Marxist strands in Russian Marxism: messianism, collectivism, anti-formalism, egalitarianism belong more to Russian traditions than to European Marxism.[134] This explains why the attempt to legitimatize Soviet Marxism-Leninism by means of the Russian philosophical tradition easily merged with the attempt to use Soviet Marxism-Leninism as a legitimate means to rehabilitate Russia's philosophical past. Both attempts performed primarily an ideological function, which is why the professionalist trend in this field of *IFN* consisted in a struggle to move away from *revdemokratizm* and 'philosophical nationalism'.

One of the veterans of this struggle was Kamenskij, another was Volodin.[135] As the latter pointed out, there were two tendencies in the historiography of Russian philosophy (called 'home thought' in Russian), which remind us of the 'slavophiles' and 'westernizers'.[136] One tendency is to reduce Russian philosophy to its European sources, the other is to treat Russian philosophy in splendid isolation from Western Europe.[137] Rejecting both tendencies, Volodin tried to establish more exactly who was influenced by whom, when, and how. He also pointed to a discussion as to whether the main influence on Russian philosophy in the 19th century came from Schelling, as Gulyga was said to maintain, or rather from Hegel and Feuerbach, as Volodin himself held.[138] This discussion is based on conflicting interpretations of the historical development of Russian philosophical thought: one stressing its secularization under the influence of Western philosophy, the other its intimate bond with religion in, e.g., Vladimir Sergeevič Solov'ëv (1853-1900). Solov'ëv and his successors were clearly intended by Gulyga, when he wrote that "ever since the 1870s... the philosophical center of the world has moved to Russia. And this lasted until the 1920s..."[139]

A tension between conflicting ideological functions and the requirements of professional historiography also marks the fate of the only (!) overall history of Russian philosophy in the Soviet period, *Russkaja filosofija IX-XIX vv.* [Russian Philosophy in the 9th-19th Centuries] by Anatolij Andrianovič Galaktionov and Pëtr Fëdorovič Nikandrov.[140] In 1961, they published a first version of their book under a slightly different title, covering the period from approx. 1050 until the 1890s – the choice of this latter date was argued from the fact that Leninism meant the end of any *national* philosophical tradition.[141] In 1970, a second enlarged version appeared, after which the authors were not heard of for 20 years.[142] In 1989, a new edition

appeared, partly enlarged to include the 9th and 10th centuries, partly reduced: the methodological introduction and the discussion of historiography of Russian philosophy had disappeared.[143] As Galaktionov stated in the preface, the methodological introduction, "every line of which was polemical, having a concrete addressee, has now lost its significance, either because the very subject of dispute has disappeared, or because there is no need to repeat what has once already been demonstrated."[144]

Why was this book controversial? Certainly not because it did not pay due respect to the importance of Marxism(–Leninism), or to the importance of Russian philosophy in its development.[145] The authors, rather than being not Marxist enough, were too Marxist: their methodological principles (materialist conception of history, 'relative independence' of philosophy, continuity of philosophical problems, and principle of historicity) belong to the standard formulations of *IFN* [Ch.3.iii-iv, Ch.4.i, and Ch.7.ii].[146] The problem is that this approach compels the authors to pay at least some attention to the actual historical development of Russian thought, including the idealist tradition in its multitude of forms, "each of which has influenced the spiritual life of the country and has linked itself in various ways to scientific and political trends."[147]

This was at odds with *revdemokratizm*, and one may safely presume that Galaktionov's 'concrete addressee' was the influential school of Ščipanov. Goerdt qualified the book as "*hochverdienstlich* [invaluable]", which is confirmed by the fact that it was difficult to purchase.[148] Nemeth praised the authors for their inclusion of early philosophical thought in Russia, thus correcting "the prevalent if not hegemonic Western attitude of treating Russian philosophy as somehow originating out of nothingness," but criticized them for paying insufficient attention to the development of philosophy through discussion, and for their tendential reduction of philosophical controversy to class struggle.[149] It might well be, however, that to present the views of Russian philosophers neutrally, without an attempt at philosophical appreciation, in combination with regular display of a 'materialist conception of history', was the only way to write an informative history of Russian philosophy at all.

A Patchwork of Philosophical Traditions

The investigation of the philosophical past of the *non-Russian* peoples was largely the affair of specialists in and from the Soviet republics and autonomous regions. Azerbaijani philosophy was studied in Baku, Georgian philosophy in Tbilisi, Central Asian philosophy in Taškent, Frunze [Biškek], and Dušanbe. The amount of work done in this area is as impressive as its quality is hard to judge: for example, a Soviet bibliography of 1980 listed 128 publications of works by Al-Farabi and reviews of those editions, and no less than 966 studies on Al-Farabi (monographs and articles) over the period 1895-1977 in Kazakh, Russian, and other Soviet languages.[150] These figures are impressive, but it is very difficult to get a more precise idea of the extent to which these many works might add something to Western, Arabic, or Iranian Al-Farabi scholarship.

The origin of this branch of *IFN* is to be sought in the famous discussion of 1947 about Aleksandrov's *Istorija zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii*, one of the evident shortcomings of which was that it did not discuss the philosophical traditions of all Soviet nations.[151] Apart from the inclusion of this branch in the activities of the centers of Soviet philosophy (departments at the IF, rubrics in journals, entries in encyclopedias), there was considerable activity in the various republics, editions and publications appearing both in Russian and in local languages.[152] The decision to study the development of philosophy of *all* Soviet peoples, in combination with the requirement to focus on progressive thought and on the struggle between idealism and materialism, resulted in titles like *From the History of Tatar Progressive Social Thought* and *The Dissemination of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy in Latvia*, but also allowed for serious study of the proper philosophical past.[153] The least one can say is that much of the work done in this area is worthy of attention for the simple reason that it is not done elsewhere.[154] Of particular interest in this connection is the history of philosophy in Transcaucasia –Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and a number of smaller nations–, a history that was investigated jointly in these republics.

The specific nature of 'local' traditions led to critical remarks with respect to the 'standard' Soviet conception of the history of philosophy. Discussing Medieval philosophy (in Western Europe and in Transcaucasia), the Georgian historian of philosophy Š.V. Khidašeli saw the specific nature of philosophy not in its being a form of world-view, or in its answer to the 'basic question', but in its being *thought*:

> Thus, in the thesis that the object of history of philosophy is the lawlike historical development of philosophy, the concept of philosophy is concreticized as a world-view, expressed in ideas, in concepts, in logical abstractions, as a reflected upon and logically systematized world-outlook.[155]

Criticizing the standard Soviet nihilist attitude towards scholasticism with the help of Marx (who regarded John Duns Scot and Roger Bacon as progressive thinkers), Khidašeli rehabilitated West European scholastic philosophy and the equally 'scholastic' philosophy of Georgia, Armenia, and the Muslim East. Invoking Engels' statement that in scholasticism the 'basic question' of philosophy took the form of the question 'Is the world created by God or does it exist from eternity?', Khidašeli remarked that, although it is easy to find Medieval philosophers who chose the second alternative and were condemned by church institutions for it, neither answer to this question denies the existence of God, so that the religious orientation of Medieval philosophers in itself need not be seen as a disqualification:

> Recognition of the eternity of the world... did not express the idea of atheism and the denial of God, but nonetheless represented a progressive solution, in the conditions of the Middle Ages, of the basic question of philosophy and significantly altered the notion of an omnipotent absolute. Creationism, asserting the absolute freedom and consciousness of the creator, gave way to necessarianism, which interpreted the coming-into-being of the world as the result of a necessity that did not depend upon the absolute and was not controlled by the absolute.[156]

Disregarding the fact that this means the destruction of the very concept of the absolute, it is clear that this interpretation gives room for serious investigation of pantheists, mystics, etc. as representing *philosophical* positions: one did not have to be 'against religion' in order to be a progressive thinker.

The book just referred to contains interesting pieces on the intensive contacts between Armenian and Georgian philosophers from the 5th century A.D. onwards, and on pantheism, regarded as "that beneficial soil on which materialism and atheism developed," with the assertion that "naturalistic pantheism has played a significant role in the history of development of materialism and atheism in the countries of the East, especially in Azerbaijan."[157] Likewise, al-Farabi is presented as a progressive thinker because of his rationalism and his doctrine of the eternal existence of the world (his 'necessarianism'), and is turned into a kind of Oriental Spinoza, while Western scholars are criticized for treating him as a Sufi mystic.[158] This, however, is food for specialists, as is the "theory of Nucubidze and Honigmann, shared by many Soviet and foreign scholars," that identifies Pseudo-Dionysus as Pëtr Iver (Petrus Ibericus), a Georgian neo-Platonist from the 5th century.[159]

It could be rewarding to compare the developments in late Medieval and Renaissance thought in Western Europe (14th-15th centuries) with those in Georgian Renaissance (11th-13th centuries), and to see whether Khidašeli is right to claim that in both cases there was a turn towards recognition of 'this our world', which both was a reaction to, and a factor in socio-economic developments taking place at that time:

> The essence of subsequent progress, 'of the entire –to quote Hegel– forward movement of culture', the glazing examples of which manifest itself in particular in Georgia in the 11th-12th centuries, 'leads to a restored belief in *this our* world'.[160]

In discussing Georgian Renaissance, Khidašeli took a position that shows remarkable resemblance to the 'integral approach' of Western philosophy [5.ii]:

> Philosophy in Georgia in the 11th-12th centuries was intimately connected with general changes of world-view, it was at the height of new moods, aspirations and ideas, with which, one might say, all forms of social consciousness were saturated. This connection had such deep roots that the key to an adequate understanding of Georgian philosophy of the period of developed feudalism is to be found not so much in historical continuity in the development of philosophical thought in Georgia, as in the peculiarities of new conceptions of the world, which found their expression in cultural life as a whole. These world-view changes were in need of theoretical foundation. And since philosophy is a systematized and logically founded world-view, it is precisely Georgian philosophy that took upon itself this task.[161]

This points to a concrete relationship between changes in the socio-economic and political situation and changes in philosophical culture. Comparable situations do not generate, but *favor* or *disfavor* comparable philosophical positions and theories. A situation does not determine philosophical *thought*, but it does determine philosophical *culture*, the conditions of philosophy and the '*Zeitgemäßheit*' of philosophical positions (or of works in history of philosophy, for that matter).

Chapter Six

Soviet Theory of the History of Philosophy

> ...involvement with Hegel is the best cure for the hereditary weaknesses of Soviet philosophy.
>
> Thomas J. Blakeley, 1975[1]

This chapter consists of a critical analysis of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, departing from two questions. The first concerns the contribution of the positions under discussion to an understanding of philosophy's historical nature. The second is the question why a theory of the history of philosophy was such an important part of Soviet philosophical culture, and why one position in particular was favored by the situation Soviet philosophical culture existed in.

With respect to the first question, the feature that makes these Soviet theories interesting is that they departed from a philosophical position –historical materialism– that robs philosophy of its proper history, and which, in its Leninist politicalization, treats philosophy as a main ideological battleground, while, at the same time, they existed in a situation that assigned prime significance to *diamat* and *istmat* as true *philosophical* theory, which explains why the tension within the heritage of the *klassiki* with respect to the history of philosophy tended to be resolved in favor of a *totalizing view* [Ch.1.iii and 2.i–iii].

Western conceptions of the history of philosophy tend to depart from a notion of philosophy as 'pure' theory individualized in a multitude of systems and positions, or they depart from some sort of reductionism. From both perspectives, the *history* of philosophy does not really present an interest: from the first, it is merely the outer appearance in time and space of philosophy, from the second, it is not the history of philosophy itself, but the history of ideas, class-struggle, psychology, libidinal economy, gender, or world-views. Soviet theory of the history of philosophy did not really escape this dilemma either, but it is theoretically interesting because it moved *from* a reduction to a fuller appreciation of the concrete nature of philosophy.

The answer to the second question is twofold. On the one hand, every philosophical culture will develop some conception of philosophy's history. On the other hand, such a theoretical conception performs an ideological function in motivating people's actions (by telling them, for example, that they are carrying on a great tradition) or in legitimatizing a status quo (for example, the place occupied by philosophy in society). Soviet theory of the history of philosophy performed this ideological function in both respects.

The function of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy resided, first of all, in the accommodation of the threefold classical heritage [Ch.1.iii]. In the second place, it had to reduce the tension between the reductionism implied by *istmat*, and the actual importance ascribed to philosophy as a 'productive force' in shaping history

and as an ideological battleground, a tension that found a first expression in the 'double statement' [Ch.3]. In the third place, it had to account for the place of *IFN* as part of the Soviet system of philosophical disciplines [Ch.4]. A main task of this theory, finally, was to mediate between Soviet philosophical culture as a whole and *IFN* as it actually existed [Ch.5].

The present chapter is divided into three sections: the first section sketches the evolution of this sub-discipline of *IFN* [6.i]; the second section offers a systematic exposition of the mainstream position in Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, that of Ojzerman and Bogomolov [6.ii]; the third section, finally, shows how this position entailed a return from Marx to Hegel, and answers the obvious question why that turn took place [6.iii]. In the following chapter, some 'alternative' conceptions of philosophy's history will be discussed that came to the fore during the period of *perestrojka* and *glasnost'*, partly compensating for the flaws in the sophisticated position, partly drawing its implicit consequences [Ch.7.v].

6.i *Development of Soviet Theory of the History of Philosophy*

The 'official position' implied in the discussion of 1947 could not provide the basis of an historiography of philosophy with a sufficient level of professionalism and adequacy, as is testified by the decline of *IFN* in the years following that discussion [Ch.3.iii]. Given the *need* to improve the quality of Soviet philosophy, and the *urge* among philosophers to engage in philosophical discussion, part of the activity of Soviet historians of philosophy had to consist in 'loosening up' this initial position, either by elaborating alternative positions, or by relativizing elements of the classical heritage or the pertinence of the connection between them.

The 'classical' dichotomization of the history of philosophy into two camps cannot serve as a basis for writing an account of the history of philosophy as a whole. The opposition idealism-materialism is not void of meaning: what is wrong is its inflation into a *sole* opposition that governs the *entire* history of philosophy, as is shown by the failure of the subsequent attempts at a universal *Istorija filosofii* show [Ch.3.ii-iv]. The same applies to a division of all philosophy into progressive and reactionary positions: again, it is not absurd to hold that philosophical controversies are related to social and political struggle, nor is it absurd to hold that this relation is a 'determinant' in the historical development of philosophy: what is wrong is to claim that philosophy's history is ultimately explicable in these terms.

From the early 1960s onwards, attempts were made to develop a more workable conception of the history of philosophy. This rather specialized field of philosophical work was quite fruitful: a bibliography in 1983 of 'Soviet literature on theory and methodology of investigations in history of philosophy' lists 311 titles, and the number of publications grew considerably over the following decade.[2] In this development, three positions can be discerned: an *official*, a *sophisticated*, and a *professionalist* position. The first, official position, can be associated with, for example, Iovčuk, the second, most of all, with Ojzerman and Bogomolov, the third with historians of philosophy like Asmus, Kamenskij, and Sokolov.

Since history of philosophy is both a philosophical and an historical discipline, the sophisticated position can be seen as an attempt to establish *IFN* as a *philosophical* discipline, while the professionalist position stresses its *historical* nature. The 'line of Ojzerman' tried to *sophisticate* the 'official position' into a theory that, at the same time, would i) be philosophically plausible or at least arguable, ii) do justice to the relative independence of *IFN*, and iii) be compatible with the 'ideology of Soviet philosophy'. The 'line of Kamenskij' was an attempt to found *IFN* as a discipline in its own right, with its own status and proper history, rather than as a branch of an allegedly systematic Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Both tried to remedy or counteract the 'ideologization' of *IFN* as part of Soviet philosophy. The first attempt can be associated with the name of Hegel, and meant a *return* to the philosophical roots of Marxism. The second must rather be seen as the pursuit of 'doing' history of philosophy without embracing a particular philosophical position, and in this sense it is opposed to the hegelianizing trend. It is exemplified by, e.g., Sokolov, who in 1969 professed his opposition to both the 'hegelianizing' tendency and the 'official position':

> The analysis of the mutual relation of philosophy and ideology is one of the most complicated tasks for the historian of philosophy. It has to be recognized that philosophical doctrines, in the period of their genesis, as well as in their later functioning in the epoch of Marxism, are on the whole rarely connected with one specific class.[3]

The development of these positions can be traced from the 1960s onwards. A complication, however, is the fact that they could not develop freely, according to their inner logic, within the framework of Soviet philosophy: the real contrast became manifest only during the period of dissolution of *IFN* [Ch.7].

Early history of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy was briefly sketched by Malinin:

> In the 1920-30s, history of philosophy was usually treated as the history of the most essential questions of knowledge in the struggle of materialism with idealism. In 1946, G.F. Aleksandrov... proposed... that 'the history of philosophy is the progressive development of man's knowledge about the world surrounding him'. This definition was, at the time of the philosophical discussion of 1947, criticized by A.A. Ždanov, and rejected. Ždanov proposed a definition of scientific history of philosophy as 'the history of the origin, rise, and development of the scientific materialist world-view and its laws. In so far as materialism rose and developed in a struggle with idealist tendencies, the history of philosophy is the history of the struggle of materialism with idealism, too'. (...) At the end of the 1950s – beginning of the 1960s other interpretations of the subject matter of philosophy acquired right of existence. According to one of them [Iovčuk, EvdZ], 'the subject matter of Marxist history of philosophy as a science is the rise and development, in the various stages of the history of society, of philosophical doctrines that consider the general foundations (laws) of being and thought and offer one or the other solution to the main question of philosophy...'[4]

Systematic interest in theoretical questions of *IFN* thus began in the early 1960s. At that time, there was already an established tradition of Soviet historiography of philosophy [Ch.3ii-iii].[5] And there was an 'official position', aptly summarized by Ballestrem in 1963:

> Soviet philosophy provides an explicit theory explaining what 'history of philosophy as a science' should be. It should... follow the general Marxist-Leninist conception of history and of philosophy: history mainly consists in the evolution of society through the struggle between progressive and reactionary classes, as expressed in historical materialism... To the basic question of philosophy only two answers are possible – materialism and idealism. The method of philosophy can be either dialectical or metaphysical. Consequently, the history of philosophy is the battle between progressive and reactionary, materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics in the different periods of history.[6]

This conception was not satisfactory, and the beginning of theoretical discussion coincides with the establishment of *IFN* as a 'relatively independent' discipline [Ch.3.iv]. In 1960, the department of *IMLF* at the philosophical faculty of MGU organized a special course on methodological questions of *IFN*, led by Iovčuk (chairman of the department) and Lev Vladimirovič Skvorcov (b.1931):

> The task of the special course is to prepare students for work as scientific researchers in the field of the history of philosophy and the critique of bourgeois conceptions of the history of philosophy. The themes of the special course cover the following problems: the subject matter, method, and significance of the history of philosophy as a science, the characteristic features of the contemporary bourgeois philosophies of neo-positivism, existentialism, neo-Thomism, neo-realism, critical realism, and phenomenology with respect to the historical heritage of philosophy, the critique of contemporary revisionism in the history of philosophy (G. Lukács, H. Lefèvre, E. Bloch *et al.*), the problem of Western and Eastern thought in contemporary history of philosophy.[7]

This in fact is a fairly complete list of the problems that Soviet theory of the history of philosophy was to deal with in years to come.

The 1960s showed a growing awareness and explication of a set of theoretical questions, in which Lenin's *Filosofskie tetrady*, with their positive appreciation of Hegel's *Lectures...*, played an important role.[8] The following themes were discussed at the symposium on the history of philosophy in 1967 [Ch.4.iv], and brought together in *Leninizm i sovremennye problemy istoriko-filosofskoj nauki* [Leninism and Contemporary Problems of Scientific History of Philosophy] as the main result of this first phase:[9]

- studies of the heritage of the *klassiki marksizma-leninizma* and Plekhanov;
- an interest in the *history* of the history of philosophy as a discipline;
- an exploration into problems of *methodology*;
- an initiative towards a 'meta-theory' of *IFN* as a discipline;
- exercises in critical *assimilation* of non-Soviet history of philosophy;
- attempts at a *philosophical* conception of philosophy's history.

The 1970s were marked by attempts at a broader synthesis, as well as by a first differentiation of positions.[10] In the 1980s, finally, five positions can be distinguished, the first three of which coincide with the 'token positions' described above:

i. a dogmatic *official* position (the 'line of Iovcuk'), in which there was little or no development: it merely restated the familiar tenets about the 'basic question', the principle of *partijnost'*, the 'revolution in philosophy' etc.[11]
ii. a *sophisticated* position (the 'line of Ojzerman'), expressed in a trilogy by Ojzerman and in *Osnovy teorii istoriko–filosofskogo processa* [Foundations of a Theory of the Historical Process of Philosophy] (1983), jointly written by Ojzerman and Bogomolov;[12]
iii. a *professionalist* position, closely linked to historiographical practice ('line of Kamenskij');[13]
iv. a number of *alternative* positions on *partial* issues;[14]
v. one isolated *alternative* position, viz the position of Losev.[15]

Of these positions, the first was intellectually sterile, and the fifth, though influential, not directly related to the task of developing a defensible Soviet position. The following exposition of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy therefore revolves around positions ii, iii, and iv.

6.ii *Theory of the History of Philosophy: A Systematic Exposition*

In the 1980s, the sophisticated position elaborated by Ojzerman and Bogomolov acquired the status of 'received view'.[16] Their conception is a synthesis of a 'sophisticated Marxist-Leninist' conception of the history of philosophy as a process, and an historical and methodological foundation of *IFN* as a discipline:

> The organic bond of positive philosophical (most of all methodological) elaborations of A.S. Bogomolov with investigations into the history of philosophy is excellently demonstrated by the book, written jointly by him and *akademik* T.I. Ojzerman... The appearance of this book can be regarded as an event of first-rank importance in our scientific history of philosophy, because such a thorough and profound investigation of this theme, of utmost importance for the historian of philosophy, had not been done so far.[17]

Much earlier, in 1969, Ojzerman made the illuminating remark that "the subject matter of historico-philosophical investigations is *philosophy*, the problems of *IFN* are *philosophical* problems."[18] Malinin commented on this "probably most concise definition of the subject matter of philosophy in... Soviet philosophical literature" with the remark that "Ojzerman, probably, purposely resorted to a tautological form of expression of a generally true idea."[19] Ojzerman himself held these theses to be "fully evident, but... nevertheless in need of demonstration..."[20] Malinin and Ojzerman departed from the assumption that philosophy has, to a certain extent

at least, a *proper* history, and from the assumption that history of philosophy as a distinct discipline was, if not a fact, a *desideratum* of Soviet philosophy.

Obviously, any history of philosophy presupposes a conception of philosophy's history (as a process), and it is equally obvious that such a history only makes sense if philosophy's history is to some extent independent, i.e. if philosophy has a *specific nature*. The first question, therefore, of any theory of the history of philosophy has to be 'What is philosophy?'[21] This question, combined with the historical aspect, leads to the following set of questions, which I shall use in the analysis of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy:

a. What is philosophy?
b. Why is philosophy historical?
c. What is the history of philosophy about?
   i. What is history of philosophy the history of?
   ii. Where does this history begin, and why?
   iii. Where does it end or lead to?
d. How does philosophy develop historically?

The answer to the fourth question yields a theoretical conception of philosophy as an historical *phenomenon* [philosophy of the history of philosophy], from which a theory of history of philosophy as a *discipline* can be deduced:

e. How is history of philosophy to be done, and how has it been done so far (methodology, didactics, history of the history of philosophy)?

Finally, the theoretical conception forms the basis of a critique of other historiographical practices and theoretical conceptions:

f. Why are other theoretical conceptions mistaken?

a. *What is Philosophy?*

The 'meta-philosophical' question 'What is philosophy?' is an inevitable question of philosophy as such, which occupies, implicitly or explicitly, a central place in any philosophical culture. It did so in Soviet philosophical culture, too, but official Soviet philosophy gave a dogmatic answer [Ch.2.iii]. Consequently, it could only be addressed indirectly, e.g. in the performative way of Mamardašvili [Ch.2.vii], or in an historical perspective. It is not surprising, therefore, that Ojzerman's first main publication in this field, *Problemy istoriko-filosofskoj nauki* [Problems of the Scientific History of Philosophy] (1969, reissued 1982) was welcomed as "the first attempt at a systematic exposition of a Marxist... 'meta-philosophy'."[22] An historical conception of philosophy lies at the heart of both 'meta-philosophy' and *IFN*, as Ojzerman made clear:

...a limitation of the concept of philosophy to its contemporary set of problems cannot be the basis of a definition of philosophy, because what interests us as philosophers (and as historians of philosophy) is not only what philosophy became as the result of its development, but also what it was during all of its history.[23]

It would be inappropriate to project the main concern of *diamat*, through which it determines itself as a position, onto philosophy's history, and so the basic question of philosophy differs from the basic question of *IFN*:

The fundamental question of philosophy is, in the final analysis, the question of the relation of the spiritual to the material. Since by far not all philosophers accept this thesis... the main question of *IFN* is the question 'what is philosophy?'. (...) From this, it seems to us, indisputably follows this conclusion: the most important problem of *IFN* is the problem of philosophy.[24]

Ojzerman discusses ten different conceptions of philosophy, recognizing that it is impossible to synthesize them all:[25]

1. 'philosophy is the doctrine of being as such' (Aristotle, (Neo-)Thomism, Hobbes)
2. 'philosophy is a doctrine *not* of being, but of knowledge' (Buddhism, Hume, Kant, positivism)
3. 'philosophy is a doctrine of everything that exists' (Hegel, Feuerbach)
4. 'philosophy is a doctrine of everything that does *not* exist, but is opposed to being as an ideal or a value' (Windelband, Husserl)
5. 'philosophy is a theory, i.e. a system of representations, concepts, knowledge, or method, related to (some) reality as its subject matter' (almost all philosophers)
6. 'philosophy is *not* a theory, but a practice, that has a function, not a subject matter' (Wittgenstein, neo-positivism)
7. 'philosophy is a science, or at least can and should be one' (Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl)
8. 'philosophy is *not*, nor can or should it be a science' (skepticism, Popper, Ayer, irrationalism (Berdjaev, Marcel))
9. 'philosophy is a world-view' (Dilthey, Jaspers)
10. 'philosophy is *not* a world-view, either because it is a science, or because science should found world-view' (Vienna Circle)

Behind this "limited diversity of definitions" Ojzerman perceives an "unlimited diversity of philosophical doctrines," and this "crying pluralism of definitions of the concept of philosophy" must be seen as an effect of the "increasing divergence of philosophical conceptions," as an "historically limited form... of development of philosophy," and it is only if we recognize "the possibility and necessity of overcoming it," that we can "arrive at such a definition of the concept of philosophy... that expresses the perspectives of the development of scientific philosophy."[26] Thanks to these perspectives, the problem is resolved:

Leaving the motley diversity of incompatible philosophical doctrines behind, Marxist-Leninist philosophy opposes to the pluralism of speculative conceptions the all-sided development of philosophical positions, confirmed by life, practice, and science.[27]

Ojzerman thus manœuvred himself into a position that obliged him to develop a *broadconception* of philosophy as it develops historically, while at the same time accounting for the presupposed superiority of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. His solution was, to say the least, cunning: his definition consists of several layers, each of which brings him closer to his goal. Each philosophy is, first of all, a form of world-view, playing an integrating, orientating role, but in contrast with a religious world-view it is a "*general theoretical* world-view."[28] It is marked by "bipolarity [*bipolar'nost'*]", viz a position between "on the one hand, the world... and, on the other, man himself, who does not exist outside the world, and perceives it as an outer world only because he distinguishes it from himself as a reality that exists independently of himself, realizing at the same time that he himself is part of that world."[29] The relation man-world is a restatement of the 'basic question', both of the "psycho-physical problem [the first aspect of the basic question, EvdZ]" and of the question whether "man, mankind can know the world [the second aspect]."[30]

When he adds the emphasis on science, historical experience, and social practice, and emphasizes their unity, Ojzerman is already speaking of *Marxist* philosophy, as is perceptible in a shift to characteristic *langue de bois*:

The scientific-philosophical world-view develops through a theoretical synthesis of scientific data and the historical experience from determinate social, partisan [*partijnye*] positions, which enter the content of the philosophical world-view, form its social pathos, its moral ideal. This world-view is a *critical* totalization of scientific data, which allows us to draw conclusions that are not immediately contained in any particular science.[31]

In this manner, Ojzerman arrives at a conception of philosophy, broad enough to include everything philosophical within the scope of *IFN*, while asserting the qualitative difference between philosophy *before* and philosophy *after* Marx:

The scientific-philosophical world-view of Marxism is a radical dialectical negation of philosophy in the old meaning of the term, i.e. of that philosophy which could not find the ways of rational comprehension of the facts of science and practice, in order to serve... the practical transformation of the world.[32]

Regardless of the display of orthodoxy, Ojzerman's definition clears the way for a study of philosophy's past (at least until Marxism) that regards it as both a practice-oriented and theoretical field of human activity, yielding knowledge, and not as a mere battlefield of ideological struggle. Thus, Ojzerman's definition founds *IFN* as a discipline that is about *philosophy*, and it could become the mainstream position because it did so while staying in tune with the ideology of Soviet philosophy.

But Ojzerman's position was not unchallenged. In a survey of 1986, it is mentioned along with several alternative positions:[33]

i. philosophy is a *general* (as opposed to specific) *theoretically founded* (in contrast with non-theoretical) *world-view* (Ojzerman, Bogomolov);
ii. philosophy is a *systematic rational world-view*, having an objective (the historical process of philosophy) and a subjective (its description and investigation) side (Arsenij Nikolaevič Čanyšev (b.1926));
iii. philosophy is the science of the universal [*vseobščee*], of universals, and of general laws (Kamenskij);
iv. philosophy is the science about "the dialectics of the subjective and the objective, consciousness and being," or the relation man-world (Mark Vasil'evič Želnov (b.1927));
v. philosophy, or in any case its "logical core [*steržen'*]" is "the history of knowledge, summarizing itself in the development of categories" (M.G. Makarov);
vi. the position of Losev.

With the exception of Losev's position, the others were not supposed to be incompatible with the position of Ojzerman and Bogomolov: they were either not fully developed (positions ii. and iii.), or only partial, highlighting aspects or elements of the mainstream position (positions iv. and v.).[34] As Želnov cautiously stated:

> The conceptions of Soviet philosophers of 'the subject matter of philosophy' can be conditionally subdivided into three or four groups. We say *conditionally* because the representatives themselves of different views as a rule do not want to be 'subdivided' at all, and will undoubtedly protest against such attempts... (...) Therefore we make the proviso that the proposed subdivision is conditional, and sets as its task only to bring out *theoretically*... the *hidden tendencies* manifesting themselves in recent Soviet philosophical literature.[35]

Želnov explicitly presented his own conception as an elaboration of the position of Ojzerman, who had singled out three fundamental themes of philosophy: "that of the object-substance, that of the subject, and the relation subject-object," and then develops his own conception of the subject matter of philosophy, according to which philosophy is basically about the subject-object relation: "the 'subject matter of philosophy' is the *objectively existing relation of the subjective and the objective*."[36]

What is noticeable in these alternative positions is that they all *intensified* Ojzerman's stress on the epistemic function of philosophy, at the expense of the ideological function included in the definition of philosophy as a form of world-view. Further, they returned, with Ojzerman, to a rather traditional conception of philosophy: the main metaphysical tradition in European philosophy, including its 'epistemological turn' in Descartes and Kant.[37] In presenting the "problem of subject-object reality" as "the most important theme of philosophy", Ojzerman came as close to German idealism as was possible for a Soviet philosopher.[38]

In the survey just referred to, Kamenskij's distinction of the history of philosophy as a) a process (the objective history of Čanyšev), b) an historiography, and c) a science, also is mentioned.[39] Here we touch upon the *professionalist* position: if it is possible to distinguish between an historiography of philosophy and a science of the historical process of philosophy, it is clear that only the second has to be part of the framework of the 'scientific' philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. Historiography can become a philosophically neutral affair, or at least one that is not required to display its Marxist-Leninist nature. This position is implicit in, e.g., Sokolov, who stressed the autonomy of "spiritual culture," and regarded science, theology, and philosophy as "the three fundamental cultural forces," together determining the history of 15th, 16th, and 17th century philosophy.[40]

b. *Why Does Philosophy Have a History?*

The existence of historiography of philosophy as a distinct field of philosophical activity presupposes that philosophy's history is the proper history of philosophy. From the perspectives of economistic reductionism and of ideological dichotomization, this is problematic. Ojzerman's solution was rather more subtle, laying stress not on social or political factors, but on factors proper to philosophy as a *cognitive* activity:

> It goes without saying that recognition of the historically transient nature of the pluralism of philosophical doctrines has nothing in common with a denial of its necessity and of its progressive significance for certain historical periods. In other words, this increasing divergence of philosophical opinions [*vozzrenija*, the Russian equivalent of German *Meinung*, EvdZ], the polarization of philosophy into irreconcilably opposed systems, has played its positive part: it was necessary, in as far as mankind *had to* develop and *exhaust all possible* philosophical hypotheses, in order to accept among them the one that is to the highest degree confirmed by experience, practice, and scientific data [italics mine, EvdZ].[41]

This answer opens up the *whole* field of pre-Marxist philosophy to historical investigation, because it is the 'pre-history' of philosophical truth.

c. *What is the History of Philosophy About?*

At the heart of Soviet attempts to interpret philosophy's past lay the notorious 'basic question', and indeed the official position defined the subject matter of *IFN* as "the rise and development of doctrines concerning the general foundations of being and knowledge, offering one or another solution of the basic question of philosophy."[42] The resulting vertical dichotomization of the history of philosophy into two camps clearly does not provide an adequate set of instruments for historians of philosophy. As early as 1967, Ojzerman objected to an *unhistorical approach* of the 'basic question':

...it is often overlooked that the formulation of the basis question as the question about the relation of 'thought' to 'being' was given by Engels in connection with an analysis of classical German philosophy of the end of the 18th – beginning of the 19th century. (...) T.I. Ojzerman raised an objection against L.Ja. Ljakhoveckij, who insisted that the antagonism between materialism and idealism runs through the whole history of philosophy from its very origin. In the initial period of development of philosophy, T.I. Ojzerman said, there was not such a clearly expressed opposition of materialism and idealism.[43]

Ojzerman's *Glavnye filosofskie napravlenija* [The Main Trends in Philosophy] (1971, reissued 1984) was an attempt to make the 'basic question' a more viable basis for *IFN*. He made three moves towards this end: i) a shift from the 'ontological' to the 'epistemological' aspect; ii) a preference for the term *trend* or tendency [*napravlenie*] to the Engelsian *camp* [*lager'*]; iii) a reduction in significance of the basic question by regarding it as an historical product.

i) In Engels' formulation, the 'basic question' had two aspects: the 'ontological' question as to what comes first, spirit or nature, and the 'epistemological' question whether the human mind is capable of grasping "the real world."[44] According to Ojzerman, the first question "no longer constitutes a problem," but the second is only resolved in principle.[45] The *ontological* claim of dialectical materialism is tantamount to the claim that matter exists objectively, and "*excludes* from the philosophical definition of matter all its distinguishing marks except one, which *epistemologically* [italics mine, EvdZ] makes up the *differentia specifica* of matter."[46] The ontological question being resolved, it is the epistemological question that remains.

The subject matter of philosophy, according to Ojzerman, is the subject-object relation, and at this point there are a lot of unresolved problems. The correct answer to the 'basic question' provides a necessary condition for their resolution, but not a sufficient one, and in this respect idealist and materialist philosophy can both be valuable sources: the development of dialectics, for example, has been the affair mostly of 'idealists', not of 'materialists'.

ii) Which, then, are these 'main trends' of philosophy? According to Ojzerman, *trends* should not be identified with doctrines [*učenija*] or 'systems', schools, currents [*tečenija*] or 'isms':

A trend is an aggregate [*sovokupnost'*] of philosophical currents (and, consequently, of doctrines), which, notwithstanding all their divergences from each other, defend some common tenets of fundamental importance.[47]

There are many trends in the history of philosophy, but only two *main* trends:

It does not require great acumen to detect, within empiricism, sensualism, anthropologism, naturalism, rationalism, and other philosophical trends the opposition of materialism and idealism... This testifies to the fact that all the trends just indicated are specific forms of materialism and idealism. Consequently, materialism and idealism are indeed the main philosophical trends. (...) It must,

however, be borne in mind that by far not all these enumerated trends break down into the opposites of materialism and idealism.[48]

The main trends thus appear as a first classification of philosophical positions, since *every* philosophical position has to contain an answer to the 'basic question', if it really is to be basic. But to which question are these trends an answer? Engels had it that the basic question, with respect to the ontological aspect, divided philosophers into "two big camps," but with regard to the epistemological aspect, the "vast majority of philosophers" gives an affirmative answer.[49] Now if the 'basic question' is mainly an epistemological question, 'the vast majority of philosophers' belongs to the *realist* camp. Therefore, either the opposition materialism–idealism has to do with the first aspect of the basic question, in which case most 'idealists', being epistemological realists, would be 'materialists' with respect to the second aspect, or it has to do with the second aspect, in which case many epistemological 'materialists' would be ontological idealists. A third possibility is that the opposition does refer to the first aspect, but that this aspect has only limited importance, which means a shift from Engels' *camps* in philosophy to *two trends* in epistemological questions, each of them with its 'epistemological roots'. This, in fact, is Ojzerman's solution: "The elucidation of the real significance of the basic philosophical question requires, in our opinion, an investigation into its *epistemological inevitability*."[50]

iii) Finally, the 'basic question' does not as such constitute the subject matter of philosophy:

> The expression 'basic question of philosophy' indicates that there are other philosophical questions, too, which also constitute the subject matter of philosophy. (...) The problem of particular and general, essence and appearance, change and development, all these problems, it goes without saying, do not logically follow from the content of the basic philosophical question..... In which relation does the basic philosophical question stand to these problems? This is subject to a special investigation, which, it may be hoped, will show, that the concept of a basic philosophical question has a specific meaning that does not in any measure lessen the significance of other philosophical questions.[51]

The 'basic question' has already been resolved, hence to treat it as a problem for contemporary philosophy would be "to conceal the qualitative difference between the philosophy of Marxism and previous philosophy."[52] Therefore, Ojzerman concludes, the 'basic question' is a problem with respect to the *history* of philosophy:

> It has been said above that the basic philosophical question is resolved by the whole development of materialism and that there is no basis for a reconsideration of that solution. And yet in one, highly essential respect this question continues to be a problem: a problem of the history of philosophy.[53]

At this point further amendments find their place. Rejecting the thesis of Aleksej Vasil'evič Potëmkin (b.1924) that "the question about the relation of thought to

being is the great basic question of all philosophy,... the subject matter of philosophy from the moment of its origin," Ojzerman has it that "its [of the basic question, EvdZ] origin does not coincide with the origin of philosophy, its history spans thousands of years, [and] characterizes in a specific manner the development of philosophical knowledge."[54]

In Greek philosophy, "there was no conscious raising of the basic philosophical question," and with respect to later, Medieval philosophy, Ojzerman argues that "it would be... naive to suppose that a correct *theoretical* understanding of the basic question of philosophy took shape (and was generally accepted) in philosophy since that time."[55] Although "in the course of many centuries, philosophers have departed,... without being aware of it, from one or another answer to the basic philosophical question," it was "only the creation of a dialectical-materialist conception of the historical process of philosophy (that) made it possible to fully reveal the real sense and significance of the basic question of philosophy."[56]

The history of the 'basic question' is a *dialectical* process. The issue 'objectively' existed long before the rise of philosophy, but could only be stated "when the development of the capacity of abstraction, introspection, analysis had reached a sufficiently high level."[57] In Hegelian terms: the basic question was contained [*an sich*] in the very origin of philosophical thought, but it took a long historical development until this question appeared as a basic question [*für sich*], viz as "the realization [*osoznanie*] of the radical opposition of materialism and idealism, the conscious setting off against each other of the main philosophical trends, which is characteristic of classical bourgeois philosophy," before it could, with the development of dialectical materialism, be fully understood [*an und für sich*] and thereby 'sublated' [*aufgehoben*], henceforth existing as the core of the historical self-conception of dialectical materialism.[58]

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The remoteness of this conception from the idea of a permanent 'struggle' between an idealist and a materialist 'camp' becomes clear from Ojzerman's treatment of the classical opposition of the 'line of Democritus' and the 'line of Plato'. Both lines are answers to the second aspect of the basic question: Democritus' doctrine of the *eidolon* formed "a first, naive variant of the theory of reflection," whereas Plato's doctrine of *eidos* was its first rejection, claiming that our ideas do not reflect things as they exist, but rather that things reflect transcendental ideas.[59] The opposition thus is a conflict between *epistemological* conceptions:

> The opposition between Plato and Democritus brings out particularly sharply the main epistemological alternative. What forms the *source* of our knowledge? Nature or the supernatural? Matter or spirit?[60]

It turns out that the real 'enemy' of dialectical materialism is not idealism, but skepticism [Ch.5.ii]. If the 'basic question' is narrowed down to the question of whether the human mind is capable of grasping the 'real world', it is clear that both materialists like Democritus or Hobbes and idealists like Plato or Leibniz gave an affirmative answer. Ojzerman agrees with Kant that both answers are dogmatic and

arise from a refusal to submit one's very principles to epistemological scrutiny, and with Kant and Hegel he holds that skepticism has to be overcome and that it was the necessary counterpart of dogmatic metaphysics.[61] It is dialectical materialism that is finally capable of doing so, making 'metaphysical' dogmatism and skepticism things of the past, and thus finishing the task Kant had set for himself.[62]

In this manner, the 'basic question', itself an historical product, loses much of its status. Although it does retain its ideological importance, providing the point of self-determination of dialectical materialism, it can no longer be seen as making up the subject matter of philosophy, nor as the line dividing past philosophers into two antagonistic camps: for contemporary philosophy it is a problem of the *past*, and with respect to philosophy's past it is employed with enough subtlety and precaution to preclude any 'mechanical' application.

c.ii. *The Genesis of Philosophical Thought*

The question about the origin of philosophical thought is immediately linked with the question of the reduction of philosophy to Western philosophy. Clearly different positions were defended by Čanyšev and Bogomolov. According to Čanyšev, there are three ways to approach the problem of the *genezis filosofii*:

> Until now... it has been explained that philosophy arises out of mythology through transitional forms and thanks to the rudiments of science and thought, by means of a spreading of the latter to the sphere of world-view, in China, India, and Greece... (...) This sense of the problem of the genesis of philosophy can be called *absolute*: philosophy emerged without the presence of either an inner or an outer philosophical tradition.
>
> But one can also speak of the genesis of philosophy in a second sense... (...) It takes place on the basis of an inner philosophical tradition. ...the gap between philosophical epochs, and within them between original philosophical systems is so great, that to present the objective history of philosophy as a purely logical process is impossible. The objective history of philosophy is a process of periodic genesis of philosophy out of para-philosophy on the basis of an inner philosophical tradition.
>
> ...in a third sense... (this) genesis is observed in presently developing nations, for example in some African nations. In these nations a developed pre-philosophical world-view has existed from time immemorial. (...) For philosophy to arise among these developing nations, mere outside influence is not sufficient. These peoples must... go through their own genesis of philosophy out of their own pre-philosophical world-view under the influence of an already developed science and of a philosophical tradition from elsewhere.[63]

In this third sense, Čanyšev argues, the problem of the genesis of philosophy has actual importance not only in Africa: "the same holds for the majority of believers in developed countries."[64] In analyzing this problem, Čanyšev develops a set of concepts that together can be called 'peri-philosophy': *predfilosofija*, *protofilosofija*, and *parafilosofija*, the first denoting "the totality of spiritual pre-conditions of philosophy, created by a cultural development that preceded its genesis," the second "the immediate result of that genesis,"[65] and the third what becomes of "pre-philosophy" after the emergence of philosophy:

...one can only speak of para-philosophy when philosophy has taken shape. Then philosophy is the core, and para-philosophy the shell. But if the core is not yet there, then para-philosophy is pre-philosophy – just the shell, within which the core is yet to arise.[66]

In this "gnoseogenetic-mythogenetic" conception of the genesis of philosophy, proto-philosophy is defined as a "systematic rational world-view," i.e. "the highest kind of world-view."[67] This conception of philosophy's genesis accounts for the emergence and reemergence of philosophy in different places and times.

It also implies a critique of the eurocentrism of Hegel, who excluded Oriental philosophy from his history of philosophy because it was not distinct from religion, but who, as Čanyšev notes, also was one of the first to pay serious attention especially to Indian philosophy.[68] It may well be questioned whether his decision to limit the history of philosophy to Europe was consistent with his conception of the emergence of philosophy under specific historical circumstances, viz the existence or emergence of a 'free constitution': even if the development of philosophy actually took place only once, are there any a priori reasons why it *necessarily* took place only once? The only *pertinent* reason, in Hegel's case, is that both the single historical development of philosophy and world history together make up the process through which the 'World Spirit' arrives at an adequate self-understanding.[69]

A materialist interpretation of the Hegelian conception would not lead to such a conclusion: why should the highest form of (social) consciousness not be plural? As Bogomolov rightly stresses, the striking thing is not so much that philosophy came into existence in several regions at the same time, but that it did so at a similar stage of socio-economic and cultural development.[70] Philosophy can, apparently, originate wherever its necessary pre-conditions are fulfilled, and it can *reemerge*, on the basis of an inner tradition, as indicated by Čanyšev, wherever it has disappeared, e.g. when, in Hegel's words, "philosophy had to repair itself out of Christianity" in the Middle Ages.[71]

The mainstream position of Ojzerman and Bogomolov was eurocentric, and followed Hegel's footsteps. Čanyšev stressed the existence of 'pre-philosophy' in the Middle East (Egypt, Babylon, Persia), and the simultaneous genesis of philosophy out of 'pre-philosophy' in Greece, India, and China.[72] But although Bogomolov agrees on this triple emergence, even adding to this list "pre-colonial Mexico, where the process was interrupted (like the whole development of Mexican culture) by the Spanish conquest," he insists that philosophy as such began with Thales:

Without in any way opposing Greek and Oriental cultures, we nevertheless have the right –not on the level of empirical (historical) study, but on the level of *theoretical* (logical) examination, *which naturally takes priority in these matters*– to take Greece as the 'purest' form of the social development within which philosophy was born, and the origin of Greek philosophy as the most general model of that process [italics mine, EvdZ].[73]

He warns that exclusive stress on ancient Greece "calls for certain corrections or amendments when we approach Oriental philosophy," but only briefly discusses

Indian and Chinese philosophy, attributing the non-emergence of 'genuine' philosophy in the Far East to the "Asiatic mode of production."[74] His reluctance to regard 'free thought' as a major condition of philosophy's origin, forces him to stress the development of the colonies as a distinctive feature of the situation in Greece (as opposed to that in China or India).[75] While it is indeed striking that virtually all pre-socratic philosophers came from the 'colonies', it seems less evident that this is due to some change in the 'mode of production', rather than to a combination of economic (foreign trade), cultural (contact with other civilizations), and political (the free *polités*) factors, and even then, these do not make up a sufficient condition: some individual still has to start *doing* philosophy.

Comparing the explanations of the historical emergence of philosophy of Bogomolov and Čanyšev with the solution proposed by Hegel, it is clear that the notion of *freedom* is missing in both Soviet authors: even if one agrees with Čanyšev that "mature mythology" and "rudiments of science" are necessary conditions for the emergence of philosophy, these conditions alone are not sufficient. Although Čanyšev does refer to Hegel's insistence on "intellectual freedom [*myslitel'naja svoboda*]" as the main condition for philosophy, he too stresses the connection of intellectual freedom with political freedom.[76] What is missing in Čanyšev's conception is the *subjective* side of this condition, the fact that freedom exists as the freely acting individuals within a free constitution, and that philosophy exists as the free thought of an *individual* [cf. Ch.7.v].

c.iii. *The Result of Struggle*

The history of philosophy had to be regarded as one single historical process because Soviet philosophy had to appear as its *final* outcome:

> The aim of this book is to investigate the initial propositions [*otpravnye položenija*] of *IFN*,... the basic philosophical question, the main trends in philosophy... which [investigation, EvdZ] allows us to understand philosophy as law-governed developing knowledge, the final result of which is dialectical and historical materialism.[77]

This theory of the history of philosophy, as both a 'meta-theory' of philosophy and an historical self-conception of dialectical materialism, inevitably moved towards a *totalizing view* of the history of philosophy, and towards an *historical* understanding of philosophy itself. It therefore is appropriate to speak of the Soviet conception of philosophy's past as the tailpiece of a philosophical *system*, a position announced by Kant, elaborated by Hegel, and resumed by Ojzerman and Bogomolov [Ch.1.i]:

> Dialectical materialism is not only based historically upon mankind's previous philosophic development,... but it also logically presumes a science of the history of philosophy, which formulates its fundamental concepts through the Marxist analysis of the development of philosophies. But a scientific history of philosophy... is also based on dialectical materialism, which organically combines scientificity [*naučnost'*] and partisanship, the categorical imperatives of the study of philosophy's past.[78]

This totalizing conception leads to an appreciation of the 'whole history' of philosophy:

> The development of the dialectical-materialist world-view is, at the same time, the scientific comprehension [*osmyslenie*] and critical appropriation [*usvoenie*] of the whole history of philosophical thought, in which, to our deep conviction, there are *no empty pages* [italics mine, EvdZ].[79]

At this point an implicit *principle of objective content* comes to the fore, which serves two goals. In the first place, the presupposition that there is some valuable content in every philosophical position is a legitimatization for historians of philosophy to study everything philosophical. Secondly, it gives a warrant that whatever Marxist-Leninist historians of philosophy find of value, *ipso facto*, i.e. because it is found by them, constitutes a contribution to the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. This 'principle of objective content' thus fulfilled a major role in the "critical appropriation" of past and contemporary non-Soviet philosophy. It is, however, at odds with another major principle of Soviet philosophy, the principle of *partijnost'*, and it presupposes a relativization of the latter, as becomes clear when we turn to the principles that guided *IFN* in its search for the laws governing philosophy's development.

d. *Of Laws, Trends, and Principles: The Dynamics of the History of Philosophy*

IFN claimed to be a scientific history of philosophy, i.e. to discover the *laws* and *regularities* of the historical development of philosophy.[80] In order to be scientific, *IFN* had to depart from the ' *most general* laws of movement and development of nature, society, and thought,' i.e. from *diamat* and *istmat*:

> And the more thoroughly and profoundly scientifically the real historical process of philosophy is grasped, the more it becomes evident that a scientific theory of the development of philosophical knowledge is possible only on the basis of dialectical and historical materialism.[81]

Philosophy, as a form of social consciousness, was *relatively autonomous*. Soviet reviewers of Bogomolov and Ojzerman's book highlighted this aspect:

> The authors... disclose the existence of inner regularities [*vnutrennie zakonomernosti*], relatively independent of social regularities. Consequently, they also found history of philosophy as a special science, having its proper theory, that investigates and formulates the regularities of the historical process of philosophy. The history of philosophy is like a *developing organism*, determined in the final analysis by the material development of society itself, but also relatively autonomous.[82]

As a result, philosophy was subject to the laws of *diamat*, to the laws applying to forms of social consciousness, and to its own 'regularities' [Ch.3.iv and Ch.4.i]. The three universal laws of materialist dialectics, viz "the unity, the mutual transmutation [*vzaimoprevraščenie*] and the struggle of opposites, the transition of

quantitative changes into qualitative ones, and the negation and negation of negation," apply to philosophy as well, but they are too general.[83] They have to be specified into a special theory of development, which of course does not contradict the general theory:

> The historical process of philosophy *differs essentially* from the development of natural science and social science. One must not absolutize this difference, as is usually done by contemporary bourgeois philosophers and historians of philosophy, but to ignore it would be a no less serious mistake. The elaboration of a theory of the historical process of philosophy is thus *not reducible* to an application of the general concept of development (or of a concept of its specific forms) to the development of philosophy. The job is to bring out the pattern specifically characterizing philosophical development, departing from the general theory of development, i.e. materialist dialectics [italics mine, EvdZ].[84]

Thus, in addition to the universal laws of dialectical development, more 'local' laws can be distinguished: laws applying to all forms of social consciousness: the *relative independence*, and the *succession* [*preemstvennost'*] of forms of social consciousness (d.i), specific laws or regularities of the historical process of *philosophy*: *differentiation*, *divergence* and *polarization* of philosophical doctrines (d.ii), and two fundamental principles of historical materialism: *partisanship*, and *historicity* (d.iii).[85] To these one can add, finally, an *implicit* fourth element, viz the principle of *objective content* (d.iv).

d.i *Continuity and Progress: Evolution or Revolution?*

The relative independence of philosophy comes to the fore in historical succession [*preemstvennost'*]: every philosophical doctrine is based on previous philosophical thought, though not necessarily on immediately preceding philosophy, not necessarily aware of its dependence, and not necessarily on *all* previous philosophy. Very often, philosophers reach back across their predecessors to earlier philosophy, which is "possible thanks to the various forms of objectivization," they tend to ignore their tribute to earlier philosophy, and they carry on some strands while leaving aside others.[86]

Stressing the difference between a "nihilistic" negation and a "concrete, positive negation, which dialectics characterizes as '*sublation*' [*snjatie, Aufhebung*]," and giving full credit to Hegel as "the first great philosopher of the pre-Marxian epoch, who adequately valued... the phenomenon of succession in the history of philosophy," Ojzerman and Bogomolov stress that "the dialectical-materialist understanding of succession, critically accepting all that is valuable in the Hegelian characteristic of the process, goes incomparably further."[87] They accuse Hegel of "absolutizing the process of succession, since according to his doctrine all philosophical systems are logical steps in a single hierarchic whole," and argue that "*logical*, theoretical succession is only one aspect... of succession [italics mine, EvdZ]," the other being "historical choice."[88] The latter, based on the principle of *partijnost'*, presupposes a specific social position, and also presupposes that "the philosophical heritage constitutes a diversity [*mnogoobrazie*] of ideas, theories,

doctrines."[89] Emphasis on the epistemic function of philosophy, i.e. on its being a form of *knowledge*, allows Ojzerman to put philosophy on the level of productive forces [Ch.2.i]:

> The inheritance of acquired productive forces and the achievements of knowledge make up the basis of progress in material and spiritual production. The history of science is completely inconceivable without this handing on of the torch of knowledge from one generation to another. Also, development, and even more so progress in the field of philosophy are possible only to the extent to which there is historical inheritance...[90]

Criticism of the absolutization of the logical side of the historical succession of philosophical theories, which would lead to an emergence of philosophical theories out of earlier theories alone, may not come as a surprise, but the full recognition of that aspect is significant, implying a distinction between philosophy as knowledge and philosophy as ideology.[91] This distinction is needed to account for the emergence of Marxism itself out of classical German philosophy, French utopian socialism and British political economy, and precludes a deterministic interpretation of that emergence: because the progressive development of philosophy is a "unity of discontinuity and continuity, of reiteration and uniqueness," and, "consequently, must be understood as a creative process, characterized by the contradictory unity of the continuous and the discontinuous," it presupposes both *choice* and creative *work* as "the decisive factor in realizing historical continuity..."[92]

Again, this is reminiscent of Hegel in the introduction to his *Vorlesungen...*, including the notion of historical choice, which, according to Ojzerman, decides whether the succession that takes place is progressive or regressive:

> Historical succession is an indispensable, but at the same time insufficient condition for progressive development. For it also exists where development occurs as decline.[93]

Philosophical and socio-political progress in the end coincide, but Ojzerman warns against any immediate identification:

> It would be a mistake, for example, to suppose that idealism by its very nature constitutes the world-view of the conservative or reactionary classes. The opposition of materialism and idealism pretty often exists within one and the same, e.g. bourgeois ideology. To suppose that the opposition of progressive and reactionary in philosophy directly coincides with the antithesis of materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics, would be an overt simplification of the tasks of research into the history of philosophy.[94]

A dialectical approach is indispensable, because "progress, whatever its forms, is a profoundly contradictory process."[95] Thus, the transition from "the naive dialectics of Antiquity to the metaphysical mode of thought that played a leading role in the development of empirical natural science in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries" was just as "undoubtedly philosophical progress" as "the transition from the metaphysical materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to dialectical idealism."[96] Rousseau, "the most revolutionary representative of the French

Enlightenment," was an idealist, who "sees his ideal in the past, condemns civilization, the development of culture, and progress."[97] A reactionary idealist, not a dialectician, and yet the most revolutionary representative of *Les Lumières*?[98] The answer to this kind of paradox is the "profoundly contradictory nature of progress," and the solution is a dialectical approach:

> Only a... dialectical-materialist consideration of separate philosophical positions and systems allows us to single out the truth contained in them and to evaluate their true social –progressive or reactionary– content and significance. And this evaluation, as a rule, requires differentiation, concretization, since in one and the same philosophical doctrine, due to qualitatively different historical circumstances,... both progressive and reactionary views are contained.[99]

Philosophical progress is marked by 'qualitative jumps', initiating new epochs in the historical development of philosophy. These philosophical revolutions include, according to Ojzerman, the "reform" of philosophy in the period of early bourgeois revolutions, French Enlightenment philosophy, and German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and Feuerbach.[100] Striking about these 'philosophical revolutions' is the fact that they, as Ojzerman states explicitly, *preceded* social and political revolutions –the English revolution of 1648, the French revolution of 1789, and the German revolution of 1848– preparing for them ideologically, rather than being their effect or result.[101]

The revolution performed by Marx and Engels is called the *great* philosophical revolution [*velikaja filosofskaja revoljucija*], because it "essentially distinguishes itself from all previous philosophical revolutions."[102] Yet it shares one characteristic with them: dated 1848, it *preceded* the corresponding social and political revolution: the equally great October revolution of 1917.[103]

This great philosophical revolution makes a great difference indeed:

> ...Marxist-Leninist philosophy, *by the very fact of its existence* and development means the beginning of a new era in the philosophical development of mankind [italics mine, EvdZ].[104]

The qualitative difference between philosophy *before* Marx and *after* Marx thus becomes even greater: Želnov, in an explicit analogy with Marx' statement about bourgeois society concluding the pre-history of human society, qualified the development of philosophy until Marx as the *pre-history* of philosophy, reserving the term *history* for the development of Marxist(–Leninist) philosophy.[105] With respect to pre-Marxian philosophy, the conception of Ojzerman and Bogomolov is sophisticated and complicated enough to legitimatize the study of even the most reactionary philosopher, and to preclude any precipitate conclusions, while at the same time the superiority of Marxism(–Leninism) gains force, since the entire "wealth of ideas" from philosophy's past is assimilated by it.[106]

d.ii *The Proliferation of Philosophical Doctrines*

Given the clear distinction between "logical, theoretical succession" and "historical, socio-economically based choice", and the stress on the "diversity of ideas, theories, and doctrines" that make up the philosophical heritage, it is interesting to see how this diversity comes about.[107] At this point, again, we come across the *relative independence* of philosophy: the diversity is produced *by philosophy itself*. Drawing an analogy with Darwin's analysis of the differentiation of natural species, Ojzerman and Bogomolov distinguish three 'modes' of diversification:[108]

a. *differentiation* against the background of "essential conceptual identity" – examples are the sequence of determinations of "primary substance" [*arkhè*] by the pre-Socratic philosophers, or 18th-century French materialism;
b. *divergence*, "a tendency towards the theoretical development of ideas in various directions, including mutually exclusive ones" – divergence differs from differentiation in that it presupposes the *negation* of at least one fundamental principle of the initial doctrine, an example being the opposition of rationalism and empiricism in West European philosophy (whereas within each of them there is differentiation);
c. *polarization*, "the inevitable result of historically progressing divergence of philosophical doctrines... the formation of fundamentally incompatible philosophies,... the negation of a whole system of principles and of the conclusions following from it" – an example is the opposition of rationalism and irrationalism: although, Ojzerman argues, these still contain common elements, "conditioned by an idealist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy," thus pointing the way to the only *radical polarization*, "the opposition between materialism and idealism."

With the last statement we are back on familiar ground, but it is important to note that Ojzerman here establishes the relative independence of philosophy as a form of *cognitive* activity: even if "the forms of development of philosophy are not, of course, the motive forces of that process," any "underestimation of the subjective factor in the development of knowledge... is particularly harmful, since it is a matter of the knowing subject's activity..."[109] Due to an increasing social need for knowledge, and to increasing division of labor, specialized forms of knowledge, including philosophy, gain "relative independence", as do the "motivating ideals characteristic of those forms."[110]

d.iii *From Struggle to Synthesis: the Neutralization of the Principle of Partijnost'*

The two main principles of *istmat*, viz those of *partijnost'* and of *istorizm*, were both relativized. Philosophical 'doctrines' were no longer primarily seen as expressions or mere legitimatizations of class positions, and in practice the principle of *partijnost'* rather served to reject any supposed impartiality [*bespartijnost'*] or supra-partiality [*nadpartijnost'*] of philosophy.[111] Again, Soviet historians of philosophy found an ally in Hegel, who rejected the idea of impartiality in history of

philosophy, a partisan attitude being an explicit interest in content, as opposed to "subjective partisanship."[112] Malinin, after making this point, hurries to stress that "the supreme virtue of the Marxist-Leninist principle of partisanship is based on its *scientific ideological nature* [*naučnaja ideologičnost'*]."[113] Likewise, Bogomolov hastens to add, after agreeing with Hegel that one should have a purpose in history of philosophy, that this purpose is not 'pure, free thought':

...partisanship in the history of philosophy means to take the social tendency of the investigated doctrine fully into account and to put it into the context of the progressive development of society, ... of the struggle of parties in philosophy, which in the final analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of hostile classes.[114]

Still, the equation 'partisan = objectively true' can be read two ways –what is partisan is true, or what is true is partisan– and here, as in the case of Batiščev, it clearly is read in the second way [Ch.2.vi]. This makes 'objective knowledge' a legitimate goal for historians of philosophy:

The aim of a scientific history of philosophy... is the concrete historical reconstruction of the historical process of philosophy, i.e. of the process of development of mankind's knowledge *such as it has in reality been* [italics mine, EvdZ].[115]

As a result, the principle of historicity becomes an independent principle of historical research, and is applicaple to Marxist(–Leninist) philosophy itself, though very cautiously and indirectly:

Philosophy, Hegel asserted, is a developing system, and so is the history of philosophy... (...) However, the philosopher *did not apply this principle to his own system*, in which he saw the absolute perfection of philosophical development. This anti-historical view was conditioned by Hegel's idealism, which interpreted philosophy as the self-comprehension of 'absolute spirit',... [italics mine, EvdZ].[116]

Ojzerman clearly rejects such an a-historical approach, thus inviting the application of the principles of *IFN* to its own position.[117]

d.iv *The Principle of Objective Content*

Of even greater significance than the sophistication and relativization of these two principles is the introduction by Ojzerman of a third principle, the principle of objective content:

...the differentiation of the *objective content* and the *subjective form* of philosophical doctrines is a *dialectical-materialist principle* of their scientific investigation. K. Marx and F. Engels permanently applied and developed this principle... Their relation to Hegel is especially revealing, because there is, probably, no other philosopher whom they appreciated so highly and at the same time criticized so sharply [italics mine, EvdZ].[118]

The dialectical idea behind this principle, also present in Soviet philosophical texts as the notion of a 'rational kernel [*racional'noe zerno*]', is that the content of any form of knowledge, however distorted or 'upside down' it may be, *must* be objectively related to reality: all forms of consciousness reflect, one way or another, objective reality. This principle picks up Lenin's 'theory' of the 'epistemic roots [*gnoseologičeskie korni*] of idealism':

> ...from the point of view of *dialectical* materialism, philosophical idealism is a *one-sided*, exaggerated... development (blowing-up, swelling-up) of one of the minor traits, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, *cut off* from matter, from nature, deified.[119]

This principle was already formulated by Pozner in 1937, and used by Bogomolov and Ojzerman in 1983.[120] It justifies a positive appreciation of 'idealist' and 'metaphysical' philosophical positions or theories. A good example is Ojzerman's interpretation of the notorious qualification of Spinoza as a materialist:

> If one had said to Spinoza that the theoretical starting point of his system was a materialist answer to the question of the relation of the spiritual and the material, he would not... have agreed... Neither matter (extension) nor the spiritual (thought) were in any causal relationship, according to his doctrine; they constituted attributes of a single (and sole) substance. (...) In delimiting the objective content and the subjective mode of expression in Spinoza's doctrine, Marx stressed the need to differentiate between 'what Spinoza considered the keystone of his system and what in fact constitutes that keystone'. The objective content of Spinoza's doctrine is incomparably richer, more significant, and more original than what he consciously formulated as his basic conviction.[121]

Other examples of the application of this principle are the 'critical' assimilation of contemporary 'bourgeois' philosophy [Ch.5.iii], and the attempt –discussed in this chapter– by Bogomolov and Ojzerman, to 'rob' everything useful from Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy for the elaboration of a palatable theory to accompany *IFN* as a branch of Soviet philosophy.

In sum, the 'mainstream position' of Ojzerman and Bogomolov developed a conception of the 'historical process of philosophy' that retained the laws, regularities, and principles of *diamat* and *istmat*, and in that sense was demonstrably Marxist-Leninist, but their interpretation of these elements, and the addition of the principle of objective content were a significant sophistication in comparison to the official position.

e. *From Aristotle to Hegel and Beyond: the Historical Self-Consciousness of IFN*

The importance of Hegel in the shaping of the 'sophisticated mainstream position' became explicit in Soviet 'history of the history of philosophy (as a discipline)': while Soviet authors agreed on the long-standing tradition of studying philosophy's past, dating it back to Aristotle (especially *Metaphysics* A), there was considerably

less agreement on the beginning of *scientific* history of philosophy.[122] The disagreement stems from the claim of Marxism to have accomplished the transition from philosophy to science. Malinin, for example, takes an orthodox position: he insists on the importance of studying "pre-scientific" forms of the theory of the history of philosophy, which includes everything from Plato to Herzen, and of comparing these with the "strict science [*strogaja nauka*]" that is possible only on "the sound basis of a dialectical-materialist understanding of history."[123] *IFN* is one of the fields of application of historical materialism, and Malinin develops his theoretical conception of history of philosophy out of a theory of the relative independence of forms of social consciousness.[124]

Others tried to make *IFN* less directly dependent upon the 'revolution in philosophy', and the obvious way to do this was to stress the value of *Hegel*'s conception of the history of philosophy and the positive appreciation of that conception by the *klassiki*, thus turning Hegel into a *klassik istoriko-filosofskoj nauki*. David Viktorovič Džokhadze (b.1935), for example, wrote that "the first to try to bring out the inner logic of the historical process of philosophy, and, in connection with it, to create a history of philosophy as a science, was Hegel."[125] He mentioned three Hegelian theses that "from the perspective of our investigation appear to us to be exceptionally valuable:"

> 1. The Hegelian method of interpretation of the historical process of philosophy as the dialectical self-unfolding of philosophical systems, and, on that basis, the affirmation of the history of philosophy as a developing scientific system... (...)
> 2. Hegel's thesis about the dialectical unity of the historical process of philosophy, about the progressive development of truth and the reflexive, stage-by-stage movement [*vozvratno-postupatel'noe dviženie*] of philosophical knowledge. (...)
> 3. The Marxist-Leninist solution of the basic central idea, stored in the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy, viz the reconstitution [*vossozdanie*] of the preceding course of history of human thought in general, and of philosophy in particular, in its necessary consecutive connection in time.[126]

This valuation of Hegel was certainly not uncontested.[127] Bogomolov and Ojzerman were criticized for *excessive* Hegelianism when they had it that Hegel "was always a dialectician," or qualified Hegel as "the only great philosopher of the pre-Marxian epoch who fully appreciated... the phenomenon of continuity in the history of philosophy."[128] In contrast with their 'hegelianization' of *IFN*, representatives of the *professionalist* position attempted to found it upon its development as a separate, historical discipline. Such an attempt was made by Arzakanjan in 1962, who rejected the idea that "the history of philosophy as an independent branch of philosophy... supposedly emerged only in the 17th century, and only became a science with the appearance of Hegel's *History of Philosophy*," whereas in reality, "mature features of the history of philosophy *as a science* existed in Antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and in Modern Times."[129]

Interesting in this connection is the critique of eurocentrism: Soviet authors often referred to the work of a 12th-century historian of philosophy, Mohammed al-Shahrastani (1086-1153), who in his *Religious Sects and Philosophical Schools* (circa 1100), "consciously set himself the task of creating a universal [*vsemirnaja*]

history of philosophy."[130] According to Malinin and Arzakanjan, he was the only genuine historian of philosophy in Medieval times, carefully distinguishing religion and philosophy, seeing philosophers as "those who do not recognize the laws of revelation, nor of religion, and in opposition to them follow their own judgment and their own reason," and analyzing the history of philosophy as an "arena of polemics" between, basically, two trends: materialism and theism.[131] Arzakanjan regarded Al-Shahrastani's work as far superior to the "first attempt to create a history of philosophy in Christian Europe, "the *Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum* (circa 1330) by Walter Burleigh (1275-1357), a "quite uncritical compilation, the 132 chapters of which treated of philosophers, mythologists, poets, writers, dramatists, historians of antiquity, disposed without any rhyme or reason."[132] Kamenskij, finally, praised Al-Shahrastani for showing the divergent nature of the historical process of philosophy, and opposed him sharply to scholastic treatments, the latter being "mere historical surveys, not reflections upon historiography."[133]

f. *The Crusade Against Bourgeois Pluralism*

Bourgeois history of philosophy was, from the Soviet point of view, false because it represented the viewpoint of a class that takes an interest in a distorted representation of social reality and of history. This explains why materialism is portrayed very negatively by idealist historians of philosophy (his example is Vl. Solov'ëv), whereas a materialist like Engels realized a full appreciation of the historical significance of idealist philosophers in spite of the fact that idealism is an erroneous philosophical position.[134] Due to the same principle of objective content, idealist history of philosophy can be a source of valuable information. As Ojzerman insisted, "an integral component of Marxist-Leninist *IFN* is the critical analysis of contemporary bourgeois philosophy, including the latest idealist theories of the historical process of philosophy," and its chief target is the "most influential among these tendencies," viz French *philosophie de l'histoire de la philosophie*,represented by Guéroult, Gouhier, and others.[135] Their idealist stance is a main flaw, more particularly their *subjective* idealism (which distinguishes them from Hegel), and the resulting *pluralist* conception of philosophy in history:

> The 'philosophy of the history of philosophy', ascertaining the existence of a multitude [*množestvo*] of philosophical doctrines, founds a pluralist interpretation of the historical process of philosophy, which is joined to conceptions of social and political *pluralism*.[136]

More specifically, Ojzerman shows himself offended by the "crying plurality [*vopijuščij pljuralizm*] of definitions of the concept of philosophy," and wonders whether it would be possible to reduce them to one.[137] The "indisputable merit of Hegel" had been the "*theoretical* overcoming of the plurality of philosophical doctrines, i.e. his substantiation of the profound dialectical idea that philosophical theories, in spite of their continuous confrontation with one another, their mutual negation and incompatibility, are necessary links in a single contradictory process of stage-by-stage [*postupatel'noe*] development of knowledge."[138] One way to explain

bourgeois pluralism was to point to the crisis of capitalist society, a motive manifest in Ojzerman's taunting of 'social and political pluralism' as a denial of class struggle. But another way was to point to the absolutization of aspects of the subject matter of philosophy. Just as the plurality of contemporary bourgeois philosophy partly resides in the absolutization of aspects of human knowledge, so a plurality of conceptions of philosophy and of its history is explicable in terms of the absolutization of aspects of philosophy or of its historical nature.[139]

This is indeed what Ojzerman attempts to do, distinguishing two forms of absolutization: the generalization of one aspect or feature of philosophy at the expense of other aspects, and the "eternalization" of one historically determined form and conception of philosophy.[140] In such general terms, this seems fair enough: examples would be the reduction of philosophy to conceptual analysis, or to worldly wisdom (as opposed to reflection, contemplation, or a specific form of knowledge), or the conception of philosophy as essentially a *system* of knowledge (as opposed to hypothetical theory, position, strategy, or therapy).[141] At the same time, Ojzerman is 'guilty' of such an absolutization, too: a pluralist conception of the history of philosophy was inadmissible, because it is at odds with the totalizing view. Soviet philosophy was, upon its own account, the true outcome of the 2,500 year long development of philosophy, a *synthesis* which absorbed any past, present, or future position. It was this *usurpation of developing truth* that excluded any recognition of *plurality*. Diversity [*mnogoobrazie*], as we have seen above, was recognized by Ojzerman, plurality [*množestvo*] vehemently rejected.

5.iii *Philosophy as Epochal Self-Consciousness*

One question has been left out of account so far, namely the question about the relation of philosophical history to history in general. The reason for this is that this question not only relates to a main problem in Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy [Ch.1.i], but also is a question of primary importance to a Marxist(–Leninist) theory of philosophy's history [Ch.3.iii-iv, and 4.i], as well as a central question in theory of the history of philosophy *tout court*. It deserves, therefore, to be discussed separately, the more so since it demonstrates the shift towards a totalizing and, in fact, Hegelian conception within *IFN*.

A Basically Hegelian Position

Due to the strong anti-Hegelian attitude during the period 1930-1955, it took a while to restore Hegel to the rank of founder of *IFN*. The initial 'vulgar' position is exemplified by Aleksandrov in 1946:

> In their works, Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin opposed the idealist interpretation of the history of philosophy with a *materialist* explanation of the history of ideas, according to which the spiritual life of society is the *reflection* of the conditions of its material life [italics mine, EvdZ].[142]

This reductionim was amended by Iovčuk [Ch.3.iii], who praised Hegel in *KIF* for contributing a 'rational kernel' to a scientific history of philosophy:

> Marxism appreciates the 'rational kernel' contained in Hegel's doctrine about the history of philosophy, which consists in that he, although on an idealist, mistaken basis, disclosed the regular connection of the various philosophical doctrines and the continuity [*preemstvennost'*] in their development, as a result of which the history of philosophy appeared not as a chaotic accumulation of opinions and conceptions, but as the historical process of the development of knowledge. A further contribution of Hegel was that he retraced the development of dialectics in the history of philosophy.[143]

On the whole, the relation of *IFN* to Hegel was *ambiguous.*; when, for example, the author's collective of *IF6* set out to write the history of all peoples in every phase of socio-economic development [Ch.3.iv], taking into account "that under the conditions of oppression not all peoples could make an equal contribution," but generally aiming to demonstrate the "universal character of the philosophical thought of mankind," it was remarked that they were repeating Hegel as much as they were rejecting him.[144]

Some Soviet historians of philosophy made a full Hegelian turn. In 1977, Džokhadze published a study of the philosophy of Antiquity, written in a clearly Hegelian fashion. Most striking is his 'rehabilitation' of Plato, where he attributes a new meaning to Lenin's famous 'lines' of Democritus and Plato:

> The main point in atomism, contrary to the Eleatic doctrine, was that for Leucippus and Democritus non-being [*nebytie*] does not at all exist to a lesser extent than being [*bytie*]. Here a great advance took place, i.e. here the beginning of that tendency was laid, which Lenin calls the line of Democritus. (...) Philosophy in the Socratic stage of its development obtained an important result especially in the field of a dialectical investigation of truth. *This line was continued by Plato* [italics mine, EvdZ].[145]

By turning the 'line of Plato' into the line of *dialectics*, not idealism, the history of philosophy becomes the gradual coupling of the true answers to both sides of the 'basic question'. Both 'lines' thus acquire positive significance, and the 'revolution' performed by Marx and Engels becomes the successful synthesis of these two lines, rather than the victory of one over the other:

> ...the interpretation of dialectics as the inner logic of philosophy's history is brilliantly illustrated by the development of ancient Greek philosophy, which appears as the first synthesis in the universal history of philosophy. The second synthesis will be German classical philosophy, the third, the highest and all-embracing [*samyj vyšij i vseokhvatyvajuščij*] synthesis, – the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism.[146]

This is an extreme example of a general tendency to move away from the dichotomization of the history of philosophy in the direction of its totalization. Hegel was fully recognized as a *klassik* of *IFN* by Ojzerman, who called him "the founder of the history of philosophy as a science," and argued that "the idea of a

necessary connection and contradictory unity of philosophical doctrines, a dialectical conception of historical succession which includes the relation of opposition, the investigation of philosophical doctrines as the self-consciousness of historically determined stages in the development of mankind, all these are excellent insights of Hegel's theory of the historical process of philosophy.[147]

Like Hegel, Ojzerman regards the history of philosophy as a progressive, dialectically developing unity, leading up to a philosophical science (or scientific philosophy).[148] It is evident, he claims, that "there exists a lawlike relation [*zakonomernoe otnošenie*] between the fundamental epochs of philosophical development and the main stages of universal history."[149] What is the precise nature of that lawlike relation? The key notion of the Soviet attempt to deal with this question is the notion of philosophy as 'quintessence of an epoch', taken, it seems, from the notion of 'philosophy of an epoch' in the work of Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937): what makes philosophy 'epochal' is the fact that it addresses "problems which emerge at a particular historical stage, problems to which different classes and social groups, various thinkers are seeking an answer."[150]

This idea is repeated in Ojzerman's statement that "we can say that philosophy, as the self-consciousness of an historical epoch, takes as its subject the most important, epochal questions."[151] A new element is added, viz the notion of "self-consciousness" [*samosoznanie*], and we come across this definition of philosophy in several places in Soviet literature in the 1980s.[152] In their *Osnovy teorii...* Bogomolov and Ojzerman state that "...philosophy at any stage of its development constitutes the self-consciousness of an historically determined epoch."[153] In *Filosofija ėpokhi...* Ojzerman quotes Marx as saying that "philosophy... is the spiritual quintessence [*dukhovnaja kvint-ėssencija*] of its time," and paraphrases it as: "sociologically understood, philosophy is the self-consciousness of an historical epoch, which in a new way reveals its cultural and historical meaning."[154]

Marx indeed wrote that "every genuine philosophy is the spiritual quintessence of its time...," but Ojzerman disregards the fact that Marx speaks of *genuine* philosophy, and it is only in doing so that he can interpret Marx in such a way that philosophy *as such*, "sociologically interpreted", i.e. as a form of 'social consciousness', is the self-consciousness of an historical epoch.[155] Moreover, Marx wrote this sentence in 1842, when he was still "a philosophical idealist" and a "revolutionary democrat," as Ojzerman emphasized in *Formirovanie filosofii marksizma.*[156] Some five years later, in a chapter of *Vvedenie v filosofiju* (1989), presumably written by Ojzerman, the qualification of philosophy as "spiritual quintessence of the time, self-consciousness of an epoch" is directly ascribed to Hegel.[157] This formulation is not, to my knowledge, to be found in Hegel's writings, and presents an interpretation that *diverges* from Hegel's idea: philosophy is the 'self-consciousness' of an epoch only *because* it is the (self-)knowledge of the spiritual substance which manifests itself in that epoch, and, in philosophy, returns to itself [*für-sich-sein*] [Ch.1.ii]. In this respect, Hegel might have agreed to call philosophy the 'essence' of an epoch, but certainly not its '*quint*essence'.

Still, as we see, a quotation from the *very* young Marx is cunningly employed to drive home a point that is Hegelian rather than Marxist, and that would require a lot

of further qualification to be compatible with the classical Marxist notion of philosophy as a reflection and expression of class-struggle.

A Hegelian Heresy?

With some qualification, therefore, the sophisticated mainstream position can indeed be labelled 'Hegelian'. Ojzerman rejects Hegel's pan-logism and absolute idealism, but nonetheless states that "...dialectical materialism... continues... the main line projected by Hegel of the investigation of philosophy as a phenomenon of world history, that is as a, in a dialectical way, single phenomenon."[158] According to Ojzerman, Hegel was closer to an understanding of the subject matter of philosophy than "those comrades of ours" who reduce the subject of philosophy to the 'basic question', to human existence, or to 'the most general laws of movement', while in fact the subject matter of philosophy is "the totality of non-philosophical phenomena, which moreover changes in the course of history," so that "philosophy, as the self-consciousness of an historical epoch, takes as its subject the most important, epochal questions."[159]

Now, if philosophy is a single [*edinyj*] phenomenon, if its subject matter is the changing totality of non-philosophic phenomena, if it is epochal self-consciousness, and if the 'developing system' of *diamat* and *istmat* is the sum total of the whole preceding development of philosophy –no empty pages!–, then it is very hard to tell what philosophy is, if not the developing self-consciousness of reality. The only difference, it would seem, is that this 'totality of non-philosophic phenomena' is regarded as objective, not as absolute.

In Hegel's conception, the subject of philosophy was 'Reason' as it gradually becomes *an und für sich*. At the same time, 'World Spirit' exists concretely in the successive generations of 'finite spirits', i.e. human beings, including philosophers, in their 'products', and in the institutions they populate. In as much as they are the concretizations or incarnations of absolute spirit, *philosophers* are the subjects of philosophy: every philosophical position or system has to be *thought* by some philosopher. An individual philosopher's thought can only be or approach 'absolute spirit', i.e. the adequate self-understanding of reality, because *both* are 'spirit' to begin with. That is also the reason why philosophy can be *epochal*: philosophy can make explicit what a certain historical era is about, *because* they are of one and the same nature, and philosophy can show an epoch to be an *epoch*, a limited stage and in that sense *relative*, *because* it is itself *absolute* spirit [Ch.1.ii].

At this point, the analogy between the Hegelian conception and the mainstream position in *IFN* stops, because in the latter case reality is material: the substance of reality is not infinite spirit, but *infinite matter*. Philosophy then is self-consciousness of a material substance which must be the *subject and object* of that consciousness. The consequence of this is to ascribe 'consciousness' to matter: *absolute* materialism – *diamat* as a system, not as a position– indeed is, as Losev argued, a "crying absurdity" and a form of idealism [Ch.2.ii-iii].[160]

The philosophy that appears 'last' in this progressive development, Hegel's dialectical idealism and dialectical materialism respectively, necessarily and definitively 'sublates' [*snimet, hebt auf*] all previous philosophy, if there is only

one philosophy, a *single* 'developing system'.[161] The foundation of that thesis "was Hegel's eminent contribution to the theory of the history of philosophy."[162] But where Hegel could *reconstruct*, in his history of philosophy, the presupposed structure of Reason, dialectical materialism, due to its notion of a material substance, either had to *abstract* a general development from history as it *actually* took place, or to assert it dogmatically. The subsequent principles of philosophical systems, appearing, in Hegel's conception, as stages in the developing self-understanding of absolute spirit, and as *moments* in the 'final' philosophical system, reappear in the mainstream conception as 'rational kernels', carefully detached from the distorted forms they existed in, and thus 'critically assimilated' by *diamat*:

> The *klassiki* of Marxism subjected Hegel's idealist doctrine to criticism, but dissected the 'rational kernel' contained in it, including the brilliant formulation of a series of problems of the history of philosophy as a science.[163]

The principle of objective content, justifying the assimilation of *everything* valuable in past philosophy into the proper system, is such a 'rational kernel', and was explicitly derived from Hegel.[164]

Link and Buffer between Official Philosophy and IFN

It is a matter of historical fact that the 'hegelianizing trend' became dominant in *IFN* When Soviet philosophers were examining the newly published *Vvedenie v filosofijn* of 1989, Aleksandr Vladimirovič Panin (b.1930) remarked:

> I see three conceptions of the history of philosophy. The first is that of Russell, i.e. all philosophy is a footnote to Plato. The second conception is the Hegelian conception, and *we hold this view until the present day*: the conception of dialectical 'sublation' [*Aufhebung*], i.e. every subsequent great philosopher takes everything valuable from the previous one, and everything non-valuable he discards. And the third conception is the conception of complementariness... [italics mine, EvdZ][165]

If the Hegelian conception was dominant, the question is *why IFN* moved in the direction of this totalizing position at the expense of the reductionist and the dichotomizing positions. The answer is, first, that it *fitted in best* with the different functions *IFN* had to perform simultaneously, i.e. it mediated successfully between the system of *diamat* and *istmat*, ideological exigencies, and professional *IFN*, and, secondly, that it was a *logical consequence* of the conception of dialectical materialism as a philosophical system.

The superiority of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism was, for *IFN*, not a conclusion, but an axiom [Ch.2.i and 2.iii]. As a result, Soviet theory of the history of philosophy had to be a reconstruction of philosophy's past as resulting in this supreme outcome. In itself, there is nothing peculiar about this: every philosophical position, to the extent to which it claims to be true, has to 'deal with' past (and present) philosophy, for the simple reason that there cannot be two truths: other philosophical positions must be either wrong, or only partially true, or the proper position will have to be revised. The easiest way to deal with the past is to state

simply that all previous positions were mistaken. Another way is to relativize truth by making it the expression of something else: class-struggle, *Wille zur Macht*, libidinal economy, world-view, struggle for life, etc. A more 'sophisticated' way, which restores the notion of truth, is to construct a dominant and a subdominant tradition, a 'mainstream' and an 'undercurrent', and identify with either of them (usually with the latter). A fourth way, finally, is to totalize the entire previous development of philosophy.

All four ways were recognizably present in the heritage of the *klassiki marksizma-leninizma* [Ch.1.iii], but *IFN* displayed a clear development towards the fourth possibility, and this development is due to the *dual function* of *IFN*: it had to fit Soviet historiography of philosophy into the framework of Soviet philosophy, providing its historical legitimatization, but at the same time, its task was to *legitimatize IFN* as a relatively autonomous discipline: Soviet philosophy thus 'objectively' needed a defensible history of philosophy, which required a professional investigation into philosophy's past, while at the same time that investigation had to be demonstrably 'Marxist-Leninist'. The 'mainstream' position elaborated by Ojzerman and others thus functioned as a *link* and at the same time as a *buffer* between official Soviet philosophy and professional historiography of philosophy.

But there was also, in addition to these functional ones, a *systematic* reason why *IFN* developed towards a totalizing conception. Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy was understood as a true "developing scientific-philosophical system."[166] If 'truth' means the "adequate reflection of an object by a knowing subject, the reproduction by the latter of the former as it exists as such [*sam po sebe*, '*für sich*', EvdZ], outside of and independently of man and his consciousness," if 'development' means "irreversible, purposeful [*napravlennoe*], law-governed [*zakonmernoe*] change of material and ideal objects," if 'philosophical' means dealing with "the general principles of being and knowing [*poznanie*], about the relation of man to the world,... about the universal laws of development of nature, society, and thought,", i.e. about "matter under the aspect of the unity of all its forms of movement," including, that is, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, if 'knowledge' means the "result of a process of cognition of reality, its adequate expression in human consciousness in the form of representations [*predstavlenija*], concepts, judgments, and theories," and if 'system', finally, means "a totality of elements, being in mutual relations and connections, forming a fixed whole [*celostnost'*], a unity [*edinstvo*]," then this 'developing system of knowledge' can hardly be anything but the ever more adequate *self*-knowledge of material substance.[167]

Since *diamat* was claimed to be "the highest form of materialism, constituting the result [*itog*] of the whole preceding history of the development of philosophical thought," the task of a Soviet theory of the history of philosophy was the reconstruction of that 'whole preceding history' as the gradual coming-to-be of the adequate self-knowledge of the substance of the world.[168] In this respect, the totalizing conception of Bogomolov and Ojzerman expressed a consequence of the self-conception of Soviet philosophy:

> The philosophy of Marxism is *not simply* the critical summing up [*kritičeskij itog*] of the entire preceding philosophical... development of mankind. It is its *developing result*, i.e. a developing philosophical system, which changes its form, enriches its

content in the course of development of society, on the basis of new historical experience, and of the achievements of the natural and social sciences [italics mine, EvdZ].[169]

The Soviet conception differed from the Hegelian one in the *speculative* nature of the latter versus the *objectivism* of the former. A Hegelian might agree with Ojzerman or Želnov that philosophy is about the relation of the subjective and the objective, but would disagree with their 'mechanical' application of the subject-object scheme to the history of philosophy. And rightly so: philosophy is not 'about' the relation of subjective and objective, it *is* itself an instance of that relation. Philosophy exists as necessarily individual philosophical thought, as the subsequent objectivization of that thought in 'a philosophy', and as the resumption of the content of that objectivation by other thinking individuals. The *concrete nature* of philosophy was rightly understood, by the mainstream position, as its *differentiation* into philosophies, but was wrongly limited to the *objective* side, ignoring the fact that different philosophical positions are the potential actualizations, and hence the actual possibilities of philosophical thought.

Even if one stresses, with Hegel, that the individual philosopher as such, as this or that individual is not really important, still it has to be *some* individual that does the thinking. The tendency in Hegel's conception towards concentration on positions or systems rather than on philosophers is justified only to the extent that it is not about 'philosophers' but about the development of Philosophy. There is a problem, in Hegel, with individuality as distinct from contingency, but Hegel certainly realized that philosophy is not simply 'developing', but develops by being developed by individual thinkers – including himself. In Russian, the words for 'is developing' and 'is being developed' are identical: *razvivaetsja*. It is clear that Soviet historians saw philosophy primarily as developing, not as being developed.

This turns philosophy's history into an objective process, but by the same token makes it as mysterious as the development of the material substance into ever higher forms, *unless* it already contained [*an sich*] the seeds of those higher forms. It does not help to deny the spiritual nature of the Hegelian absolute: to replace the absolute idea by infinite matter does not preclude a 'totalizing' vision of philosophy's history, as both lead to the idea of philosophical truth as adequate self-knowledge of substance. If material substance is *mere* substance, the result is an *actualism* which is as such incomprehensible; if material substance is *substance-subject*, the result is 'absolute materialism'. In order to preclude this absolutization of philosophy, and arrive at a viable conception of the history of philosophy that preserves the strong points of the Hegelian conception, what has to be denied is not the spiritual nature of substance, but its *singularity*. But this means that the very ideas of *substance*, of *system*, and of *truth* become problematic, a consequence drawn by 'post-modern' Western philosophical culture, but unacceptable within the framework of Soviet philosophy, continuing "to philosophize in the grand manner."[170]

The 'sophisticated mainstream position' came close to a Hegelian position, acquiring the status of a concluding part of a philosophical system. Although Bogomolov and Ojzerman rightly criticized Hegel for making philosophy's history "the *self-development* of philosophy," it is questionable how consistent their critique of Hegel is.[171] The main difference with the Hegelian view resides in one major

point: for Hegel, the 'highest point' of philosophical development was not so much an objectivized philosophical doctrine, but rather the *point* where 'Reason', personified in a philosopher, actually *thinks* the development of philosophy as 'absolute Spirit' (substance-subject). In the case of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, because of the rejection of the initial thesis of absolute idealism, the historical process of philosophy becomes an objective, 'observable' process.

The 'sophisticated mainstream position' was as sophisticated as it could be within the framework of Soviet philosophical culture, and therefore became the *mainstream* position. It successfully legitimatized *IFN* as a discipline within the framework of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. The end of Soviet philosophical culture meant the disappearance of the functional and systematic grounds for its predominance. As I shall show in the next chapter, it lost its predominant position, and alternative positions came to the fore. These can partly be interpreted as *corrective* in relation to the conception of Ojzerman and Bogomolov, highlighting aspects that they did not or could not fully appreciate, but also, at least in some cases, as showing signs of over-reaction [Ch.7.v].

The positive elements in the conception developed by Ojzerman and Bogomolov stem from the fact that they *departed from* a reductionist and dichotomizing position, moving 'back to Hegel' towards a *totalizing* view. This points the way to an adequate understanding of the concrete historical existence of philosophy. Philosophy is neither determined by socio-economic conditions, nor is it explicable in terms of its progressive or reactionary political nature, nor is it steered by its 'inner logic' of development alone. It is conditioned by all three determinants, and by a fourth, namely individual truth-oriented thought, in their interplay and interdependence. Ojzerman and Bogomolov offer a number of valuable elements for a realist conception of the history of philosophy: the differentiation, divergence, and polarization of positions, the *relative* autonomy of philosophy (its partial dependence on science and on socio-political conditions), the distinction between an *epistemic* and an *ideological* function of philosophical theories. This contribution is blurred by a pre-ordained monism, but can be detached from it: the thesis that all philosophy reflects some reality does neither presuppose, nor imply that the whole of philosophy reflects all of reality.

What is elaborated in the sophisticated position is the individuation of philosophy into philosophical *doctrines*, not its concrete existence in *philosophers*, or in philosophical *thought* as a human activity. Of course the historical continuity in philosophy "becomes possible only due to the manifold forms of objectivization" of philosophical theories.[172] This is true, inasmuch as objectivization is a necessary condition for the succession of philosophical positions, and hence for the development of philosophical culture. However, it is not a sufficient condition: individual philosophical thought remains a necessary condition for the existence of philosophy in the first place. The relative absence, in the mainstream position, of the philosophizing individual, fits in remarkably well with the negation of the philosopher as a thinking individual in Soviet philosophy – the inadmissibility of Il'enkov's "I think [Ch.2.vii]." In this way, Soviet philosophical culture itself, as it existed and developed historically, demonstrated the merits and the limitations of the conception of philosophy that dominated it.

Chapter Seven

Coming to Terms With the Past (*IFN* 1986 - 1989)

> The moment has come to speak out in defence of 'pure' investigations into the history of philosophy...
> Konstantin N. Ljubutin, A.V. Percev, 1988[1]

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to exploit the advantage of hindsight. *Perestrojka* and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet system meant the end of Soviet philosophical culture [Ch.2.viii]. With respect to *IFN*, this meant the gradual disappearance of its specifically Soviet conditions. The present chapter discusses five developments during *perestrojka* which, through their corrective and compensatory character, highlight the determinants of *IFN* as it existed during its 'classicial' period [Ch.4-6]: the subordination of philosophy to ideology, and the ideological functions of *IFN*, which contrast with the failed attempt to let *IFN* play a constructive role in the *perestrojka*-program [7.i]; the process of professionalization and specialization, leading to the transformation of *IFN* into a 'purely historical' discipline [7.ii], and the shift from *K(S)BF* to an investigation of contemporary Western philosophy that does not serve immediate ideological goals [7.iii]; the function of *IFN* as 'refuge' after 1967 and 1974, and the return of 'systematic' philosophers from this 'ecological niche' [7.iv]; the role of the 'sophisticated maistream position' as 'link and buffer', the vanishing need for such a covering theory of the history of philosophy as a process *and* a discipline, and the formulation of alternative conceptions of the history of philosophy, corrective with respect to the 'sophisticated position' [7.v].

7.i. *Perestrojka and History of Philosophy*

For *IFN*, *perestrojka* began with a large conference on the implications of the 27th CPSU-Congress (1986) on research into the history of philosophy.[2] The materials, published in 1988, testify to the conflict between the ideological function of *IFN* and the aspirations of professional historians of philosophy.[3] A traditional Soviet tone was set by party-philosopher Fedoseev:

> The historians of philosophy are facing important and responsible tasks both in the further deepening of the scientific methodology of research into the history of philosophy and in the field of the enrichment of the 'scientific-philosophical world-outlook', the struggle against bourgeois ideology and the education of conscious and active builders of communism. Our historians of philosophy must make an adequate contribution to the solving of the majestic tasks that the 27th Congress of the CPSU has set before us.[4]

It is hard to believe that Soviet historians of philosophy felt tempted to derive practical guidelines from these general statements for their daily scholarly work, nor that they were very eager to embrace new guidelines at all. During the same conference, one 'general' of *IFN*, Vladimir Vlasovič Mšvenieradze (1926-1990), made a call for an objective study of philosophy's past (trading *partijnost'* for *patriotičnost'* [patriottism] in passing):

> The classics of Marxist philosophy were not afraid of the truth.... (...) Only what is veracious [*pravdivo*] can be patriotic [*patriotično*]. (...) A 'half-truthful account' of the history of philosophy leads... to an unhealthy... interest in religion and mysticism, in philosophical idealists like Schopenhauer or Nietzsche, Berdjaev or Vl. Solov'ëv, or contemporary Western philosophers.[5]

Mšvenieradze lamented the "peculiar paradox" that the number of specialists on individual philosophers and schools was growing, but the number of "professional historians of philosophy" who study "the objective regularities of the historical process of philosophy" was in decline, thus pointing to the tension, neither peculiar nor paradoxical, between professional but 'limited' studies on the one hand, and more generalizing, 'synthetic' work, which was problematic because it was inevitably bound up with official philosophy, on the other.[6]

Matters became more concrete in 1988 with the production of a new *učebnik*, in which, first of all, the presentation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a basically true doctrine was dropped:

> ...the authors have tried to show that Marxism is not at all a finished doctrine, in which answers to any question that... may arise... would be given beforehand; on the contrary, Marxist philosophy is an open, developing system.[7]

No fixed answers were to be expected from this new *učebnik* – on the contrary, students were urged to think independently: "...this textbook is only an invitation to arduous independent work, an introduction into the sphere of problems of this aged, but eternally young science about the essence of the world and of man in it."[8] With respect to the history of philosophy, the authors of *Vvedenie...* clearly tried to learn from the past: *Osnovy...* had comprised a few pages about the 'theoretical sources of dialectical and historical materialism' and a chapter of 25 pages on 'Contemporary bourgeois philosophy'.[9] The new *učebnik* contained a chapter of nearly 150 pages on 'The origin and the historical forms of philosophy', ending with German idealism and Russian philosophy, and another of 85 pages on 'Twentieth-century non-Marxist philosophy'.[10] The comparison with former textbooks shows a different attitude towards both pre-Marxian and bourgeois post-Marxian thought:

> The philosophy of Marxism emerged as a criticism of all previous philosophy. (...) From the point of view of reasonable, dialectical thought the excellent philosophers of the past are not only our predecessors, but also our contemporaries, from which we can learn a lot and with whom it is possible to have, with equal rights, a dialogue and discussion, agreeing with some of their views, questioning others.[11]

7.ii. *Towards a 'Pure' History of Philosophy*

As the crisis of official Soviet philosophy deepened, and the Marxist-Leninist character of *IFN* became less than evident, historians of philosophy called for a *separation* of philosophical theory and 'pure' historiography of philosophy.[12] At the same time, however, philosophical journals started to publish less on the history of philosophy, as they focused on actual problems. Historians of philosophy complained about the reduced possibilities for publishing their materials, and someeven escaped to *samizdat.*[13]

Though the results of the Soviet period with regard to classical philosophical texts were quite impressive, there were many 'white spots', especially in Russian idealism, religious philosophy, and emigrated philosophy after 1920, and in Western 'philosophy after Marxism' [see Ch.4.iv]. Authors like Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, Berdjaev or Losskij, Heidegger or Gadamer, who –if at all– had only been available in pre-revolutionary editions, were now published by Soviet publishing houses.[14] These translations appeared as separate publications, in a variety of journals, and in the newly established series *Istoriko-filosofskij ežegodnik* [History of Philosophy Yearbook: *IFE*], first published in 1986 (the 10th volume appeared in 1997), and dedicating an increasing portion of its pages to the publication of primary sources, either in translation from a wide range of languages or in Russian original: from 16.4% in 1986 to 57.6% in 1991.[15] The contributions to the subsequent *IFE* show great variety in subject and approach, and testify both to the desire to make the entire philosophical heritage of human culture available and to the capacity of historians of philosophy to fulfill this desire.

West European philosophy, and especially classical German philosophy, continued to be of special importance.[16] Thematic historical studies appeared that were both a continuation and a break with earlier work in *IFN.* An example is *Problema samosoznanija v zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii* [The Problem of Self-Consciousness in West European Philosophy] (1987) by Michail Anatol'evič Garncev, a specialist in Medieval philosophy at MGU.[17] This book, which discusses Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Scholasticism, and Descartes, is based on Western literature (only 3 Soviet sources are mentioned, and Marx and Engels appear only ritually), and there is nothing particularly Marxist or materialist in it.

Another example is Dobrokhotov's *Kategorija bytija v klassičeskoj zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii* [The Category of Being in Classical West European Philosophy] (1986).[18] For Dobrokhotov, "classical philosophy" means philosophy for which such principles as the recognition of reason as the highest authority (at least within philosophy) have preserved their normative nature, regardless of the claims of science or theology, and this classical philosophy ends with Hegel.[19] Of course, Marxism also situated the end of classical philosophy near Hegel, but it claimed to have surmounted and 'sublated' [*aufgehoben*] it, whereas Dobrokhotov holds that the "philosophical results of the evolution of the category of being" should be retained as they were formed during the classical period.[20] His aim is not to write the history of the concept of being, but to investigate the logic of its development, thus restoring the bond with the metaphysical tradition of the West.[21]

This book evades the 'basic question' of philosophy by supposing that the concept of Being, introduced by Parmenides, is the fundamental concept of philosophy. A question about the relation between thought and being, i.e. the 'basic question' that haunted Soviet philosophy, only emerges after a determination of being as thought, matter, substance, and so forth. This reintroduction of the category of being means a restoration of metaphysics as *preceding* any opposition of metaphysics and dialectics.

Themes in Hegel's philosophy that could not be fully elaborated before now became the subject of historical studies. Such themes are the Hegelian concepts of thought and of absolute spirit, both evidence of Hegel's idealistic answer to the 'basic question' of philosophy. The Hegelian conception of thought was the subject of a monograph by Marina Fëdorovna Bykova, praised by Karimskij for being the only person to investigate Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit* in its entirety in her dissertation.[22] This book is remarkable for its clarity and mastery of literature, and telling about the past in stressing the need to turn to original texts instead of not always reliable translations.[23] Bykova systematically investigates the Hegelian concept of 'thought' [*myšlenie*, German: *das Denken*], in close relation with the concepts of 'reason' [*razum*, *Vernunft*] and 'spirit' [*dukh*, *Geist*], taking Hegel seriously as the idealist he was, and not trying to point out the "materialist elements" of his philosophy.[24] The same applies even more strongly to the work of Aleksandr Vladimirovič Kričevskij, who discusses and appreciates the theological aspects of Hegel's thought.[25] Bykova and Kričevskij more recently combined their interest in Hegel with a joint publication, *Absoljutnaja ideja i absoljutnyj duch v filosofii Gegelja* [Absolute Idea and Absolute Spirit in the Philosophy of Hegel] (1993), in which they make use of both Soviet and Western scholarly literature, and aim at an "immanent examination of the problems contained in Hegel's system" from a logicist [Bykova] and a speculative-theological [Kričevskij] perspective.[26]

The close association of Soviet philosophy with Hegel further explains his sharply decreased popularity during the years of *perestrojka*: Soviet philosophers began to reach beyond Hegel to Kant in order to foster humanistic ideas.[27] As a matter of fact, Kant had already been cautiously 'rehabilitated' in recent years through the works of, e.g., Asmus, Gulyga, and Georgian historians of German idealism like Tevzadze.[28] Studies like the ones just mentioned are important because Hegel, a philosopher who was for a long time caught in the exigencies of Soviet ideology, is studied as an important philosopher in his own right. This trend has its roots in the *Soviet* period: Bykova is doing what her teacher Motrošilova had been trying to do for some 30 years, namely to combine textual scrutiny with philosophical commitment.[29] The same approach was present in Khandruev, Kissel', and Karimskij, who also warned against simplification of Hegel's thought, and made pleas for a "Hegel-exegesis" and "Hegel-hermeneutics."[30]

7.iii. *From KBF to the History of Contemporary Western Philosophy*

The shift from *KBF* to *istorija buržuaznoj filosofii* could fully deploy itself under the conditions of *perestrojka*. One former kingpin of *KBF*, Mel'vil', acknowledged that the simplistic attitude of Marxist philosophers towards 'bourgeois' philosophy, the enforcement of "criticism and exposure" along with the "disengagement from international philosophy" were responsible for the often uninteresting nature of Soviet philosophy.[31] He called for a new approach to contemporary non-Marxist philosophy, advocating dialogue and discussion together with serious analysis, and philosophical instead of "ideological" criticism.[32]

In the new *Vvedenie...* we find this new approach to contemporary non-Marxist philosophy, too:

> ...Marxist humanism, and the new political thinking based upon it, take upon themselves the defence and affirmation of values common to all mankind. In turn this compels in many respects to a new approach to the interaction of the philosophy of Marxism with other trends of contemporary philosophy.[33]

The immediate sign of this different treatment was a change in terminology: in the second half of the 1980s, the label 'contemporary bourgeois philosophy' disappeared.[34] This change is further exemplified by Motrošilova, the senior Soviet specialist in phenomenology, who opened the 'round-table' on phenomenology by calling Husserl a 'classic of 20th-century philosophy':

> I am not accidentally saying: one of the classics of 20th-century philosophy, instead of a classic of 'contemporary bourgeois philosophy', as was usual. I assume that phenomenology is common property of contemporary philosophy. And not only Husserl (...) is a classic of the 20th century.[35]

Both the use of the ideologically burdened title of '*klassik*' and the qualification of phenomenology as "common property of 20th-century philosophy" deny the fundamental gap that used to separate Marxist-Leninist from bourgeois philosophy. Motrošilova discusses recent developments in phenomenology in a sympathetic manner, concentrating on topics that do not receive due attention from Soviet philosophers: intersubjectivity, mind-body problem.[36] In conclusion, she stresses the importance of contacts between Soviet philosophers and foreign phenomenologists and criticizes the people who used to frustrate an objective analysis of phenomenology.[37]

Another representative example is an article by Nina Stepanovna Julina (b.1927) on the relationship between Karl Popper and 'classical German philosophy', published in 1987.[38] Julina clearly knows what she is talking about, and gives a fair account of Popper's philosophy.[39] These elements were also present in a text by the same author, published in 1983, i.e. during the high-tide of 'stagnation'.[40] A new element, however, is the positive attitude towards this 'bourgeois' philosopher, explicit in Julina's remark that *The Open Society and its Enemies*, an easy target for Soviet authors, should be left out of account because "one must appreciate a serious philosopher... by his strong and mature works, not by his weak ones."[41]

The smooth transition from *kritika* to *istorija* of contemporary Western philosophy is further illustrated by Aleksandr Feodosievič Grjaznov (b.1948), MGU's specialist in contemporary analytical philosophy: his introduction to the translation of Wittgenstein's 'Lecture on Ethics' is not recognizably 'Soviet' or 'Marxist(-Leninist)'.[42] In another article, Grjaznov pays special attention to Wittgenstein's 'Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*', which according to him is of great importance for Wittgenstein's concept of *Lebensform* as a key to understanding the mutual non-comprehensibility of cultures.[43] Frazer's *Golden Bough* was translated in 1980, Wittgenstein's 'Remarks' appeared in 1989 with a commentary by Zinaida Aleksandrovna Sokuler (b.1950).[44]

Soviet philosophy disposed of a large number of specialists in 20th century Western philosophy, but their expertise could not be made productive within the context of Soviet philosophy, and thus remained limited to the presence of a number of experts. Only very recently, in 1991, an attempt was made to unite their skills into a *Sovremennaja zapadnaja filosofija; slovar'* [Dictionary of Contemporary Western Philosophy], edited by Vladimir Sergeevic Malakhov and Vladimir Petrovič Filatov (b.1948), in which we find Kissel' writing on Collingwood and Croce, Malakhov on Gadamer and Hermeneutics, Grjaznov on Wittgenstein, Austin, Kripke, Ryle and Strawson, Julina on Analytical philosophy and Popper, Avtonomova on Foucault, Lacan and Althusser.[45] The book, mainly written by former "critics of bourgeois philosophy", offers, now that every trace of 'Marxist-Leninist critique' has disappeared, accurate surveys of a vast number of philosophers, tendencies, and schools in 20th century Western philosophy. It is one of the ways in which what was done in *Soviet* philosophy is made to work for *post-Soviet* philosophical culture, and it testifies to the fact that *KBF* often was an external composition of neutral summary and dutiful commentary, of objective content and critical form, which favored the import of non–Soviet philosophy, but at the same time *impeded* its *philosophical assimilation.*

7.iv. *From Philosophy to IFN and Back Again*

In the critical discussions about Soviet philosophy in the *perestrojka* period [Ch.2.viii], *IFN* was not spared, but it was often pointed to as a field of relatively high quality.[46] A collection of Soviet studies into the history of Western philosophy, edited by Motrošilova and published in German in 1986, received positive reviews.[47] Philosophers working in *IFN* were often judged favorably: in 1988, for example, "amateur-philosopher" P.V. Tulaev mentioned five philosophers whose works ought to be published more often – four of them were historians of philosophy (Losev, Gulyga, Gajdenko, and Motrošilova), the fifth a 'critic of contemporary bourgeois philosophy' (Davydov).[48] In the late 1980s, these five shifted to historically oriented philosophizing.

Losev completed his *Istorija antičnoj ėstetiki* and posthumously showed his 'real face' with a sympathizing study of Vl. Solov'ëv in 1990, thus "symbolically completing his path of encounters with a philosopher whom he loved in this

youth," having already published, in 1983, "a book, small but with an enormous echo: *Vl. Solov'ëv*," in which he had urged the Soviet readers "to put Solov'ëv upside down as Marx had done with Hegel" – an instruction to "read between the lines"?[49]

Gulyga summarized his earlier studies in classical German philosophy, and turned his historical interest into a contemporary one with essays on subjects ranging from the Russian nationalist writer Valentin Pikul', whose popularity knew no limits in the late 1980s, to the question 'What is Post-Modernity?', a text in which he not only condemned "post-modernism" as he saw it in, e.g., contemporary art, but also explicitly turned from history to the present:

> History, understood as the investigation of the past... must answer three questions. The oldest of them...: 'What was it like?' (...) Also of vital importance is another question: 'Why did it happen that way?' (...) But most important of all is the third question: 'What to do [*čto delat'*]?' At this point, history goes beyond its immediate proper limits, turns to the future, becomes super-history, accomplishing a synthesis of knowledge and behavior, a transition to practice. If modernity loses, in the process, the consciousness of its own superiority over previous epochs, turns to the past in order to learn, than it can be praised as post-modernity, as the wisest and highest modernity.[50]

Davydov republished his controversial *Ėtika ljubvi...* [Ch.5.iii], and "actualized" it with a protest against the publication, under the conditions of *glasnost'*, of a Russian translation of *Lolita* by Vladimir Nabokov, an author slightly less popular than Pikul'.[51] He and his spouse Gajdenko also turned their earlier, 'critical' investigations of the 'bourgeois' sociologist Max Weber into a plea to use his theory in the creation of a 'work ethic' in the era of *perestrojka*.[52]

Motrošilova applied her conception of philosophy, developed in historical studies, to the practical situation of the disintegrating USSR, arguing that it is the "moral responsibility of the historian of philosophy" to use the ideas of humanism and civilization from the (West European) past –Greek Antiquity, G. Bruno, Kant– in a plea for 'civilization' in the present world.[53]

Another *šestidesjatnik* who turned from history of philosophy to actuality is Ė. Solov'ëv. He published a collection of articles from earlier years under the title *Prošloe tolkuet nas* [The Past Speaks to Us]. Here, it says in the colophon, "in the life and work of excellent thinkers of the past... the author tries to find parallels and prophesies of those acute social problems, that were, in the period of stagnation, closed for direct theoretical discussion."[54]

What is interesting about this phenomenon is not so much the predictable turn from past to present, but rather the fact that, in each of the cases just mentioned, their previous work is in a sense continued, which substantiates the conjecture that these questions were what their work had been about all the time.

7.v. *Reactions and Corrections: Theory of the History of Philosophy*

During *perestrojka*, the official account of the history of philosophy underwent considerable change. In the draft version of *Vvedenie...* the "beginning of dialectical materialism" was still announced as the 'Great Revolution in Philosophy', but in the final text this was replaced by a neutral 'Formation and Development of Marxist Philosophy'.[55] Also, the tradition of acquainting students with the positions of past philosophers through commentaries by the *klassiki* was abandoned: the authors of *Vvedenie...*, by contrast, compiled a voluminous reader to accompany the textbook.[56] As regards the notorious 'basic question', it no longer was self-evident, but had to be argued for:

> It is no secret, that the majority of philosophers in the past and present did and do not consider it as their main objective to solve precisely this question. (...) Unwittingly you start thinking: is it possible to regard as fundamental a question that is not even formulated by the majority of philosophers? (...) One thing at least is clear: the question about the relation of consciousness and being does not rank with the numerous concrete philosophical questions, it is of a different nature. Perhaps, it is not so much a question after all... It is important to understand that the *polarity* 'material-spiritual', 'objective-subjective' enters all philosophical reflections, forms a kind of 'nerve-center' of every philosophical question, whether philosophers are aware of it or not.[57]

There is quite a difference between a fundamental *question* and a fundamental *polarity*, at play in concrete philosophical questions; in this respect, the 'sophisticated mainstream position' had become the official position.[58]

However, these changes came too late, because official philosophy had already lost its credibility, and its disappearance made the 'covering' theory, developed by Bogomolov and Ojzerman, obsolete. 'Pure historiography' and 'systematic' philosophy (including reflections on the historical nature of philosophy) became separate fields of philosophical work, no longer requiring a 'link and buffer'.

Fed Up With Hegel: the Limits of Sophistication

In the epilogue to the first *IFE* (1986), the editors stated that a main objective was "to expand the discussion of theoretical and methodological problems of scientific history of philosophy."[59] However, in the first three issues we do not find any theoretical or methodological contribution, in subsequent issues they remained very rare, and in *VF* and *FN* the result was zero, too.[60] This is not to say that nothing happened. After the publication of Bogomolov and Ojzerman's *Osnovy teorii...* in 1983, a round-table discussion was held about the methodology of the historiography of ancient Russian philosophy, and in 1986, a large conference was held about methodological and ideological problems of the history of philosophy.[61] However, while historiographical practice was prospering, theory of the history of philosophy 'stagnated', due to the tacit victory of the professionalist position and to the return to philosophy of those who had sought refuge in *IFN*.

In 1988, Ojzerman summarized his position, observing that the actual plurality of philosophical doctrines is not a matter of "anarchy of philosophical systems," as Dilthey had it, but a complex process of differentiation, divergence, integration, polarization, and, finally, radical polarization of the "innumerable multitude of philosophical doctrines" into "the fundamental antipodes of materialism and idealism."[62] These manifold philosophies are "materially conditioned," but this does not cancel their "relative independence, *the significance of which is constantly growing* in the course of world history [italics mine, EvdZ]."[63] He further rejects the idea that materialism was always right against idealism, pointing out a number of instances where idealism was right against materialism, and he also denies that idealists were always "the ideologists of reactionary classes, and only the materialists expressed the interests of the revolutionary classes."[64] He thus arrives at a new definition of philosophy:

> Philosophy is the unity of social consciousness (the expression of social being) and research-activity, the subject of which is not only social, but natural reality as well...[65]

This definition enables Ojzerman to make a distinction between the ideological function of philosophy and its scientific, epistemic value: philosophy is not just an instrument in class struggle, but "the self-consciousness of an historically determined epoch."[66] Ojzerman thus basically restated his earlier, 'Hegelian' position, having reached the limits of its sophistication. The actual development of *IFN*, legitimatized by the 'sophisticated position', now made it appear outdated, and during the 1986 conference its 'Hegelianism' was criticized:

> Of course, nobody defended a Hegelian model of the historical process of philosophy in its literal sense: its organic flaws are too noticeable, and especially ...the claim to a monopoly of philosophical truth, which already includes everything really substantial in the philosophical heritage.[67]

All participants agreed that the "linear arrangement of philosophical doctrines," proposed by Hegel, "unwittingly impoverishes the substance of the historical process of philosophy."[68] But "more powerful stances were expressed too, provoking controversy."[69] One of these was a "culturological approach," advocated by a certain M.S. Glazman, who argued that "philosophy ought to be investigated most of all as a cultural phenomenon, and not as the process of development of a specific form of scientific knowledge," and by Leonid M. Batkin and Tamara Borisovna Dlugač.[70] As Kissel' rightly commented, a culturological approach may explain the role that certain ideas play within an historical epoch, but it does not touch upon the philosophical significance of those ideas.[71] At the same time it is an understandable attempt to stress the value of philosophy without entering into a discussion of its 'truth', monopolized by an official philosophy for too long.

The work done in the theory of the history of philosophy presents a combination of reaction and continuity, offering an example of the interplay between inner logic of development (the negation of elements of an earlier position), and outer, situational

logic (the disappearance of *Soviet* philosophical culture). Some philosophers presented alternatives to elements of the predominant Soviet theory, by denying the idea of progress in philosophy (Dobrokhotov), by stressing the individual act of thought as the essential moment in philosophy (Mamardašvili), and by ascribing primacy to logic in the history of philosophy (Bibler). Others developed lines that were already present in Soviet times by pointing out the determinants of philosophy (Kamenskij), by focusing on the importance of the subjective strife for truth (Čanyšev), and by elaborating the notions of concrete situation and personal origin [*ličnostnoe načalo*] of philosophical thought (Motrošilova).

Three Radical Reactions

In his article on 'the real progress in metaphysics since Parmenides' Dobrokhotov simply disregarded the 'revolution in philosophy' by Marx and Engels.[72] In Soviet philosophy, metaphysics was not seen as a philosophical discipline, but as a philosophical *method* opposed to *dialectics*, and all questions that traditionally fell within the scope of metaphysics were supposed to be answered by *diamat*. For Dobrokhotov, by contrast, metaphysics is the central discipline of philosophy, and its questions remain unresolved, which is why it is vital to human culture:

> Indem sie ihre historische Kreise beschreibt, bewahrt die Metaphysik in der sich verändernden Welt die Identität eines gewissen 'ich' in der Weltkultur. Jeder Versuch jedoch, eine gehaltvolle Bestimmung dieses 'ich' zu geben erweist sich als erfolglos... Mit unbedingter Notwendigkeit zwingt die Metaphysik zur Freiheit. Darin kann man schon jetzt eine Rechtfertigung ihrer Existenz finden, ohne auf eine Antwort auf die gestellten Fragen zu warten...[73]

Dobrokhotov's conception of philosophy is strongly historical, but he rejects the idea of a "linear progress of metaphysics."[74] Philosophy is historical, but not in the sense of yielding irreversible results: it exists only as a reflection upon its own past, but every attempt to understand, say, Parmenides, adds something to philosophy.[75]

Mamardašvili incarnated the idea of the presence of past philosophy in actual philosophical thought [Ch.2.vii]. At a 'round table' on phenomenology, he expounded the view that the phenomenological movement (Husserl and his school), represents "a special technique" to resuscitate the eternal phenomenological problem of absolute individuality, manifest in every act of thinking: "*Ich denke*" (Kant), or "*cogito, ergo sum*" (Descartes).[76] Phenomenology is a constitutive element of every philosophy, since "for me, the problem of phenomenology is the problem of pure thought," i.e. of the *event* of thinking, an event that is, evidently, distinguishable from its content.[77]

If every philosophy contains these 'phenomenological problems', their appearance in philosophy does not depend on the historical sequence of philosophies. This is also why the role of phenomenology in Soviet philosophy did not depend on familiarity with Husserl:

...what I know about phenomenology, in the sense of a problem, did not come to me from Husserl at all. And it is not important whether I knew that all of it had already been done, in other terms, by Husserl. ...the living existence of a thought does not depend on whether I know it textologically or not. (...) ...phenomenological problems came into our philosophy independently of our assimilation of Husserl. (...) ...in my case it went via Marx...[78]

Even though Mamardašvili's conception of philosophy is strongly historical, too, he rejects the idea that history of philosophy "is the only philosophical task, attainable for the present time."[79] For Mamardašvili, philosophy arises from the "relation of man to the world, to the objects" as part of the "experience of consciousness:"

...the essential, constitutive acts of consciousness and of our spirituality always take place against the background of what might be named the experience of consciousness. Not consciousness of something, but the experience of consciousness itself as a particular kind of ontologically implanted being..., a certain non-verbal or terminologically indivisible state of 'I am, I think', which on the verge of utmost individuation... continues our (your, my), for ourselves indubitable, living existence in the world. But here I would like to remark that on the verge of that individuation an utmost universalization simultaneously takes place.[80]

When we understand what Descartes had in mind when he formulated his '*cogito, ergo sum*', we are, in spite of temporal and spatial distance, in touch with *what he thought*, expressing the same phenomenon in other terms, as Kant actually did, and if somebody thinks today what another philosopher thought 300 years ago, that is not plagiarism, but a resuscitation of his thought:

...we are alive in the act that we perform now, if we keep our forerunners *alive*, and not mortified in text. If Kant is alive, then I am alive, too. And if, conversely, I am alive, if I am able to contemplate something Kantian as a possibility of my own thinking, and not of my erudition, then Kant is alive as well.[81]

Mamardašvili's view is reminiscent of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, which he criticized from a Marxist point of view 30 years earlier, demonstrating that Hegel did not work out a truly historical method, but "in fact developed a way of familiarization, assimilation of the historical heritage by the individual as the subject of culture."[82] He has obviously learned a lot from Hegel, but like Dobrokhotov he rejects the idea of progress in philosophy in the sense of 'sublation' of all previous philosophy by the latest system, which is what Soviet Marxism-Leninism retained from Hegel.[83] For Mamardašvili, progress in philosophy is not the *Aufhebung* of all previous philosophy, but the resuscitation of past philosophy by present philosophizing individuals as their own *possible thought*.[84] This idea is a forceful antidote to the 'objectivism' in Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, including the position of Bogomolov and Ojzerman.

In a similar vein, Bibler elaborated the notion of a "logical expanse" in which "the possible answers of, say, Plato to Aristotle's criticism become real; the philosophy

of Plato develops [*razvivaetsja*] (develops *itself* [*razvivaetsebja*]) *not at the expense of a transition to another system* (not at the cost of 'sublation' [*snjatie*]...), but as the infinite development of all potential possibilities of platonism in a discussion (about logical principles) with Aristotle, but also with Plotinus, or with Nicholas of Cusa, or again with Kant and Hegel..."[85] Philosophy does not exist in the systems themselves, but "'in the interspace [*v promežutke*]' between" them, it "exists and develops in the logical communication (dialogue) between many logically simultaneous philosophical systems and doctrines:"

> Thus, the profound philosophical meaning of that same *Ethica* of Spinoza is revealed, if we (the investigators) discover (this discovery is also a phenomenon of the philosophical-logical movement of thought), that the idea, for example, of Spinozian 'substance' is a particular relationship between the *two* substances of Descartes (thought and extension), that the conversion of the Cartesian substances into *attributes* (in Spinoza's sense) is at the same time a substantial understanding of the notion of attributivity.[86]

Like Mamardašvili, Bibler lays full stress on the *act* of philosophical thought, when he argues that "only what exists on the border of philosophy *and* philosophy ...is the phenomenon of philosophizing [*filosofstvovanie*]."[87] This is naturally at the expense of the *output* of thought, the philosophical theories and systems, usually regarded as the proper subject matter of history of philosophy as a discipline. The fact that philosophical thought necessarily exists as *act* does not imply that history of philosophy should limit itself to an exploration of "*philosophical logic*, i.e. the logical (?) foundation of the indivisible *principles of thought* (which are the same as the *principles of being*, that can be founded by thought)," but if we follow Bibler this is what historians of philosophy should do:

> History of philosophy is not simply one of the properly philosophical disciplines; it is philosophy *par excellence*, in its pure form, without its (of philosophy, that is) conversion, or more precisely, degenerations into metaphysical systems...[88]

Bibler's main source of inspiration is Hegel, but with a major correction:

> The Hegelian schematism of the identity of 'logic and history of philosophy' is an appearance [*fenomen*] of philosophy as *true scientific doctrine*. For Hegel, philosophy is... the doctrine of the principles of scientific-theoretical knowledge... Such a philosophy is congenial to Modernity, congenial to *knowing reason* [*oznajuščij razum*; '*die wissende Vernunft*', EvdZ] (beginning with the philosophy of the 17th century –Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz– and ending with classical German philosophy of the 19th century, including Neo-Kantianism...).[89]

Modelling philosophy after science, Hegel was forced to introduce a quasi-cumulative conception of philosophy as the self-knowledge of substantial reality as it *gradually*, in and through history, came into being. This implies, within the Hegelian conception, the notion of *progress* ["die *letzte* Philosophie ist das Resultat aller früheren"], as well as the notion of *irreversibility* ["man kann jetzt nicht mehr Platoniker sein"], notions enthusiastically adopted by Soviet philosophy, and just as

enthusiastically rejected by Bibler, who stresses the *opposite* tendency in Hegel's thought, that of the logic "at work" in the history of philosophy [see Ch.1.ii]. The absolutization of logic implies a *radical* de-historization of philosophy which allows Bibler to point out that all possible philosophical positions are possibilities of present philosophical thought.[90]

The three contributions just discussed are radical reactions to key elements of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, and they reopen a field of discussion that had been blocked by official Soviet philosophy and its ideology. In doing so, they show signs of absolutization and 'over-reaction'. To deny monolinear development is not to deny all development, to hold that the questions of metaphysics are a sufficient justification of its existence does not exclude that the answers are relevant only because they are claimed to be true, and to agree that a Hegelian position is a real possibility of present thought because it is a logical possibility of thought as such, does not exclude that the Hegelian position could only be developed *because* and *after* Kant had developed *his* position. And not only had it to be *thought*, but also fixated as a *theory* and objectivized as a *text*. We can only 'reach' Kant's thought through objectifications of his thought, and the 'logical expanse' that we enter when we 'think what Kant thought' is a partial *reconstruction* of that expanse, taking its departure from a particular position *within* it, generated by problems that occupy us today. Finally, philosophy is historical in an important, 'epochal' sense excluded by Bibler's conception: Platonism is a possibility of present thought, but it cannot be the 'philosophy of its time', because its time is past.

Three Valuable Corrections

Other, more moderate corrections brought out elements that were underexposed in Soviet theory. A first example is Kamenskij, who, in a trilogy that has not received due attention, develops a "system of historical knowledge of philosophy," i.e. a theory of the objective historical process of philosophy and a theory of the history of philosophy as a discipline.[91] He thus continues a line present in the mainstream position, but without the latter's absolutization of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. Kamenskij emphasizes the opposition between history of philosophy as a primarily *philosophical* discipline, elaborated by Hegel, and history of philosophy as a primarily *historical* discipline, to be practised independently of 'systematic' philosophy.

This clear distinction of a (philosophical) theory of the historical process of philosophy, and a theory of *IFN* as a discipline is a major improvement upon the identification of the two in Soviet conceptions [Ch.6.i], which enables Kamenskij to trace back the "history of philosophy as the reproduction... of the historical process of philosophy" to Aristotle.[92] In Kamenskij's terminology this is the *second* history of philosophy, the *first* being the historical process itself [see Ch.4.iii]. He divides the development of the *third* history of philosophy, i.e. the theory of the first and the second history of philosophy, into three periods: a period of sporadic reflection (from Aristotle until the 17th century), a transitory period (until Kant, the first to formulate a theoretical conception, and from Kant to Hegel),

and "the period of the development of conceptualized reflection – of... a special discipline (from Hegel to the present day)" [see Ch.1.i].[93]

Kamenskij elaborates the notion of a *triple determination* of philosophy: it is determined, first of all, by a "subject matter determinant," i.e. by what it is about, viz "the forms of universality," secondly, by "the socio-historical... conditions in which a thinker lives and works," and, thirdly, by the tradition from which a philosopher departs.[94] Kamenskij's distinctions are clear and illuminating, but in his conception the individual philosopher appears only as the contingent *individuation* of philosophy; in this respect, a major flaw of the Soviet (and the Hegelian) conception is as apparent in his conception as it was in the conception of Bogomolov and Ojzerman [Ch.6.iii].

Another traditional flaw of Soviet history of philosophy was its tendency to identify philosophy as a part of ideology. One Soviet specialist in philosophy of Antiquity, Čanyšev, in reaction to an article that was highly critical of the official Soviet account of the history of philosophy, arrived at a separation (instead of a distinction) of the epistemic and the ideological function of philosophy, and a denial of the partisan nature of philosophy:

> ...to reduce the objective historical process of philosophy only to this ideological function is incorrect. The moving force of philosophy as an objective rational world-view process was not struggle for the sake of struggle, but striving for truth, for an understanding of the world in which people live... (...) Philosophy is essentially impartial.[95]

Slightly exaggerating (after all, neither Lenin nor official Soviet philosophy regarded 'struggle for the sake of struggle' as the moving force of philosophy's development), Čanyšev put all the blame for the notion of *partijnost'* on Lenin:

> Declaring, that philosophy always has been partisan, V.I. Lenin prepared a sad and disgraceful future for philosophy and philosophers: for philosophy, the lot to be... a handmaid of politics, and for philosophers, the lot of being the certified lackeys of partocracy [*diplomirovannykh lakeev partokratii*]...[96]

Čanyšev rightly observes that both the epistemic and the ideological function of philosophy are present in "the objective historical process of philosophy," and that a separation of the two does not imply that history of philosophy should completely disregard the ideological function.[97] But he points out an important aspect, viz that for there to be philosophy it takes individuals who aim at a true understanding of the world, and who, in doing so, disregard the eventual ideological function of the results of their strife. The fact that this recognition appears as a critique of Soviet philosophical practice shows that theoretical truth was seen as the automatic product of the development of philosophy, not as the aim of an individual endeavor.[98]

A forceful 'individualist' amendment, finally, was made by Motrošilova, who linked it to the notion of the concrete existence of philosophy in history. In her earlier studies on 17th century philosophy of man, Motrošilova attempted to solve the old

question of how social and political history determines philosophy's history and to what extent philosophy is autonomous [Ch.5.ii]. Refusing to regard great philosophers as "straightforward and conscious partisans of revolutionary socio-political reforms of that era," she interpreted 17th century philosophy of man as a *reaction* to rapidly changing social and political conditions and as a conscious *assimilation* by the people involved of their own objective position within those conditions.[99]

When Motrošilova investigated, in 1990, the ways in which classical German philosophy was both conditioned by its epoch *and*, by virtue of its understanding of its epoch, one of the factors in *making* it, she developed a theory of the "general mechanisms of the socio-historical conditionedness [*social'no-istoričeskaja obuslovlennost'*] of philosophical knowledge."[100] In 1991, turning her theory into practice, Motrošilova tried to make ideas, taken from the history of philosophy, *work* in concrete situations; she not only resumed her theoretical model in a discussion of selected chapters from the history of philosophy, but included it in an awareness of what she herself is doing, including the '*otsebjatina*' involved:

> ...this book... is about *the role of the personal origin in philosophy*. The search of creative, humanist spiritual structures of the person, oriented towards universal human ideas and values, that is perhaps the main requirement of our time and of the coming epoch. (...) It is *me* that is appealing to the readers, appealing to them directly, 'from myself [*ot sebja*]'...[101]

In Motrošilova's model of the interrelation of philosophy and the historical development of society three levels are discerned: civilization, epoch, and historical situation.[102] She rightly adopts a realist interpretation of the Hegelian concept of epoch as a stage in the development of World Spirit, of which the most general level is that of *civilization*, "the dimension of the contradictory, spasmodic development of mankind since barbarianism," a universal and generally progressive movement.[103] This development takes place as a succession of *epochs*, "large-scale stages in the development of human civilization."[104] These concepts are rather traditionally Hegelian, but Motrošilova introduces a third level, implied by Hegel's notion of concreteness, but hardly elaborated in his philosophy, viz *historical situation*. It is at this concrete level of historical existence of philosophical thought that regional, national, social, political, *and personal* factors come into play. This third level is of crucial importance, and at this point Motrošilova's ideas are a valuable contribution to a realist conception of the history of philosophy. At the same time, it helps us understand how in the concrete situation of Soviet philosophical culture *IFN* was one of the places where the culture of philosophy was preserved.

Conclusion

'Is philosophy a science?' Most contemporary Western philosophers will find it difficult to give a definite answer to this question, even if they tend do so in the affirmative. The reason for this, I think, is that it is a pseudo-empirical question: the affirmative answer, 'Philosophy is a science', as well as the negative answer 'Philosophy is not a science' are not mere descriptive statements, but they state a *norm*. Philosophers who hold that philosophy is a science will draw a line between 'good' (scientific) and 'bad' philosophy. This applies to analytical philosophy and phenomenology alike, and it also applies to Soviet philosophy. In all three cases, the affirmative answer to the question 'Is philosophy a science?' founds a field of intellectual activity that is as close to 'normal science' as philosophy can get.

The definition of philosophy as a science answers a more fundamental 'meta-philosophical' question: 'What is philosophy?' Obviously, every scientific discipline presupposes an answer to this 'What is...?' question, but it is only in the case of philosophy that the question *about* the discipline is a question *of* the discipline at the same time. Philosophy is *reflexive* in a way no other discipline is: every act of philosophical thought is a self-determination of philosophy, and it therefore is no wonder that the question 'What is philosophy?' has become a fundamental, perhaps even the most fundamental question of philosophy.

Soviet philosophy, too, presupposed an answer to this question, defining philosophy as 'science of the most general laws of development' or as 'scientific-philosophical world-view' [2.i, 2.iii]. In the case of Soviet philosophy, this self-determination of philosophy was dogmatic, and the question itself was excluded from discussion: the scientific nature of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism was as much part of the ideology of Soviet philosophy as was the notion of 'partisanship [*partijnost'*]' that legitimatized the inclusion of philosophy in the Soviet political system and its subordination to a primarily ideological function [2.i.-iv]. This explains why Mamardašvili, permanently raising this question, could only do so in the margin of Soviet philosophical culture [2.vi]. And when the question 'Is philosophy a science?' was raised, in 1989, this already marked the end of Soviet philosophical culture [2.viii].

This culture depended, from its foundation in the 1920s and 1930s, on a dogmatic, politically secured answer to the 'basic question' of philosophy, an answer given -or supposed to be given- by a 'system' of dialectial materialism that colonized the field traditionally covered by two central philosophical disciplines: metaphysics and epistemology [2.i-2.iii]. As a result, creative philosophical thought took place in a number of specialist disciplines, where fundamental philosophical questions could be evaded or addressed indirectly [2.v-vii]. One of these disciplines, increasingly important as a 'niche' where a certain level of philosophical culture was preserved, was *istoriko-filosofskaja nauka*, *IFN* [2.vi, 4.i-ii].

IFN was not only one of the applications of dialectical and historical materialism, it also was the concluding part of the Soviet philosophical system, yielding its 'historical self-awareness' and, at the same time, part of its ideological self-defence. *IFN* accomodated the heritage of the *klassiki marksizma-leninizma*, who

had not left an elaborated Marxist theory of the history of philosophy, but a set of tendentially conflicting impulses [1.iii, 3.i-iv]; it investigated, with an increasing level of professionalism and 'ideological neutrality', a considerable part of the history of philosophy in all parts of the world [3.v, 4.iii-iv, 5]; and it developed a theory of the history of philosophy, as a process and as a discipline, that determined -in the sense of limiting and founding- *IFN* as part of Soviet philosophical culture [6].

The value of the theoretical conceptions of philosophy's history, developed within the framework of *IFN*, for a better understanding of the historical nature of philosophy is limited but real, especially since these conceptions, departing from the reductionism present in the Marxist heritage, arrived at a restoration of philosophical problems, theories, and, finally, individual philosophical thought as the proper subject matter of the history of philosophy as a discipline [6.ii]. A focus on individual philosophical thought as the necessary condition and the concrete realization of philosophy means the reintroduction of the fundamental question 'What is philosophy?', a question that *has* to be answered, implicitly or explicitly, dogmatically or not, by every philosophizing individual [7.iv-v]. In this sense, the development of *IFN* led to a restoration of philosophical thought at the expense of the 'system', but this restoration could only fully manifest itself in the period of *perestrojka*, showing the hidden tendencies at work before [7.i, 7.iii, 7.v].

Istoriko-filosofskaja nauka - scientific history of philosophy, history of philosophy *as a science*. Is history of philosophy a science? What is its status as a discipline [1.i]? If history of philosophy is an historical discipline, then it is scientific to the extent to which history is a science. If it is a philosophical discipline, it is scientific if philosophy is a science. If it is both, it contains a tension which must and will manifest itself in every philosophical culture that allows the free development of conflicting philosophical positions [1.i]. Soviet philosophy was not such a philosophical culture, which explains why, in trying to prevent such a development of conflicting perspectives, it gradually returned to a 'Hegelian' conception of the history of philosophy, reimporting both its strong and its problematic sides [6.iii].

Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, as a process and and a discipline, has remained a major point of reference, positively and negatively, in philosophy of the history of philosophy [1.ii]. Hegel arguably was the last Western philosopher who conceived of philosophy as a system of scientific disciplines, and who conceived of history of philosophy as a concluding part of a philosophical system, in which it looks back upon the historical develoment that led to 'knowledge [*epistème*, *Wissen*]'. From this angle, Soviet philosophy in general, and *IFN* in particular, presented an anachronism in the 20th century. It was a unique example of a specific type of philosophical culture, tied up with an oppressive socio-political system, but also realizing a conception of philosophy that, whether we like it or not, lies at the heart of the Western philosophical tradition. For this reason alone, it continues to deserve our attention.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER ONE

1. Lenin, *PSS* XXIX, p.131.

2. Cf. Wetter 1964 and Grujić 1969.

3. Peperzak 1989, p.19.

4. Cf. Geldsetzer 1968; for a general survey of positions, see Hösle 1984, pp.22-43; for an introduction to the problems involved: Schneider 1988.

5. Cf. Gouhier 1948², E. Castelli 1956, Braun 1973 and 1985, Guéroult 1984-1988 and 1979, Ehrhardt 1967, Hösle 1984, Schneider 1990 and 1992, Copleston 1979, Rorty 1984, Holland 1985, Peperzak 1981, Lavine 1989, Gracia 1992, and Holz 1992.

6. Cf. Hösle 1984, p.12, and Gracia 1992, who does refer to Bréhier, Braun and Guéroult, but not to Hösle, Schneider or Düsing.

7. The only extensive study of Soviet historiography of philosophy so far was the dissertation by M.L. Rybarczyk (Rybarczyk 1975); Hösle limits himself to a brief mention of that text, thereby totally ignoring the much more interesting work done by Soviet scholars *after* 1975 (cf. Hösle 1984, p.30, n.20); Braun, Rorty, Holland, Peperzak, Gracia, and even the Marxist Holz do not mention the subject.

8. Cf. Hösle 1984, pp.17-22, Kamenskij 1984, pp.113-125, idem 1992, pp.5-8, and Gracia 1992, pp.42ff.

9. Cf. Guéroult 1979 and 1984-1988, Braun 1973 and 1985, Hösle 1984, Schneider 1990, and Gracia 1992.

10. Cf. Geldsetzer 1968.

11. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics A 3* [983b].

12. Cf. H.S. Long, 'Introduction', in: Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, with an English translation by R.D. Hicks [Loeb Classical Library, vols. 184 - 185] (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP & London: Heinemann, (1925) 1980), p.xvi; cf. also the subtitle of Thomas Stanley's *Historia philosophiae* (1655): 'vitas opiniones, resque gestas et dicta philosophorum'.

13. Cf., for example, Thomas Stanley's *The History of Philosophy* (London 1655, fourth edition in 1743), several times translated into Latin, and the standard history of philosophy for nearly a century.

14. J. Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabilis ad nostram aetatem perducta* (Leipzig 1742; a shorter version was reprinted several times).

15. Kant, *Preisschrift...*, A 21 [*Werke* VI, p.595]; cf I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 852 / B 880 [*Werke* IV, p.709].

16. Kant, *Preisschrift...*, A 21 [*Werke* VI, p.595].

17. Cf. Geldsetzer in Gründer *et al.* 1990, p.914f, and Guéroult 1984-1988, vol.2, p.399.

18. Thus, in the *Enzyklopädie* ..., philosophy as historically developing is assigned a place in the *system* of philosophy itself (cf. Hegel, *Werke* VIII, p.58 [Enz. § 13]); cf. also Walsh 1965, p.72.

19. Two incomplete manuscript versions have survived (cf. Helferich 1979, p.93); Hegel taught history of philosophy 9 times between 1805 and 1831 (cf 'Anmerkung der Redaktion zu Band 18, 19 und 20', in: Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.520, and Helferich 1979, p.93).

20. Cf. Düsing 1983, p.1.

21. Cf. Passmore 1972², p.226, and Hösle 1984, pp.17-22.

22. Cf. Peperzak 1989, p.24, and Gracia 1992, pp.253-276.

23. Cf. Gracia 1992, pp.234-252.

24. Cf. Peperzak 1989, p.31.

25. Cf. Hösle 1984, pp.38-41, and Geldsetzer in Gründer et al. 1990, p.905.

26. Cf. Gracia 1992, pp.1-11, and pp.318-323; cf. also Passmore 1972², p.228.

27. Cf. Passmore 1972², p.229.

28. Cf. Hösle 1984, pp.43-50, and Gracia 1992, pp.318-323.

29. Cf. on various types of reductionism Passmore 1972², p.228f, Hösle 1984, pp.26-38 and pp.51-54, Geldsetzer in Gründer *et al.* 1990, p.907, and Gracia 1992, pp.225-233.

30. Cf. Helferich 1979, p.90, and Geldsetzer 1990, p.906.

31. Cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 880 [*Werke* IV, p.709], Hegel, *Werke* X, p.393 [§ 574], XVIII, p.46 and p.134f.

32. Both have been the subject of numerous studies: a bibliography, composed by Flay in 1974, mentions no less than 787 publications dealing with Hegel's theory and practice of history of philosophy (J.C. Flay, 'Bibliography', in: O'Malley *et al.* 1974,

pp.194-236.), while Düsing gives 226 titles (Düsing 1983, pp.250ff.). In the two decades since Flay's bibliography, the number of studies no doubt has grown considerably. Moreover, only a few of the many Russian and Soviet sources are included by Flay and Düsing (cf. Düsing 1983, p.14.).

33. Making use of Hollak 1962, Walsh 1965, Geldsetzer 1968, Flay 1974, Helferich 1979, Düsing 1983, and of course Hegel himself, viz of the 'Einleitung' to his *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, and the concluding paragraphs (§§ 572-577) of the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*; I use the most accessible edition, which comprises, as far as the *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* are concerned, the compilation of *Nachschriften* by Michelet, already criticized as cut-and-paste work by Hoffmeister (cf. Helferich 1979, p.93); the critical edition of both Hegel's manuscripts and of the so-called *Nachschriften* is currently being published, and any serious scholarly discussion must take these into account.

34. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.24, and XX, p.467.

35. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.36, and XX, pp.471ff.

36. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.34f.

37. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, pp.28ff, and XX, p.473.

38. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.37, XX, p.473; cf. Walsh 1965, p.71f.

39. Cf. Caponigri 1974, p.3.

40. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.25f, p.29, and p.37.

41. "Wenn wir nun so diese Bestimmungen von Konkret und Entwicklung festhalten, so erhält die Natur des Mannigfaltigen einen ganz anderen Sinn..." (Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.52); cf. also Geldsetzer 1968, p.49f, Düsing 1983, p.25f, and Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, pp.39ff, pp.42ff.

42. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.461; cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.38 and p.57, and *Werke* VIII, p.58 [§ 13]).

43. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.455.

44. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.476.

45. Hegel, *Werke* X, p.393 [Enz. § 574].

46. Hegel, *Werke* X, p.379 [Enz. § 573].

47. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.48.

48. Cf. Helferich 1979, p.91, Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.70, XX, p.485, and XVIII, p.117: "In der Geschichte tritt daher die Philosophie nur da auf, wo und insofern freie Verfassungen sich bilden."

49. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.478; cf. also XVIII, p.49, Düsing 1983, p.34, and Hegel, *Werke* VIII, p.59 [Enz. § 14]: "Dieselbe Entwicklung des Denkens, welche in der Geschichte der Philosophie dargestellt wird, wird in der Philosophie selbst dargestellt, aber befreit von jener geschichtlichen Äußerlichkeit, *rein im Elemente des Denkens*."

50. Cf. Hösle 1984, p.87, Lauer 1974, p.22, and Helferich 1979, p.94.

51. Cf. Hösle 1984, p.85f, Düsing 1983, p.26 and p.30, Henrich 1971, and Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.49: "Ferner unterscheidet sich allerdings auch nach einer Seite die Folge als Zeitfolge der Geschichte von der Folge in der Ordnung der Begriffe. Wo diese Seite liegt, dies näher zu zeigen, würde uns aber von unserem Zwecke zu weit abführen" (cf. also XX, p.478f).

52. Hegel, *Werke* VIII, p.58 [§ 13]; cf. also XVIII, p.21 and 61, and XX, p.455, 465, and 510.

53. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.455.

54. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.461; on the historian's perspective cf. Hegel, *Werke* XII, p.114.

55. Hollak 1962, p.355.

56. Ibid., p.354, and Hösle 1984, p.90.

57. According to Hösle, this is indeed the case (Hösle 1984, p.744); the idea that Hegel indeed concluded the Modern stage (Descartes - Hegel) in the historical development of philosophy is not only present in Hösle: we can find it in encyclopedia entries, like H. Berger, entry 'Zekerheid', in: Willemsen 1992, p.490, and also in Vl. Solov'ëv: "... his general meta-philosophical conclusion is that Hegel was to philosophy what Louis XIV was to the nation-state: both led to the decline of what they stood for – rationalist philosophy and absolute monarchy (Kline 1974, p.162)."

58. Cf. Caponigri 1974.

59. Cf. especially Düsing 1983, p.31f.

60. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* X, p.353 [Enz. § 552]: "Der denkende Geist der Weltgeschichte aber, indem er zugleich jene Beschränktheiten [as the concrete, *bestimmte* incarnation of *Weltgeist*, EvdZ] der besonderen Volksgeister und seine eigene Weltlichkeit abstreift, erfaßt seine konkrete Allgemeinheit und erhebt sich zum *Wissen des absoluten Geistes*, als der ewig wirklichen Wahrheit, in welcher die wissende Vernunft frei für sich ist und die Notwendigkeit, Natur und Geschichte nur seiner Offenbarung dienend und Gefäße seiner Ehre sind."

61. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.73f, and XX, p.482.

62. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.508f, and XVIII, pp.54ff; cf. also Flay 1974, p.56f.

63. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.74f: "...die Philosophie... ist Wissen des Substantiellen ihrer Zeit. (...) Die Philosophie steht jedoch andererseits der Form nach über ihrer Zeit, indem sie als das Denken dessen, was der substantielle Geist derselben ist, ihn sich zum Gegenstande macht."

64. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.131f and Hösle 1984, p.749.

65. Hegel, *Werke* VII, p.26, and XVIII, p.73.

66. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.38, and p.54: "Die große Präsumption, daß es auch nach dieser Seite in der Welt vernünftig zugegangen – was der Geschichte der Philosophie erst wahrhaftes Interesse gibt..."

67. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, pp.25ff, and Düsing 1983, p.31.

68. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.54f.

69. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.53.

70. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.56.

71. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.57.

72. Cf. Düsing 1983, p.30f, and Hösle 1984, p.169f.

73. "Die Zufälligkeit muß man mit dem Eintritt in die Philosophie aufgeben (Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.55)."

74. Hegel: "...man muss... diese reinen Begriffe *in dem zu erkennen* wissen, was die geschichtliche Gestalt enthält (*Werke* XX, p.478)," and: "...um in der empirischen Gestalt und Erscheinung, in der die Philosophie geschichtlich auftritt, ihren Fortgang als Entwicklung der Idee zu erkennen, muss man freilich die Erkenntnis der Idee schon mitbringen (ibid. p.479);" cf. also *Werke* XVIII, p.49 and p.67.

75. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.479f.

76. Cf. Passmore 1972, p.228.

77. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.56f: "Das Verhalten gegen eine Philosophie muß also eine affirmative und eine negative Seite enthalten; dann erst lassen wir einer Philosophie Gerechtigkeit widerfahren."

78. "Die Gegenwart ist das Höchste (Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.456)"; cf. Hösle 1984, p.94.

79. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.65.

80. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.65; cf. also XX, p.461, Düsing 1983, p.36, Walsh 1965, p.74 and Geldsetzer 1968, p.52.

81. Likewise, Hösle does not do justice to the "tremendous diversity of philosophies" in past and present (Oger 1985, p.177).

82. Hösle 1984, p.159.

83. Cf. Marx / Engels, *MEW*, Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, pp.257-373, *MEW* XXI, pp.259-307, Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, and *PSS* XXIX, pp.219-278.

84. Cf. also Kamenskij 1992, p.15.

85. K. Marx an F. Lassalle (1858), [*MEW* XXIX], p.549; cf. Marx, *Die Doktordissertation*, [*MEW* Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil], p.261.

86. F. Engels an C. Schmidt (1891), [*MEW* XXXVIII], p.204.

87. Lenin, *PSS* XXIX, p.263, 267, 261, 250.

88. Cf. Irrlitz *et al.* 1985, p.5f; cf. also Bocheński 1967b, p.192.

89. Irrlitz *et al.* 1985, p.14, 16.

90. Irrlitz *et al.* 1985, p.9, 12, 16.

91. Kamenka 1965, p.84; cf. also Irrlitz *et al.* 1985, p.40, the 'Vorwort' in *MEW* Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, p.vi, ibid., p.664, n.31, and Ojzerman 1986[3], pp.39-57 [translation: Ojzerman 1980b, pp.58-83].

92. In his doctoral dissertation we find Marx' famous dictum "Prometheus ist der vornehmste Heilige und Märtyrer im philosophischen Kalender" [*MEW* Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, p.263]; cf. also Irrlitz *et al.* 1985, p.39.

93. Marx, *MEW* Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, p.261f; cf. Irrlitz *et al.* 1985, p.42.

94. Kamenka 1965, p.84f.

95. Marx, *MEW* Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, p.305.

96. Cf. *MEW* III, pp.5-7.

97. Marx & Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie* [*MEW* III], p.27.

98. Op.cit., p.8f; the concept of 'social consciousness' was deduced from this text by orthodox Marxism, but is not present in it: Marx speaks of 'gesellschaftliche Bewußtseinsformen', i.e. 'social forms of consciousness', not of 'forms of social consciousness' ('Formen des gesellschaftlichen Bewußtseins').

99. Cf. Lenin, *PSS* XXVI, p.56, Aleksandrov 1937, p.38, and Scanlan 1985, p.184f.

100. Kamenka 1965, p.92.

101. Marx & Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie* [*MEW* III], p.26f.

102. Op.cit., p.90.

103. Cf. also Marx' defence of the "dead dog [*toter Hund*]" Hegel in the 'Preface' of *Das Kapital* [*MEW* XXIII], p.27, Marx' letter to Kugelmann of 1870 [*MEW* XXXII], p.685f, and Engels, *Dialektik der Natur* [*MEW* XX], p.334f.

104. Kamenka 1965, p.92.

105. Engels, *MEW* XXI, p.274f.

106. Cf. Engels' famous remark, concluding his *Ludwig Feuerbach*...: "Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung ist die Erbin der deutschen klassischen Philosophie" [*MEW* XXI, p.307].

107. Engels, *MEW* XXI, p.302.

108. Engels, *MEW* XXI, p.270: "Mit Hegel schließt die Philosophie überhaupt ab; einerseits weil er ihre ganze Entwicklung in seinem System in der großartigsten Weise zusammenfaßt, andrerseits weil er uns, wenn auch unbewußt, den Weg zeigt aus diesem Labyrinth der Systeme zur wirklichen Erkenntnis der Welt"; cf. ibid., p.306.

109. Cf. *MEW* XXI, p.294.

110. Kamenka 1965, p.92f.

111. Ballestrem 1963a, p.113.

112. Kamenka 1965, p.93.

113. Engels, *MEW* XX, p.330; the quotation occurs from Iovčuk 1970, p.14 to the draft version of the last Soviet *učebnik* in philosophy, *Vvedenie*..., *FN* 1988, p.96; in the final version the reference to Engels was replaced by a neutral "as is well known" (Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.12).

114. Irrlitz & Lübke limit themselves to this development, bracketing the *Totalitätsgesichtspunkt* (p. 6).

115. Cf. Kamenka 1965, p.93.

116. Cf. Petrović 1972, p.349.

117. Cf. op.cit., p.348.

118. Plekhanov 1976, p.358.

119. Ibid., p.358f, and Petrović 1972, p.348.

120. Plekhanov 1976c, p.365; cf. Edie *et al.* 1976[2], III, p.356: "In reply to Populist criticism that Marxist determinism destroys freedom and therefore moral responsibility, Plekhanov turns to Spinoza and Hegel and argues that freedom in fact exists: it is the recognition of necessity"; cf. also Kołakowski 1981, III, p.380.

121. Cf. also Iovčuk *et al.* 1973-1974, III, pp.5-18.

122. Plekhanov 1976a, p.366f.

123. Cf Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, p.356; cf. also p.359: "Either materialism that is consistent to the end, or the lie and confusion of philosophical idealism, – there you have the formulation of the question, that is given in *every paragraph* of 'Anti-Dühring', and which only people with brains long since spoiled [*podporčennye*] by reactionary professorial philosophy, could fail to notice"; ibid., p.360: "Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from beginning to end, they were capable of uncovering deviation from materialism and indulgences [*poblažki*] to idealism and fideism in each and every 'latest' trend"; cf. ibid., p.361.

124. V.I. Lenin, *Filosofskie tetrady*, 'Konspekt *Nauki logiki* Gegelja', in: *PSS*, XXIX, p.215.

125. Althusser was right, I believe, to draw this conclusion (cf. Althusser 1969, especially pp.42ff).

126. Cf. Lenin, 'Tri istočnika i tri sostavnykh časti marksizma', in: *PSS* XXIII, p.43.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Chernyak 1987, p.89.

2. Jeu 1969, p.23.

3. Berdjaev 1953, Losskij (1961) 1991, Levickij (1968-1981) 1996, Marcuse 1964, Kołakowski 1960, Somerville 1946 and 1974, Graham 1987[3], Bocheński 1951[2], pp.73-84 and 1967[5], Wetter 1960[5] and 1962, Dahm 1991, Blakeley 1961 and 1964, Dahm *et al.* (eds.) 1988.

4. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Dialektičeskij materializm', p.159, idem in Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], p.168, and Blauberg *et al.* 19824, entry 'Dialektičeskij materializm', p.76.

5. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], p.5.

6. Scanlan 1985, p.9.

7. Cf. Chernyak 1987, p.89.

8. Cf. V.I. Lenin, 'O značenii voinstvujuščego materializma', in: *PSS* XXXV, p.24; J.V. Stalin, *O dialektičeskom i istoričeskom materializme*, in: *PSS* XIV], p.279; N.S. Khruščëv, *K pobede v mirnom sorevnovanii s kapitalizmom* (M.: 1959), p.360, p.389 and p.427, quoted after Blakeley 1961, p.150; L.I. Brežnev, address to the XXVth CPSU-congress, published in *Pravda* 25/02/1976, p.8, quoted after Huber 1977, p.350 (translation from the Russian original Huber's, from the French mine, EvdZ); Ju.V. Andropov, 'Učenie Karla Marksa i nekotorye voprosy socialističeskogo stroitel'stva v SSSR', *VF* 1983, N°4, p.3; K.U. Černenko, *Izbrannye reči i stat'i* (M.: 1984[2]), p.501, quoted after V.E. Kozlovskij, 'Protivorečija v uslovijakh socializma', *VF* 1984, N°8, p.13, and idem, *Na uroven' trebovanij razvitogo socializma; nekotorye aktual'nye problemy teorii, strategii i taktiki KPSS* (M.: 1984), p.3f, quoted after L.F. Il'ičëv, G.A. Davydova, 'Materialističeskaja dialektika i problema razvitija (*stat'ja pervaja*)', *VF* 1985, N°3, p.13; M.S. Gorbačëv, 'Doklad general'nogo sekretarja CK KPSS', in: *Materialy XXVII s"ezda KPSS*, p.84.

9. Vasil'ev 1984, p.54.

10. Cf. Jakovlev 1992, p.4: "If it is at all possible to speak of a smoldering fire of philosophical thought during all those years, then only in terms of the phenomenon of 'inner emigration' or 'catacomb culture';" cf. also Zamaleev 1995, p.172.

11. Cf., for example, Mamardašvili 1991a, p.20.

12. Cf. Planty-Bonjour 1965, p.149f [in the English translation p.129f].

13. Cf. Blauberg *et al.* 19824, entry 'Formy obščestvennogo soznanija', p.372, cf. also Konstantinov 1982[6], p.316 and Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, entry 'Obščestvennoe bytie i obščestvennoe soznanie', p.448.

14. Blauberg *et al.* 19824, entry 'Obščestvennoe bytie i obščestvennoe soznanie', p.223.

15. Cf. Blauberg *et al.* 19824, entries 'Nauka', p.200f, and 'Proizvoditel'nye sily', p.270, as well as Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, I.S. Alekseev, entry 'Nauka', p.403.

16. Blauberg *et al.* 19824, entry 'Ideologija', p.105; cf. also Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, V.Ž. Kelle, entry 'Ideologija', p.200.

17. Blauberg *et al.* 19824, entry 'Mirovozzrenie', p.186; cf. also Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, M.P. Mčedlov, Z.M. Pavlova, entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.345, and op.cit., A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Mirovozzrenie', p.376.

18. Blauberg *et al.* 19824, entry 'Filosofija', p.366.

19. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.726; cf. Jeu 1969, p.80.

20. Hegel, *Werke* X, pp.348-352 [Enz. § 549, Anm.], *Werke* XVIII, p.136f, and Hegel 1959, pp.134ff.

21. Cf. Utekhin 1961, p.406.

22. Ignatow 1988, p.63f.

23. *Konstitucija* ..., stat'ja 6 [p. 7]: "**Article 6**. The leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the core of its political system, of its governmental and social organizations is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (...) Armed with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Communist party determines the general prospect of development of society, the line of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive activity of the Soviet people, impacts a planned, scientifically founded character to its struggle for the victory of communism."

24. Cf. Engels, *Anti-Dühring* [*MEW* XX], p.131f: "Die Dialektik ist aber weiter nichts als die Wissenschaft von den allgemeinen Bewegungs- und Entwicklungsgesetzen der Natur, der Menschengesellschaft und des Denkens"; cf. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6],

p.17, Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Dialektičeskij materializm', p.159, Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Dialektičeskij materializm', p.76 (exactly the same formulation is given, in this work, as one of the definitions of 'Dialektika' [op. cit., p.71]), and Ožegov 1983[14], entry 'Filosofija', p.758.

25. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.731.

26. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], p.36f.

27. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], p.42f; cf. ibid., p.7.

28. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.727.

29. Lenin's position was a position *on* rather than *in* philosophy, but a meta-philosophical position is a philosophical position or presupposes one (cf. Althusser 1969, p.11); Lenin, in a letter to Maksim Gor'kij of 07/02/1908, qualified himself as a "dilettante in philosophy" (cf. Schaefer 1986, p.38, and Althusser 1969, p.16); cf. also Copleston 1986, p.310.

30. N.A. Karev in *PZM* 1924, N°4-5, p.241, and A.M. Deborin, *Lenin kak myslitel'*(M. – L.: 1929), both quoted after Jeu 1969, p.54; cf. Kołakowski 1981, III, pp.36ff.

31. Cf., for a recent account, Harding1996, pp.219-242.

32. Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, p.146, cf. ibid., p.138, Copleston 1986, p.310, and Kołakowski, II, p.509f.

33. Lenin, *PSS* XXIII, p.43; cf. Nikiforov 1990b, p.117.

34. Cf. Litschev *et al.* 1992, p.13.

35. De George 1966, p.179: "Once the revolution had been a success, the central concern of theory vis-à-vis developments in Russia could no longer be revolution; it became the construction of a communist society"; cf. idem 1967, p.50; cf. also Kołakowski 1981, III, p.181, Glazov 1985, p.53, and Shlapentokh 1990b, p.111f.

36. Cf. Košarnyj 1981, p.6, Pascal 1981, pp.82-95, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.60f, Goerdt 1984, p.71f, Hagemeister 1990, Nethercott 1991.

37. Cf. Utekhin 1961, p.579, Ballestrem 1968, p.107, Kamenka 1972, p.163, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.57, Goerdt 1984, p.71f, Nethercott 1991, p.207, and Nikiforov 1990b, p.116; for the Soviet point of view, cf. Košarnyj 1981, pp.14-42.

38. Alekseev 1990, p.14f; among them were Berdjaev, Losskij, Semën Ljudvigovič Frank (1877-1950), Dmitrij I. Čiževskij (1895-1977), Ivan Aleksandrovič Il'in (1882-1954), Sergej Nikolaevič Bulgakov (1871-1944), Lev Platonovič Karsavin (1882-1952), Boris Petrovič Vyšeslavcev [Petrov] (1877-1954), Vasilij Vasil'evič Zen'kovskij (1881-1962), Pavel Ivanovič Novgorodcev (1866-1924), Pëtr Berngardovič Struve (1870-1944), Ivan Ivanovič Lapšin (1870-1955); cf. also De George 1966, p.7, Bocheński 1967[5], p.36, Kamenka 1972, p.163, Blakeley 1980, p.317, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.58, Goerdt 1984, pp.73ff, Takho-Godi 1991, p.8, Losskij 1991, p.125, and Kogan 1993.

39. Losev became professor at the Moscow conservatory in 1922, and subsequently moved to the State Academy of Liberal Arts [*Gosudarstvennaja Akademija Khudožestvennykh Nauk*, GAKhN], led by P.S. Kogan, where he headed the department of aesthetics until the Academy was closed in 1929 (cf. Takho-Godi 1991, p.8); his philosophical works Losev managed to publish on his own during the 1920s, although he had to take censorship into account (ibid., and Hagemeister 1989, p.362, n.92); Špet was vice-president of the same GAKhN from 1924 until 1929 (cf. Il'ičëv e.a 1983, entry 'Špet', p.784); Florenskij, finally, concentrated on his work in physics and aesthetics after the October Revolution (cf. Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], entry 'Florenskij', p.710).

40. "After the victory in the Great October Revolution a start was made with the creation of a system of philosophical education, based upon the principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy" (Prokhorov *et al.* 1970-1978[3], XXVII, entry 'Filosofskoe obrazovanie', p.426; cf. also Košarnyj 1981, pp.43-71); in fact, there was no such thing as Marxism-Leninism until after Lenin's death – a fine example of rewriting history.

41. Cf. Goerdt 1984, pp.72ff, and Kołakowski 1981, III, p.57; the terms "official philosophy [*Dienstphilosophie*]" and "philosophical sects [*philosophisches Sektierertum*]" are borrowed here from

Wilhelm Goerdt, who took them from V.V. Rozanov: "*služebnaja filosofija*" and "*filosofskoe sektantstvo*" (Goerdt 1984, p.67f, and n.41); "internal pluralism [*Binnenpluralismus*]" was coined by Goerdt himself (ibid., p.71f); on the influence of Bogdanov on later Soviet thought, cf. Lecourt 1977.

42. Cf. Fetscher 1974, p.10f, and Kołakowski 1981, II, pp.538-548.

43. Cf. Lenin, *PSS* XXXXV, p.25, Ahlberg 1960, which contains an extensive bibliography, Wetter 1960[5], pp.161-204, De George 1966, pp.180-183, Bocheński 1967[5], p.38f, Goerdt 1967, Jeu 1969, pp.44-54, Kamenka 1972, p.163, Jakhot 1981, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.57, Zapata 1983, pp.25ff, Goerdt 1984, p.71ff, and Alekseev 1990; Negt 1974[2] contains texts by Deborin, Bukharin, Mitin and Stalin in German translation, Zapata 1983 offers a highly instructive introduction by D. Lecourt, 'Avant le déluge', an equally valuable analysis by Zapata, and French translations of the main texts of this period, and Goerdt 1967 contains some of the relevant texts in German translation.

44. Minin [1922] 1990.

45. Cf. Zapata 1983, p.27, Enčmen [1920] 1990, and Bukharin [1924] 1988; Enčmen seems to have survived the Great Terror and to have worked somewhere in the AN SSSR after it (cf. Alekseev *et al.* 1993, p.65).

46. Cf. Ahlberg 1960, which contains an extensive bibliography, Zapata 1983, and Negt 1974[2].

47. The title was an invention by the 'deborinist' editor, David B. Rjazanov, and the translation at places was deliberately inadequate: Engels' "Whatever pose the natural scientists may adopt, *philosophy* holds sway over them *[Kakuju by posu ni prinimali estestvoizpytateli, nad nimi vlastuet filosofija]*" was rendered as "However the natural scientists may grumble, *the philosophers* govern them [*Kak by ni upiralis' estestvoispytateli, no imi upravljajut filosofy*]" [italics mine, EvdZ] (Alekseev 1990, p.21, the German original reads: "Die Naturforscher mögen sich stellen, wie sie wollen, sie werden von der Philosophie beherrscht" (Engels, *Dialektik der Natur* [*MEW* XX], p.480). The 'mechanicists' found support in, e.g., Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach...* [*MEW* XXI], p.306, and idem, *Anti-Dühring* [*MEW* XX], p.24.

48. Cf. Graham 1987[2], p.25, and p.443, n.1 and 2, Kołakowski 1981, II, p.381, and White 1996, p. 324.

49. Cited from 'Résolution...1929', in Zapata 1983, p.238; cf. also Goerdt 1984, p.85, and Jakhot 1981, pp.51-55.

50. Cf. Mitin [1930] 1983, Jakhot 1981, p.72, Zapata 1983, p.276, and Ahlberg 1960, p.89f.

51. Cf. Deborin *et al.* [1930] 1983 and Jakhot 1981, p.73 and 91; a detailed version of the accusations is Mitin [1931] 1974.

52. Cf. Ahlberg 1960, p.103, Pascal 1974, p.1165, Jakhot 1981, p.91, Zapata 1983, p.27; important texts related to this termination of philosophical discussion are 'Aus der Resolution...' [1931] 1974, Mitin [1931] 1974, and 'Décret...', [1931] 1983, pp.318-320.

53. De George 1966, p.183. One of the last discussions was held in October 1930 at the Presidium of the Communist Academy, preceding the intervention by the CK VKP(b) on 25 January 1931, the stenographic accounts were only recently published: 'Iz istorii...' 1991, with addresses by V.P. Miljutin and Deborin; Jakhot quotes from *Raznoglasie na filosofskom fronte* (M.-L. 1931; Jakhot 1981, p.82ff), which apparently contained the same text; interesting details about the preparation of this episode –a visit by Mitin, Judin, and Ral'cevič to Deborin, proposing him to denounce his pupils and to declare Stalin a great philosopher– are related by Volkov (Volkov 1988, p.3, 3rd. col.).

54. The idea of Marxism as a philosophical and ideological doctrine [*učenie*] was present in earlier Russian Marxism as well, but there never was one dominant and obligatory doctrine – this only became urgent when a government was established that regarded itself as Marxist (cf. Goerdt 1980a).

55. Jakhot 1981, p.55, quoting *PZM* 1929, N°5, p.165.

56. Cf. Goerdt 1980b, p.235f. Apparently, Deborin was the founding father Lenin's transformation into a *klassik marksizma-*

leninizma [classic of Marxism-Leninism], and into *the* Marxist philosopher of modern times. It was not until the late 1980s that Lenin could be overtly deprived of this status (cf. Nikiforov 1990b, p.119). In 1924, a few days after Lenin's death, Deborin published 'Lenin, the Militant Materialist' (Deborin 1924, p.81). This text, published in tens of thousands of copies, represents one of the classical texts of Soviet philosophy (cf. Zapata 1983, p.78, n.1).

57. Deborin 1924, p.81, and Volkov 1988, p.3, 2nd col.: "It is precisely Deborin to whom belongs the idea, that 'Leninism is the revolutionary Marxism of the epoch of disintegration of capitalism', – an idea, borrowed by Stalin and expressed by him in a slightly altered formulation." Stalin defined Leninism as "...Marxism in the era of imperialism and of proletarian revolution. More precisely: Leninism is the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution in general, and the theory and tactics of dictatorship of the proletariat in particular" (Stalin, *PSS* VI, p.71).

58. Cf. Goerdt 1980b, p.236.

59. Cf. Lecourt, 'Avant le deluge', preface to Zapata 1983, p.15f; Zapata lists the following persons in the categories of 'liquidationists': Minin, Enčmen, Adoratskij; 'mechanicists': Timirjazev, Aksel'rod, Stepanov; 'dialecticians': Deborin, Stėn, Karev; and 'bolshevizators': Mitin, Judin, Ral'cevič, Maksimov, Kol'man (cf. Zapata 1983, p.26f).

60. Losev, *Dialektika mifa*, in Losev 1991, p.112; cf. Scanlan 1984, p.225, idem 1985, p.12, n.2, Hagemeister 1989, p.362, n.92, and Losev 1991, p.514.

61. Cf. Haardt 1993, p.190.

62. Cf. Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], entry 'Losev', p.324, and Takho-Godi 1991, p.15; cf. on the campaign against Losev in 1930: Scanlan 1984, p.224f, Goerdt 1984, p.596, n.290, Hagemeister 1985, p.23 and p.50f, n.145-149, and Haardt 1993, p.188ff. As late as 1984 the facts about Losev's fate after 1930 were, it seems, not known: Scanlan presumes that Losev "did not, apparently, suffer imprisonment or professional ostracism (op. cit., p.225)," and reports his teaching activity at the *Moscow Krupskaja Regional Pedagogical Institute* from 1931 onwards, Goerdt also reports him as teaching there as early as 1931, and mentions that he "may have been imprisoned for 10 months in 1930 (ibid.)"; today we know that he was in jail for 17 months in the Ljubjanka after his arrest on 18/04/1930, and freed from the camp in autumn 1933 (cf. Haardt 1993, p.191).

63. Cf. Goerdt 1984, p.83, and p.594, Hagemeister 1985, p.53, n.169, Zapata 1988, p.70, Goerdt 1989, p.705, Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], entry 'Florenskij', p.710, and entry 'Špet', p.751f, Zen'kovskij 1989, II, p. 369 and p.415, Alekseev 1990, p.525, P. Florenskij, *An den Wasserscheiden des Denkens; ein Lesebuch* (Berlin: Kontext Verlag, 1991), p.258, Haardt 1993, p.70, and Alekseev *et al.* 1993, p.207.

64. Graham 1987[3], p.6.

65. Donoso 1979, p.116f, quoting *Pravda*, 21/12/1929.

66. Kołakowski 1960, p.8.

67. Cf. De George 1966, p.183).

68. Cf. Mitin [1930] 1983, Mitin 1981, and Deborin *et al.* [1930] 1983, as well as Ahlberg 1960, p.89f, Jakhot 1981, p.72f, Zapata 1983, p.276, and Goerdt 1984, p.84, n.81; on Mitin cf. esp. Korolëv 1988, who recounts that Mitin, who became *akademik* in 1939 without having defended either a candidate's or a doctor's dissertation, pursued his career in spite of the fact that he was exposed as a plagiarist already in 1970 – he even was awarded the Order of the Friendship of the Peoples shortly before his death in 1986, in spite of the fact that a Party commission was investigating the many scandals related to his name.

69. Bocheński 1951[2], p.77.

70. Cf. Deborin 1924, *passim.*

71. Cf. De George 1966, p.180.

72. There was only one fundamental change, viz the elimination of the "law of the negation of negation" from the canons of materialist dialectics for obvious political reasons: if negation of negation was to be a law, the newly established Soviet state (a negation of the bourgeois state) was likely to be 'negated' during the development towards stateless communism (cf. Kołakowski 1981, III, p.122f); similarly, the Marxian notion of the "asiatic mode of production" was

cancelled, because it did not fit in with actual Soviet development policy in Central Asia (ibid.).

73. Prokhorov *et al.* 1970-1978[3], XXII, entry 'Rossijskaja federacija', p.255; cf. 'Décret...' 1931 in: Zapata 1983, p.318f.

74. Cf. De George 1966, p.184: "... the Party is the arbiter of disputes and the ultimate judge of orthodoxy."

75. Volkov 1988, p.3, 4th col.

76. Volkov 1988, p.3, 5th col.; cf. Hollak 1961, p.240f, Kamenka 1972, p.165, and Zapata 1988, p.98; it can be argued that this actual *partijnost'* was the logical consequence of Lenin's notion: "Der Marxismus läßt sich nur als das aktuelle Urteil jener Instanz (d.h. Stalin persönlich) definieren. (...) Die Gleichung Wahrheit = Weltanschauung des Proletariats = Marxismus = Weltanschauung der Partei = Urteile der Parteiführung = Urteile des Führers ist in der Leninschen Version des Marxismus vollkommen korrekt" (Kołakowski 1981, III, p.14f)"; cf. Berdjaev 1953, p.78.

77. Korolëv 1988, p.6, 3rd col.

78. Aron 1986, p.184.

79. Cf. Wetter 1964, p.46f, Donoso 1979, p.124, and p. 136, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.100 and p.186, and Scanlan 1985, p.15.

80. Bocheński 1967[5], p.153: "Als 'Klassiker' werden jetzt stets und *nur* Marx, Engels und Lenin genannt; bis Februar war auch Stalin ein 'Klassiker'. Dagegen ist uns *kein einziger* philosophischer Text bekannt, in welchem irgend ein anderer Autor so genannt wäre..."

81. Cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.49f.

82. Interview with Mikhail Mikhailovič Gamajunov on 17/09/1991; cf. Lenin, *PSS* XXIX, p.248.

83. Lapin 1986, p.9; cf. also Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, M.P. Mčedlov, Z.M. Pavlova, entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.345, quoting from a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on occasion of Lenin's 110th birthday (in: Averincev *et al.* 1989[2]: p.342); cf. esp. Groys 1987.

84. *Materialy...* 1981 (M.: Politizdat, 1981), p.77.

85. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, M.P. Mčedlov & Z.M. Pavlova, entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.344f (Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], idem. p.341); cf. Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.164.

86. Cf. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, M.P. Mčedlov & Z.M. Pavlova, entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.345 (Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], p.341, as well as Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], p.164, and Rozental' *et al.* 1954[4], p.315.

87. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], p.42; cf. also Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, V.Ž. Kelle, entry 'Ideologija', p.200.

88. Lenin, *PSS* VI, p.39f (quoted after Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], p.24); cf. Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Pljuralizm', p.251; hence also the interpretation of both the 'end of ideology' thesis and the 'need to reideologize' thesis as demonstrations of the despair and weakness of bourgeoisie: "... the bourgeoisie today is not capable of creating a dynamic ideology that meets the requirements of our time" (Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Ideologija', p.105; a comparable phrasing in Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, V.Ž. Kelle, entry 'Ideologija', p.200, minimalized in the revised edition (Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], p.207)).

89. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, V.Ž. Kelle, entry 'Ideologija', p.200 (in the revised edition of 1989 (Averincev *et al.* 1989[2]) these lines were simply dropped), and Wetter 1967, p.165f, 172; since the victory of communism was historically inevitable, the argument ran, a "*peaceful coexistence* of states with a different social structure" is possible: communism will gain victory on the level of economy (cf. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], p.256).

90. Ožegov 1983[14], entry 'Leninizm', p.284.

91. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.726; cf. Lenin, *PSS* XXIII, p.43.

92. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, M.P. Mčedlov, Z.M. Pavlova, entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.347; cf. Lenin, *PSS* XXIII, p.43.

93. From a different angle, Boris Groys characterized Soviet ideology as a "unity of ideology and criticism of ideology (or meta-ideology)" (Groys 1987, p.205).

94. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, M.P. Mčedlov, Z.M. Pantina, entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.344 (Averincev 1989[2], p.341): "Marxism-Leninism, the scientific ideology of the working class,..."; and Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4],

entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.164: "Marxism-Leninism is a developing scientific system of... views, that make up the *world-view* of the working class." The subordination of Soviet philosophy to Marxist-Leninist ideology is a classic example of the mutually complementary roles of repression and ideology, highlighted by Althusser (Althusser 1976, p.85).

95. Ahlberg 1960, p.102; cf. Blakeley 1980, p.317, Bocheński 1967[5], p.38f, and Kołakowski 1981, III, p.90.

96. Hollak 1961, p.240; cf. Scanlan 1985, p.21: "The standard summary statements of this theory, moreover, are drawn from the nineteenth century and in particular from a few well-mined pages of Frederick Engels' *Anti-Dühring* (1878) and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* (1886)."

97. Zapata 1988, p.105; cf. also Jakhot 1981, p.26; on the earlier textbooks, see Jakhot 1981, pp.21-26, where he stresses the fact that there were not only *several* –he mentions 11– *učebniki*, but also that they were considerably *different* from each other; Zapata's "la ligne générale du Parti", Wetter's "die Generallinie der Partei" (1956[3], p.593), Berdjaev's "General Line of Soviet Philosophy" (1935[2]) all refer to Russian "*general'naja linija partii*"; cf. 'Décret...' [1931] 1983, p.319.

98. Blakeley 1980, p.319; cf. Kołakowski 1981, I, p.151, and Planty-Bonjour 1974, p.281.

99. Bocheński 1967[5], p.7; and Zapata 1988, p.100: "Pour aborder l'étude de cette période [1931-1956, EvdZ] ...il faut d'abord se défaire de certains stéréotypes qui, malgré leur allure 'critique', ne font en réalité que reproduire l'image que voulait donner le stalinisme de lui-même. En philosophie, ces stéréotypes concernent surtout le mythe d'une philosophie stalinienne monolithique, simple reflet d'autres monolitismes mythiques comme ceux du Parti ou de la société soviétique dans son ensemble."

100. De George 1966, p.183f; or, as Wetter put it, "... in der ganzen Epoche des Stalinismus [war Stalin] ... der einzige Mann in der Sowjetunion, der es wagen durfte, etwas neues zu sagen (Wetter 1960[5], p.245)," a judgement almost literally repeated, in 1962, by Okulov: "Une seule personne était en droit de créer quelque chose de nouveau, d'original (A.F. Okulov in *VF* 1962, N°1, quoted from Jeu 1969, p.64)"; on Stalin as a philosopher cf. Lange 1955, pp.104ff, Wetter 1960[5], pp.245-268, Bocheński 1967[5], p.37f, Kamenka 1972, p.165: "...to the professional philosopher there is not one sentence of Stalin's work that displays any philosophical competence or insight."

101. Mitin 1950, p.15; on Stalin's renovations in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, cf. De George 1966, pp.189-194, and Wetter 1960[5], pp.248-268; on the deification and "ever greater adulation" of Stalin as a philosopher, cf. Wetter 1960[5], pp.245-250, and esp. 1956[3], pp.237-247, Blakeley 1980, p.317, and Bocheński 1967[5], p.154f; a typical example can be found in Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.475, where he mentions 4 titles by Marx, 4 by Engels, 1 by Marx and Engels jointly [*Communist Manifesto*], 6 by Lenin, and then no less than 7 titles by Stalin! cf. also Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.265.

102. Cf. Jakhot 1981, pp.196-220; although Bakhurst is right to criticize Jakhot for overstating the 'eclipse' of Lenin by Stalin (Bakhurst 1991, p.95, n.2), this does not disprove the main point: the establishment of a cult of the *person* of the leader(s) of the Party.

103. Cf. Somerville 1943, p.475, Kline 1952, p.127, Wetter 1960[5], p.210, Zapata 1983, p.329, Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], entry 'Deborin', p.149, and Alekseev *et al.* 1993, p.59.

104. De George 1966, p.186; cf. also Bocheński 1967[5], p.51.

105. Cf. Wetter 1960[5], p.209.

106. Cf. Nethercott 1993, p.215, and Ščipanov *et al.* 1982.

107. Cf. Nethercott 1993, esp. p.219, and Bakhurst 1991, p.5f.

108. "Die sowjetische Philosophie ist 1931 domestiziert worden und funktioniert nunmehr als Instrument der kommunistischen Herrschaft (Lange 1955, p.111)"; similarly De George 1966, p.183 – according to De George, the expression "dead period" was coined by Bocheński (cf. 'Preface', in: Dahm *et al.* 1988, p.1, and Bocheński 1967[5],

p.43); cf. also Jakhot 1981, p.82ff, and n.43.

109. Stalin, *PSS*, XIV, pp.279-326; cf. Scanlan 1985, p.107; according to a recent Soviet source, "its author, though it is until the present day not really clear, whether that indeed was Stalin, was deified (Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.265)"; Zapata suggests that Mitin 'edited' the text (Zapata 1988, p.105); according to Wetter, it was mainly after 1948 that Stalin was presented as the author – the original Russian edition and the German translation were attributed to "a committee of the Central Committee of the VKP(b)", and the Italian translation of 1944 mentioned Stalin, Kalinin, Molotov, Vorošilov, Kaganovič, Mikojan, Ždanov, and Berija [i.e. all full members of the *Politburo* as of 1944 except A.A. Andreev and N.S. Khruščëv (cf. Löwenhardt 1978, pp.162ff)], adding that the work was produced "sotte la redazione di Stalin," but Wetter mentions E.M. Jaroslavskij as the actual editor (cf. Wetter 1960[5], p.212); the text, appeared first in *Pravda* of 12/09/1938, reached, apart from the 85 million newspaper and journal copies in which it appeared, a total edition of 35,762,000 copies by 1949 (cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.48, and Wetter 1956 [3] p.242), and 301 editions until 1953 (cf. Wetter 1960[5], p.248); cf. for a brief rendering Donoso 1979, pp.117ff, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.108, 112f, Kamenka 1972, p.165f, or Wetter 1964, pp.43ff, and idem 1960[5], pp.246ff.

110. Volkov 1988, p.3, 5th col: "It was the only, the unique one. It was at once declared the peak of Marxist-Leninist thought. And its author – the genius of geniuses of all ages and peoples, a coryphaeus of all sciences"; cf. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.265f, quoting *KPSS v rezoljucijakh i rešenijakh s"ezdov, konferencij i plenumov CK* (M., 1954), III, p.316; also in Ogurcov 1987, p.177.

111. Cf. Lange 1955, p.114, and De George 1966, p.183.

112. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.265; this text was "important primarily because it was slavishly followed and quoted in works of Soviet philosophers from its appearance until Stalin's death, and because the *History* was used as a basic text in Soviet and Party schools and became familiar to a generation of Soviet people still alive today (De George 1966, p.187)."

113. In philosophical journals, the section *dialektičeskij materializm* disappeared in 1987 [*VF*] and 1989 [*FN*].

114. Scanlan 1985, p.120f.

115. "...die Philosophie ging in die Verfügungsgewalt der Partei über und konnte mit Hilfe der Prinzipien der 'Parteilichkeit' und 'Aktualität' zur Rechtfertigung ihrer ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Maßnahmen *benutzt* werden. Im selben Maße aber, wie sich die neue Konzeption...durchsetzte, verlor die sowjetische Philosophie *ihre immanenten Wahrheitskriterien*... (Ahlberg 1960, p.94)."

116. Cf. Ahlberg 1960, p.94; cf. also Litschev *et al.* 1992, p.13.

117. Graham 1987[3], p.6.

118. Cf. De George 1966, p.180, Jeu 1969, pp.375-383, Scanlan 1985, pp.29-33, Zapata 1988, p.113f, and Bakhurst 1991, pp.15ff.

119. Cf. Kamenka 1972, p.166 and idem 1965, p.93f, and Wetter 1956[3], p.303.

120. Blakeley 1964, p.76, and idem 1980, p.317; cf. also Kamenka 1965, p.94.

121. Ždanov 1947, p.268; the discussion was held in two stages: in March 1947, a discussion at the IF with 15 participants, and in June 1947 a large congress with some 100 Soviet philosophers, a quarter of their overall number participating – Ždanov reports that 98 people had registered for the discussion, producing 55 speeches (*VF* 1947, N°1, p.288); cf. also Ždanov 1947, p.256, Wetter 1960[5], pp.216-218, Ballestrem 1963a, p.116, Blakeley 1964, p.76, Kamenka 1965, p.94, Bocheński 1967[5], p.42, and Kołakowski 1981, III, pp.141ff.

122. "... A. Zhdanov, passed down the word from on high that Soviet philosophers were to stop their scholastic discussions on 'safe' topics, to emulate the 'Leninist style' of philosophizing, and in general to be 'more creative' (Blakeley 1980, p.317);" cf. Lange 1955, p.201f, Wetter 1960[5], pp.215-222, Bocheński 1967[5], pp.42f, A.A. Ždanov, 'O položenii na našem filosofskom fronte', in idem1947, pp.267-272, in particular p.268, and Bocheński 1967[5], p.49, n.*: "Während der Diskussion im Juni 1947 haben sich scharfe Proteste gegen diese 'Zitatologie'

(*citatologija, citatnyj podkhod*) erhoben, so besonders seitens V.A. Čagin (*VF* 1, 200b) und M.M. Baskin (160a). Ždanov hat sich dann (256a) entschuldigt, daß er trotzdem zitieren müsse; und das tut nicht nur er, sondern tun fast alle anderen Schriftsteller, auch nach der 'Diskussion' [Bocheński refers to *VF* 1947, N°1, the figures indicating page and column]."

123. "It is worth noticing that the worst threats to Soviet science in the late forties and early fifties did not come, as is often thought, from professional philosophers, but from third-rate scientists who tried to win Stalin's favor (Graham 1987[3], p.17f)." Cf. also Bocheński 1967[5], p.44; Asmus reportedly did not yield to criticism of his 'formalist' position in logic (cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.157 and 163); on Asmus' importance for the rehabilitation of (formal) logic, see Scanlan 1985, p.149f, and Ščipanov 1982, p.247f: "When it became an obvious necessity to overcome the negative attitude to formal logic, Prof. Asmus became one of the most active philosophers to write about logical questions. Traditional formal logic was expounded in his *Logic* (1947)."

124. Bocheński 1967[5], p.164.

125. Cf. Chernyak 1987, p.85, Shlapentokh 1990, p.246, and the entries on these philosophers in Ili'čëv *et al.* 1983 and, significantly much shorter, Alekseev *et al.* 1993[2].

126. A full table of contents of *VF* over the years 1947-1956, as well as translations into German of many fragments is Goerdt 1960.

127. Cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.45f.

128. This account of Soviet philosophical industry is calculated on the basis of figures and estimates given in Somerville 1946, p.246, Wetter 1956[3], p.303, Kline 1956, p.137, Utekhin 1961, p.260, Kamenka 1963, p.9, Bocheński 1967[5], p.46 and pp.140ff, Prokhorov *et al.* 1970-1978[3], XXII, entry 'Rossijskaja federacija', p.255, Kamenka 1972, p.166, Zubatý 1975, pp.223ff, Huber 1977, p.60, and Zapata 1983, p.323f.

129. According to Jeu, the "slow and complex" process of decentralization began in the 1950s (Jeu 1982, p.285).

130. The 6 institutions where candidate's dissertations were defended in 1947 were all located in Moscow, out of the 30 institutions in 1953/4 11 were located in Moscow (36%) (1948: 5 out of 10 = 50%, 1951/2: 11 out of 28 = 39%) (cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.140); of the dissertations themselves, the 'provincial proportion' grew from 0% in 1947 through 6% over 1947-1951 (15 out of 225), and 27% over 1951/1 (54 out of 149) to 36% (169 out of 300) in 1953/4 (cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.142).

131. Cf. the entires on the Soviet republics in Prokhorov *et al.* 1970-1978[3], Kamenka 1963, p.9, and idem 1972, and Jeu 1969, p.29, p.166; on the earlier situation, cf. V.S. Iovčuk, in *VF* 1947, N°9, p.221a, quoted from Bocheński 1967[5], p.45, n.**.

132. Graham 1987[3], p.14.

133. Cf. Bocheński 1967[5], pp.44ff, Kamenka 1972, p.166, and De George 1966, p.188f.

134. For this reason, some Western scholars date the revival of Soviet philosophy after Stalin's death (cf. De George, 'Preface', in Dahm *et al.* 1988, p.1 and 9, and Kamenka 1972, p.166).

135. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.268; cf. also Goerdt 1984, p.106.

136. Cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.44, Zapata 1988, p.109, and Wetter 1960[5], p.221f, referring to 'Za bol'ševistskuju partijnost' v filosofii', *VF* 1948, N°3, p.11f;" cf. also Bocheński 1967[5], p.130, quoting Kedrov in *Kul'tura i žizn'* of 22/03/1949, where his *mea culpa* was reproduced: "Ich halte es für meine Pflicht als Parteimitglied zu erklären, daß ich mit dieser Kritik (von M. Mitin) völlig einverstanden bin und daß ich einen feindlichen Kosmopolitismus, den ich vertreten habe, entschieden verurteile."

137. Goerdt 1984, p.118.

138. "Question: Is it true, that language forms a superstructure upon the basis? Answer: No, that is not true (Stalin, *PSS* XVI, p.114);" cf. ibid., p.118.

139. Cf. Goerdt 1984, p.116 and p.119, De George 1966, p.197, and Bocheński 1967[5], p.43, p.137, and p.154f, where he gives a sampling of reactions by Soviet philosophers to Stalin's innovation of Marxist linguistics.

140. Cf. Donoso 1979, p.120, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.160, and Kamenka 1965, p.93; the text by Stalin appeared in *Pravda*,

03/10/1952, in *Bol'ševik* 1952, N°18, pp.1-50, and in Stalin, *PSS* XVI, pp.188-245.

141. Cf. Lange 1955, p.200f, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.157, Blakeley 1960, p.xi, and idem 1961, p.84: "For the contemporary Soviet philosopher, the '*Party line*' ... *must be directive for the posing of the problems* (we have seen that certain questions are not even to be asked), *for the guidance of the discussion* (the Party decides *when* a 'discussion' is ended) and *for the corroboration of the conclusions.*"

142. De George 1966, p.199f; cf. also Wetter 1960[5], p.282; the 'destalinized' *Kratkij kurs* appeared in an English translation in 1960: *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (M.: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960); on Stalin as a *klassik* cf. Kamenka 1972, p.166, Bocheński 1967[5], p.153, and esp. Donoso 1970, pp.121-124; the edition of Stalin's *Collected Works* was abruptly stopped (completed only in the West in 1967).

143. G.F. Aleksandrov *et al*., *Dialektičeskij materializm* (M., 1954), and F.V. Konstantinov *et al* ., *Istoričeskij materializm* (M., (1951) 1954[2]).

144. Cf. Kline 1956, p.126ff, and p.137, and Wetter 1960[5], p.280).

145. Cf. Alekseev *et al.* 1993[2], p.261.

146. Cf. Wetter 1960[5], p.281, and Bocheński 1967[5], p.139.

147. At a meeting of the Kafedra *IZF* of MGU on 12/09/1989, A.F. Grjaznov remarked that, at a congress on Wittgenstein he had just attended in Austria, the Soviet participants did not form a delegation: they only met in Austria, and did not know of each other's participation beforehand.

148. Cf. Scanlan 1985, p.26f, and Jeu 1969. p.38f.

149. Cf., for example, Wetter 1960[5], p.322f, on the 1950s.

150. Cf. also Mikhajlov 1991, who demonstrates that it was impossible to stop publication once a text was accepted.

151. Gulyga 1990, p.185; the generally accessible edition pleaded for by Gulyga appeared only in 1991: two separate editions of together 100,000 copies [= Losskij 1991].

152. Interview with A.F. Zotov on 12/09/1989; cf. also Malakhov 1993, p.109.

153. Fetscher 1974, p.4.: "...eine Korrektur dessen, was Stalin erfolgreich als 'Leninismus' dogmatisiert hatte."

154. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.268; cf. also De George, 'Preface', in: Dahm *et al.* 1988, p.1.

155. On cybernetics and information theory cf. Graham 1987[3], pp.299-293; on sociology, cf. Hanak 1976, pp.246-250, Shlapentokh 1990, Smith 1991, pp.99-101, and Scanlan 1985, p.190.

156. Cf. Bocheński 1962, p.9f.

157. Kline 1972, p.267.

158. Cf. Averincev *et al* 1989[2], entry 'Filosofija', p.698, and Uemov 1990, p.19f.

159. *Spravočnik dlja postupajuščikh... 1992*, p.54; the departments of aesthetics, ethics, and history of religion and atheism were founded in 1960 (cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.183), 1969 (op.cit., p.191), and 1959 (op.cit., p.196) respectively, and headed by M.F. Ovsjannikov, A.I. Titarenko and I.D. Panckhava (1959-1969), and M.N. Novikov.

160. Cf. Jeu 1969, p.62, and Bocheński 1967[5], p.139; *FN* started appearing in 4 issues a year 1958-1961, 6 issues a year 1962-1986; editors-in-chief 1958-1970: M.T. Iovčuk, 1971-1991: V.S. Gott (cf. Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], entry 'Filosofskie Nauki', p.705).

161. Cf. Zubatý 1975, p.225.

162. Cf. Jeu 1969, p.28f, whose figures are based on reports in *VF*.

163. Cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.142, Kline 1956, p.137, and Jeu 1969, p.28f.

164. Cf. Kamenka 1963, p.9: "The bibliography of Soviet philosophy compiled by Professor Bocheński and his colleagues lists 329 philosophical books of more than ninety-nine pages published in the decade 1947-1956 and 225 such books for the years 1957-58 alone: a rise from roughly thirty-three books a year to over 112 a year;" on *VF*, cf. Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], entry 'Voprosy filosofii', p.98; the total size was over 2,300 pages a year, the edition of 50,000 in 1956 was reduced to 32,500 in 1957 (cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.145).

165. The percentage of candidate's dissertations defended outside Moscow, which

had grown from zero to 36% over 1947-1954, grew to 39% in 1964/5 (108 out of 277), and 46% in 1965/6 (124 out of 303); as to doctoral dissertations, 25% (14 out of 55) were 'peripheral' in 1964/5, 27% (8 out of 37) in 1965/6 (cf. Jeu 1969, p.28f).

166. In 1982, Jeu reported on the growing importance of both the Russian and the non-Russian periphery (Jeu 1982, p.299, n.47); in 1969, he quoted a report by E.M. Mirskij (*VF* 1968, N°6, p.152), giving the following distribution of contributions to *VF not* coming from Moscow over the years 1952-1967: 317 from the Russian Federation (L. 175, Sverdlovsk 71, Rostov-na-Donu 27, Novosibirsk 16, Tomsk 15, Ivanovo 13), 228 from other Soviet republics (Ukraine 92, Georgia 39, Kazakhstan 26, Armenia 22, Azerbajdžan 20, Estonia 15, White Russia 14) (Jeu 1969, p.29).

167. Cf. the entires on the Soviet republics other than the Russian Federation in Prokhorov et al. 1970-1978[3], and Jeu 1969, p.29.

168. Georgia's first important philosopher was, according to Gobar, Pëtr Iver [Peter the Iberian], 4th century A.D. (cf. Gobar 1978, p.182), and Jeu also dates Georgian philosophy back to the 4th century (Jeu 1982, p.286); as regards Armenia, its philosophical history is counted back to the 1st century B.C., its first university dating back to the 12th century (cf. Jeu 1973, p.251f) – to compare, Moscow university was founded in 1755, that of Kiev in 1834 (there is a university in the now Ukrainian city of L'viv, but L'viv / L'vov / Lemberg was part of neither Ukraine nor Russia from 1152 until 1939) (cf. Utekhin 1961, entries 'Universities' and 'L'vov'); according to most authors [Zen'kovskij, Goerdt, Copleston, Walicki] it was only in the 18th century that one can really speak of philosophy in Russia); Central Asia (Samarkand, Bukhara) was one of the centers of Islamic culture, including science and philosophy: two leading Islamic philosophers, Al-Farabi (870-950) and Ibn-Sina [Avicenna] (980-1037), lived and worked there (cf. Jeu 1982.); cf. also Bocheński 1967[5], p.142, Kamenka 1972, p.166, and Mitrokhin 1975, p.xv, who reports on a group of philosophers in Alma-Ata studying theory of knowledge and dialectical logic in the wake of Il'enkov.

169. Cf. Wetter 1960[5], p.285, and Hanak 1976, p.243.

170. Konstantinov *et al.* (1958) 1982[6]; cf. Wetter 1962, p.9.

171. This process was not limited to philosophy: leading politicians of the era of *perestrojka*, including M.S. Gorbačëv, received their formation in the same period; in an interview taken on 04/12/1991, Gorbačëv showed his pride of having been a classmate of M.K. Mamardašvili, a leading *šestidesjatnik* in philosophy (cf. 'Zelfs Christus kan deze knopen niet ontwarren', *De Volkskrant*, 12/12/1991 [interview by Ju. Ščekočikhin, originally appeared in *Literaturnaja gazeta*]).

172. Kamenka 1963, p.14.

173. Cf. Schlögel 1990, pp.32-36.

174. Which housed 82 *aspiranty* [graduate students] already in 1948 (cf. Bocheński 1967[5], p.45).

175. Cf. De George 1967, p.66, and Jakhot 1979, p.48; cf. on Gott Chernyak 1987, and the *nekrolog* in *FN* after his death (*FN* 1991, N°9, p.190).

176. Cf. entries in Alekseev *et al.* 1995[2]; on Il'enkov, a monograph appeared: Bakhurst 1991; cf. also Novokhat'ko 1991, and Friedrich 1993, p.54f, n.4; on Mamardašvili, cf. Delokarov 1992, and the introduction by Ju.P. Senokosov, 'Prizvanie filosofa', in: Mamardašvili 1990, pp.5-13; bibliography in: op.cit., pp.357-359; on Batiščev, cf. Mitrokhin 1975, p.xv; on Ščedrovickij, cf. the introduction by A. Piskoppel' in G.P. Ščedrovickij, *Izbrannye trudy* (M.: Škola kul'turnoj politiki, 1995) pp.xviii-xxxvii.

177. Cf., e.g., Mitrokhin's introduction of Il'enkov and Batiščev in: Mitrokhin 1975, p.xv.

178. Cf. Malakhov 1993, p.106, 'Fenomenologija ...' 1988, p.56 (p. 102 in Mamardašvili 1990); cf. also Motrošilova 1993, p.11, Mamardašvili 1991a, pp.39f, and Mamardašvili 1991c, p.3ff.

179. Blakeley 1980, p.319.

180. K. Marks & F. Ėngel's, *Iz rannikh proizvedenij* (M.: Politizdat, 1956) (cf. Scanlan 1985, p.299); this Russian

translation was prepared for publication by Ė.V. Il'enkov and G. Seidel, professor at Leipzig, and later published by the IML (cf. Ė.Ju. Solov'ëv, 'Umer li marksizm?', translated in *SEET*, p.39).

181. Ė.Ju. Solov'ëv, in 'Umer li marksizm?', in *SEET*, p.39f.

182. Smith also mentions courses in history of political doctrine, attended by, among many others, M.S. Gorbačëv, by a pre-revolutionary professor, Stepan F. Ketšekian (Smith 1991, p.65; Ketšekian is also mentioned in Jeu 1969, p.487).

183. Bocheński 1967[5], p.162f.

184. An early example can be found in logic, where Kondakov and Bakradze were allowed to publish their reply to the official criticism they had received on their unorthodox view of the relation between logic and dialectic (cf. esp. Hänggi 1971, p.13f; also Bocheński 1967[5], p.158, and Kamenka 1963, p.11); according to Hänggi, from 1956 onwards, and in spite of the fact that Kondakov and Bakradze were effectively silenced (cf. Hänggi 1971, p.32), all Soviet philosophers agreed on one thing, namely that dialectical logic is not a clearly defined science, but a general postulate (cf. op.cit., p.176), which in the Soviet context meant: an unavoidable dogma.

185. "Soviet philosophy has a certain relative momentum of its own, and within limits the philosophical task of analyzing basic terms and beliefs develops according to its own internal logic (De George 1967, p.47f)."

186. De George 1967, p.48.

187. Cf. Jeu 1969, p.25: "L'objet de la présente étude n'est pas l'examen d'une idéologie ... l'essentiel de cette étude est justement ce qui s'en détache. C'est la philosophie, ou l'idéologie qui prend conscience de soi et qui se veut cohérente et qui se juge." Jeu rightly points to the same source of philosophical development as did De George: "Within the Marxist-Leninist framework the task of Soviet philosophers is to explicate specific types of technical problems and to introduce order and clarity as far as is possible and consistent with the functions of ideology (De George 1967, p.51)" ; cf. also Kamenka 1963, p.18f: "Soviet leaders are anxious to foster education and technical skill; they are anxious to suppress critical independence and heresy. Yet the former strains... produce and foster the latter."

188. Cf. Zapata 1988, p.113f, Scanlan 1985, pp.27-29, and Jeu 1969, pp.38-44; Ayer's article appeared 1962 in the first issue of *VF* of that year.

189. Cf. Scanlan 1985, p.30f and pp.106-111, Graham 1987[5], pp.58-61, and Jeu 1969, p.542.

190. Scanlan 1985, p.32, quoting S.P. Dudel', G.M. Štraks, *Zakon edinstva i bor'by protivopoložnostej* [The Law of the Unity and Struggle of Opposites] (M.: 1967), p.170.

191. Cf. Chernyak 1987, p.84.

192. Scanlan 1985, p.9, and De George 1967, p.47f.

193. Jeu 1969, p.66.

194. Jeu 1969, p.67, p.23.

195. De George 1984, p.16.

196. Graham 1987[3], p.20.

197. Zubatý 1975, p.288.

198. Konstantinov *et al.*, 1960-1970; a selection of entries in English translation is Blakeley (ed.) 1975.

199. Cf. Zubatý 1975, p.227 (quoting Soviet sources).

200. Cf. Waegemans 1986, p.389.

201. Kline discussed uncensored texts by Esenin-Vol'pin, Čalidze, and Pomeranc, published in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Goerdt mentions texts by Dobrovol'skij and Pjatigorskij from about the same time; cf. Goerdt 1984, p.105, and p.728, and Kline 1975, p.158; several texts of a more or less strictly philosophical nature are present in: M. Meerson-Aksënov, B. Šragin (eds.), *The Political, Social and Religious Thought of Russian 'Samizdat' – an Anthology* (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland Publishing Company, 1977).

202. Cf. Bakhurst 1991, p.9, incl. n.6; on Davydov, cf. Scanlan 1985, p.313, and Shlapentokh 1990, p.103; on Pomeranc, cf. Goerdt 1984, p.106f, Shlapentokh 1990, p.120, 134, 190, and Kline 1975, pp.180-188, who discusses one of Pomeranc's *tamizdat*-publications; Pomeranc stayed in the USSR, and an article by him appeared in *VF* 1990, N°11, republished 1995 in G. Pomeranc, *Vykhod iz Transa* (M.: Jurist,

1995); on Mamardašvili, cf., e.g., Delokarov 1992, p.151.

203. Cf. Goerdt 1984, p.107f, and Shlapentokh 1990, p.144.

204. Bakhurst 1991, p.2, Chernyak 1987, p.85.

205. Only towards the end of his career, Losev returned publicly to his roots with two books on Vl. Solov'ëv: *Vl. Solov'ëv* (M.: Mysl', (1983) 1994[2]), and *Vl. Solov'ëv i ego vremja* [Vl. Solov'ëv and His Time] (M.: Progress, 1990).

206. Cf. Losev 1984, p.145f, where he says: "Slavery brought with it the strict necessity to distinguish between intellectual and physical work. (...) Consequently, the living, but senseless [*bessmyslennaja*] thing, which according to the ancients is the slave (this is beautifully expressed by Engels), must be united into some kind of whole together with the abstract intellect that organizes it (p. 146)." Hence, according to Losev, the basic problem not only of the pre-Socratic philosophers, but also of Plato and Aristotle: the union of senseless matter and organizing intellect.

207. In the *FĖS* of 1983, we find an entry on Losev, in which his books until 1930 are listed, and we then find, instead of an account of his arrest and forced labor at *Belomorkanal*, a mere "henceforth, Losev adopted a Marxist position (Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, entry 'Losev', p.324)"; cf. Losev 1986, p.182, and Losev 1981, where he starts with half a dozen references to Marx, Engels and Lenin, and even manages to quote Brežnev, adding that "the fully correct remark of the general secretary of the CPSU directs all [!] Soviet scientists to an even more responsible attitude to their own affair (Losev 1981, p.56)" – naturally, this passage was deleted in the 1991 edition of the same text (cf. Losev 1991, p.495).

208. Ė.V. Il'enkov, 'From the Marxist-Leninist point of view', in: N. Lobkowicz (ed.), *Marx and the Western World* (Notre Dame (Ind.): Notre Dame UP, 1967), pp.391-407; Il'enkov was invited, but he could not go since, as was assumed in the 'Preface' to the English edition, "he was in hospital" (Lobkowicz, op.cit., p.xii); but as the editor of the first publication in a Soviet journal has it: "To put it plainly, 'they didn't let him go' (Novokhat'ko 1988, p.98);" cf. Chernyak 1987, p.83, v.d. Zweerde 1990a, p.3f, and Bakhurst 1991, p.7f.

209. Bakhurst 1991, p.8. As for the content: it is clear that statements like "these nightmares [Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, and George Orwell's *1984*, EvdZ] (...) do not scare us. We understand these tendencies as our yesterday, although not yet completely outlived (Il'enkov 1988, p.108; p.403 in the English version)," *could* only be condemned as "anti-Marxist" by the Soviet government of the day.

210. Il'enkov 1991, p.156.

211. Ibid., p.168.

212. Cf. Friedrich 1993, p.55, n.4.

213. De George 1984, p.17; cf. Goerdt 1984, p.100, and, on Tumanova, Bibler 1990, p.106.

214. Graham 1987[3], p.13.

215. Cf. Blakeley 1980, p.318, and Zapata 1988, p 115; cf. also Zubatý 1975, p.12, n.11; it created a scandal, for example, when A.L. Dobrokhotov was appointed at the philosophical faculty of MGU, as he was not a Party-member, and succesfully refused to yield to pressure to become one (interview on 03/09/1989); since 1930, book publication was only possible trough either State or Party organs and institutions.

216. Cf. Voslensky 1984, Graham 1987[3], p.13, Gardner 1988, p.92f, Glazov 1988, p.43 and p.58, and Barnett *et al.* 1988, p.162f.

217. Cf. Walker 1988, p.90, and Barnett *et al.* 1988, p.161.

218. Mamardašvili 1990a, p.9.

219. Cf., for example, Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.166: "In the contemporary period Marxism-Leninism is being creatively developed by the collective forces of the CPSU and other communist and labor parties..."; cf. also Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, M.P. Mčedlov, Z.M. Pavlova, entry 'Marksizm-leninizm', p.344, and ibid., A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.729; this image was reflected in Western comments on Soviet philosophy: cf. the 'Preface' to A.G. Spirkin, 'Dialectical Materialism', in: Edie *et al.* 1976[2], p.465), and Laszló *et al.* 1967, cover: "Soviet thought... is being developed by

some 3,000 active philosophers in the U.S.S.R. and by perhaps as many others in the Communist World."

220. Cf. e.g., the entry 'Istorija filosofii' by C.G. Aleksandrov and others in Konstantinov *et al.* 1960-1970, II [1962], pp.376-387.

221. Cf. Scanlan 1985, p.55, and p.331.

222. Quoted after Scanlan 1985, p.54f, and Konstantinov *et al.* 1960-1970, IV [1967], G.S. Batiščev, entry 'Partijnost'', p.217.

223. Scanlan 1985, p.55.

224. Ibid.

225. Cf. Mitrokhin 1975, p.xv, Scanlan 1985, p.250, and Katvan 1978, pp.102-107.

226. Cf. Bakhurst 1991, p.3.

227. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.271.

228. As Bakhurst notes: "The reforms of the Khrushchev era, which had promised so much, failed to remove the old guard of philosophers (Bakhurst 1991, p.6);" cf. Vranicki 1974, p.727.

229. Shlapentokh 1990b, p.112f.

230. Shlapentokh 1990b, p.114, Scanlan 1985, p.331f.

231. Cf. Mitrokhin 1975, p.xiv, and Motrošilova *et al.* 1986a, p.28.

232. De George 1984, p.10f.

233. Scanlan 1985, p.329f.

234. E.g., Graham reports that "the year 1982 saw a new outbreak of the controversy [between an 'epistemologist' and an 'ontologist' interpretation of dialectical materialism, EvdZ], with over seventy authors speaking out on the subject in philosophical journals (Graham 1987[3], p.61)."

235. Scanlan 1985, p.9, cf. De George 1984.

236. Cf. Gobar 1978, Jeu 1982, and Mamardašvili 1991a, p.67.

237. As Viktor Igor'evič Molčanov told me (interview on 13/09/1991), there were people in the USSR who tried to do serious work in phenomenology; supported by N.V. Motrošilova, for a long time the only Soviet author on phenomenology, and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, local centers could emerge in Rostov-na-Donu with Molčanov himself, in Lithuania, and in Latvia; texts were published in *Analecta Husserliana*; on Loone, cf. Scanlan 1985, pp.208ff; on the Moscow-Tartu school of semiotics and on the difficulties they encountered, as well as for further references, cf. Scanlan 1985, pp.313-317; on 12/09/1991, I had the luck to attend the first lecture Lotman was allowed to give at MGU for a very long time (cf. v.d. Zweerde 1992a, p.7).

238. Bibler worked at the Moscow *Institut Istorii Estestvoznanija i Tekhniki AN SSSR* (cf. Jeu 1969, p.455), built a reputation with *Myšlenie kak tvorčestvo* [Thought as the Act of Creativity] (M.: 1975), and remained "active as a professional philosopher" (Chernyak 1987, p.85); in 1988, *VF* mentioned him as *docent*, not giving any indication of his place of work, but the *IFE '89* introduces him as collaborator of the *Institut psikhologii* of the APN (Akademija pedagogičeskikh nauk) SSSR ('Avtory vypuska', in: *IFE* '89 1989, p.367).

239. Cf. Mamardašvili 1991, p.20.

240. Cf. the '*nekrolog*' 'Merab Konstantinovič Mamardašvili', *VF* 1990, N°12, p.171, Mamardašvili 1990, back cover, Novikov 1991, p.226f, and A. Epelboin, introduction to Mamardašvili 1991a, p.8 and p.20.

241. Malakhov 1993, p.111; cf. also Novikov 1991, p.225: "Im Laufe seines ganzen Lebens war Mamardašvili mit der Ausarbeitung einer Alternative zum offiziellen dialektischen und historischen Materialismus beschäftigt: die PHILOSOPHIE ALS SOLCHE;" for Mamardašvili's thoughts on this topic cf., e.g., Mamardašvili 1988, 1992, 1993.

242. Cf. Mamardašvili 1989c, p.154: "Public space, precisely, is a condition for thought itself. (...) Thought only exists in its execution, only in a space that is not occupied by any prejudices, prohibitions, and the like."

243. Pjatigorskij 1992, p.97.

244. Cf. Scherrer 1996, *passim*, and Rozov 1988; I owe the comparison with 'agora' to Alessandro Mongili.

245. Cf. Pjatigorskij 1974, p.188f, and Glazov 1988, p.56.

246. Cf. Malakhov 1993, p.106.

247. De George 1967, p.52.

248. Fedoseev *et al.* 1985[2], p.43.

249. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.726.

250. Cf. Shlapentokh 1990, p.180.

251. Nikiforov 1990a, p.21; cf. Kamenka 1963, p.19, and Huber 1977, p.352.

252. Scanlan, for example, in 1985 was able, "in most fields", to distinguish systematically between an official, "orthodox" level, and a "more specialized, professional level of Soviet philosophy – the level at which probing questions are raised and basic disagreements revealed ... (Scanlan 1985, p.10)."

253. On Soviet aesthetics, see Scanlan 1985, ch.8, and esp. Swiderski 1979; on Soviet philosophy of science see Henry 1977, p.61, Graham 1987[3], and Scanlan 1985, ch.3.

254. Cf. Huber 1977, p.356, Blakeley 1980, p.323, De George 1984, Scanlan 1985, p.9, Copleston 1986, p.409.

255. Cf. Okudžava 1992; Friedrich rightly warns against the simplistic attribution of all positive developments in Soviet philosophical culture to "the creativity and subversiveness of the 'generation of the 1960s'," but their contribution to the preservation of at least some level of philosophical culture is not to be denied (Friedrich 1993, p.18; cf. also Gusejnov 1994, pp.264-268).

256. See, e.g., Scanlan 1985, pp.26-48, or Jeu 1969, pp.70-83.

257. Scanlan 1985, p.37, referring to Ojzerman 1982[2], pp.137-148.

258. Cf. Zapata 1988, p.114f.

259. Scanlan 1985, p.47.

260. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.211; cf. also Scanlan 1985, p.48.

261. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.211.

262. Cf. McClellan *et al.* 1991, p.257.

263. Cf. Litschev *et al.* 1992, p.11: "Als geschlossene, staatlich und parteiamtlich gesicherte und einheitliche Philosophie gab es die 'Sowjetische Philosophie' spätestens seit 1988 nicht mehr;" on post-Soviet philosophical culture cf., e.g., v.d. Zweerde 1996a and 1996b.

264. 'Programma Kommunističeskoj Partii Sovetskogo Sojuza – Novaja Redakcija', in: *Materialy... 1986*, p.122, 'Ustav Kommunističeskoj Partii Sovetskogo Sojuza', in: op.cit., p.189, and 'Ustav Kommunističeskoj Partii Sovetskogo Sojuza', in: *Materialy... 1990*, p.108.

265. Cf. Shlapentokh 1990, p.236f, and esp. p.242.

266. Cf. Gorbačëv 1987, p.72ff; Laqueur 1990, p.67f.

267. Cf. Hedeler 1992, p.54.

268. See 'Anketa...1987-1988', Glinčikov 1989, p.159f, Ivin 1989b, and v.d. Zweerde 1997b.

269. The 'boom' in *samizdat* took shape in early 1988 (cf. *Spravočnik* ... 1990, p.0; information obtained thanks to Mr. H.M. Leich, Russian / Soviet specialist at the Library of Congress, Washington D.C.). The total number of *samizdat* periodicals was, according to this source, 750-800 by the beginning of 1990, some 500 of them in Russian. The majority of these periodicals had a socio-political profile, but nine of them were of a philosophical or religious-philosophical nature (cf. *Spravočnik*... 1990, p.1, p.44, p.87, p.105, p.106, p.109.

270. Cf. Korolëv 1988 on Mitin, Shlapentokh 1990, p.99 and p.226 on M.N. Rutkevič and P.N. Fedoseev, Volkov 1988 about Stalin, Baskov *et al.* 1989, G.S. Batiščev, 'Filosofskaja koncepcija čeloveka i kreativnosti v nasledii S.L. Rubinštejna [The Philosophical Conception of Man and Creativity in the Heritage of S.L. Rubinstein]', *VF* 1989, N°4, pp.96-109, and G.S. Pomeranc, 'Istorija v soslagatel'nom naklonenii [History in the Subjective Mood]', *VF* 1990, N°11, pp.55-66.

271. Cf., e.g., I.T. Frolov, *O čeloveke i gumanizme; raboty raznykh let* (M.: Politizdat, 1989), or Frolov *et al.* 1987, as well as Frolov *et al.* 1989, and the accompanying anthology: Gurevič *et al.* 1991; cf. further Buchholz 1990, Fisk 1991, Fleischer 1988, Oittinen 1989, and v.d. Zweerde 1992c, pp.222-225.

272. Cf, e.g., Frolov 1989a, Gorbačëv 1987a, pp.139-149, and 'Programma Kommunističeskoj partii Sovetskogo Sojuza; novaja redakcija', in: *Materialy XXVII...*, p.168.

273. Kupcov 1989, p.3: "For the present, however, our social scientists [to which category philosophers were reckoned, EvdZ] have not rendered very much assistance to

perestrojka, hence they impede it [italics mine, EvdZ]." And: "Of course, the immediate object of our attention has to be the philosophy of *perestrojka* ..."

274. Cf. Gorbačëv 1987b.

275. K.N. Ljubutin, D.V. Pivovarov, 'Problema naučnosti...', in 'Zaočnaja...', *FN* 1989, N°6, p.72.

276. The Soviet 'delegation' to the 18th World Congress in Brighton (1988) represented the new philosophical line of the USSR (cf. esp. Frolov 1989a), but was composed in a broader and more open way (cf. 'Vsemirnyj filosofskij kongress [World Congress of Philosophy]', *VF* 1989, N°2, p.17, and Mitrokhin 1989, p.71f.

277. At the 'Russian Humanities State - University [*Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Gumanitarnyj Universitet*, RGGU]', the 'Lumumba-University of Friendship between the Peoples [*Universitet Družby Narodov imeni Patrisa Lumumby*]', and the 'Russian Orthodox University [*Rossijskij Pravoslavnyj Universitet*]'.

278. Cf. Filatov 1996, and v.d. Zweerde 1997a.

279. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6].

280. Cf. *VF* 1983, N°9, p.168, and 1987, N°3, p.170, as well as *FN* 1987, N°5, p.112: "Twenty-two manuscripts were submitted... The jury... has decided not to award the first and the second prize."

281. Cf. Frolov *et al.* 1989, '*Vvedenie...*'; reactions in *VF* 1989, N°3, pp.155-159, Golobokov 1990, 'Obsuždenie...', 1990; cf. Buchholz 1988a and 1990, Frolov *et al.* 1989, II, p.620f, Dlugač 1991, p.209, and v.d. Zweerde 1990a, p.31.

282. The clearest example is Lapin *et al.* 1991, the result of a series of discussions, in which many philosophers from the IF AN took part; the seminar was started in 1987, but the results were published only in 1991; cf. also Mikhajlov 1991, Oittinen 1989, and Fleischer 1988.

283. Cf. Barabanov 1990, p.73 and Davydov 1988.

284. Cf 'Zaočnaja...' 1989 / 1990; cf. also v.d. Zweerde 1992c, pp.218–221.

285. Cf. Nikiforov, in 'Zaočnaja...', *FN* 1989, N°6, pp.52-62.

286. Nikiforov, op.cit., p.53.

287. Cf.Nikiforov, op. cit., p.60f; cf. also idem, 'Filosofija kak ličnyj opyt [Philosophy as Personal Experience]', in idem, *Zabluždajuščij razum? Mnogoobrazie vnenaučnogo znanija* [Erring Reason? The Diversity of Non-Scientific Knowledge] (M.: Politizdat, 1990), pp.296-326; cf. further Davydov 1988, p.62, and Mamardašvili 1989.

288. See Lapin *et al.* 1991, pp.40-70.

289. Cf. v.d. Zweerde 1992b.

290. Cf. Nikiforov 1990, and Panarin 1990; other contributions to the same discussion by B. Altukhov and T. Panfilova in *ON* 1990, N°5, pp.84-98 and pp.98-110.

291. For example, Nikiforov carefully distinguished between Marxism-Leninism as a dogmatic "state religion" and Marxism as a philosophical theory (cf. Nikiforov 1990a, p.15): the first was entirely dependent upon the CPSU and the Soviet system, whereas the other was a respectable position, but already part of history (Nikiforov 1990b, p.127f).

292. Cf., e.g., Gusejnov 1991.

293. Cf. Scanlan 1985, pp.261-292; the 'Moral Code of the Builder of Communism', adopted by the CPSU in 1961, was in force until the mid-1980s (op.cit., p.263f, with the complete text of the Code).

294. See Davydov 1989[2], Gulyga 1990b, and idem, 'Točka zrenija [Point of View]', *Pravda* 1989, N°204 (23/07/1989), p.3, Shlapentokh 1990, p.277, Solov'ëv 1991, esp. 'Ličnost' i pravo [Person and Right]', (pp. 403-431, also in *VF* 1989, N°8, pp.67-90), and Swiderski 1989, and idem 1993b.

295. See, e.g., the discussion, organized by the debating club of the IF AN on 'Vera [Faith]' (*Naše nasledie* 1990, N°4, pp.25-29) or the *kruglyj stol* 'Kul'tura; Nravstvennost'; Religija [Culture; Morality; Religion]', *VF* 1989, N°11, pp.30-63; cf. also Dlugač 1991, p.209, v.d. Zweerde 1992d.

296. Gulyga 1990a; cf. Geyer 1989.

297. Texts by these thinkers appeared in the newly-founded journal of religious philosophy, *Načala* [Origins], but also in *VF*; cf. N.K. Gavrjušin, 'Russkaja filosofija i religioznoe soznanie [Russian Philosophy and Religious Consciousness]', *VF* 1994, N°1, p.67, S.S. Khoružij, *Posle Pereryva; puti*

russkoj filosofii [after the Interval; The Ways of Russian Philosophy] (SPb.: Aletejja; 1994), and S.S. Khoružij (ed.), *Sinergija; problemy asketiki i unistiki pravoslavija* [Synergy; Problems of Asceticism and Mysticism of Orthodoxy] (M.: Di-dik, 1995); on Russian religious philosophy see, e.g., Dlugač 1991, pp.216-219, Müller *et al.* 1992, Koslowski 1992, Müller 1993, Kornblatt 1996, Sieber 1996.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Iovčuk 1967, p. 66, referring to V.I. Lenin, 'Konspekt *Nauki logiki*', *PSS* XXIX, p. 84.

2. Bolotnikov 1933, p.35, n.1.

3. Cf. Bocheński 1967b, p.192.

4. Cf. Kamenka 1965, p.93: "The dissolution of philosophy as a discipline, implicit in the concept of Marxism as the scientific foundation for all knowledge and in its tendency toward economic reductionism, has not become part of the official ideology of Bolshevik Marxism. (...) As Soviet leaders, from Stalin onward, came to ascribe more and more importance to ideology as a means of gaining social support and exercising social control, the economic reductionism implicit in the materialist interpretation of history was modified more and more."

5. This periodization is also present in Soviet publications, e.g. in Bogdanov 1971, who distinguished three periods in Soviet Hegel-studies: 1917 – 1930, 1930 – 1955, 1955 onwards (p. 121), or in Mel'vil' 1989, who marks 1938 and 1947 as main breaks in Soviet study of 'bourgeois philosophy' (p. 3); Rybarczyk has 1947 as the main break, but also points to 1956 (Rybarczyk 1975, p.45), Bocheński mentions: i) 1917 – mid 1930s, ii) mid 1930s – mid 1950s, and iii) since the 20th CPSU-congress in 1956 (Bocheński 1965, p.311); Iovčuk also points to the mid 1930s as the main break (Iovčuk 1967, p.67).

6. Cf. Jeu 1969, p.49: "À travers ces discussions, c'est donc en fait toujours le même débat qui se prolonge. La tendance positiviste, au nom de la science, récuse toute philosophie comme archaïsme de la pensée et invoque l'étude précise du concret. Spinoza, Hegel sont avant tout des représentants du passé et sont donc dépassés et repoussés. La tendance dialectique n'a pas de peine à montrer que ce prétendu concret est finalement ce qu'il y a de plus abstrait."

7. Cf. Kołakowski 1981, III, p.82.

8. Cf. Ballestrem 1968, p.108, and especially Bakker 1982, pp.175-178; in Deborin's words: "Im weitesten Sinne ist Materie die ganze, unendliche konkrete Gesamtheit von 'Vermittlungen' d.h. von Beziehungen und Verbindungen" (A.M. Deborin, *Lenin kak myslitel'* (M.: 1924), p.42, quoted after Ballestrem 1968, p.108).

9. Bakker 1982, p.177; reference is to A.M. Deborin, 'Mirovozzrenie Spinozy', *Vestnik Kommunističeskoj Akademii* 20 (1927), appeared in English translation in Kline's *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952; 2nd edition: Westport CT: Hyperion Press, 1981[2]) as 'Spinoza's World View' (pp. 90-119); cf. also Bakker 1982, p.175f, referring to Kline, op.cit., p.14f; cf. also Kline 1961, p.349, Jakhot 1981, p.221, who quotes Plekhanov as qualifying Marxist materialism as "just a Spinozism that is more or less aware of itself", and Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, IV, p.189.

10. Cf. Bakker 1982, p.181f.

11. Lenin, *Filosofskie tetrady* [*PSS* XXIX], p.162; cf Engels: "Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung ist die Erbin der deutschen klassischen Philosophie" (*Ludwig Feuerbach* ... (*MEW* XXI), p.307.

12. Lenin, 'Eščë raz o profsojuzakh [Once Again About the Trade Unions]', in: *PSS* XXXII, p.290; though placed between brackets, the remark is by no means coincidental in the context of the whole text; on *PZM*, cf. Lenin, *PSS* XXXXV, p.30.

13. Cf. Edie *at al.* 1976[2], III, p.352; Plekhanov joined the Mensheviks, opposed the October revolution, and organized anti-Bolshevik opposition (cf. Utekhin 1961, p.422f).

14. Jakhot 1981, p.229, p.234.

15. L.I. Aksel'rod-Ortodoks, 'Otvet na 'Naši raznoglasija' A. Deborina [Answer to A. Deborin's 'Our Disagreements']', *Krasnaja nov'* 1927, N°5, p.163, quoted after Jakhot

1981, p.179 (A. Deborin, 'Naši raznoglasija' appeared in *Letopis' marksizma* 1926, N°2); cf. also Jeu 1969, p.49.

16. Cf. Jakhot 1981, p.178 and p.180.

17. L.I. Aksel'rod, 'Nadoelo!', *Krasnaja nov'*, 1927, N°3, p.154, quoted after Jakhot 1981, p.234.

18. Aksel'rod, op.cit., p.176, quoted after Jakhot 1981, p.233f.

19. Cf. Jakhot 1981, p.230f.

20. Cf. Jakhot 1981, p.232, referring to A.M. Deborin, 'Revizionizm pod maskoj ortodoksii', *PZM* 1929, N°9, p.13; cf. also Utekhin 1961, p.24.

21. Cf. Jeu 1969, p.48: "Et c'est en défendant la philosophie (à travers une défense de Spinoza) qu'on tendait à rapprocher marxisme et spinozisme"; cf. Jakhot 1981, p.178.

22. Cf. Jakhot 1981, p.176: "Engels often spoke about the contradiction between method and system in Hegel's philosophy. (...) And in the struggle unfolding in 1930-1931, this weapon proved to be simply indispensable: the deborinists could be accused of "overestimating" Hegel, the mechanicists of "underestimating" him. There was no defence against this "weapon", because it was not employed for any thorough analysis, but for the achievement of particular goals."

23. Cf. Jakhot 1981, p.237 and p.239, quotation from M.B. Mitin, 'Spinoza i dialektičeskij materializm', *PZM* 1932, N°11-12, p.173 and p.177.

24. Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, VI, kn. 1, p.417, quoted by Jeu 1969, p.48.

25. Cf. Jakhot 1981, p.233, and. Jeu 1969, p.47f, who refers to Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, VI.

26. Bolotnikov 1933, p.33.

27. Cf., for the economistic impulse: Pozner 1937, p.28, and Aleksandrov 1937, p.37; for the dichotomic impulse: Pozner 1937, p.30, and Aleksandrov 1937, p.38; and for the totalizing impulse: Pozner 1937, p.30f, and Aleksandrov 1937, p.49.

28. Aleksandrov 1937, p.23.

29. Konstantinov *et al.* 1960-1970, II (1962), C.G. Arzakanjan, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.376; cf. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.8 ("History of philosophy as a genuine science ... took shape in the middle of the 19th century. (...) Such a science *–a materialist understanding of history–* appeared thanks to the great creative exploit of the *klassiki* of Marxism"), or Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.129 ("A scientific history of philosophy became possible with the emergence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy").

30. Aleksandrov 1937, p.41.

31. Cf. Aleksandrov 1937, p.24: "Let's have a brief look at the essence of this idealist history of philosophy, in conflict with which Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin originated the dialectical-materialist history of philosophy, turning it *eo ipso* into a true science."

32. Karimskij, a specialist in history of American philosophy (he published, among others, *Revoljucija 1776 goda i stanovlenie Amerikanskoj filosofii* [The Revolution of 1776 and the Genesis of American Philosophy] (M.: Mysl', 1976), stated that Soviet historians of philosophy do not suppose that an elaborate theory of the history of philosophy is to be found in the *klassiki* , rather they are trying to create such a theory on the basis of general methodological principles of *diamat*. As for Sokolov, he stated that the *klassiki* did not write a history of philosophy, and that the remarks they made were "occasional and not always successful" (interviews May 1986).

33. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p 266; cf. Prokhorov *et al.* 1970-1978[3], XXII, entry 'Rossijskaja federacija', p.256f: "At the end of the 1930s, beginning of the 1940s, the number of studies into the history of philosophy increased."

34. Okulov 1962, p.26, quoted after Ballestrem 1963a, p.114.

35. Cf. Majorov *et al.* 1979, p.45, Jeu 1969, p.460, entries on Luppol, Serëžnikov, Aleksandrov, Černysëv, and Dynnik in Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, and entries on Luppol, Aleksandrov, Černyšëv, Dynnik, and Bykhovskij in Alekseev *et al.* 1995[2].

36. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.266.

37. Cf. Mitin 1974, where he accuses Luppol, together with Deborin, Karev and others of "overestimating" Hegel (p. 367), and of ascribing equal importance to theory and

practice (p. 374). Asmus in 1930 participated in the OVMD, and also was accused of idealist errors (cf. Ahlberg 1960, p.103, 'Iz istorii...' 1991, p.153, and Jakhot 1981, p.72f, quoting from Mitin *et al.* 1983 (orig. 1930)); cf. on other accused historians of philosophy Balyčeva 1982, Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.266, and Iovčuk 1967, p.68.

38. Lenin, *PSS* XXXXV, p.30, and ibid., p.25: "A long time ago, Engels advised the leaders of the contemporary proletariat to translate the militant atheist literature of the end of the 18th century for massive spreading among the populace";cf. also Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.266.

39. Cf. Iovčuk *et al.* 1958, p.46, Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.266, and De George 1966, p.186f: "Professionally, they did little creative work and concerned themselves primarily with translations of and commentaries on various works in the history of philosophy, including those of Democritus, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, and some of the pre-Marxist Russian philosophers."

40. Ballestrem 1963, p.114, quoting Okulov 1962, p.26; cf. Ballestrem 1963b.

41. Somerville 1946, p.236; cf. also Mitin 1944, p.78, and Kamenka 1963, p.6: F. Bacon, e.g., appeared in a 23,000 copy edition, Democritus reached 10,000, Holbach 79,400; of the works by Hegel, 200,500 copies were published in 1917-1938.

42. Cf. Mitin 1944.

43. Cf. Kołakowski 1981, III, p.115: "... zu den Werken Platons etwa, von noch gefährlicheren Idealisten ganz zu schweigen, hatte der Leser rund vierzig Jahre lang keinen Zugang"; Kołakowski exaggerates, however, when he writes: "In den dreißiger Jahren erschienen noch einige Übersetzungen der Klassiker der Philosophie, aber nur jener, die (verdienstermaßen oder nicht) in dem Ruf standen, 'Materialisten' zu sein, oder antireligiöse Traktate verfaßten: So konnte dem sowjetischen Leser von Zeit zu Zeit ein antiklerikales Pamphlet Holbachs oder Voltaires in die Hand fallen oder bestenfalls ein Text Bacons oder Spinozas. Es erschienen gleichfalls die Werke Hegels, der bereits als 'Dialektiker' kanonisiert war."

44. Cf. Averincev *et al.* 1989^{2}, V.V. Bibikhin, entries 'Nikolaj Kuzanskij', p.421, and 'Losev', p.324.

45. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.266; cf. Bocheński 1967^{5}, p.53f); an exception was Somerville's enthusiasm about Aleksandrov's 1940 book on Aristotle (cf. Somerville 1946, p.238f).

46. Cf. Ballestrem 1963b.

47. Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, VI, k.1, p.420. cf. also Kamenka 1965, p.94.

48. Cf. Kosičev 1986, p.11, and Iovčuk 1985, p.5.

49. Iovčuk, characteristically ignoring –as part of this primarily ideological statement– the difference between historians of philosophy (Asmus, Dynnik, Trakhtenberg) and "party-philosophers" (Mitin, Judin, Vaseckij), wrote: "A significant role in the defence and propaganda of the best traditions of philosophical and socio-political thought of the past was played in the pre-war years and during the Patriotic war by works in the history of philosophy by scientists of Moscow university and ... MIFLI G.F. Aleksandrov, V.F. Asmus, G.S. Vaseckij, A.P. Gagarin, M.A. Dynnik, D.Ju. Kvitko, V.S. Kružkov, M.B. Mitin, I.K. Luppol, Todor Pavlov (Dosev), A.A. Petrov, V.I. Svetlov, O.V. Trakhtenberg, B.S. Černyšëv, P. Judin, and others (Iovčuk 1967, p.69; cf. also Iovčuk 1985, p.5)."

50. Cf. Kołakowski 1981, III, pp.133f, Planty-Bonjour 1974, p.332, and Kamenka 1972, p.165; cf. also, e.g., Iovčuk 1985, p.5.

51. World War II was called, in the USSR, the 'Great Patriotic War [*Velikaja Otečestvennaja Vojna*]'.

52. Kosičev 1986, p.13f; cf. also Iovčuk 1985, p.5: "The investigation of Russian philosophy and of the philosophical thought of other peoples of the USSR played an important part in the patriotic and internationalist education of the Soviet people already before the war."

53. Stalin, *PSS* XIV, p.540, quoted from Aleksandrov 1946^{2}, p.423 and Edgerton 1950, p.22.

54. Cf. Iovčuk *et al.* 1958, p.47.

55. Cf. Bogdanov 1971, p.125.

56. Cf. Bolotnikov 1933, p.35, and Aleksandrov 1936, pp.76ff.

57. Bolotnikov 1933, p.36.

58. Kammari 1936, p.81, cf. ibid., p.86; in general, Jakhot seems to be right in perceiving a growing tendency to regard Hegel as a reactionary ideologist of German nationalism and Prussian authoritarianism, a tendency dated back by him to 1930, and which presented a merging of "the demands of anti-deborinist and anti-Fascist propaganda, which predetermined the sharply negative attitude towards Hegel" (Jakhot 1981, p.186f, quoting M.B. Mitin, 'Gegel' i teorija materialističeskoj dialektiki [Hegel and the Theory of Materialist Dialectics]', *PZM* 1931, N°11-12).

59. Cf. Nethercott 1993, p.223, and Rybarczyk 1975, p.47.

60. Cf. Iovčuk 1967, p.70 Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.146, Iovčuk 1985, p.9, Kosičev 1986, 13, and the *nekrologi* on Ščipanov in *FN* 1983, N°5, p.189, and *VMGU* 1983, serija 7, N°4, p.80.

61. Kosičev 1986, p.13; cf. Vaseckij *et al.* 1942, p.9, p.13 and p.266; other revolutionary democrats included N.A, Nekrasov (1821-1878), M.E. Saltykov-Ščedrin (1826-1889), D.I. Pisarev (1841-1868), M.A. Antonovic (1835-1918), N.V. Šelgunov (1824-1891), and M.L. Mikhajlov (1829-1865) (cf. Swiderski 1979, p.64, referring to *Istorija ėstetiki; pamjatniki mirovoj ėstetičeskoj mysli*, IV (M.: Iskusstvo, 1970)); on *revdemokratizm* cf.also Kołakowski 1981, III, p.144.

62. Vaseckij *et al.* 1942, p.6; cf Kosičev 1986, p.14.

63. Iovčuk 1967, p.70.

64. Iovčuk 1985, p.5; cf. Wetter 1960[5], p.214, and Ballestrem 1963b.

65. Cf. Majorov *et al.* 1979, p.46, and Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.240.

66. Cf. Volodin *et al.* 1991, p.3f, and Sitkovskij 1991, p.5f.

67. A.V. Ščeglov, *Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii* (M.: 1940); cf. Wetter 1960[5], p.214.

68. Aleksandrov *et al.* 1941-1943; the 7 volumes were divided as follows: I – Antiquity and Middle Ages; II – 15th-18th centuries; III – 1st half of the 19th century; IV – Marxism; V – philosophy of the peoples of the USSR; VI – contemporary bourgeois philosophy; VII – development of Marxist philosophy by Lenin and Stalin (Aleksandrov *et al.* 1941-1943, I, p.3); cf. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.267, Somerville 1943, p.509, and idem 1946, p.239.

69. Iovčuk 1985, p.9; cf. Wetter 1960[5], p.214.

70. Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, VI, kn. 1, p.419, and Iovčuk 1967, p.70; cf. Bocheński 1967, p.42.

71. Cf. Iovčuk 1985, p.9.

72. Cf. Majorov *et al.* 1979, p.46, and Ogurcov 1989, p.178: "It was met with interest by both scientists and the Soviet public at large. Thus Vernadskij, after reading the first two volumes... remarked that they were 'better and more interesting than he had expected'" (reference is to a letter by V.I. Vernadskij (1863-1945), the famous and "consistently anti-Marxist" (Utekhin 1961, p.588) Soviet scientist, to B.L. Ličkov on 22/05/1942).

73. Cf. Somerville 1946, p.420, Iovčuk 1967, p.70, Majorov *et al.* 1979, p.46, Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.137, and Kosičev 1986, p.14.

74. Cf. Kamenskij 1991, p.10f.

75. 'O nedostatkakh...' 1944; cf. Iovčuk *et al.* 1958, p.46, Rybarczyk 1975, p.46, 52, and Jakhot 1981, p.187.

76. Cf. Somerville 1946, p.420, and Ogurcov 1989, p.179.

77. Cf. Jakhot 1981, p.188.

78. For example, by Iovčuk: "There were some shortcomings and mistakes in this otherwise correct and valuable work" (Iovčuk 1985, p.9), or by Majorov, Mel'vil', and Sokolov, all of them members of the *kafedra izf*: "... *Istorija filosofii* (1940-1943), which, regardless of a series of inaccuracies, modernizations, and simplifications, has not lost its significance as an educational textbook [*učebnoe posobie*] for students to the present day. (...) An important [*nemaluju*] role in the determination of the scientific-pedagogical interests of the collective of the department and of the style of its work was played by the gifted scholar and organizer B.S. Černyšëv,..." (Majorov *et al.* 1979, p.46).

79. Jakhot 1981, p.188: "The whole fire was directed against one of those who were not interested in political intrigues, but only in science — B.S. Černyšëv. He could not endure it, fell seriously ill (a stroke) and died shortly thereafter"; 1943/4 he was dean of the philosophical faculty of MGU (cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.244), a function in which he was reportedly "driven to infarct by the first generation at MGU of philosophical 'hacks'" (Novokhat'ko 1991, p.9).

80. Cf. Zapata 1988, p.107.

81. Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, VI, k.1, p.419; cf. also Bogdanov 1971, p.125, Bocheński 1967[5], p.42, and Ballestrem 1963a, p.115: "This work was not found satisfactory, especially its third volume was criticized as not being nationalist enough and as overestimating the German classics."

82. Cf. Jakhot 1981, p.187.

83. Kammari 1936, p.86.

84. Kammari 1936, p.86.

85. Cf. Iovčuk *et al.* 1958, p.46f, and Aleksandrov *et al.* 1941-1943, I, p.3.

86. Cf. Iovčuk *et al.* 1958, p.46, Iovčuk 1967, p.71, and Jakhot 1981, p.187.

87. Cf. Mitin 1944, p.77, and Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.267: "After the appearance of this article... further work on this edition was cancelled."

88. Cf. Ballestrem 1963a, p.115f.

89. = Aleksandrov 1946[2].

90. Cf. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.267, Ballestrem 1963a, p.116, Il'ičev *et al.* 1983, entry 'Aleksandrov', p.19, and Bocheński 1967[5], p.42.

91. Bocheński 1967[5], p.43.

92. Bocheński 1967[5], p.42; cf. equally Kamenka 1972, p.165f, and Donoso 1979, p.119.

93. This definition is indeed absent from Aleksandrov's text; instead he stresses the contradictory nature of Hegel's philosophy: "The whole world-view of Hegel is full of doubleness [*dvojstvennost'*], contradictoriness [*protivorečivost'*]" (Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.401), while stating that "Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin disclosed two sides in the philosophy of Hegel — a progressive side, and a conservative, reactionary side" (op.cit., p.412), meaning by this the famous "contradiction" between system and method (op.cit., p.416), and arguing that "for the beginning of the 19th century, Hegel's doctrine of the development of thought played a basically progressive role" (op.cit., p.404), Aleksandrov also has it that "Hegel, as an idealistic philosopher, drew conservative conclusions from the thesis that 'everything that is real is rational'. He overtly stood for the defence and foundation of reactionary social order [*otkryto stal na put' zaščity i obosnovanija reakcionnykh social'nykh porjadkov*]" (op.cit., p.414; on the reactionary character of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and *Philosophy of History* cf. op.cit., p.418ff). On the charges against Aleksandrov, cf. Ždanov 1947, p.262 and p.268, Kamenka 1965, p.94, and Iovčuk 1967, p.71.

94. Kołakowski 1960, p.9, quoted from the edition in Oelmüller *et al.* 1977, p.15; cf. Bogdanov 1971, p.125, and Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.267.

95. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.261.

96. Cf. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.423.

97. Cf. Ždanov 1947, p.260, and Blakeley 1964, p.77.

98. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.5.

99. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.19 and p.481.

100. Cf. Ždanov 1947, p.257f, and Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.267.

101. Cf., e.g., Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.481; according to Aleksandrov, it was Stalin in his 'Anarkhizm ili socializm?' of 1906, who concluded a discussion about the inevitability of development by saying: "Hence... the well-known dialectical thesis: 'everything that really exists, i.e. everything that grows from day to day, is rational'," provided "the classical Marxist explanation of the thesis 'everything that is real is rational; everything that is rational is real' (Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.415, quoting from Stalin, *PSS* I, p.299)."

102. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.8.

103. Pozner,1937, p.21: "One of the most important problems of the history of philosophy as a science is the question about the connection between the development of philosophical thought, as it is expressed in

the struggle and shift [*bor'ba i smena*] of philosophical systems, and the course [*chod*] of economic and socio-political historical development".

104. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.8.

105. Cf., e.g., Iovčuk 1960, p.13, and idem, 1971[3], p.16, Konstantinov *et al.* 1960-1970, II (1962), C.G. Arzakanjan *et al.*, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.380, and Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.232; cf. also Rybarczyk 1975, p.6.

106. "Nach materialistischer Geschichtsauffassung ist das *in letzter Instanz* bestimmende Moment in der Geschichte die Produktion und Reproduktion des wirklichen Lebens. Mehr haben weder Marx noch ich je behauptet. Wenn nun jemand das dahin verdreht, das ökonomische Moment sei das *einzig* bestimmende, so verwandelt er jeden Satz in eine nichtssagende, abstrakte, absurde Phrase. Die ökonomische Lage ist die Basis, aber die verschiedenen Momente des Überbaus... und nun gar die Reflexe aller dieser wirklichen Kämpfe im Gehirn der Beteiligten, politische, juristische, philosophische Theorien... üben auch ihre Einwirkung auf den Verlauf der geschichtlichen Kämpfe aus und bestimmen in vielen Fällen vorwiegend deren *Form*. Es ist eine Wechselwirkung aller dieser Momente, worin schließlich... als Notwendiges die ökonomische Bewegung sich durchsetzt (F.Engels, 'Brief an J. Bloch (1890)', *MEW* XXXVII, p.463; quoted after Irrlitz *et al.* 1983, p.89 and Kołakowksi 1981, I, p.384)," and: "Und insofern sie [philosophers and other intellectuals, EvdZ] eine selbständige Gruppe innerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsteilung bilden, insofern haben ihre Produktionen... einen rückwirkenden Einfluß auf die ganze gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, selbst auf die ökonomische. Aber bei alledem stehn sie selbst wieder unter dem beherrschenden Einfluß der ökonomischen Entwicklung" (F. Engels, "Brief an C. Schmidt (1890)', *MEW* XXXVII, p.492; quoted after Irrlitz *et al.* 1983, p.92f); cf. also Kołakowksi 1981, I, p.384-389.

107. Rozental' *et al.* 1954[4], entry 'Istorija filosofii kak nauka', p.208.

108. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.12; cf. also Aleksandrov 1937, p.33 and p.37f, as well as Pozner 1937, p.15: "The splendid formulation of the fundamental idea of historical materialism, given by Marx in the preface to *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, is the first fundamental premiss of a Marxist explanation of the origin, the content, the significance and the role of social consciousness, social ideology, and, consequently, philosophical views."

109. Aleksandrov 1937, p.62.

110. Aleksandrov 1937, p.41.

111. Kamenka 1965, p.93.

112. As Pozner remarked in 1937: "Just as for general history an adequate subdivision of history into epochs, a scientific periodization is an indispensable condition for the scientific character of the whole construction, so in scientific history of philosophy, too, the solution of the question of the right periodization is one of its essential elements" (Pozner 1937, p.27).

113. Marx, *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* [*MEW* XIII], p.9.

114. Cf. Kołakowski 1981, I, p.395f; cf. also Scanlan 1985, p.187f, and 194f, and Pozner 1937, p.28.

115. Cf. Scanlan 1985, p.188, and Kołakowski 1981, I, p.396.

116. Cf. Pozner 1937, p.28: "A materialist understanding of history is the theoretical basis of Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy. Indispensable for the construction of such a history is a detailed study of each socio-economic formation, its mode of production, its distinctive forms of class-struggle, the level of development of science, and the nature of the social ideology that is proper to it. On this basis philosophy can also be properly understood as one of the forms of class ideology."

117. This is especially manifest in Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965.

118. Cf. op.cit., p.30f: "A Marxist-Leninist elaboration of the history of philosophy ... shows, that everything alive, effective, progressive, that conditioned the historical role of classical philosophical doctrines, can be preserved, revived, and developed only by the revolutionary theory of the proletariat..."

119. Ballestrem 1963a, p.113; cf. also Rybarczyk 1974, p.91.

120. Cf. Fleischer 1984 and Nikiforov 1990c.

121. Kamenskij 1947; cf. also Goerdt 1984, p.117f; sSummaries of the article by Kamenskij, reactions by other historians, and an unfavorable reply by Ščipanov, accusing Kamenskij of 'bourgeois objectivism' and '*kosmopolitizm*' [the latter being the usual reproach against people of Jewish descent, especially under Stalin] (Goerdt 1984, p.118), can be found in Goerdt 1960, pp.46ff, 55f, and 66ff; cf. also Wetter 1960[5], p.220-222. The simplification of Russian philosophical history was particularly obvious with respect to those philosophers who did not fit into the narrative: "As regards such representatives of philosophical idealism, the agents of the reactionary camp, the standard-bearers of 'autocracy, orthodoxy and nationality [*samoderžavie, pravoslavie, narodnost'*]' [the fundamental concepts of official czarist ideology since their formulation in 1833 by Count Uvarov (cf., for example, Masaryk 1992, I, p.94f)] –Katkov and Ševyrev, the mystical neo–Platonist Jurkevič, the neo–Kantian Vladimir Solov'ëv, and others– their philosophical views do not represent anything original (Vaseckij *et al.* 1942, p.11)."

122. Quoted from Wetter 1960[5], p.221f, who refers to 'Za bol'ševistskuju...' 1948, p.11f.

123. Interview with Z.A. Kamenskij on 17/12/1993.

124. Ballestrem 1963a, p.116.

125. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.268.

126. If we base ourselves on the account given by Ballestrem, we find for the years 1931-1940 a total of 59 translations, an average of 5.9 a year, for the period 1941-1950 a total of 13, 1.3 a year, and for the period 1951-1960 a total of 40, an average of 4.0, the years 1951 and 1952 each yielding only 2; it is only in 1953 that we see a production of at least 4 translations a year (4.5 yearly from 1953 to 1960 on average) (cf. Ballestrem 1963b).

127. Cf. Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, VI, kn. 1, pp.422ff, and Kołakowski 1981, III, p.144.

128. Cf. Rybarczyk 1973b, p.106.

129. Rybarczyk 1975, p.50.

130. Cf. Kosičev 1986, p.14, Ogurcov 1989, p.181, and Rybarczyk 1975, p.48.

131. Cf. Blakeley 1964, p.77, Kołakowski 1981, III, p.144, and Ždanov 1947, p.256: "To elaborate a good textbook on the history of philosophy means to arm our intelligencija, our functionaries, our youth with a new powerful ideological weapon, and at the same time it means to take a big step forward on the path of the development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy."

132. Lange 1955, p.202.

133. Asmus 1947, pp.276ff.

134. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.139, and Vasil'ev 1984, p.52.

135. Edgerton 1950, p.1.

136. Op.cit., p.1, footnote.

137. Cf. also Rybarczyk 1975, pp.143ff.

138. Cf.Edgerton 1950, p.28; cf. ibid., p.2: "...there at once arose the question as to which part of the book should contain the history of Russian philosophy during the second half of the nineteenth century. This question was of essential importance, because it related to the general evaluation of the character and historical significance of Russian philosophy. (...) After a full consideration of the question, the authors' collective decided to place the classical Russian philosophy of the nineteenth century in the first part of the book on these grounds: first, although Chernyshevsky's and Dobrolyubov's philosophy was worked out historically after the appearance of Marxist, nevertheless, in content and character it belongs to the philosophy of the pre-Marxist period, *as the highest stage of this development* [italics mine, EvdZ]; second, to carry over the history of nineteenth-century Russian philosophy into the second part would disturb the historical and logically balanced exposition of the history of the development of dialectical and historical materialism by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin."

139. Op.cit., p.2.

140. Cf. Edgerton 1950, p.20f.

141. Chapter 8 (chapter 9 in the *konspekt* (cf. Edgerton 1950, p.19)) of vol.I ['Razvitie materialističeskoj i peredovoj obščestvenno-političeskoj mysli v Rossii v period usilenija krepostničestva i ukreplenija central'nogo gosudarstva (XVII vek)', *VF* 1950, N°2,

pp.264-295], and chapters 4 ['Razvitie marsksistskoj filosofii v period reakcii i novogo pod"ema revoljucionnogo dviženija', *VF* 1950, N°1, pp.281-308] and 5 ['Razvitie Marksom i Ėngel'som dialektičeskogo i istoričeskogo materializma posle Parižskoj Kommuny (1871-1895 gody)', *VF* 1950, N°1, pp.308-356] of vol.II; cf. Rybarczyk 1975, p.146, and p.152, n.13, and Wetter 1960[5], p.228.

142. Cf. Rybarczyk 1975, p.147.

143. Source of this information: Sergej Nikolaevič Plotnikov (1929-1995), privileged owner of a copy of the *maket* (interview on 24/09/1991).

144. Ballestrem 1963a, p.116; cf. Kline 1956, p.127, Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, pp.422ff, Ballestrem 1963a, p.114f, and Blakeley 1964, p.78, and Rybarczyk 1975, pp.48ff.

145. Cf. Bogomolov 1967, p.100.

146. In an interview I had in 1986 with Ju.K. Mel'vil', then chairman of the *kafedra izf*, he also dated the beginning of *ifn* 30 years earlier, i.e. around 1956.

147. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.138.

148. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.146; in September 1991, the Kirghiz philosopher Anara Abdynasyrova informed me about how young philosophers from the different republics were allowed only to write about their own republics, not to study classical or contemporary Western philosophy.

149. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.138f.

150. Cf. Iovčuk 1967, p.71f, and Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.165, and p.165.

151. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.139.

152. Cf. De George 1966, p.10, who refers to *Kommunist* 1956, N°17, pp.100-114, and Kline 1956, p.135, who mentions "a series of relatively 'objective' expository and critical articles on thinkers long neglected by Soviet philosophers."

153. Ballestrem 1963a, p.117, and p.114, quoting Okulov 1962, p.26.

154. Cf. Kline 1956, p.128, quoting *VF* 1955, N°3, p.195, and further referring to 'Nasuščnye... 1955, p.17; cf. also Wetter 1960[5], p.279, who refers to the same text in *VF*, apparently a survey of philosophical dissertations over the past two years (1953/4), Kamenka 1972, p.167, and Kamenka 1965, p.97: "The article [the editorial in *VF* 1955, N°3, EvdZ] singles out for criticism the philosophers Z.Ya. Beletskii, who had said at the philosophical discussion in 1946 that 'pre-Marxist philosophy, defending the interests of the propertied classes, presented a distorted, falsified view of reality'."

155. Cf. Kamenka 1972, p.167, Kamenka 1965, p.97, and the *nekrologi* on Ščipanov in *FN* 1983, N°5, p.189, and *VMGU* 1983, serija 7, N°4, p.80.

156. Kline 1956, p.135f.

157. Kamenka 1965, p.97, referring to 'Povyšat' idejno-teoretičeskij uroven' issledovanij po istorii filosofii', *VF* 1955, N° 3, p.7f; criticism is directed against the collective work *Dialektičeskij materializm* (M.: 1953), published under Aleksandrov's editorship.

158. Cf. Kline 1956, p.136, referring to 'Povyšat'...'; cf. Rybarczyk 1975, p.73, n.11.

159. Wetter 1960[5], p.278, quoting 'Nasuščnye... 1955, p.18f.

160. Kline 1956, p.136.

161. Kamenka 1972, p.167, and Kline 1956, p.138.

162. Kline 1956, p.136, quoting 'Povyšat'...', p.16.

163. Cf. op.cit., p.135.

164. Ballestrem 1963a, p.116.

165. The publication of *IF6* in 12 foreign countries was mentioned with equal pride (Pavlov 1966, p.135).

166. Cf. Ballestrem 1963a, p.116, and 'K vykhodu...' 1964, p.127.

167. 'K vykhodu...' 1964, ibid.; cf. also Pavlov 1966, p.135: "It must be stressed that for the first time the development of Marxist-Leninist philosophical thought in the Soviet Union from the first days of the existence of Soviet power until the present time comes into view."

168. Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, VI, kn. 1, p.422.

169. Ojzerman 1988, p.50.

170. Pavlov 1966, p.137.

171. Cf. Blakeley 1964, p.78, and Pavlov 1966, p.138.

172. Interview with Sokolov in May 1986.

173. Iovčuk *et al.* (1960) 1975[4]; it appeared first in 1960, then, revised, in 1967, 1971 (50,000 copies), and 1975: "*Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii* is designed as a textbook for students in the humanities faculties of institutions of secondary education..., as well as for the Soviet intelligencija, studying the history of philosophy independently" (Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.3).

174. Cf. Rybarczyk 1975. p.151, referring to M.T. Iovčuk, 'Aktual'nye problemy istorii marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii v svete sovremennoj ideologičeskoj bor'by', *FN* 1969, N°5, p.47.

175. Malinin 1985, p.194.

176. Interviews with Sokolov and Mel'vil' in April / May 1984.

177. Cf. Ojzerman 1988, p.51, and Džokhadze 1988, p.160. The Soviet planning periods, the famous *pjatiletki*, comprised, in post-war USSR, the first and the second five years of each decade: 1971-1975 thus was the 9th *pjatiletka* (cf. Smith 1984[2], p.291), 1985-1990 the 12th (cf. *SSSR v cifrakh v 1988 godu*, p.17).

178. Interview with Ojzerman on 05/09/89.

179. Kamenskij 1992, p.4.

180. Ballestrem 1963a, p.110, and Iovčuk *et al.* 1960 and 1971[3], p.15.

181. Pavlov 1966, p.135f.

182. Bocheński 1967b, p.192.

183. Kamenka 1965, p.99.

184. Pavlov 1966, p.136, referring to statements made by Ščipanov, Bogomolov, and Sokolov.

185. Ballestrem 1963a, p.110, referring to Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, I [1957], p.623.

186. Kamenka 1965, p.101.

187. Pavlov 1966, p.136, referring to remarks made by Ščipanov.

188. Ballestrem 1963a, p.110.

189. Cf. Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, II, pp.427-429, and V, pp.774-777.

190. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.15, and Iovčuk *et al.* 1971[3], p.14; reference is to Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.122, in the Russian edition: Gegel', *Sočinenija* IX, p.93.

191. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.121: "Die eigentliche Philosophie beginnt im Okzident. Erst im Abendlande geht diese Freiheit des Selbstbewußtseins auf,..." (p. 92 in the Russian edition); the "Germanic world" is the world of the Germanic peoples [*germancy* in Russian, including Scandinavians, Dutch, and English] not that of the Germans [*nemcy*].

192. Cf. Plott 1977-1989, V, p.65.

193. Cf. Plott 1977-1989, Kimmerle 1995, Mall 1995, Libbricht 1995.

194. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.15.

195. Pavlov 1966, p.137.

196. Op.cit., p.135.

197. Iovčuk *et al.* 1971[3], p.15.

198. In the revised edition of *KIF* "asiacentrism" is attacked as being "equally groundless and reactionary" as "eurocentrism", and much criticism is directed at "the allegation of the '*aziacentristy* ' to the extent that the most prominent philosophical currents of the West (including French materialism and classical German philosophy) and even Marxism have their source in Confucianism and other idealist doctrines of the Ancient East" (Iovčuk *et al.* 1971[2], p.16), but it could also be applied to the 'Stalinist' interpretation of the history of Russian philosophy as outlined above, and perhaps this was part of the intention of the authors (which would substantiate the qualification of Iovčuk as a 'party-philosopher': he was both editor-in-chief of *KIF* and one of the architects of *revdemokratizm*).

199. Kamenka 1965, p.96.

200. Ballestrem 1963a, p.108f, referring, in that order, to: Ždanov 1947, p.257; Rozental' *et al.* 1954[4], p.209; Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, I, p.10, and Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.6; I have followed Kamenka in most of his amendments of Ballestrem's translation.

201. Iovčuk *et al.* 1971[3], p.6.

202. Kamenka 1965, p.99.

203. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.5f.

204. "Therefore, to say that such a concept [i.e. "matter", EvdZ] can 'become obsolete [*ustaret'*]' is an *infantile babble*, is the nonsensical repetition of the arguments of fashionable *reactionary* philosophy. Could the struggle between idealism and materialism become obsolete after two thousand years of development of philosophy? The tendencies [*napravlenija*] or lines [*linii*] of Plato and

Democritus in philosophy? The struggle of religion and science? The denial of objective truth and its recognition? The struggle between the advocates of supernatural knowledge and its adversaries?" (Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, p.131); cf. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, pp.110ff, Kamenka 1965, p.101, where many examples of classification of philosophers are given, and Ballestrem 1963a, p.118.

205. The second paragraph of the second chapter of the first volume of *IF6* is named "the materialism of the 5th century B.C. and its struggle against idealism (the 'line of Democritus' and the 'line of Plato')", and in Konstantinov 1982[6], p.11, it reads: "The 'line of Democritus', as V.I. Lenin remarked, was in opposition to the idealist 'line of Plato'"; cf. Kamenka 1965, p.100f.

206. Cf. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.15.

207. Iovčuk *et al.* 1971, p.13.

208. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, and idem 1971[3], p.16; cf. Rybarczyk 1975, p.62; the 'vulgarizers' are A. Bogdanov, B. Šulatikov and others (cf. also Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.130).

209. Op.cit., p.17.

210. Iovčuk *et al.* 1971, p.17f.

211. Based on Rybarczyk 1973a, p., 102, and idem 1975, p.125f (who refers to Konstantinov *et al.* 1960-1970, II (1962)), C.G. Arzakanjan *et al.*, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.380, and Iovčuk *et al.* 1967[2], p.18; cf. also Zubatý 1975, p.208, who also uses the article by Arzakanjan, and Ballestrem 1963a, p.109, whose source is Iovčuk *et al.* 1960; Blakeley gives a more general division into five periods: primitive society (no philosophy); slave-owning society (fight between objective idealism and spontaneous materialism); feudal society (dominated by objective idealism of scholastic philosophy); the period of capitalism (the beating down of subjective idealism (Descartes, Kant) by mechanicist materialism); the socialist period (dominated by Marxism-Leninism) (Blakeley 1984, p.77); cf. Ballestrem 1963a, p.109 "...as philosophy only rose as an expression of the social consciousness of classes, there was no philosophy in the times of primitive society."

212. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.18; the formulation in Iovčuk *et al.* 1971[2], p.18, shows important differences, but not with respect to the present topic; cf. also Ballestrem 1963a, p.109.

213. Cf. the chapters on regions like Dagestan and Burjatija in Evgrafov *et al.* 1968-1988.

214. General bibliographical information on work in the field of *ifn* with regard to the period until approx. 1975 can be obtained from Rybarczyk 1975 and Fotonov 1976.

215. Cf. Bogomolov 1967, p.100.

216. Cf. Rybarczyk 1975, p.50.

217. Cf. 'Kratkaja bibliografija rabot po istorii filosofii i obščestvennoj mysli za 1972-1976 gg.', in: Bogdanov *et al.* 1977, p.349-358; this bibliography, which includes books in languages other than Russian, some republications as well as a few translations into Russian from Hungarian, Polish, etc., lists 285 titles in all, but is clearly not complete for 1976 (1972: 82; 1973: 61; 1974: 50; 1975: 68; 1976: 24).

218. In 1963 Kamenka stated: "Its [of Soviet philosophy, EvdZ] greatest achievements are reasonably scholarly works in the history of philosophy (...) – works from which one has learned to expect no more than a reasonable *understanding* of the man being discussed, an understanding that is virtually always vitiated, at some point or other, by the politically imposed duty of showing that all philosophical conflicts are ultimately reducible to the conflict between idealism and materialism. Critical, as opposed to expository and historical work, is remarkably poor" (Kamenka 1963, p.2.)," but in 1972 he added: "The serious, unabusive tone of K.S. Bakradze's book on contemporary bourgeois philosophy (*Ocherki po istorii Noveishei i Sovremennoi Burzhuaznoi Filosofii*, Tiflis, 1960), of A.S. Bogomolov's studies in contemporary bourgeois theories of evolution and development, especially his *Ideya Razvitija v Burzhuaznoi Filosofii* (Moscow, 1962),... has no parallel in Soviet philosophy before 1955 (Kamenka 1972, p.167)."

219. Kamenka 1972, p.167; cf. also Blakeley 1980, p.322: "Most recently, contemporary Soviet philosophers have devoted themselves to more extensive research on all pre-Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers. Instead of

quoting just enough to club, they provide longer quotations and use these for sometimes quite sophisticated commentaries and interpretations."

220. Readily accessible examples of such accounts are the brief but accurate entries on Epicurus and Epicureanism in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, written by A.L. Dobrokhotov, one of the younger Soviet specialists in Ancient Greek philosophy (cf. *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* [translation of the third edition] (New York: MacMillan & London: Collier MacMillan), XXX, A.L. Dobrokhotov, entries 'Epicureanism' and 'Epicurus', p.263f.), or on Epictetus by S.S. Averincev, a scholar of an older generation (cf. op.cit., S.S. Averincev, entry 'Epictetus', p.263.).

221. Ballestrem 1963a, p.118.

222. Solov'ëv 1991, p.8f.

223. Cf. Gorbačëv 1987.

224. Motrošilova *et al.* 1986a, p.14f.

225. Cf. Clark *et al.* 1984, pp.27ff, Kamenka 1963, p.2, n.5, and Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.246f; on Dynnik, cf. Ballestrem 1963a, p.246; in the first attempt, *IF3*, Dynnik was not a member of the editorial group, but he contributed several chapters on classical Greek philosophy to the first volume (cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.246, and Aleksandrov *et al.* 1941-1943, I, p.3).

226. Cf. Goerdt 1984, p.80f, and, for example, Mitin 1974, p.363, where he attacks Losev's "overt, papal, counterrevolutionary idealism," and Mitin *et al.* 1983, p.272, also referred to in Jakhot 1981, p.73.

227. Cf. Abramov 1986, p.33.

228. Cf. Goerdt 1984, p.80f and 59f, and Scanlan 1984.

229. Cf. Losev 1963-1994, VII, kn. I, p.3.

230. Cf. 'Beseda...'1984, p.144, *Yearbook USSR '86*, p.182, Takho-Godi 1991, p.16, and Haardt 1993, p.191f; at a meeting which I attended in 1986 at the *kafedra izf* of MGU, Losev's nomination for the "Lenin prize" was discussed, and the enormous appreciation of Losev's work by Soviet historians of philosophy was more than evident.

231. Clark *et al.* 1984, p.142, p.145, and p.258ff.

232. Ibid., p.336ff.

233. Ibid., p.326.

234. Clark *et al.* 1984, p.332, and p.340.

235. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.247f, and 'Pamjati vydajuščegosja sovetskogo filosofa V.F. Asmusa', *VMGU* 1975, N°6, pp.93-94.

236. Cf. Jeu 1981, p.73, Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.247, and Ahlberg 1960, p.103; reference is to Mitin *et al.* 1983, p.270, and Motrošilova 1988, p.67; quoted from the English translation by J.P. Scanlan in *Soviet Studies in Philosophy*, Fall 1989, p.60.

237. Gulyga 1984, p.301.

238. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.142: "An important role in the increase of authority of the department [the *kafedra izf*, EvdZ] was played by the activity of the widely known scholar and wonderful teacher V.F. Asmus, who worked at the department from 1954 until the end of his life."

239. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.248, Motrošilova 1988, p.69, and Buchholz 1991, p.274; a bibliography of Asmus' works between 1924 and 1982 is included in Asmus 1984, pp.312-317.

240. Asmus 1956, p.3 and p.19f.

241. K.S. Bakradze, *Sistema i metod filosofii Gegelja* (Tbilisi: izd. TGU, 1958); cf. Scanlan 1985, p.109, and especially Kline 1964.

242. Cf. Kline 1964, p.37 and p.56, referring to Bakradze 1958, p.257f.

243. These difficulties were passed over in silence in Soviet sources: "As against contemporary falsifiers of the history of Russian and Marxist philosophy, accusing the Bolsheviks of the 'extermination' of Russian philosophical professors after the revolution, everybody willing to cooperate with Soviet power was offered the possibility to do so. As a result of complicated, sometimes agonizing quests, many historians of philosophy (P.P. Blonskij, A.F. Losev, A.O. Makovel'skij, the historian of logic P.S. Popov and others) found their place in Soviet scientific history of philosophy or other fields of knowledge (Iovčuk 1967, p.67f)."

244. Motrošilova 1988, p.68.

CHAPTER FOUR

REFERENCES

1. Mamardašvili 1989a, p.29 (p. 27 in Mamardašvili 1990).

2. Ojzerman 1982b, p.11.

3. Many students told me that their motivation to do history of philosophy as a specialization was the opportunity it offered to study non-Soviet and non-Marxist philosophers.

4. Another was to become a specialist in 'philosophical questions of natural science' or aesthetics, but there the thematic scope was strongly limited.

5. Cf. the 'group photograph' in the introduction by Motrošilova to the German edition of a selection of Soviet studies in history of philosophy: "...wenn bekannt wird, daß Werke von Sergej Averincev, Piama Gajdenko, Ėrich Solov'ev, Vladislav Lektorskij gerade erscheinen, beginnt die Jagd des Leserpublikums... Hin und wieder lädt unsere Institutsabteilung ... Averincev oder Gajdenko zum Vortrag ein. Dann wissen wir schon vorher: die Nachricht wird sich pfeilschnell in Moskau verbreiten, unsere größten Hörsäle werden überfüllt sein... wenn P. Gajdenko, Ė. Solov'ev, M. Kozlova, V. Lektorskij, G. Majorov, N. Avtonomova in Moskau oder Leningrad, in Kiev oder Minsk, in Rostov oder Riga, in Sverdlovsk oder Novosibirsk Vorträge halten, gilt dies als großes Ereignis (Motrošilova *et al.* 1986a, p.12)."

6. Interview with Ojzerman 29/08/1989.

7. Cf. also Ignatow 1988, p.75, incl. n.56.

8. N.V. Motrošilova, 'Einleitung', in: Motrošilova *et al.* 1986a, p.22f.

9. Solov'ëv 1991, p.15.

10. Motrošilova 1993, p.11, referring to Mamardašvili 1989a, p.29 [Mamardašvili 1990, p.28].

11. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Dialektičeskij materializm', p.159; cf. Ballestrem 1963a, p.109, p.113f, and Blakeley 1964, p.77.

12. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.232f.

13. Cf. Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, p.361.

14. They are comparable to Popper's 'trends' as distinct from 'laws' (cf. K.R. Popper, *Poverty of Historicism* (London: 1957), p.128).

15. Cf. Scanlan 1983, and Scanlan 1985, p.207f, referring to A.Ja. Gurevič, 'General Law and Concrete Regularity in History' (1965). Today, Gurevič is one of Russia's leading 'culturologists'. He is the author of a rather well-known book on the categories of Medieval culture (A.Ja. Gurevič, *Kategorii srednevekovoj kul'tury* (M.: 1972); German translation: A.J. Gurjewitsch, *Das Weltbild des mittelalterlichen Menschen* (Dresden: VEB Verlag der Kunst, 1978, and München: C.H. Beck, 1986)), in the 'structuralist' tone of which it is difficult not to see an implicit critique of the universalist and 'teleological' Marxist approach of human history.

16. For example in Bogomolov *et al.* 1983 it is hard to find the notion of *zakon* at all.

17. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.233; cf. Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.128.

18. Cf. Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Dialektika', p.73.

19. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, L.F. Il'ičëv, entry 'Istoričeskij materializm', p.228.

20. Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Istorija filosofii', pp.128ff.

21. Rybarczyk discerned 4 different functions of *ifn*: an ontological, a logical, an epistemological, and a methodological function (Rybarczyk 1975, p.61f), referring to a source of 1966, but it remains unclear what exactly these functions are.

22. Cf. Iovčuk 1970, p.13ff.

23. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.232f.

24. For example, O.E. Nesterova, 'Istoriko-filosofskie predposylki učenija Avgustina o sootnošenii vremeni i večnosti', in: *IFE '86*, pp.35-48; P.P. Gajdenko, 'O filosofsko-teoretičeskikh predposylkakh mekhaniki Galileja', ibid., pp.69-83; A.V. Semuškin, '«Zagadka» Ėmpedokla', in: *IFE '88*, pp.22-37; A.A. Čanyšev, 'Problema cennostnogo i celevogo edinstva kul'tury v idealizme A. Šopengauera', in: *IFE '88*, pp.135-150; or S.S. Averincev, 'Die Symbolik des frühen Mittelalters; zu einem Problemkreis', in: Motrošilova *et al.* 1986, pp.72-104.

25. Kamenskij 1984, p.125; cf. Kamenskij 1992, chapter 1: 'Three histories of philosophy' (pp. 5-24).

26. Ojzerman 1982b, p.7f, and Kamenskij 1984, p.121.

27. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.233.

28. Cf. *Spravočnik... universitet 1986*, p.57.

29. Information gathered from Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, pp.112-203, *Spravočnik... universitet 1984*, p.28, and *Spravočnik... universitet 1986*, p.57.

30. Cf. Belkina *et al.* 1967, p.178, and 'Ot redkollegii', in: Mšvenieradze *et al.* 1988, p.4.

31. Cf. 'Tematika dissertacij po filosofii...

32. 'Škola...' 1987, p.102; cf. Apryško *et al.* 1987, p.86, and 'Sto tomov...', *FN* 1987, N°4, pp.17-19.

33. 'Škola...' 1987, p.102.

34. V. Vodolagin, in 'Škola...' 1987, p.102f.

35. Apryško *et al.* 1987, p.88; the "opponent of Marxism" Scanlan is invoked to state the enormous influence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy on "the minds of the Soviet citizenry" (Apryško *et al.* 1987, p.86, quoting Scanlan 1985, p.12) and the assumption is made that "the essential basis of the authority of Soviet philosophical science is made up by its permanent orientation towards the bond with the spiritual values of mankind, their profound assimilation and critical interpretation (ibid.)."

36. Published in the 1930s in an "imperfect translation," and a "bibliographical rarity" anyway (cf. V.V. Sokolov, in 'Škola...' 1987, p.102) a reprint is appearing since 1993 [see Bibliography].

37. I.S. Narskij, in 'Škola...' 1987, p.103.

38. Cf. I.S. Narskij, in 'Škola...' 1987, p.103, and Apryško *et al.* 1987, p.88.

39. A.V. Gulyga, in 'Škola...' 1987, p.103, and Apryško *et al.* 1987, p.88.

40. Cf. Vasil'ev 1984, p.51f: "After World War II ... in Soviet publications even simple references, including critical ones, to Western philosophy and sociology were crossed out. (...) No translations into Russian of Western authors were realized. In the 1940s and 1950s, first of all, libraries in the USSR received practically no scientific literature in foreign languages, and, in the second place, *all* books on philosophical and sociological subjects by Western authors were in '*speckhran*' [*special'noe khranenie*]."

41. D. Gil'bert, V. Akkerman, *Osnovy teoretičeskoj logiki* (M.: 1947) [orig. D. Hilbert, W. Ackermann, *Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik* (Berlin: 1938), English translation: *Principles of Mathematical Logic* (New York: 1950)], and A. Tarskij, *Vvedenie v logiku i metodologiju deduktivnykh nauk* (M.: 1948) [orig. A. Tarski, *Einführung in die mathematische Logik und die Methodologie der Mathematik* (1937) (Polish orig. 1936), English translation: *Introduction to Logic and the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences* (New York: 1946²)]; R. Karnap, *Značenie i neobkhodimost'* (M.: 1959) [orig.: R. Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity* (Chicago: (1947) 1956²)], A. Čërč, *Vvedenie v matematičeskuju logiku* (Mosva: 1960) [orig.: A. Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic* (Princeton (N.J.): 1956)], J. Lukasevič, *Aristotelevskaja sillogistika s točki zrenija sovremennoj formal'noj logiki* (M.: 1959) [orig.: J. Łukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic* (Oxford: (1951) 1957²)]; cf. Hänggi 1971, Edwards *et al.* 1972², V, entry 'Logic, Modern', p.33, and Cavaliere 1988, pp.542ff.

42. Cf. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, entry 'Vitgenštejn', p.84, G. Frege, 'Smysl i denotat', *Semiotika i informatika*, vyp. 8, 1977, K.R. Popper, *Logika i rost naučnogo znanija* (M.: 1983), containing 200 closely printed pages from *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, ch.1, 3 and 10 of *Conjectures and Refutations*, ch.3 and 6 of *Objective Knowledge*, K. Levi-Stros, *Strukturnaja antropologija* (M.: 1983); cf. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, entry 'Levi-Stros', p.303, R.Dž. Kollingwud, *Ideja istorii* (M.: 1980); cf. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, entry 'Kollingwud', p.265, and Kh.-G. Gadamer, *Istina i metod; osnovy filosofskoj germenevtiki* (M.: Progress, 1988).

43. M. Fuko, *Slova i vešči; arkheologija gumanitarnykh nauk* (M.: 1977), Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, entry 'Fuko', p.750, Malakhov *et al.* 1991, entry 'Prigožin', p.250f, I. Prigožin, *Ot sušestvujuščego k voznikajuščemu; vremja i složnost' v fizičeskikh naukakh* (M.: 1985), and I. Prigožin, I. Stengers, *Porjadok iz khaosa; novyj dialog čeloveka s prirodoj* (M.: 1986).

44. T. Kun, *Struktura naučnykh revoljucij* [The Structure of Scientific Revolutions] (M.: 1975, 1977[2]; orig. 1963); I. Lakatos, *Dokazatel'stva i oproverženija* [Proofs and Refutations] (M.: Nauka, 1967); R. Karnap, *Filosofskie osnovanija fiziki* [Philosophical Foundations of Physics] (M.: 1971); Ja. Khintikka, *Logiko-ėpistemologičeskie issledovanija* (M.: 1980); M. R'juz, *Filosofija biologii* [The Philosophy of Biology] (M.: 1977); R. Uéllek, O. Uorren, *Teorija literatury* [Theory of Literature] (M.: 1978); S. Tulmin, 'Konceptual'nye revoljucii v nauke [Conceptual Revolutions in Science]', in: *Struktura i razvitie nauki* [The Structure and Development of Science] (M.: 1978), and *Čelovečeskoe ponimanie* [Human Understanding] (M.: 1984); Dž. Kholton, *Tematičeskij analiz nauki* [Thematical Analysis of Science] (M.: 1981).

45. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, P.P. Gajdenko, entry 'Khajdegger', p.753.

46. Cf. 'Ot redakcii', *VF* 1989, N°9, p.109, Malakhov *et al.* 1991, pp.365ff, Malakhov 1993, p.109, and Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], P.P. Gajdenko, 'Khajdegger', p.722.

47. Cf. Malakhov 1993, p.109, M. Khajdegger, *Razgovor na proseločnoj doroge* [Conversation on a Country Road] (M.: Vysšaja škola, 1991), and M.Khajdegger, *Vremja i bytie* [Time and Being] (M.: Respublika, 1993).

48. There were some pre-revolutionary translations of Husserl, but the first Soviet translation appeared 1986: 'Krizis evropejskogo čelovečestva i filosofija [The Crisis of European Humanity and Philosophy]', *VF* 1986, N°3, pp.101-116; no mention of Russian translations of Habermas can be found in the entries on Habermas in Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], p.721, or Malakhov *et al.* 1991, p.364f, but in 1989, his contribution to the World Congress of Philosophy appeared in Russian (Ju. Khabermas, 'Ponjatie individual'nosti [The Concept of Individuality]', *VF* 1989, N°2, pp.35-40), followed by a piece by Ricœur (apparently the first Soviet translation, too, as no further titles are mentioned in the entries on Ricœur in Averincev *et al.* 1989[2], p.559, or Malakhov *et al.* 1991, p.3264f): P. Rikër, 'Čelovek kak predmet filosofii [Man as the Subject Matter of Philosophy]', *VF* 1989, N°2, pp.41-50.

49. Malakhov *et al.* 1991, p.3.

50. Ju.M. Bochen'skij, *Sovremennaja evropejskaja filosofija* (M., 1960), translated by V.V. Mšvenieradze and M.K. Mamardašvili (cf. Mamardašvili 1990, p.359); = Bocheński 1951[2]; on Soviet philosophy: pp.67-75.

51. V.I. Molčanov, one of the very few Soviet specialists in phenomenology, told me that he and his colleagues indeed depended on spare copies from Western colleagues, or on copies of *Analecta Husserliana* sent to them because they had published in them (interview on 24/09/1991).

52. Cf. A. Subbotin in 'Škola...' 1987, p.103: "There are practically no cadres for the publication of works of philosophers of the East (Arab, Indian, Chinese, Japanese philosophy), nor are there for Medieval European philosophy."

53. Cf. Hagemeister 1989, p.3f.

54. Apryško *et al.* 1987, p.88.

55. A. Volodin, in 'Škola...' 1987, p.108.

56. Of al-Farabi, a series of translations appeared in Alma-Ata in the 1970s (cf. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, entry 'Farabi', p.713), and Russian translations of main works by Ibn Sina were published in Dušanbe in 1967, and in Moscow in 1980 selected philosophical writings by Ibn Sina appeared (cf. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, entry 'Ibn Sina', p.194).

57. Cf. Gerhart 1974, p.87f, and Valiulina 1991; to take an example from a philological faculty: history of the CPSU (3 semesters), *diamat* (1 semester), *istmat* (1 semester), political economy I (capitalism), Marxist-Leninist ethics and aesthetics, political economy II (socialism), history of philosophy, and scientific communism; in this second case, there was particular stress on the *history* of philosophy, not only in the subject so named, but also in *diamat*, *istmat*, and the course in ethics and aesthetics (according to Külli Prosa during a lecture at Leiden university, 23/02/1993).

58. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], p.27; reference is to V.I. Lenin, 'Zadači sojuzov molodëži [Tasks of the Youth Unions]', in: Lenin, *PSS* XLI, p.304.

59. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], p.28.

60. Op.cit., pp.44ff, and 382ff.

61. Op.cit., p.11, and p.16.

62. *Programma kursa ... 1982* and *Programma kursa ... 1984*, p.4f.

63. Interviews with T.I. Ojzerman and Ju.K. Mel'vil', May 1986.

64. *Programmy ... 1987*, p.3, p.47.

65. Cf. *Programma kandidatskogo ... 1984*, p.3.

66. Cf. *Programma kandidatskogo ... 1984*, p.32.

67. Cf. *Programma kandidatskogo ... 1984*, p.6-10.

68. Cf. *Programmy kandidatskogo ... 1984*, pp.33-37.

69. Cf. op.cit., pp.6-9: 'K. Marx, F. Engels, and V.I. Lenin on ancient philosophy'; 'The appreciation of the materialism of 18th century French philosophers in the works of K.Marx, F. Engels... , V.I. Lenin...'; 'The Leninist Critique of the philosophy of Berkeley and Hume'; 'K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin on the philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach'; 'Lenin's appreciation of the philosophy of the Russian revolutionary democrats'.

70. Ibid., p.9f.

71. *Programma kandidatskogo ... 1984*, p.18f.

72. Cf. *Spravočnik... universitet 1986*, p.57.

73. Cf. *Spravočnik... universitet 1986*, p.57f.

74. Based on the program of the *kafedra* of the history of foreign philosophy (Bogomolov *et al.* 1982), inside cover.

75. Cf. Vasil'ev 1984, p.52, who mentions *diamat*, *istmat* , scientific communism, *filosofskie voprosy estestvoznanija* [philosophical questions of natural science], history of philosophy, and *kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii i sociologii*, and 'Tematika dissertacij...', where 8 specialities for the title of *kandidat filosofskikh nauk* are distinguished: *diamat* and *istmat*, scientific communism, history of philosophy (in this case including kritika *(sovremennoj) buržuaznoj filosofii*), aesthetics, ethics, scientific atheism, logic, and *filosofskie voprosy estestvoznanija*.

76. Zaičenko 1980, p.163.

77. Cf. Boguslavskij 1981, p.176, Zaičenko *et al.* 1981, p.179, and Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.144; the volumes were: V.F. Asmus, *Antičnaja filosofija* [Philosophy of Antiquity] ((1965), 1976[2]), V.V. Sokolov, *Srednevekovaja filosofija* [Medieval Philosophy] (1979), A.Kh. Gorfunkel', *Filosofija ėpokhi Vozroždenija* [Renaissance Philosophy] (1980), I.S. Narskij, *Zapadnoevropejskaja filosofija XVII veka* [17th Century West European Philosophy] (1974), idem, *Zapadnoevropejskaja filosofija XVIII veka* [18th Century West European Philosophy] (1973), idem, *Zapadnoevropejskaja filosofija XIX veka* [19th Century West European Philosophy] (1976), *Buržuaznaja filosofija kanuna i načala imperializma* [Bourgeois on the Eve and in the Beginning of Imperialism] (1977), A.S. Bogomolov *et al.*, *Sovremennaja buržuaznaja filosofija* [Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy], 2 vols. ((1972) 1978[2]).

78. Cf. Semaško 1978, p.181, and Zaičenko *et al.* 1981, p.181.

79. Cf. Zaičenko *et al.* 1981, p.181, and Ljubutin *et al.* 1978, p.71.

80. Semaško 1978, p.180.

81. Cf. Semaško 1978, p.181.

82. Kuznecov *et al.* 1986, p.3, n.1.

83. Byčko *et al.* 1987, p.122f.

84. Cf. Byčko *et al.* 1987, p.123; reference is to Sokolov 1984, p.417, and Kuznecov *et al.* 1986, p.9.

85. Cf. Sokolov 1981, p.179.

86. Cf. Zaičenko *et al.* 1981, p.181.

87. Kuznecov *et al.* 1986, p.6, and op.cit., p.4 and p.400.

88. Cf. Ljubutin *et al.* 1978, pp.69ff.

89. Cf. Kissel' 1978, p.171, and Kissel' 1988, p.177.

90. Cf. Agudov *et al.* 1973, p.168, and Kuznecov *et al.* 1986.

91. Zajčenko *et al.* 1981, p.179f; quotations from Narskij, 1974, p.365, and from K. Marx, F. Ėngel's, *Iz rannikh proizvedenij* (M.: 1959), p.195; the latter is a quotation from Marx' preparatory notes, written in 1839/40 (cf. *MEW* Ergänzungsband I, p.662, n.9) for his doctoral dissertation on Democritus and Epicurus: K. Marx, *Hefte zur epikureischen, stoischen und skeptischen*

Philosophie , 6. Heft [*MEW* Ergänzungsband I], p.214f.

92. For example in Iovčuk 1970, p.15.

93. Sokolov 1984, p.4.

94. I have made use of three widely used histories of philosophy from three European languages: F. Châtelet, *Histoire de la philosophie* , I-VIII (Paris: Hachette, 1972-1973): vol.III, *La Philosophie du monde nouveau: XVI^e et XVII^e siècle*, and vol.IV, *Les Lumières: le XVIII^e siècle*; K. Vorländer, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I-III (Reinbek: Rowohlt, (1949) 1990): Band II, *Mittelalter und Renaissance*, Teil II, 'Renaissance', and Band III, *Neuzeit bis Kant*, Teil I, '17. Jahrhundert', and Teil II, 'Aufklärung'; F.C. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vols. I-VI (New York: Image Books, (1946-1950) 1985): vol.III, *Ockham to Suárez*, vol.IV, *Descartes to Leibniz*, and vol.V, *Hobbes to Hume*. The division of subjects is Sokolov's. The divisions of subjects of the other works have, where they differed, been adapted. For example, Sokolov discusses Malebranche in his chapter on Descartes, Châtelet has a separate chapter on Malebranche, which thus, for the present purpose, has been added to the chapter on Descartes. Likewise, the order of subjects has at places been adapted, for example in the case of Copleston, who deals with the 'rationalist' and 'empiricist' tradition in separate volumes. For each subject, the *number of pages*, dedicated to it in each of the works, has been indicated. What is relevant, of course, is not the absolute number of pages, but their proportion.

95. Cf. Sokolov 1984, pp.427ff.

96. Cf. Byčko *et al.* 1986, p.167.

97. Cf. J. Cottingham, *The Rationalists* [A History of Western Philosophy: 4] (Oxford & New York: Oxford UP, 1990), pp.1-4.

98. Sokolov 1984, p.6.

99. Cf. Störig 1972, I, pp.302ff.

100. Sokolov 1984, p.347; reference is to Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus*; cf. also Sokolov 1977, p.124 and p.134.

101. Cf. Sokolov 1984, 'Ot avtora', pp.3-7.

102. Cf. Byčko *et al.* 1986, p.169; Sokolov indeed pays virtually no attention to East European –not to mention Russian– philosophy.

103. Byčko *et al.* 1986, p.169.

104. Cf. Sokolov 1984, pp.434ff; V. Vindel'band, *Istorija novoj filosofii v eë svjazi s obščej kul'turoj i otdel'nymi naukami*, I (SPb: 1902), G.V.F. Gegel', *Lekcii po istorii filosofii*, III (M. & L.: 1935), B. Rassel, *Istorija zapadnoj filosofii* (M.: Inostrannaja literatura, 1959), R. Fal'kenberg, *Istorija novoj filosofii ot Nikolaja Kuzanskogo do našego vremeni* (M.: 1910).

105. Sokolov 1984, p.7.

106. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1982, pp.79-103.

107. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1982, p.95.

108. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1982, pp.96-103.

109. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1982, p.95-102.

110. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1982, p.103, and p.77f.

111. Interview with Mel'vil', May 1984.

112. Cf. Abramov *et al.* 1986.

113. Cf. Motrošilova *et al.* 1986b, pp.288-293.

114. I have taken into account the volumes 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, which together may yield a representative picture of this period.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. V.I. Lenin, 'Ešče odno uničtoženie socializma [Yet Another Elimination of Socialism]', in: Lenin, *PSS* XXV, p.37.

2. Cf. Kamenskij 1984, p.114, and 124; cf. also Rybarczyk 1975, p.47.

3. Cf. Ballestrem 1963a, p.117.

4. Cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.143: A.M. Karimskij, G.Ja. Strel'cova, and A.M. Rutkevič.

5. For example: B.N. Bessonov, I.S. Narskij, *Germenevtika: istorija i sovremennost'* [Hermeneutics: Past and Present] (M.: Mysl', 1985), V.N. Kuznecov, *Francuzskoe neogegel'janstvo* [French Neo-Hegelianism] (M.: izd. MGU, 1982), Bessonov *et al.* 1981, M.A. Kissel', *Sud'ba staroj dilemmy; racionalizm i empirizm v buržuaznoj filosofii XX veka* [The Destiny of an Old Dilemma; Rationalism and Empiricism in 20th Century Bourgeois Philosophy] (M.: Mysl', 1974),

Kissel' 1982, or K.N. Ljubutin, *Problema sub"ekta i ob"ekta v nemeckoj klassičeskoj i masrksistsko-leninskoj filosofii* [The Subject - Object Problem in Classical German and Marxist-Leninist Philosophy] (Moskava: Vyssaja škola, 1981).

6. Cf. 'Informacionno-bibliografičeskij ukazatel' literatury o Kante (1960-1974)'.

7. Cf. Ballestrem 1963a, p.115.

8. Based on the *selective* bibliographies in *IFE* '86 – '88.

9. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XIX, p.188; for Hegel, the 'epochal' synthesis of the first major phase in the historical development of philosophy was neo-Platonism (cf. Hegel, *Werke* XIX, p.126, and Hösle 1984, p.667 and p.675f), and Hösle argues that Hegel 'ought to have' treated Plato, not Aristotle, as the conclusion of the first cycle of philosophy (cf. Hösle 1984, p.173).

10. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.727f.

11. Goran 1984, Lukanin 1984, Bočarov 1984.

12. Lukanin quotes Engels to the extent that Aristotle was, next to Hegel, the only philosopher who had seriously discussed dialectics (Lukanin 1984, p.3), and Goran quotes Marx as having qualified Aristotle as a genuine source to get acquainted with the philosophy of Democritus (Goran 1984, p.10).

13. Aleksandrov *et al.* 1941-1943, I, p.371; cf. Aleksandrov 1946², pp.92ff and 100.

14. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, Ju.A. Šičalin, entry 'Neoplatonizm', p.427f; cf. 'Nekrolog...' 1988, Losev 1985, p.206, Scanlan 1984, p.221, Scanlan 1985, p.330, and Takho-Godi in *FN* 1988, N° 10, p.67.

15. Likewise, in a short introduction to the philosophy of antiquity, Losev dedicated 40% of his space to neo-Platonism (Losev 1989).

16. Losev 1963-1994, VII, kn. I, p.3.

17. Takho-Godi 1991, p.20.

18. Cf. Losev 1963-1994, VII, kn. II, 'Prokl', pp.23-336.

19. Džokhadze 1988, p.159; reference is to Lenin, *PSS* XXV, p.37.

20. Cf. Simonov 1982, p.188.

21. Abramov *et al.* 1986, p.36.

22. Simonov 1982, p.188.

23. Simonov 1982, p.188.

24. Simonov 1982, p.188.

25. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, B.M. Kedrov, entry 'Materializm', p.351.

26. Ibid.; cf. also Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.728: "In the 11th-14th centuries, in the dispute between realism ... and nominalism ... the struggle between the idealist and the materialist tendency found its expression."

27. Cf. Dobrochotov 1992, p.172.

28. Cf. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983: Averincev was editor-in-chief of the second edition of 1989 of this *FĖS*; cf. also Shlapentokh 1990, p.198; later, Averincev became known as the author of a new translation of the *Bible* and as a politician (cf. *De Volkskrant*, 07/07/1988, and the interview with Averincev by A.V. Karaulov (Karaulov 1990, pp.118-135).

29. Cf. Abramov *et al.* 1986.

30. Abramov *et al.* 1986, p.36; cf. Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, p.2.

31. Op.cit., p.3.

32. Gorfunkel' 1984, Kalinnikov 1984, Mitrokhin 1985, and Šinkaruk 1985.

33. Mitrochin 1985, p.161.

34. Gorfunkel' 1984, p.175.

35. V.V. Lazarev, 'Ranneburžuaznaja ėpokha i genezis filosofii novogo vremeni [The Early Bourgeois Period and the Genesis of Modern Philosophy]', in: Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, pp.112-158, and Ė.Ju. Solov'ëv, 'Ot teologičeskogo k juridičeskomu mirovozzreniju [From the Theological to the Judicial World-View]', in: op.cit., pp.159-223; both elaborated their contributions in greater detail: V.V. Lazarev, *Stanovlenie filosofskogo soznanija novogo vremeni* [The Coming-About of Modern Philosophical Consciousness] (M.: Nauka, 1987), and Solov'ëv 1984; cf. also Kissel' 1988, p.182: "Formally, the significance of Reformation was always recognized in our literature, and the corresponding quotations from the *klassiki* were adduced, but there it ended, perhaps because the analytical sorting out of the spiritual innovations of protestantism could easily be interpreted as a manifestation of 'religious apologetic'. (...) The historical

importance of Reformation remains totally incomprehensible [*nikak nel'zja ponjat'*], if one looks at protestantism only from the point of view of today's tasks of anti-religious propaganda."

36. Mitrokhin 1985, p.161; cf. also Abramov *et al.* 1986 p.36f, and Kissel' 1988, p.181.

37. "...any skepticism reveals an essential moment in the dialectics of knowledge. But skepticism one-sidedly stresses negation, relativity, errors in our knowledge, concealing or even denying its positive, true, absolute content, since it sees these oppositions as excluding each other, as totally incompatible" (Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, p.462; reference is to V.I. Lenin, *Materializm i empiriokriticizm* [*PSS* XVIII], p.139); cf. also Ivanov 1991, p.31.

38. Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, p.462.

39. Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, p.465.

40. Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, p.474.

41. Cf. Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, p.5, p.28, p.379, and Engels, *MEW* XXI, p.276.

42. Šinkaruk 1985, p.115.

43. Cf. Mitrokhin 1985, p.160, and Kalinnikov 1984, p.178.

44. Abramov *et al.* 1986, p.36.

45. For a more elaborate discussion cf. v.d. Zweerde 1989b, pp.30ff.

46. Cf. Abramov *et al.* 1986, p.40; five of the books on Kant are subsequent volumes of the *Kantovskie sborniki*, an annual series of article-collections published by the university of Kaliningrad (Königsberg).

47. Cf. Gulyga 1985[2], p.123, 128, 129f, and 293 (references to the German translation of 1985).

48. On the reception of Hegelian thought in Russia, see, e.g., Čiževskij, 'Hegel in Rußland', in: idem (ed.), *Hegel bei den Slaven* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1961[2]), Planty-Bonjour 1974.

49. Ždanov 1947, p.269; cf. Ballestrem 1963a, p.117, and Blakeley 1964, p.78; Ballestrem mentions: Bakradze 1958; T.I. Ojzerman, *Filosofija Gegelja* [The Philosophy of Hegel] (M.: 1956); M.F. Ovsjannikov, *Filosofija Gegelja* [The Philosophy of Hegel] (M.: 1959); M.F. Ovsjannikov, *Pervye filosofskie raboty molodogo Gegelja; učënye zapiski moskovskoj oblastnoj pedagogičeskogo instituta, vol.42* [The First Philosophical Works of the Young Hegel] (M.: 1956); V.A. Šamovskij, *V.I. Lenin ob osnovnykh principakh istoriko-filosofskoj koncepcii Gegelja* [V.I. Lenin on the Fundamental Principles of Hegel's Conception of the History of Philosophy] (M.: 1958); V.V. Sokolov, *Filosofija Gegelja* [The Philosophy of Hegel] (M.: 1959); cf. Kapferer 1990, p.185f, on the establishment, by Ojzerman of a new official position with respect to Hegel in the Soviet bloc in general.

50. Cf. Ojzerman 1982b, p.6, and L.N. Suvorov (ed.), *Filosofija Gegelja i sovremennost'* [The Philosophy of Hegel Today] (M.: Nauka, 1973), pp.397-414; in a survey of 1971, Bogdanov mentioned three general books on Hegel, and a large number of monographs and articles (cf. Bogdanov 1971, p.126; reference is to the books by M.F. Ovsjannikov, V.V. Sokolov, and T.I. Ojzerman, all three called *Filosofija Gegelja* [The Philosophy of Hegel]; on Ovsjannikov and Sokolov cf. Kline 1964b).

51. Cf. Zubatý 1975, p.214, and Rakitov 1985, p.167.

52. Cf. Zubatý 1975, p.218.

53. Asmus 1984, p.183; the article in question, 'Učenie Gegelja o pravakh i predelakh formal'nogo myšlenija,' first appeared *VF* 1970, N°8, and *VMGU* 1970, N°4 (this presumably is the text that Blakeley described as the "highlight of the volume" *Filosofija Gegelja i sovremennost'* (Blakeley 1975a, p.161)).

54. Kamenka 1963, p.2, n.5.

55. Bogdanov 1971, p.128; cf. Kamenka 1965, p.101.

56. Cf., e.g., K. Marx, *Das Kapital Bd. I, Nachwort zur 2. Auflage 1873* [*MEW* XXIII], p.27, K. Marx, F. Engels, *Die heilige Familie* [*MEW* II], p.63, K. Marx, *Das Elend der Philosophie* [*MEW* IV], p.125ff, F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* [*MEW* XXI], p.268, p.279, and F. Engels, 'Materialien zum *Anti-Dühring*" [*MEW* XX], p.574.

57. In his *Byloe i dumy*, Part IV, Chapter XXV; cf. Copleston 1986, p.83, who refers to the English translation of *Byloe i dumy*

(A.I. Herzen, *My Past and Thoughts*, 4 vols. (London: 1968), II, p.403), and to the Soviet edition of Herzen's works (A.I. Gercen, *Sobranie sočinenij*, 30 vols. (M.: 1954-66), IX, p.23), and Planty-Bonjour 1974, p.176 and 261.

58. Rakitov 1985, p.167.

59. Motrošilova 1986a, p.184; cf. also v.d.Zweerde 1989a.

60. Ibid.

61. Motrošilova 1984, p.5.

62. Kissel' 1982, p.7, referring to Lenin, *PSS* XXIX, p.202.

63. Kissel' 1982, p.20; cf. ibid., p.8ff.

64. Kissel' 1982, p.8; cf. ibid., p.134, referring to Hegel's famous last publication on the English *Reformbill* of 1931: "The parliamentary reform only strengthens, in his opinion, political instability, because radical elements may turn to the people and stir it up. Therefore he did not regard this measure as expedient, but not because he, as is sometimes thought, became an 'advocate of aristocracy' – his relation to the latter was expressed completely unequivocally."

65. Cf. Kissel' 1982, p.109f, and 122f, p.111f, p.131f.

66. Kissel' 1982, p.133.

67. Kissel' 1982, p.142.

68. Kissel' 1982, p.144f.

69. Kissel' 1982, p.109f.

70. Khandruev 1990, p.75 and p.5; the quotation from Hegel is from *Realphilosophie I* (1803/4), p.239f, quoted from: G. Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, II, p.517 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973).

71. Khandruev 1990, p.5.

72. Khandruev 1990, p.116f.

73. Khandruev 1990, p.115, referring to Marx, *MEW* XXIII, p.27: "Meine dialektische Methode ist der Grundlage nach von der Hegelschen nicht nur verschieden, sondern ihr direktes Gegenteil. Für Hegel ist der Denkprozeß, den er sogar unter den Namen Idee in ein selbständiges Subjekt verwandelt, der Demiurg des Wirklichen, das nur seine äußere Erscheinung bildet. Bei mir ist umgekehrt das Ideelle nichts andres als das im Menschenkopf umgesetzte und übersetzte Materielle."

74. Khandruev 1990, p.117.

75. Cf. Karimskij 1988, p.101 and p.114.

76. Karimskij 1988, p.9, Kissel' 1982, p.144.

77. Cf., e.g, Blakeley 1964, p.77: "Marxist-leninist philosophy ... is the ultimate stage in the history of philosophy, embodying all that was positive in previous philosophical development."

78. Bogomolov *et al.* 1970, p.347; cf. Jeu 1969, p.17: "...aux jeux des penseurs soviétiques, la diversité des options philosophiques occidentales... exprime une dissolution de la pensée."

79. Cf. Rosenthal 1988 and Deppermann 1992.

80. Cf. Deppermann 1992, p.211; cf. M. Gerschenson, W. Iwanov, *Briefwechsel zwischen Zimmerwinkeln* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990).

81. Cf. Rosenthal 1988, p.206f, and B.G Rosenthal (ed.) *Nietzsche in Russia* (Princeton UP, 1986), chapters 11-13.

82. Rosenthal 1988, p.207.

83. Cf. Dynnik *et al.* 1957-1965, III, p.356, and Rosenthal 1988, p.195f, referring to S.F. Oduev, the leading Soviet Nietzsche-specialist.

84. Cf. Rosenthal 1988, p.206.

85. S.F. Oduev, *Tropami Zaratustry* (M.: Mysl' (1971) 1976[2]); German translation: S.F. Oduev, *Auf den Spuren Zarathustras* (Berlin (DDR): 1977); cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1982, p.98, Deppermann 1992, p.211f, and Alekseev *et al.* 1995[2], p.429.

86. Rosenthal 1988, p.197, quoting Oduev 1971, p.414f.

87. Cf. Deppermann 1992, p.211, n.2.

88. Cf. Rosenthal 1988, p.205f, where other Soviet studies, sympathetic to Dostoevskij and hostile to Nietzsche, are discussed too.

89. Rosenthal 1988, p.198; on this comparison of Dostoevskij and Nietzsche, cf. op.cit., pp.198-206.

90. For a discussion, cf. Rosenthal 1988 pp.200-205, v.d. Zweerde 1990a, p.4f, and idem 1990b, pp.66-68.

91. Interview with Gennadij Batygin on 17/12/1994.

92. Scanlan 1985, p.278; cf. Petropavlovskij 1983, as well as Shlapentokh 1990, 189f.

93. 'Ot redakcii', *VF* 1989, N°5, p.114.

94. Mikhajlov 1989, p.113.

95. Ibid., p.122.

96. Very often, the phrasing "*i sociologii*" was added, because, in the Soviet conception, sociology fell within the scope of *istmat.*

97. Mel'vil' 1989, p.4; cf. Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.138.

98. Belkina *et al.* 1967, p.193.

99. Vdovina *et al.* 1988, p.185f.

100. Kamenka 1965, p.100.

101. Cf. Kline 1963, p.739f.

102. Vasil'ev 1984, p.55.

103. Ibid; cf. Vdovina *et al.* 1988, p.186.

104. Ignatow 1988, p.75.

105. Cf. Vasil'ev 1984, p.53 for a concise exposition of the official account of *KBF.*

106. R. v.d. Warreburg, '(review of) Viktor Ilyin and Anatoli Kalinkin, *The Nature of Science* (Moscow: Progress, 1988)', to appear in *SEET,* 1997; orig. V.V. Il'in, A.T. Kalinkin, *Priroda nauki* (M.: Vysšaja škola, 1985).

107. Cf. Scanlan 1985, pp.156ff, Graham 1987[3], p.266 and p.271, referring to the CPSU Party Program of 1961, pp.71-73, as well as p.277.

108. N.S. Avtonomova, *Filosofskie problemy strukturnogo analiza v gumanitarnykh naukakh* (M.: 1977), and M.S. Kozlova, *Filosofija i jazyk* (M.: Nauka, 1972).

109. Schiller 1987, p.432; cf also Schaefer 1988, 161f, and v.d. Zweerde 1989a, p.708f, referring to the texts by Kozlova and Avtonomova in Motrošilova *et al.* 1986a.

110. Cf. 'K vykhodu...' 1964, p.127.

111. Nemeth 1983, p.209.

112. Kešeleva 1975, p.171; cf. Ojzerman 1986[3], p.3 (German translation p.8), referring to Lenin, 'Istoričeskie sud'by učenija Karla Marksa [The Historical Fate of the Doctrine of Karl Marx]', *PSS* XXIII, p.1.

113. Cf. Ojzerman 1986[3], p.145f (in the German translation p.205f), and Nemeth 1983, p.208, Kešeleva 1975, p.169.

114. Cf. Nemeth 1983, p.207.

115. Ojzerman 1986[3], p.19 (German translation p.30); cf. Ojzerman 1986[3], p.10f (German translation p.19), and Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.161.

116. Mamardašvili 1968, p.16 (quoted after the English translation, p.104).

117. Op.cit., p.17f (quoted after the English translation, pp.105ff).

118. Op.cit., p.18f (quoted after the English translation, p.108).

119. Marx, *MEW* XIII, p.9.

120. Cf. Mamardašvili 1968, p.25, n.1 (in the English translation p.118, n.10), quoting Marx' preface to *Das Kapital*: "...es handelt sich hier um die Personen nur, soweit sie die Personifikation ökonomischer Kategorien sind, Träger von bestimmten Klassenverhältnissen und Interessen. Weniger als jeder andere kann mein Standpunkt, der die Entwicklung der ökonomischen Gesellschaftsformation als einen naturgeschichtlichen Prozeß auffaßt, den einzelnen verantwortlich machen für Verhältnisse, deren Geschöpf er sozial bleibt, sosehr er sich auch subjektiv über sie erheben mag" (K. Marx, *Das Kapital* [*MEW* XXIII], p.16).

121. Mamardašvili 1968, p.18 and p.23 (quoted from the English translation, p.107 and p.114).

122. In Soviet sources, the two are usually identified as *otčuždenie* (which literally means to become or to make alien, whereas "objectivization" is russified as "*ob"ektivacija*" by Mamardašvili), an identification for which Ojzerman was criticized, but which he retained in later editions (cf. Nemeth 1983, p.207) – Mamardašvili *does* make this distinction.

123. Mamardăsvili drew these conclusions in all clarity twenty years later (Mamardăsvili 1991a, p.50f).

124. Grier 1984, p.193.

125. Ibid.; reference is, through H. Fleischer, *Marxism and History* (London: Penguin, 1973), p.8, to a text by Vladislav Žanovič Kelle (b.1920) and Matvej Jakovlevič Koval'zon (1913-1992), that marked the beginning of Soviet discussions at this point (cf. Scanlan 1985, pp.211ff).

126. Ibid.

127. S. Čatterdži, D. Datta, *Drevnjaja indijskaja filosofija* (M.: 1954; orig. S. Chatterjee, D.M. Datta, *Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (cf. Kline 1956, p.135)), S. Radkhakrišnan, *Indijskaja filosofija*, 2 vols. (M.: 1956-1957; orig. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (Bombay: (1923-1927, 1948) 1977)).

128. Cf. Šajmukhambetova 1987, pp.22ff, and Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p 138.

129. Šajmukhambetova 1987, p.21.

130. Cf. Šajmukhambetova 1987, p.14.

131. Recent examples are M.A. Mamonova, *Zapad i Vostok: tradicii i novacii racional'nost myšlenija* [West and East: Traditions and Innovations of the Rationality of Thought] (M.: izd. MGU, 1991), and V.G. Alad'in *et al.* (eds.), *Čelovek kak filosofskaja problema: Vostok – Zapad* [Man as a Philosophical Problem: East and West] (M.: izd. Universiteta Družby Narodov, 1991).

132. *Konstitucija* ...1988, art. 70 (p. 24).

133. Cf. on this Goerdt 1989b and Shlapentokh 1990a, p.209, n.2.

134. This, of course, is not a study into the history of Russian philosophy, but to give just one example: it is hard *not* to perceive the connection between the Russian idea of *sobornost* '–a basically religious concept– and Soviet collectivism as practiced in the 1930s through the ideas of Bogdanov (cf., e.g., his 'Kollektivistskij stroj', in: A.A. Bogdanov, *Voprosy socializma; raboty raznykh let* (M.; Politizdat, 1990), pp.295-304).

135. E.g. Volodin 1986a and 1986b (originally published in 1974); cf. also Solov'ëv 1991, p.9.

136. As W. Goerdt points out, one ought to be very careful with the labels 'westernizer' and 'slavophile' (cf. Goerdt 1984, pp.262-265).

137. Volodin 1986a, p.138.

138. A.V. Gulyga is the author of a book on Schelling and of a study on Kant which, translated into French and German, as well as into Bulgarian, Chinese, and other languages, received some attention in the West (cf. 'Bibliography' and the review by V. Zegman, *SST* 31 (1986), pp.170-174).

139. Gulyga 1990, p.185.

140. Cf. Goerdt 1989b.

141. "In der Tat, für marxistische-(–leninistische) Historiker der russischen Geistesgeschichte und Philosophie findet das originäre Suchen des russischen Geistes nach 'Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit' (prawda), d.h. die 'russische Idee' ihre Erfüllung in Theorie und Praxis des Marxismus-Leninismus" (Goerdt 1984, p.510, referring to Galaktionov *et al.* 1970, p.616, and ibid., p.22; cf. Galaktionov *et al.* 1961, p.455).

142. Goerdt 1989b.

143. Cf. Galaktionov *et al.* 1989, p.3.

144. Galaktionov *et al.* 1989, p.3f.

145. In the 1961 and the 1989 edition, the concluding sentence uniformly read: "Leninism, being a / the highest achievement of Russian and world culture, inherited [*(u)nasledoval*] all the best characteristics of Russian social thought and philosophy (Galaktionov *et al.* 1961, p.456, and Galaktionov *et al.* 1989, p.740, which has *unasledoval* instead of *nasledoval* , thus making it a once and forever conclusive event)."

146. Cf. Goerdt 1984, p.697f, who refers to Galaktionov *et al.* 1970, pp.10-12.

147. Galaktionov *et al.* 1970, p.11, quoted from Goerdt 1984, p.698.

148. Cf. Goerdt 1989b; the *tiraž* was small (10,000 copies), and it was sold under the counter, an indication of public interest.

149. Nemeth 1991.

150. Cf. Beljaeva 1980, p.22.

151. Cf. Khidašeli 1982b, p.6: "The history of the peoples of the USSR, as an established fact of Soviet science, is the best refutation of 'eurocentrism'."

152. Cf. Khidašeli 1982b, p.5.

153. Cf. for examples the bibliography in Rybarczyk 1975, pp.178-213.

154. What is known of it in the West is due to researchers like Bernard Jeu (see Bibliography).

155. Khidašeli 1982b, p.11; as early as 1967, Khidašeli opposed the identification of philosophy and *mirovozzrenie* (cf. Belkina *et al.* 1967, p.188).

156. Khidašeli 1982b, p.18; cf, also p.16 and Engels, *MEW* XXI, p.275: "Die Frage nach der Stellung des Denkens zum Sein, die übrigens auch in der Scholastik des

Mittelalters ihre große Rolle gespielt hat, die Frage: Was ist das Ursprüngliche, der Geist oder die Natur? – diese Frage spitzte sich, der Kirche gegenüber, dahin zu: Hat Gott die Welt erschaffen, oder ist die Welt von Ewigkeit da?"

157. Cf. Mirzojan 1982, Rapava 1982, Ismajlov 1982, p.170, and Rzakulizade 1982, p.81.

158. Cf. Baširov 1982, pp.230ff.

159. Cf. Khidašeli 1982a, p.142, referring, in n.12, to Š.I. Nucubidze, *Tajna Psevdo-Dionissija Areopagita* [The Secret of Pseudo-Dionysus the Areopagite] (Tbilisi: 1942), and to E. Honigmann, *Pierre l'Ibérien et les écrits du Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite* (Bruxelles: 1952), p.18-19; the works of Pëtr Iver were published in German: R. Raabe (Hrsg.), *Petrus der Iberer* (Leipzig: 1895).

160. Khidašeli 1982a, p.137, referring to Gegel', *Sočinenija* XI, p.112; in the original this passage reads: "...der ganze Fortgang der Kultur geht darauf, den Glauben an *diese* Welt wiederherzustellen" (Hegel, *Werke* XIX, p.544).

161. Khidašeli 1982a, p.136.

CHAPTER SIX

1. Blakeley 1975a, p.161.

2. Cf. Žučkov 1983, to which Kamenskij added: 'Since that date a good deal of new publications on this theme have appeared' (Kamenskij 1992, p.16).

3. V.V. Sokolov, as reported in Arzakanjan 1969, p.115f; quoted after Rybarczyk 1975, p.23, n.27, translation from the German mine; cf. also interview with Sokolov, March 1986.

4. Malinin 1976, p.93f, referring to Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.13, Ždanov 1947, p.257, and Iovčuk 1960, p.5 (a formulation almost literally identical with the one in Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.6); the first discussion among Soviet philosophers about *theoretical* questions of the history of philosophy is back by Kamenskij to texts by A. Varj'aš and V.F. Asmus in 1924 (cf. Kamenskij 1992, p.19, and p.104, n.40).

5. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.3, where the emergence of an interest in theoretical and methodological questions of the history of philosophy is explicitly related to the work on *IF6*.

6. Ballestrem 1963a, p.107.

7. Berežnoj 1960, p.198.

8. They were used to this end by, among others, Bogdanov (cf. Bogdanov 1969, 1970a, 1970b, and his 'Problemy istorii filosofii', in: Evgrafov *et al.* 1968-1985, *Istorija filosofii v SSSR*, IV, pp.555-570).

9. Iovčuk *et al.* 1970, especially the first part, called 'Leninizm i metodologičeskie problemy istorii filosofii'; cf. Bogomolov 1967, Delokarov *et al.* 1972, p.172, Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.3; on the various topics, cf.M.T. Iovčuk, *G.V. Plekhanov i ego trudy po istorii filosofii* (M.: 1960); Z.P. Protasenko, *Lenin kak istorik filosofii* (L.: 1969), and Bogdanov 1969; Arzakanjan 1962; Myslivčenko 1970, Evgrafov 1970, Ščipanov 1970; Bogdanov 1970b, Novikov 1970; Ojzerman 1970, and Mamardašvili, 1959, 1960, and 1965; Asmus 1961.

10. Ojzerman (1969) 1982[2], (1971) 1984[2], and 1979, Malinin 1976, Bogdanov 1970a, Brutjan 1979, Potëmkin 1973 and 1980.

11. Interviews with Ojzerman and Sokolov, 1984 and 1986; the best source is Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6]; cf. also Iovčuk *et al.* 1986, for a display of his unflagging 'orthodoxy'.

12. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983; the main publications by Ojzerman alone are: Ojzerman 1979, 1982[2], and 1984[2]; on Bogomolov and his significance for *IFN*, cf. especially Antonov *et al.* 1986.

13. The best source in this respect is Kamenskij 1992: despite its being published in post-Soviet times, it continues the position developed by Kamenskij in his earlier publications (cf. Kamenskij 1992, p.21).

14. Reference is to Solov'ëv 1981, Gorskij 1981, Čanyšev 1982, Želnov 1981, Potëmkin 1973, 1980.

15. Cf. Abramov *et al.* 1986, p.32, referring to the *liber amicorum* for Losev: *A.F. Losevu k 90-letiju so dnja roždenija* [To A.F. Losev on Occasion of his 90th Birthday] (Tbilisi: 1983)).

16. Cf. Abramov *et al.* 1986, p.31: "Here [in connection with the attempt to construct a

systematic science of the history of philosophy, EvdZ] we must in the first place mention the book by A.S. Bogomolov and T.I. Ojzerman... and the generalizing article by T.I. Ojzerman 'Istorija filosofii' in the *FĖS* [Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983]"; cf. also Kissel' 1988, p.171: "The global analysis of the historical process of philosophy is represented in a series of works by T.I. Ojzerman, in particular in a book, written together with A.S. Bogomolov, ..."

17. Antonov *et al.* 1986, p.285.

18. Ojzerman 1969, p.4, and idem 1982[2], p.9.

19. Malinin 1976, p.95.

20. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.9.

21. Cf. Čanyšev 1982, p.6, Malinin 1976, p.4, and Ojzerman 1982[2], p.13.

22. Mikhajlov 1970, p.160, who adds: "A scientific theory of philosophy is a *history* of philosophy, elaborated, however, by means of a *logical*, not an historical method [italics mine, EvdZ]."

23. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.118.

24. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.13.

25. Cf. Ojzerman 1982[2], pp.121-133.

26. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.114 and p.134f.

27. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.137.

28. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.139f.

29. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.142.

30. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.143.

31. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.147.

32. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.148.

33. Cf. Abramov *et al.* 1986, p.30ff, referring to: Čanyšev 1982, p.182f, Kamenskij 1984, Želnov 1981, p.90, 110, M.G. Makarov, *Razvitie ponjatij i predmeta filosofii v istorii eë učenij* [The Development of the Concepts and the Subject matter of Philosophy in the History of its Doctrines] (L.: 1982), and Losev 1984.

34. Cf. Abramov *et al.* 1985, p.31.

35. Želnov 1981, p.52; one of the positions discussed by Želnov is the official position: "The *force* of the 'synthetic' position of the 'subject matter of philosophy' and of philosophy itself is that... in it everything is 'taken into account [*učteno*]', and it is in its own way invulnerable to criticism. (...) Its *weakness* is the absence of firm initial positions, so essential for a heuristic orientation [*évristíčeskaja ustremlënnost'*]. A compromise takes the edge off the search for new ways of creative perfection of Marxist-Leninist philosophy" (op.cit., p.59). He further distinguishes between three *serious* alternative positions: an ontological (represented by S.Š. Avaliani, V.V. Orlov, V.V. Il'in; cf. op.cit., p.53f), a logico-epistemological [*logiko-gnoseologičeskaja*] (represented by Ė.V. Il'enkov and B.M. Kedrov; cf. op.cit., p.55f), and a 'sociological' and 'activity-' [*'filosofsko-sociologičeskaja' i 'dejatel'nostnaja' koncepcii*] position (represented by V.P. Tugarinov, M.Ja. Koval'zon, and others; cf. op.cit., p.56f), and then sides with Ojzerman.

36. Želnov 1981, p.71f; cf. Ojzerman 1982[2], pp.186-205, where he concludes that "in the philosophy of Marxism all fundamental philosophical themes are considered to be equally essential and organically connected with each other" (p.205).

37. Cf. Ojzerman 1982[2], pp.186-202.

38. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.202: "...pre-Marxian materialism... in elaborating the theme of the primary, substantial reality, ...attributed only secondary importance to the derivative 'second nature', created by mankind – objective human reality, which determines the spiritual life of society and subjective reality. The bankruptcy of idealism, hypostatizing subjective reality, is shown clearly by the fact that the subjective, the spiritual is cut off from its material ground, is transformed into a self-sufficient reality, i.e. is mystified."

39. Cf. Abramov *et al.* 1986, p.31.

40. Interview with Sokolov, April 1986; Ju.K. Mel'vil' explicitly agreed with this conception, probably retraceable to Asmus.

41. Ojzerman 1982[2], p.136, and Želnov 1981, p.11.

42. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.6.

43. Belkina *et al.* 1967, p.185; during an interview with Ojzerman in 1986, he confirmed the need to see the 'basic question' in historical perspective; cf. also L.F. Il'ičev *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.232: " 'Philosophy, Hegel maintained, is a developing system, and so is the history of philosophy (...)'. (...). *The philosopher did not apply this principle to*

his own system, (...). *This anti-historicist view* was caused by his idealism [italics mine, EvdZ]."

44. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* ... [*MEW* XXI], p.274f.

45. Ojzerman 1984², p.16f (in the English translation p.19f).

46. Ojzerman 1984², p.18 (in the English translation p.21), and p.21 (p.23); cf. Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, p. 276.

47. Ojzerman 1984², p.10 (in the English translation p.12); cf. also Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.232 (in the English translation p.291).

48. Ojzerman 1984², p.11f (in the English translation p.12f).

49. Engels, *MEW* XXI, p.275.

50. Ojzerman 1984², p.9f (in the English translation p.11).

51. Ojzerman 1984², p.9f (in the English translation p.11); in a footnote, Ojzerman agrees with the East German historians of philosophy Buhr and Irrlitz that "the basic problem of classical bourgeois philosophy –from F. Bacon and R. Descartes to G.W.F. Hegel and L. Feuerbach– is the problem of mastering the laws of nature and rationally restructuring social life. (...) This 'basic problem' of classical bourgeois philosophy does not lessen the significance of the basic philosophical question" (p. 10, n.*; reference is to M.Buhr, G. Irrlitz, *Der Anspruch der Vernunft* I (Berlin [DDR]: 1968), p.19).

52. Ojzerman 1984², p.19 (in the English translation p.22); cf. ibid., p.17 (p.20).

53. Ojzerman 1984², p.30 (in the English translation p.33); cf. Ojzerman 1984², p.20 (in the English translation p.22), where he calls it "a problem of *IFN*."

54. Ojzerman 1984², p.30 (in the English translation p.19), quoting A.V. Potëmkin, *V.I. Lenin o specifike filosofskogo znanija* (Rostov-na-Donu: 1970), p.12, and p.30 (in the English translation p.33).

55. Ojzerman 1984², p.33f (in the English translation pp.35ff).

56. Ojzerman 1984², p.40 (in the English translation p.43), and p.34 (in the English translation p.37).

57. Ojzerman 1984², p.31f (in the English translation p.34f).

58. Ojzerman 1984², p.34 (in the English translation p.37).

59. Ojzerman 1984², p.89 (in the English translation p.93).

60. Ojzerman 1984², p.90 (in the English translation p.94); cf. Avtonomova 1988, p.68f.

61. "The history of Marxist philosophy witnessed that in some historical periods questions of the struggle against epistemological dogmatism came to the fore, in others the critique of epistemological skepticism. But in spite of the differences in conditions and tasks, the *klassiki marksizma* waged a constant battle against both these metaphysical conceptions" (Ojzerman 1984², p.127 (in the English translation p.129) cf. ibid., p.20 (p.22f)).

62. Cf. Ojzerman 1984², p.125 (in the English translation p.129)), and Kline 1955, p.95f on the Soviet use of 'metaphysical' as synonymous with 'non-dialectial'; cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 856 / B 884 [*Werke* IV, p. 711f]

63. Čanyšev 1982, p.178f.

64. Čanyšev 1982, p.179.

65. Čanyšev 1982, p.8.

66. Čanyšev 1982, p.49; cf. also p.55.

67. Čanyšev 1982, p.41f.

68. Cf. Čanyšev 1982, p.24f, and Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, pp.147-169; Hegel held that in Indian philosophy, like in Medieval Western philosophy, "in more recent times truly philosophical works have become known (Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.149."

69. Cf. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1930)*, § 574 [*Werke* X], p.393.

70. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.86 (in the English translation p.105f).

71. Hegel, *Werke* XIX, p.548.

72. Cf. Čanyšev 1982, p.177.

73. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.85f (in the English translation p.105f); with respect to Mexico, Bogomolov refers to a book by a certain M. Leon-Portilla, obviously a Mexican, entitled *Filosofija nagua* (M.: 1961).

74. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, pp.86-94 (in the English translation pp.106-116).

75. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.193 (in the English translation p.243), and p.90 (p. 110).

76. "Hegel's idea of a free state-structure and the flourishing of political freedom as a condition for the full existence of philosophy is connected with his understanding of philosophy as an anti-dogmatic, free, and unselfish spiritual activity, striving for an integral understanding of the world, of philosophy as the objective science of truth. 'To look boldly into the face of truth, to believe in the power of the mind — that is the first condition of philosophy», the great German philosopher said...' (Čanyšev 1982, p.25, also p.22f; reference is to Gegel', *Sočinenija* IX, p.5, in the German original: Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.13: "Der Mut der Wahrheit, der Glaube an die Macht des Geistes ist die erste Bedingung der Philosophie"); cf. Čanyšev 1982, p.22, referring to Gegel', *Sočinenija* IX, p.137; in the German original: Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.175.

77. Ojzerman 1984[2], p.4 (in the English translation p.5f).

78. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.271f (in the English translation p.335f); cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 880-884 / A 852-856 [IKant, *Werke* IV, p.709-712], and Hegel, *Werke* X, p.379 [*Enz* ., § 572], XX, p.455, XVIII, p.47, and XX, p.477.

79. Ojzerman 1984[2], p.289 (in the English translation p.298).

80. Cf. Blauberg *et al.* 1982[4], entry 'Nauka', p.200: "Scientific knowledge in the full sense of the term begins only when behind the totality of facts a regularity [*zakonomernost'*] is perceived ...."

81. Ojzerman 1979, p.44.

82. Agudov *et al.* 1984, p.178.

83. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.200 (in the English translation p.253f); when, e.g., Garncev writes that "the historical process of philosophy is one of the fields to which the law of negation of negation is applicable," he means little more than the alternation of continuity and change, rejection of a previous position and subsequent resumption of the initial position (Garncev 1987, p.188).

84. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.201 (in the English translation, not reliable in these paragraphs, p.254f); cf. also p.200 (p. 253).

85. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, pp.216-228 (in the English translation pp.272-286).

86. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, pp.228f (in the English translation p.286f).

87. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, pp.229ff (in the English translation pp.287ff).

88. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.231 and p.236 (in the English translation p.290, and p.296).

89. Bogomolov *et al.* p.237 (in the English translation p.296).

90. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.229 (in the English translation p.286f).

91. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.241 (in the English translation p.301).

92. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.237-240 (in the English translation p.296-300).

93. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.241 (in the English translation p.300f); cf. Hegel, *Werke* XVIII, p.12 and p.22.

94. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.246f (in the English translation p.307).

95. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.244 en 245 (in the English translation p.305 and 306).

96. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.243f (in the English translation p.304).

97. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.245 (in the English translation p.306).

98. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.247 (in the English translation p.308): "... undoubtedly a more revolutionary thinker than the materialists Lamettrie, Holbach, Helvétius."

99. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.245 (in the English translation p.306).

100. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* p.251f (in the English translation p.313f).

101. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.257 (in the English translation p.320), and Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, p.13.

102. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.257f (in the English translation p.320).

103. Cf. Ojzerman 1986[3], p.3 (in the German translation p.8), and Ščipanov *et al.* 1982, p.157.

104. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.260 (in the English translation p.322).

105. Cf. Želnov 1981, p.7.

106. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.226 (in the English translation p.283).

107. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.236f (in the English translation p.296).

108. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, pp.216-223 (in the English translation pp.272-280); Presocratic philosophy, according to Ojzerman and Bogomolov, shows "that the differentiation of doctrines was characterized by an essential objective content, i.e. expressed not simply the philosopher's subjective claims to his special view, but the *development* of a definite conception, the advancing of various aspects to the foreground, and self-criticism within a given school (ibid., cited after the English translation)" French materialism represented, according to Ojzerman and Bogomolov, "a single current, a union of like-minded persons, within which, however, there was an essential (and fruitful) differentiation of views," due to "two qualitatively different trends ... the Cartesian and the sensualist."

109. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.226f (in the English translation p.284f).

110. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.227 (in the English translation p.284).

111. Cf., e.g., Ojzerman 1984², pp.265ff (in the English translation pp.274ff), Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, pp.85ff (in the English translation pp.105ff), and Arzakanjan 1969; in interviews in 1986, V.V. Sokolov gave as his opinion that class-struggle and class-position are clearly present in political and social theories, but only distantly connected to theories in the fields of ontology or epistemology, and Ju.K. Mel'vil, who distinguished a scientific and an ideological aspect, felt that it was very difficult, in concrete historiographical research, to determine what was scientific and what was ideological.

112. Cf. Malinin 1976, p.87, as well as Ojzerman 1984², p.268 (in the English translation p.277), and Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.193f (in the English translation p.243); cf. Hegel, *Werke* X, p.348f [*Enz.* § 548, Anmerkung], and Hegel 1959, p.134f [*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* 1823-1827/28]: "So muß man auch in der Geschichte der Philosophie parteiisch sein, etwas voraussetzen, einen Zweck haben; und dieser ist der reine, freie Gedanke."

113. Malinin 1976, p.88.

114. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.193f (in the English translation p.243f).

115. Malinin 1976, p.90.

116. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.232; cf. Ojzerman 1984², p.10f (in the English translation p.11f), Ojzerman 1982², pp.212ff, and Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, pp.216ff (in the English translation pp.272); in *interviews* , Soviet historians of philosophy were much less cautious; for example, T.I. Ojzerman told me that, in his opinion, the statements by Engels and Lenin on the history of philosophy, on the struggle between materialism and idealism, and on the antithesis of dialectics and metaphysics, had to be regarded as historically bound; Ju.K. Mel'vil' and V.V. Sokolov relativized especially the opposition of dialectics and metaphysics, wrongly made into a central issue by, according to Mel'vil', Bogomolov; Mel'vil' did think that every philosophical position can be qualified as either materialist or idealist, but he equally felt that this wasn't saying very much; M.A. Kissel', finally, one of Ojzerman's collaborators, characterized both the opposition of the two main trends and that of the two methods as *abstractions* from the actual processes; Ojzerman, Sokolov, and Mel'vil' all rejected a classification according to the basic question, and Sokolov spoke, in this connection, of "simplification" and "schematism", regarding materialism and idealism as "tendencies" (interviews April 1984, May 1986).

117. Cf. Malinin 1976, p.4.

118. Ojzerman 1984², p.35 (in the English translation p.38); cf. also Želnov 1981, p.11, who refers to the same passage on p.4 in the first edition of *Glavnye napravlenija...*

119. Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, p.322.

120. Cf.Pozner 1937, p.26, andOjzerman 1984², pp.252ff (in the English translation pp.262ff).

121. Ojzerman 1984², p.36 (in the English translation p.38); reference is to K. Marx, 'Letter to M. Kowalewski (1879)' [*MEW* XXXIV], p.506.

122. Cf., e.g., Goran 1984, p.10, Džokhadze 1977, pp.4ff, Arzakanjan 1962, Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, pp.147ff (in the English translation pp.184ff), and Kamenskij 1992, p.7.

123. Malinin 1976, p.9, p.4, and pp.16-61, esp. pp.61ff.

124. Cf. Malinin 1976, pp.63-90.

125. Džokhadze 1977, p.7.

126. Džokhadze 1977, p.9.

127. Malinin, for instance, is far less positive with respect to Hegel (cf. Malinin 1976, p.37, 39).

128. Agudov *et al.* 1984, p.178, referring to Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.184 (in the English translation p.230), and p.230 (in the English translation p.289).

129. Arzakanjan 1962, p.95f.

130. Arzakanjan 1962, p.100, see also p.96; cf. also Malinin 1976, p.19, and Kamenskij 1992, p.102, n.14; according to these sources, al-Shahrastani's works are available in a German edition: Abu'l'-Fath Mohammad asch Schahrastany, *Religionsparteien und Philosophenschulen*, vols. I-II (Berlin / Halle: 1850-1851), translated by Th. Haarbrücker. Kamenskij informs us that the most interesting part of this book was reprinted in H. Ley, *Geschichte der Aufklärung und des Atheismus* (Berlin [DDR]: 1963), that a Russian translation of the first part –on religions and sects– appeared 1984 (edited by S.M. Prozorov), and that a study of his work as an historian of philosophy appeared in Tadžikstan, apparently in Russian: K. Bekov, *Mukhamed Šakhrastani* (Dušanbe: 1987).

131. Arzakanjan 1962, p.100f; cf. Malinin 1976, p.19.

132. Arzakanjan 1962, p.101, and Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.161 (quoted from the English translation, p.203).

133. Kamenskij 1992, p.10f.

134. Cf. Malinin 1976, p.89.

135. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.233.

136. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.233.

137. Cf. Ojzerman 1982b, p.114, and Ojzerman 1979, pp.45ff; I translate 'pljuralizm' here as 'plurality', not as 'pluralism': pluralism means the *position* that there is or ought to be plurality, whereas plurality means an actually existing multitude.

138. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.207f (in the English translation p.262).

139. Cf. Bogomolov *et al.* 1970, p.347.

140. Cf. Ojzerman 1982b, p.121.

141. See Ojzerman 1982[2], pp.114-137.

142. Aleksandrov 1946[2], p.8.

143. Iovčuk *et al.* 1960, p.11, and Iovčuk *et al.* 1971[3], p.11 (with minor differences).

144. Pavlov 1966, p.135f.

145. Džokhadze 1977, p.284f.

146. Džokhadze 1977, p.287.

147. Ojzerman 1982, p.60f, and Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.232.

148. Cf. Hegel in the 'Preface' to his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*: "Daran mitzuarbeiten, dass die Philosophie der Form der Wissenschaft näher komme, - dem Ziele, ihren Namen der *Liebe* zum *Wissen* ablegen zu können und wirkliches *Wissen* zu sein ist es, was ich mir vorgesetzt." (Hegel, *Werke* III, p.14f); cf. Ojzerman 1982, p.60.

149. Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, p.5.

150. Cf. Matveev 1987, p.5; references to Gramsci's discussion of Renaissance philosophy can be found in Ojzerman's introduction to Solov'ëv 1984 (Ojzerman 1984a, p.5.), and *Filosofija epokhi...* as examples of the recognition in Soviet literature of Gramsci's notion (Matveev 1987, p.6f; for a much earlier discussion of Gramsci's ideas about the history of philosophy see Z.N. Meleščenko, 'Voprosy istorii filosofii v trudakh Antonio Gramši', *FN* 1961, N°1, pp.157-164); references are to the 3rd volume of a three-volume edition of *Selected Works* by Gramsci in Russian (M.: 1959), p.35-38. 85, to A. Gramsci, *Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce* (Roma: 1979), p.167, 188-189, 287, 298-299, and to A. Gramsci, *Quaderni del carcere* (Torino: 1975), pp.423-424.

151. Ojzerman 1988, p.54.

152. E.g.: '*Vvedenie ...*', *VF* 1989, N°2,

p.219, and N°9, p.55; Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.68; Ojzerman 1989, p.632; Kočergin 1990, p.7.

153. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.255.

154. Ojzerman *et al.* 1983, p.5.

155. K. Marx, 'Der leitende Artikel in Nr.179 der *Kölnischen Zeitung*', *Rheinische Zeitung* 1842, N° 191 [10/07/1842] [*MEW* I], p.97 (pp. 86-104): "jede wahre Philosophie (ist) die geistige Quintessenz ihrer Zeit,..."; Ojzerman did add the adjective 'genuine' [*istinnaja, wahre*] in *Formirovanie filosofii marksizma* (cf. Ojzerman 1986[3], p.99 (in the German translation p.140)).

156. Cf. Ojzerman 1986[3], chapter II.2, pp.99-112, passim (in the German translation pp.138-158); it was in 1843, Lenin wrote, that Marx was "only just becoming Marx [*tol'ko čto stanovitsja Marksom*]" (Lenin, *PSS* XVIII, p.357; cf. Ojzerman 1986 [3], p.9 (in the German translation p.17)).

157. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.68.

158. Ojzerman 1988, p.49.

159. Ojzerman 1988, p.53f.

160. Cf. Losev 1991, p.111f.

161. Soviet authors preferred to call Hegel's absolute idealism 'dialectical idealism', *omitting* its *absolute* character.

162. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.232.

163. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.232.

164. Cf. Ojzerman 1980, p.112f.

165. A.V. Panin in 'Obsuždenie...' 1990, p.171.

166. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, T.I. Ojzerman, entry 'Istorija filosofii', p.233.

167. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Istina', p.226, Ė.G. Judin, entry 'Razvitie', p.561, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Filosofija', p.726, and A.P. Ogurcov, entry 'Substancija', p.660, entry 'Znanie', p.192, and V.N. Sadovskij, entry 'Sistema', p.610.

168. Il'ičëv *et al.* 1983, A.G. Spirkin, entry 'Dialektičeskij materializm', p.159.

169. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.260 (in the English translation p.322).

170. Scanlan 1985, p.21.

171. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.235 (in the English translation p.294).

172. Bogomolov *et al.* 1983, p.228 (in the English translation p.286).

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Ljubutin *et al.* 1988, p.169.

2. Cf. Mšvenieradze *et al.* 1988, p.4;f course, the Party Congress did not discuss at length the state of affairs in *IFN*, but a few passages in the report by Gorbačëv and a few lines in the new Party program concern the social sciences (of which philosophy was one): cf. Garbačëv in *Materialy...* 1986, pp.84ff, and 'Programma KPSS, Novaja redakcija, II, 5, 'Idejno-vospitatel'naja rabota, obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura', ibid., pp.163-168.

3. Cf. Džokhadze 1988, Kissel' 1988, and Vdovina *et al.* 1988.

4. Fedoseev 1988, p.43.

5. Mšvenierazde 1988, p.12.

6. Mšvenierazde 1988, p.13.

7. '*Vvedenie* ...' 1988, p.18.

8. '*Vvedenie* ...' 1988, p.24; in the final version, this formulation was replaced by "Joining philosophy, it is possible to learn a lot more, which lies beyond an *introduction* . But that requires reciprocal activity: philosophy rewards with its wisdom [*vonagraždaet svoej mudrost'ju*] only those, who search zealously and work painstakingly" (Frolov *et al.* 1989 II, p.628).

9. Cf. Konstantinov *et al.* 1982[6], pp.27-30, and pp.398-423.

10. Cf. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, pp.74-220, and pp.280-367.

11. '*Vvedenie*...' 1988, p.15f; the final version differed substantially from the draft version on the last point: "The philosophy of Marxism, regardless of all its novelty and originality, which the authors will try to disclose and demonstrate (and not just proclaim!), does not do away with previous philosophy (Frolov *at al.* 1989, I, p.15)."

12. Ljubutin *et al.* 1988, p.169.

13. Cf. 'Anketa..."; the same complaint was heard in interviews with A.F. Zotov, M.A.. Garncev, and A.F. Grjaznov in 1989; in 1989, Grjaznov published an article, 'Vešč' v sebe ili kak Lenin oprovergaet Kanta [The

Thing-in-itself or How Lenin Rejects Kant]', in the *samizdat*-journal *Kritičeskaja mysl': nezavisimoe filosofskoe mladomarksistskoe obščestvo* 1989, N°1.

14. Cf. the selective, but extensive bibliographies in *IFE* '86-'96, as well as v.d. Zweerde 1989b, p.20, and idem 1990a, n.6 and n.39.

15. For a detailed discussion of the first *IFE* see v.d. Zweerde 1989b.

16. The IF even started a series of studies called *Nemeckaja klassičeskaja filosofija; novye issledovanija* [German Classical Philosophy; New Investigations], with the following titles: N.V. Motrošilova, *Social'no-istoričeskie korni nemeckoj klassičeskoj filosofii* [The Socio-Historical Roots of German Classical Philosophy] (M.: Nauka, 1990) [= Motrošilova 1990]; T.B. Dlugač, *I. Kant: ot rannikh proizvedenij k 'Kritike čistogo razuma'* [I. Kant: From the Early Works to the *Critique of Pure Reason*] (M.: Nauka, 1990); V.V. Lazarev, *Filosofija rannego i pozdnego Šellinga* [The Philosophy of the Early and the Late Schelling] (M.: Nauka, 1990); P.P. Gajdenko, *Paradoksy svobody v učenii Fikhte* [The Paradoxes of Freedom in Fichte's Doctrine] (M.: Nauka, 1990); V.V. Lazarev, I.A. Rau, *Gegel' i filosofskie diskussii ego vremeni* [Hegel and the Philosophical Discussions of his Day] (M.: Nauka, 1991); I.S. Narskij, T.I. Ojzerman, *Teorija poznanija Kanta* [Kant's Theory of Knowledge] (M.: Nauka, 1991); M.F.Bykova, *Absoljutnaja ideja i absoljutnyj dukh v filosofii Gegelja* [Absolute Idea and Absolute Spirit in the Philosophy of Hegel] (M.: Nauka, 1992).

17. = Garncev 1987.

18. Dobrokhotov 1986; for a more elaborate discussion, see v.d. Zweerde 1990b, pp.63-66.

19. Cf. Dobrokhotov 1986, p.4, p.229.

20. Dobrokhotov 1986, pp.235ff.

21. Cf. Dobrokhotov 1986, p.4.

22. Cf. Karimskij 1988, p.35; reference is to Bykova 1985.

23. Cf. Bykova 1990, p.20f.

24. Bykova 1990, p.30.

25. Kričevskij, A.V., 'Ponjatie absoljutnogo dukha v filosofii Gegelja', in: *IFE '91* (M.: Nauka, 1991), pp.37-52; Kričevskij, A.V., *Avtoreferat ... Koncepcija absoljutnogo dukha v filosofii Gegelja* [Abstract ... the Concept of Absolute Spirit in the Philosophy of Hegel] (M.: IF AN SSSR, 1992); Kričevskij, A.V., 'Učenie Gegelja ob absoljutnom dukhe kak spekuljativnaja teologija [Hegel's Doctrine of Absolute Spirit as Speculative Theology]', *VF* 1993, N°5, pp.161-172.

26. Bykova *et al.* 1993, p.5.

27. Cf. Buchholz 1988a, p.5, idem 1991, p.274, and v.d. Zweerde 1992c, p.229f.

28. An example of the attempt to 'assimilate' Kant into a dialectical-materialist framework is Ojzerman 1983c.

29. Cf. Bykova 1990, p.28f.

30. Cf. Karimskij 1988, p.112, and ibid., p.8.

31. Mel'vil' 1989, p.3f.

32. Op.cit., p.5.

33. '*Vvedenie...*' 1988, p.16.

34. In *IFE '86* we find, instead of '*kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii*', '*sovremennaja buržuaznaja filosofija* [contemporary bourgeois philosophy]', without '*kritika*', that is, and the same occurred in *FN* (cf. 'Ukazatel' statej, opublikovannykh v žurnale v 1988 godu', *FN* 1988, N°12, p.123); in *IFE* '87 and '88 this became '*zapadnaja filosofija XX veka* [20th-century Western philosophy]', and in the new *učebnik*, *Vvedenie v filosofiju* it became '*nemarksistskaja filosofija XX veka* [non-Marxist philosophy of the 20th century' (cf. Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, pp.280-367); in *VF* we come across equally neutral headings : '*filosofija za rubežom* [foreign philosophy]' (cf. 'Ukazatel' statej, pomeščennykh v žurnale *Voprosy filosofii* za 1988 god', *VF* 1988, N°12, p.168) and '*mirovoe filosofskoe i kul'turnoe nasledie: istorija i sovremennost'* [philosophical and cultural heritage of the world: past and present]' (cf. op.cit., p.167); there was still room for a heading '*idejnaja bor'ba* [ideological battle]', but here we find articles about fascism, neo-nazism, etc.; cf. also Rozov 1988, p.28: "Not so long ago, the sector of critique of contemporary bourgeois sociology in one of our institutes was renamed sector of the study of contemporary bourgeois sociology," and Dlugač 1991, p.208.

35. Motrošilova in 'Fenomenologija ...', 1988, p.43f; according to Molčanov, himself a specialist in phenomenology, Motrošilova's *Principy i protivorečija fenomenologičeskoj filosofii* [The Principles and Contradictions of Phenomenological Philosophy] (M.: 1968) was the only decent Soviet study of phenomenology (interview 13/09/1991).

36. Cf. op.cit., p.46ff.

37. Motrošilova, in 'Fenomenologija ...', p.48f.

38. Julina 1987; for a more elaborate discussion; see v.d. Zweerde 1990a, pp.34ff.

39. It is another question whether the Marxist-Leninist concept of "social consciousness" is much more satisfying.

40. Julina 1983; it is illuminating to compare this study by Julina (edition: 4100 copies) with a more popular (30,000 copies) publication of the same year: Narskij 1983.

41. Julina 1987, p.139; cf. Bessonov *et al.* 1981, and Narskij 1983.

42. Grjaznov 1989b, and L. Vitgenštejn, 'Lekcija ob ėtike [Lecture on Ethics]', in: *IFE* '89, pp.238-245.

43. 'Wittgenstein in particular realized his aim in the notes that he wrote, impressed by J. Frazer's *Golden Bough*' (Grjaznov1989a, p.37).

44. Sokuler 1989; L. Vitgenštejn, 'Zametki o *Zolotoj vetvi* Dž. Frėzera', in: *IFE '89*, pp.251-263; cf. also Sokuler 1990, and Dž. Frėzer, *Zolotaja vetv': Issledovanie magii i religii* (M.: (1980) 1983[2]).

45. Cf. Malakhov *et al.* 1991, entries M.A. Kissel', 'Kollingwud', p.129f, and 'Kroče', p.143f, V.S. Malakhov, entries 'Gadamer', p.67ff, 'Germenevtika', p.74ff, A.F. Grjaznov, entries 'Vitgenštejn', p.61f, 'Kripke', p.136f, 'Ostin', p.224, 'Rajl', p.258, 'Stroson', p.286f, N.S. Julina, entries 'Analitičeskaja filosofija', p.16-21, and 'Popper', p.236f, and N.S. Avtonomova, entries 'Al'tjusser', p.15f, 'Lakan', p.148f, and 'Fuko', p.361ff.

46. Cf. 'Anketa ...', *VF* 1987, N°8, p.73f, answers to the 6th question: "Which problems and fields of philosophy are, in your opinion, presently the most elaborated, and advanced, and which are least elaborated, most backward?" cf. Fleischer 1988, p.19.

47. Cf. Schiller 1987, Schaefer 1988 (and v.d. Zweerde 1989a).

48. Cf. Tulaev in 'Otvety...', *VF* 1988, N°1, p.122.

49. Cf. Goerdt 1984, p.475, n.17, and Takho-Godi 1991, p.18; reference is to A.F. Losev, *Vladimir Solov'ëv* (M.: 1983), and to A.F. Losev, *Vladimir Solov'ëv i ego vremja* [Vl. Solov'ëv and his Time] (M.: Progress, 1990).

50. Gulyga 1990, p.378f; cf. Gulyga 1986; in 1990, the journal *Knižnoe obozrenie* published a hit parade of books which had appeared in the USSR in 1989: Pikul' was present in this list with no less than 6 titles, taking places 6, 7, 17, 38, 56, and 98 (cf. *NK* 1990, N°45-46, p.29); on Pikul's popularity, cf. Laqueur 1990, pp.128-131, who refers to *Ogonëk* 1988, N°12.

51. *Lolita* was ranked 45 in the hit parade just referred to, but was popular, too: in 1990, for example, it was published again in 300,000 copies (V. Nabokov, *Lolita* (M.: ANION, 1990)).

52. Gajdenko *et al.*1991; cf. on the historical background of this theme: Rosenthal 1991.

53. Motrošilova 1991, p.5.

54. Solov'ëv 1991, p.2, colophon.

55. Cf. '*Vvedenie...*', *VF* 1988, p.25, and Frolov *et al.* 1989 I, p.8 and pp.221-279.

56. Cf. '*Vvedenie* ...', *VF* 1988, N°9, p.17, and Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.18; this reader, announced as *Chrestomatija po filosofii* in 1988, and for 1990 as *Kniga dlja čtenija po filosofii* in 1989 (*NK* 1989, N°7, nr.40) , finally appeared in two volumes (Gurevič *et al.* 1991).

57. '*Vvedenie* ...' *FN* 1989, p.78f, as well as, with minor changes, Frolov *et al.* 1989, I, p.43f.

58. For example, Ljubutin & Pivovarov in 'Zaočnaja ... 1989, p.69.

59. *IFE '86*, p.295.

60. Cf. Ljubutin *et al.* 1988, p.169)."

61. 'Problemy...' 1988; cf. Goerdt 1989b, and Kamenskij 1992, p.16.

62. Ojzerman 1988a, p.32.

63. Ojzerman 1988a, p.32.

64. Plato was right, according to Ojzerman, in criticizing early materialists for not recognizing other than corporeal reality (cf. Ojzerman 1988a, pp.33ff); Rousseau was an idealist whose philosophy was the most revolutionary of his time (cf. Ojzerman 1988a, p.37f).

65. Ojzerman 1988a, p.39.

66. Ojzerman 1988a, p.39.

67. Kissel' 1988, p.172.

68. Kissel' 1988, p.174.

69. Kissel' 1988, p.174.

70. Cf. Kissel' 1988, p.174, and Kamenskij 1992, p.22.

71. Kissel' 1988, p.174.

72. With his title, Dobrokhotov alluded to Kant's *Preisschrift* 'Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte ... seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten gemacht hat?' (Kant, *Werke*, VI, pp.585-676).

73. Dobrokhotov 1988, p.141.

74. Op.cit., p.140.

75. Op.cit., p.140f.

76. Mamardašvili in 'Fenomenologija ...', p.57, referring to Kant, *Werke*, III, p.136 [B 131], and R. Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode*, part IV (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1953), p.147f.

77. Mamardašvili in 'Fenomenologija ...', p.55f, p.58; cf. Mamardašvili 1989c.

78. Op.cit., p.56.

79. Mamardašvili 1989a, p.290; cf. his earlier criticism of the conception elaborated by Karl Jaspers in *Die großen Philosopher* (Mamardašvili 1965, p.93).

80. Mamardašvili 1989a, p.285, p.291.

81. Op.cit., p.287f; cf. p.289f.

82. Mamardašvili 1960.

83. Cf. Hegel, *Werke* XX, p.455.

84. Mamardašvili 1989a, p.291.

85. Bibler 1989, p.49.

86. Bibler 1989. p.41; cf. p.40, and p.48; cf. also Dlugač 1991, p.210.

87. Bibler 1989, p.40.

88. Bibler 1989, p.39.

89. Bibler 1989, p.42ff.

90. Cf. Bibler 1989, p.49.

91. Kamenskij 1992, p.4; as the author told me, the book did not cause any reactions in philosophical literature (letter by Kamenskij of 20/07/1992); it is the first part of a trilogy, the second of which is Kamenskij 1995 (interviews with Kamenskij on 17/12/1993 and 15/04/1996).

92. Kamenskij 1992, p.7.

93. Kamenskij 1992, pp.13ff.

94. Cf. Kamenskij 1992, p.33f.

95. Čanyšev 1991, p.88; cf. Donskikh *et al.* 1991, whose targets are, as Čanyšev rightly notes, the historical parts of subsequent *učebniki* and the like, i.e. texts *not* representative of professional *IFN*.

96. Ibid., parodying Lenin, *PSS* XXXXV, p.25.

97. Čanyšev 1991, p.88.

98. Cf., e.g., Rozov 1988, p 27: "... philosophy... cannot be successfully developed in a purely accidental manner, if nobody is, in a direct manner, suffering its pains, is experiencing its problems as his own personal ones, is feeling the beats of its 'pulse' exactly as those of his own."

99. Motrošilova 1986, p.92.

100. Motrošilova 1990, p.4.

101. Motrošilova 1991, p.15; cf. ibid., p.9.

102. Cf. Motrošilova 1990, pp.6-10.

103. Motrošilova 1990, p.6.

104. Op.cit., p.9.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AN SSSR	Akademija Nauk SSSR	Academy of Sciences of the USSR
AON	Akademija Obščestvennykh Nauk	Academy of Social Sciences
BSĖ	*Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Ėnciklopedia*	Great Soviet Encyclopedia
CPSU	[KPSS]	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
dfn	doktor filosofskikh nauk	doctor of philosophy
FĖ	*Filosofskaja Ėnciklopedia v 5-i tomakh*	Encyclopedia of Philosophy (5 vols.)
FĖS	*Filosofskij Ėnciklopedičeskij Slovar'*	Encyclopedic Dictionary of Philosophy
FI	*Filosofskie Issledovanija*	Philosophical Investigations
FN	*Filosofskie Nauki*	Philosophical Sciences
FN	*Filosofskoe Nasledie*	Philosophical Heritage
FO SSSR	Filosofskoe Obščestvo SSSR	Philosophical Association of the USSR
FSM	*Filosofskaja i Sociologičeskaja Mysl'*	Philosophical and Sociological Thought
IF	Institut Filosofii	Institute of Philosophy (of the AN SSSR)
IKP	Institut Krasnoj Professury	Institute of Red Professors
IML	Institut Marksizma-Leninizma	Institute of Marxism-Leninism
IF3	*Istorija Filosofii v 3-kh tomakh*	History of Philosophy (3 vols.)
IF2	*Istorija Filosofii v 2-kh tomakh*	History of Philosophy (2 vols.)
IF6	*Istorija Filosofii v 6-i tomakh*	History of Philosophy (6 vols.)
IF10	*Istorija Filosofii v 10-i tomakh*	History of Philosophy (10 vols.)
IFE	*Istoriko-Filosofskij Ežegodnik*	History of Philosophy Yearbook
IFN	Istoriko-filosofskaja nauka	Science of the History of Philosophy
IFNS	Istorija Filosofii Narodov SSSR	Hist. of Phil. of the Peoples of the USSR
IMLF	Istorija Marksistsko-Leninskoj Filosofii	History of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy
IZF	Istorija zarubežnoj filosofii	History of Foreign Philosophy
KBF	Kritika buržuaznoj filosofii	Critique of Bourgeois Philosophy
KSBF	Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj fil.	Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Phil.
KSBS	Kritika sovr. buržuaznoj sociologii	Critique of Cont. Bourgeois Sociology
kfn	*kandidat filosofskikh nauk*	post-graduate (Ph.D.) in philosophy
KFS	*Kratkij Filosofskij Slovar'*	Short Philosophical Dictionary
KIF	*Kratkij Očerk Istorii Filosofii*	A Short Outline of the History of Phil.
Komm.	*Kommunist*	Communist
KSF	*Kratkij Slovar' po Filosofii*	Short Dictionary of Philosophy
L.	Leningrad	
LGU	Leningradskij Gosudarstv. Universitet	Leningrad State University
M.	Moskva	Moscow
MGPI	Mosk. Gos. Pedagogičeskij Institut	Moscow State Pedagogic Institute
MGU	Mosk. Gosudarstvennyj Universitet	Moscow State University
MIFLI	Moskovskij Istoriko-Filosofskij i Literaturnyj Institut	Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature
NK	*Novye Knigi v SSSR*	New Books in the USSR
ON	*Obščestvennye Nauki*	Social Sciences
OVMD	*Obščestvo Voinstvujuščikh Materialistov-Dialektikov*	Association of Militant Materialists-Dialecticians
RAN	Rossijskaja Akademija Nauk	Russian Academy of Sciences
RFO	Rossijskoe Filosofskoe Obščestvo	Russian Philosophical Association
SEET		*Studies in East European Thought*
SPb.	Sankt Peterburg	St. Petersburg
SST		*Studies in Soviet Thought*

VAN	*Vestnik Akademii Nauk*	Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences
VF	*Voprosy Filosofii*	Problems of Philosophy
VKP(b)	Vsesojuznaja Komm. Partija (bol'ševiki)	All-union Communist Party (bolsheviks)
VLGU	*Vestnik LGU*	Bulletin of Leningrad State University
VMGU	*Vestnik MGU*	Bulletin of Moscow State University
VPŠ	Vysšaja Partijnaja Škola	Party High School
VUZ(y)	Vysšee Učebnoe Zavedenie (sg./pl.)	Institution of Higher Learning
ZTK	Zaočnaja Teoretičeskaja Konferencija	Theoretical Conference by Correspondence

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For abbreviations see 'List of Abbreviations'. As to alphabetical order, I have placed the Cyrillic letters Č, Ė, Š, Šč, and Ž at the end of C, E, S (Šč after Š), and Z respectively.

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